Licences to occupy land by Rendell, C.A.
Durham E-Theses
Licences to occupy land
Rendell, C.A.
How to cite:
Rendell, C.A. (1988) Licences to occupy land, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham
E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6403/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
LICENCES TO OCCUPY LAND 
A. Rendell 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 
Section I 
The Development of the possessory l i c e n c e : 
(a) Development up to ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 6 
(b) Development a f t e r ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 33 
Section I I 
Li c e n c e s and l e g i s l a t i o n c o n t r o l l i n g the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between l a n d l o r d and tenant 62 
Section I I I 
L i c e n c e s and the L i m i t a t i o n Acts 93 
Section IV 
Li c e n c e s and informal f a m i l y and q u a s i - f a m i l y 
arrangements f o r occupation of property: 
(a) The need f o r l i c e n c e concepts 116 
(b) The p o s i t i o n of the l i c e n s e e a t 
common law 134 
(c) The i n t e r v e n t i o n of equity 138 
(d) Contractual l i c e n c e s : 
( i ) I r r e v o c a b i l i t y and the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r 141 
t i H ^  T r r o T r n n a h i 1 i f w a n r l -t-V-i-i rr\ n a r H o c T f i O 
\ / • ' — 1 " J. -"• " ' — • 
(e) P r o p r i e t a r y estoppel: 
( i ) The development of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel 
and a p p l i c a t i o n 185 
( i i ) Can a l i c e n c e be i r r e v o c a b l e both i n the 
law of c o n t r a c t and by reason of 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel? 205 
( i i i ) P r o p r i e t a r y estoppel and t h i r d p a r t i e s 214 
( f ) S e t t l e d Land Act 1925 240 
Conclusion 25 2 
Bibliography 256 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
U '.'i'7 ;oqj.j 
J=i£lQ£ei_t9_S£cuB.v_land 
S e c t i o n • 1 o f t h e t h e s i s . d i s c u s s e s w h e t h e r t h e c o n c e p t o f 
a l i c e n s e e i n n;;cUt';i v'c p o = s p c c i o n o:; 1 T,1 c d p r i o r t o t h e 
d e c i s i o n in';:ERRIWGTON V ERRINBTON a n d t h e n p r p c e e e d s t o 
c n n s i d c r t h e t e s t s w h i c h w;-re '.-.ubsequenrly d e v e l o p e d t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n \a l i c e n s e e , i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n 
a n d a t e n a n t . T h e a i m . o f t h e e x e r c i s e i s t o show how t h e 
p o s s e s s o r y l i c e n c e , was i n - f a c t d e v e l o p e d t o . . d e a l w i t h 
c e r t a i n p e r c e i v e d need'.: i ; ; , a f , u n b r l i n t h e r ^ m r i n i n g t h r e e 
s e c t i o n s . 
Section 11 s e t s o u t t o show how t h e j u d i c i a r y : became 
i n c r e a s i n g l y w i l l i n g t o u s e t h e c o n c e p t o f a p o s s e s s o r y 
l i c e n c e to a v o i d t h e f u l l r i g o u r s o f t h e Rent-'.- A c t s a s 
s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s - w e r e i n c r e a s e d a n d how i n r e c e n t y e a r s ' 
w i t h a move t o w a r d s d e r e g u l a t i o n , t h e y h a v e b e e n l e s s 
p r e p a r e d t o sp>e t h e l i c e n c e f u l f d l l t h i s' r o l e"» \ 
S e c t i o n 111 e x a m i n e s t h e u s e w h i c h h a s been! made o f 
l i c e n c e c o n c e p t s t o a v o i d t h e L i m i t a t i o n . A c t s - a n d t h e r e b y , 
p r e v e n t a f i n d i n g o f " a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n . '• G i v e n .. t h e 
a m e n d m e n t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e L i m i t a t i o n . A c t ,: 1 9 8 0 t h e 
s e c t i o n a l s o c o n s i d e r s t h e p r e s e n t s c o p e a s w e l l a s t h e ! 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u s e o f t h e l i c e n c e - i n t h i s •-way „ , ; . 
F i n a l l y S e c t i o n I V s h o w s how, i n . c o n t r a s t t o t h e u s e o f 
t h e l i c e n c e , t o d e t r a c t . f r o m o c c u p a t i o n a l . s e c u r i t y 
e x a m i n e d i n . ''.Sectins 11 a n d H i ,-,:: l i c e n c e c o n c e p t s : h a v e 
b e e n u s e d a n d d e v e l o p e d . t o . p r o t e c t , r , e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y 
w h e r e i n f o r m a l f a m i 1y a n d : q u a s i — f a m i 1y a r r a n g e m e n t s - f o r 
t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y h a v e ^ b e e n made...' The S e c t i o n 
c o n s i d e r s the v a r i o u s a p p r o a c h e s w h i c h h a v e b e e n t a k e n b y 
t h e c o u r t s i n o r d e r t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s 
w e r e n e c e s s a r y a n d d e s i r a b l e , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r c o n s i d e r s 
w h e t h e r t h e . protection-of v u l n e r a b l e . g r o u p s i n s o c i e t y n c c c c s i t * t e s r e c " " " . ! +• i nn. n f --the l i c e n c e a s an i n t e r e s t i n 
• J. a n d .• 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of a l i c e n c e and aims of the t h e s i s . 
I n the l e g a l context, a l i c e n c e i s simply a permission, 
d i s p e n s a t i o n or a u t h o r i s a t i o n to do something which would 
not otherwise be l a w f u l . As such, l i c e n c e s may a r i s e i n 
very d i v e r s e circumstances and e i t h e r give r i g h t s to the 
l i c e n s e e or merely a l i b e r t y or p r i v i l e g e to do a 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t . For i n s t a n c e , a l i c e n c e may a r i s e out of 
c e n t r a l or l o c a l government r e g u l a t i o n s which i n some way 
r e s t r i c t the a c t i v i t i e s of c i t i z e n s , e.g. the need f o r a 
l i c e n c e to d r i v e a c a r on the p u b l i c highway, to s e l l 
a l c o h o l i c l i q u o r , to use a t e l e v i s i o n s e t e t c . L i c e n c e s 
may a l s o be granted to i n t e r f e r e with the body of another 
i n some way (e.g. to cut a person's h a i r , remove h i s 
t e e t h , have sexual i n t e r c o u r s e ) , thereby negating the 
t o r t of t r e s p a s s to the person and, i n some c a s e s , a 
crime. F i n a l l y , a l i c e n c e may be given by an owner of 
any type of property to permit i n t e r f e r a h c e with such 
property i n some p r e s c r i b e d way, e.g. destroy a pet, to 
use a telephone, to enter land (preventing the t o r t of 
t r e s p a s s to p r o p e r t y ) , t o reproduce c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l 
(preventing a breach of c o p y r i g h t ) . 
The concern of t h i s t h e s i s , however, i s with only one 
type of s i t u a t i o n i n which l i c e n c e s o c c u r , namely, 
l i c e n c e s to occupy the land of another, whether e x c l u s i v e 
or non-exclusive. Of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r area of law, a New 
J e r s e y judge once commented: 
"The a d j u d i c a t i o n s upon t h i s s u b j e c t are numerous 
and discordant. Taken i n t h e i r aggregate, they 
cannot be r e c o n c i l e d and i f an attempt should be 
made to arrange them i n t o harmonious groups, I 
e c c e n t r i c i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n of l e g a l 
p r i n c i p l e s , as w e l l as i n t h e i r l o g i c a l 
d e d u c t i o n s , as to be i m p o s s i b l e of 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . " ( 1 ) 
Arguably, the same comment i s appropriate to j u d i c i a l 
treatment of the l i c e n c e i n the E n g l i s h courts s i n c e the 
beginning of the present century. Hanbury and Maudsley 
express the view: 
"The h i s t o r y of l i c e n c e s i s a remarkable s t o r y of 
f a l s e t r a i l s and confused thoughts."(2) 
The aim of t h i s t h e s i s then i s to study the development 
of occupational l i c e n c e s i n an attempt to d i s p e l some of 
the confusion and to suggest the way forward. The study 
i s d i v i d e d i n t o four main s e c t i o n s . The f i r s t S e c t i o n , 
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S e c t i o n I t r a c e s the development of the possessory-
l i c e n c e , that i s to say the notion t h a t a l i c e n s e e may 
be i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of land. Sections I I and I I I 
look at the use the j u d i c i a r y have made of the concept of 
the p o s s e s s o r y l i c e n c e i n a v o i d i n g the s t a t u t e s 
c o l l e c t i v e l y known as the Rent Acts ( S e c t i o n I I ) and the 
L i m i t a t i o n A c t s ( S e c t i o n I I I ) . The f i n a l s e c t i o n , 
Section IV considers the r o l e occupational l i c e n c e s have 
been made to play i n fami l y or q u a s i - f a m i l y arrangements 
concerning r e a l property. I n each s e c t i o n , i n ad d i t i o n 
to t r a c i n g and e x p l a i n i n g why judges have made use of 
l i c e n c e concepts i n the p a r t i c u l a r sphere i n i s s u e , an 
attempt has been made to e v a l u a t e the n e c e s s i t y and 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of such developments from the p r a c t i c a l as 
w e l l as the t h e o r e t i c a l point of view, and to look at 
present as w e l l as fu t u r e trends. 
I n the context of r e a l property, the term ' l i c e n c e ' was 
o r i g i n a l l y used i n c o n t r a s t to the s i t u a t i o n where a 
person was on the land of another by v i r t u e of some 
' i n t e r e s t i n land'. A f i n d i n g of a l i c e n c e i n r e l a t i o n 
to land was th e r e f o r e e s s e n t i a l l y a negative thing; i t 
was a judgement on what the i n t e r e s t i s not, compared 
with what i t might be. Hence, i n THOMAS v SORRELL, 
Vaughan C.J. explained: 
"A d i s p e n s a t i o n or l i c e n c e p r o perly passeth no 
i n t e r e s t , nor a l t e r s or t r a n s f e r s p r o p e r t y i n 
anything, but only makes an a c t i o n l a w f u l , which 
without i t had been unlawful."(3) 
I t i s a r g u a b l e , t h a t s i n c e Vaughan C . J . made h i s 
statement, the law has developed i n such a way th a t a 
l i c e n s e e may i n some circumstances have an i n t e r e s t i n 
land. This i s s u e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d f u l l y i n Section IV. 
w . w.1. , — >- ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ — — • . ~ 
the House of Lords i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, Lord Templeman 
r e i t e r a t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of l i c e n c e s 
emphasising t h e i r negative nature. He s a i d : 
"The l i c e n c e does not create an i n t e r e s t i n land 
to which i t r e l a t e s but only makes an a c t l a w f u l 
which would otherwise be unlawful."(4) 
From the outset, i t i s important to note t h a t care i s 
r e q u i r e d i n d e f i n i n g l i c e n c e s , e s p e c i a l l y where a 
comparison i s e x p r e s s l y or i m p l i c i t l y being drawn with an 
i n t e r e s t i n land. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , some of the p r i n c i p a l 
textbook w r i t e r s are not very h e l p f u l , as they define 
l i c e n c e s r e l a t i n g to land i n terms which are p o s i t i v e . 
For example, Cheshire and Burn say: 
". . .. a l i c e n c e i s e s s e n t i a l l y a permission to 
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e n t e r upon the l a n d of a n o t h e r f o r an agreed 
purpose. The p e r m i s s i o n j u s t i f i e s what would 
otherwise have been a t r e s p a s s . " ( 5 ) 
S i m i l a r l y , i n the opening to the chapter on l i c e n c e s , 
Megarry and Wade say: 
"Fundamentally a l i c e n c e i s a mere p e r m i s s i o n 
which makes i t l a w f u l f o r the l i c e n s e e to do what 
would otherwise be a t r e s p a s s . " ( 6 ) 
Such d e f i n i t i o n s obscure the e s s e n t i a l l y negative nature 
of a l i c e n c e , and a r e the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r the 
confusion which has a r i s e n i n r e l a t i o n to occupational 
l i c e n c e s . I n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD v SMITH, where the 
court was c a l l e d upon to decide-^hether the occupier was 
a tenant or a l i c e n s e e , Roxb/orough L . J . was h e s i t a n t i n 
h i s use of the term ' l i c e n c e ' . A f t e r r e f u s i n g to f i n d 
the occupation was as tenant, he commented: 
"How the i n t e r e s t of the occupant ought, i n those 
circumstances to be described, I do not know. I t 
would be a p i t y to c a l l i t a ' l i c e n c e ' because the 
word has .... al r e a d y been appropriated to q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s . I t must, I think, be l e f t 
to j u r i s t s to invent a new name...."(7) 
Moreover, i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD v HASTINGS CAR 
MART, a case concerned with whether a wife who had been 
d e s e r t e d by h e r husband had an i n t e r e s t i n the 
matrimonial home binding on a t h i r d party, Lord Hodson 
described the term ' l i c e n c e ' i n r e l a t i o n to land as an 
"overworked word",(8) w h i l s t Lord Wilberforce asked, of 
the term ' l i c e n s e e ' : 
[ p l a i n t i f f ] has been so described, the i n c i d e n t s 
of the d e s c r i p t i o n have to be a s c e r t a i n e d . " ( 9 ) 
Much of the confusion disappears when one brings to the 
fo r e f r o n t the f a c t t h a t l i c e n c e r e l a t i n g to land i s not a 
p o s i t i v e but a negative thing. The concept of a l i c e n c e 
has i n e v i t a b l y been a p p l i e d to d e s c r i b e an i n c r e a s i n g 
v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s because i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a term 
which e x p l a i n s what an i n t e r e s t i s not, and as such i t 
cannot be ex p e c t e d t o embody a u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of any recognised p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t a permission to occupy land may c r e a t e a 
r i g h t to be t h e r e , as i n the c a s e of a l e a s e , or 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y m e r e l y a p r i v i l e g e , f o r example, an 
i n v i t a t i o n to a f r i e n d ' s house f o r dinner. I t i s a l s o 
c l e a r t h a t a permission to be on land may give r i g h t s to 
occupy, to the e x c l u s i o n of a l l others, or merely be a 
permission to occupy along with another or others. I n 
the f i r s t s e c t i o n of the t h e s i s , the development of the 
s o - c a l l e d possessory l i c e n c e w i l l be examined c r i t i c a l l y . 
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SECTION I 
The Development of the possessory l i c e n c e . 
(a) Development UP to ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
I t has been argued t h a t , ( l ) before the case of ERRINGTON 
v ERRINGTON, i f a person was " i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of 
land", then a tenancy arose. There was no a u t h o r i t y f o r ^ 
the f i n d i n g t h a t a p e r s o n c o u l d be i n e x c l u s i v e 
possession without an e s t a t e at common law or i n equity. 
At maximum the person would have a fee simple absolute; 
at minimum,a tenancy a t w i l l . However, i n the_ course- of 
h i s judgement i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON L o r d J u s t i c e 1 ) X 
Denning s t a t e d : 
" I n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between [ l e a s e s and l i c e n c e s ] , 
a c r u c i a l t e s t has sometimes been supposed to be 
whether the occupier has e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n or 
not. I f he was l e t i n t o e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , he 
was s a i d to be a tenant a l b e i t only a tenant at 
w i l l . . . . whereas i f he had not e x c l u s i v e 
possession he was only a l i c e n s e e . . . . T h i s t e s t 
had, however, o f t e n g i v e n r i s e to m i s g i v i n g s 
because i t does not correspond to r e a l i t i e s . . . . 
The t e s t of e x c l u s i v e possession i s by no means 
d e c i s i v e . " ( 2 ) 
The f a c t s of ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON were b r i e f l y as 
f o l l o w s A f a t h e r bought a house f o1" h i s s o n anr) 
d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w w i t h the a i d of a mortgage from a 
b u i l d i n g s o c i e t y . The house was conveyed i n t o the 
f a t h e r ' s name and he was re s p o n s i b l e to the b u i l d i n g 
s o c i e t y f o r payment of the mortgage ins t a l m e n t s , although 
these were i n f a c t paid by the couple r i g h t up u n t i l the 
time of the dispute. The f a t h e r did, however, hand over 
the b u i l d i n g s o c i e t y book to h i s daughter-in-law and 
there was evidence he had t o l d her that i f and when she 
and h i s son paid a l l the instalments the house would be 
t h e i r s . The dispute arose when the f a t h e r died, l e a v i n g 
the house by w i l l to h i s wife . By t h i s time, the son had 
l e f t the daughter-in-law f o r another woman, and the widow 
brought an a c t i o n f o r poss e s s i o n a g a i n s t her daughter-in-
law. I n the county court the daughter-in-law r a i s e d two 
defences: e i t h e r (1) the arrangements amounted to a 
tenancy at w i l l , i n which case the widow's c l a i m was 
barred by the operation of the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939, or 
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(2) the couple were tenants with Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . 
The county court judge favoured the f i r s t c o n s t r u c t i o n 
and the widow appealed, The Court of Appeal (Denning, 
Hodson and Somervell L . J J . ) dismissed the appeal although 
they disagreed with the county court judge^' > f i n d i n g that 
the couple were tenants at w i l l . I n s t e a d , d e s p i t e the 
f i n d i n g that the couple were i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , the 
Court of Appeal decided they were c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e e s 
w i t h an i r r e v o c a b l e r i g h t t o remain so long as the 
instalments were paid. 
I t i s proposed i n t h i s s e c t i o n to examine whether 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON i n f a c t marks a major development 
i n the law by i n t r o d u c i n g the notion of a l i c e n s e e i n 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and i f so t o e v a l u a t e i t s 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . Before embarking upon t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i t 
may be h e l p f u l t o s t o p and to c o n s i d e r b r i e f l y the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and development of l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t s , 
as i t i s w i t h l e a s e s t h a t l i c e n c e s t o occupy have 
predominently been con t r a s t e d . 
I n order f o r a t r a n s a c t i o n to come w i t h i n the d e f i n i t i o n 
of a l e a s e or 'term of y e a r s ' ( 3 ) the grantor ( l a n d l o r d ) 
must confer on the grantee ( l e s s e e or tenant) e x c l u s i v e 
possession to c e r t a i n land (4) f o r a period that i s 
capable of d e f i n i t i o n ; t h a t i s to say there must be an 
a s c e r t a i n a b l e commencement date (5) and a c e r t a i n maximum 
duration by the date the l e a s e i s to take e f f e c t . (6) A 
term of years i n v a r i a b l y , but not n e c e s s a r i l y , ( 7 ) a r i s e s 
out of a b i l a t e r a l c o n t r a c t and i s g r a n t e d i n 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a money rent/. I t i s worth noting that 
o r i g i n a l l y the l e a s e or tenancy was merely regarded as a 
rig h t i n personam e x i s t i n g only i n the law of contract.A 
tenant f o r years was possessed but not s e i s e d of the 
land, and consequently i f dispossed could only bring a 
personal a c t i o n f o r recovery of damages. I t was not u n t i l 
^ ' ww^ .-w.^ .^ .J w^ .^ . w >"""*t'-' ' - — 3 " • — 
came to be recognised as p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s . However, 
because of t h e i r development, l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t s have 
always been thought of along commercial l i n e s i n c o n t r a s t 
to freehold i n t e r e s t s which, apart from the fee simple 
absolute i n p o s s e s s i o n , have been used mainly to provide 
f o r ^ f a m i l y members and have been p r i m a r i l y concerned with 
•public" d u t i e s owed by the holders of the land under the 
feudal s t r u c t u r e of which l e a s e s had no p a r t . At a time 
when investments i n the modern understanding of the term 
were v i r t u a l l y unheard of, the l e a s e was a way i n which a 
person could i n c r e a s e h i s income. Moreover, one of the 
common methods by which s e c u r i t y f o r a loan could be 
r a i s e d and the laws of usury avoided, was f o r the debtor 
to l e a s e land at a nominal rent to the c r e d i t o r , the 
c r e d i t o r obtaining i n t e r e s t from the p r o f i t s of the 
l a n d . ( 8 ) C o n s e q u e n t l y a l t h o u g h the l e a s e i s today 
r e c o g n i s e d as a l e g a l e s t a t e i n l a n d , i t i s s t i l l 
regarded as being of a somewhat hybrid nature; p a r t l y 
r e a l t y and p a r t l y pers o n a l t y . T h i s i s summed up i n the 
term ' c h a t t e l r e a l ' , a n a l t e r n a t i v e name f o r l e a s e h o l d . 
I t should be noted from the outset, that i n any s i t u a t i o n 
where a person occupies the land of another, a l e g a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p must r e s u l t i n the sense t h a t the law f i n d s 
i t n e c e s s a r y t o d e f i n e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
person and the land. The law of p r o ^ r t y i s of course 
concerned with the r e l a t i o n s h i p be'tween persons and 
things , and not merely things i n i s o l a t i o n from the 
persons who have r i g h t s over them. However, there i s 
obviously a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between an ' i n t e n t i o n to 
c re-ate ^ a. l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 1 ; t h a t i s to say to enter a 
contract 1 with r e s p e c t to occupation of some land, and the 
l e g a l — r e l a t i o n s h i p which n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t s from any 
•''dealings' between persons concerning land. Because the 
concept of a term of years developed out of the law of 
contract i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , as w i l l be seen, (9) 
the concept of i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
has been of s i g n i f i c a n c e i n d i s t i g u i s h i n g between l e a s e s 
and l i c e n c e s . However i t w i l l be shown that f a i l u r e to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the r o l e of ' l e g a l r e l a t i o n s ' , on 
the one hand, and an ' i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l e g a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p 1 , on the o t h e r , has l e d the law i n t o 
confusion. 
We are now i n a p o s i t i o n to proceed with the e v a l u a t i o n 
ot the impact of ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON (10) i n 
in.t.r.aducing the concept of a l i c e n c e e i n e x c l u s i v e 
"possion?) The f i r s t step towards a c h i e v i n g t h i s aim must 
be to examine the somewhat s l i p p e r y concept of e x c l u s i v e 
possession which i t has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d i s e s s e n t i a l 
to the f i n d i n g of a tenancy or l e a s e p o s s e s s i o n * . I n COBB 
v LANE, Somervell L . J . commented on the term ' e x c l u s i v e 
" I t h i n k i t may be t h a t t h e r e i s a c e r t a i n 
ambiguity i n the expression."(11) 
Although he did not do so e x p l i c i t y , he seems to go on to 
draw the d i s t i n c t i o n between an occupier with the r i g h t 
to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and an o c c u p i e r w i t h s o l e 
possession i n f a c t , but without n e c e s s a r i l y having the 
r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . He then expressed the 
view that although occupation with the r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n must g i v e r i s e to a t e n a n c y , i t i s not 
n e c e s s a r i l y t r ue that a person i n s o l e possession i n 
f a c t , without a r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , should be 
regarded as a tenant. However, unfortunately, as C u l l i t y 
points out,(12) a t the time when the possessory l i c e n c e 
was arguably being developed, some judges e i t h e r did not 
recognise or d i d not draw out the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
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two p o s s i b l e meanings of 'e x c l u s i v e p o ssession'. For 
example, i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH, Evershed M.R. 
does not seem to be aware of the d i s t i n c t i o n , f o r at one ^ 
point i n h i s judgement, he spoke of "a r i g h t to occupy / N 
premises with many of the a t t r i b u t e s of a tenancy but 
without the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n of an i n t e r e s t i n 
land"(13) whereas l a t e r he used the wider phrase "go i n t o 
e x c l u s i v e possession",(14) which encompasses the concept 
of s o l e possession i n f a c t . On the other hand, i t would 
appear from the co n s i s t e n c y and h i s c a r e f u l choice of 
words with reference to e x c l u s i v e possession i n e a r l y 
cases such as MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH and ERRINGTON 
v ERRINGTON, th a t Lord Denning (as he now i s ) was aware 
of the d i s t i n c t i o n and used the p h r a s e ' e x c l u s i v e 
possession' to r e f e r to so l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t . For 
example, i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH, he s a i d of the 
defendant: 
"She was I think a l i c e n s e e i n the sense that she 
did not acquire any i n t e r e s t i n land.... the word 
" l i c e n s e e " . . . . i s used to denote permissive 
occupation f a l l i n g short of a tenancy",(15) 
and i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON he commented: 
"a c r u c i a l t e s t has sometimes been supposed to be 
whether the occupier i s i n e x c l u s i v e occupation or 
not",(16) 
a phrase which would again suggest the wider meaning of 
sole possession i n f a c t . However, i t i s no t i c e a b l e t h a t 
i n the l a t e r case of LUGANDA v SERVICE HOTELS LTD.(17) 
f o r the purposes of S.70 (2) of the Rent Act 1968, Lord 
Denning draws the d i s t i n c t i o n between " e x c l u s i v e 
occupation" and " e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n " . He appeared then 
to use the term e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n t n mpan R D I P 
possession i n f a c t , r e s e r v i n g " e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n " f o r 
the s i t u a t i o n where a person has the r i g h t to exclude 
everyone i n c l u d i n g the lan d l o r d , f o r he s a i d : 
" I am qu i t e s a t i s f i e d t h a t " e x c l u s i v e occupation" 
i n S.70 (2) does not mean " e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n " 
i n the t e c h n i c a l sense i t i s sometimes used i n 
lan d l o r d and tenant c a s e s . A lodger who takes a 
f u r n i s h e d room i n a house i s i n e x c l u s i v e 
occupation of i t notwithstanding t h a t the landlady 
has a r i g h t to access a t a l l times A person 
has e x c l u s i v e occupation of a room when he i s 
e n t i t l e d to occupy i t by himself and no-one e l s e 
i s e n t i t l e d to occupy i t . " ( 1 8 ) 
Text book w r i t e r s do not always a s s i s t i n a l l a y i n g any 
confusion as to the d i f f e r e n t meanings to be attached to 
9 
e x c l u s i v e possession. P e t t i t , ( 1 9 ) w h i l s t i n the main 
body of the t e x t drawing out the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e possession and the s o l e possession i n 
f a c t , then proceeds to footnote the fo l l o w i n g cases as 
a u t h o r i t y f o r the f i n d i n g of a l i c e n s e e with a r i g h t to 
e x c l u s i v e possession: FOSTER v ROBINSON ( 2 0 ) ; MARCROFT 
WAGONS V SMITH (21) ; ERRINGTON V ERRINGTON (22); COBB V 
LANE ( 2 3 ) ; FACCHINI v BRYSON ( 2 4 ) ; ADDISCOMBE GARDEN 
ESTATES LTD. V CRABBE ( 2 5 ) ; BRACEY V READ (26) FINBOW V 
AIR MINISTRY (27) ; BARNES V BARRATT (28) ; SHELL-MEX AND 
B.P. LTD. v MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD. (29) ; and HESLOP v 
BURNS ( 3 0 ) . I t i s submitted that out of t h i s l i s t 
c l e a r l y a t l e a s t COBB v LANE and HESLOP v BURNS do not 
i n v o l v e l i c e n s e e s w i t h a r i g h t t o e x c l u s i v e 
possession.(31) 
I t i s o b v i o u s l y i m p o r t a n t t o a s c e r t a i n the meaning 
attached to the phrase " e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n " i n cases 
before ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON to decide whether the case 
marks a development i n the law. I n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
i t was suggested that the defendant-and her husband were 
" i n permissive occupation". -Lord JusticeNDenning s a i d : 
c ... 
"They had a mere p e r s o n a l p r i v i l e g e t o 
remain."(32) 
Consequently i f i t i s true to say t h a t the term e x c l u s i v e 
possession was used i n e a r l i e r cases to r e f e r only to the 
s i t u a t i o n when a person was i n poss e s s i o n with the r i g h t 
to e x c l u s i v e possession, then ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON would 
not i n t h i s r e s p e c t seem to mark a development i n the 
law. I f , on the other hand, e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was 
used i n the sense of s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t , and p r i o r 
to ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON t h i s was c o n s i s t e n t l y found to 
give r i s e to at very minimum a tenancy at w i l l , the case 
does give r i s e to a development In th<= law. However, the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the development would s t i l l have to be 
examined. 
I t i s proposed f i r s t to consider whether cases before 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON are unanimous i n the f i n d i n g t h a t 
s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t g i v e s r i s e to a t e n a n c j . 
P r o f e s s o r Hargreaves i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'Licenced 
P o s s e s s o r s ' ( 3 3 ) argues t h a t , s u b j e c t to some s p e c i a l 
exceptions (e.g Crown Land, e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and c h a r i t a b l e 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ) t h i s was i n f a c t the case. I n c o n t r a s t , 
P r o f e s s o r C u l l i t y (34) purports to c i t e a u t h o r i t i e s which 
show that the law p r i o r to ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON was by 
no means unanimous on t h i s i s s u e . He argues that the t e s t 
of a tenancy adopted i n some cases was the narrower t e s t 
of the 'ri g h t to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n ' . The s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON i s thus reduced, as i t i s not 
suggested t h a t the young couple i n t h a t case had a r i g h t 
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to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , 
ex a m i n a t i o n w i l l t h e r e f o r e 
reviewed by both C u l l i t y and 
but a mere 
be made of 
Hargreaves. 
p r i v e l e g e . An 
the d e c i s i o n s 
In h i s a r t i c l e Hargreaves uses the expression " a c t u a l 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n " which would seem to be synonymous 
with the phrase " s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t " . He r e l i e s 
upon four main groups of a u t h o r i t i e s f o r h i s p r o p o s i t i o n 
t h a t , b e f o r e ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
i n t e n t i o n , a c t u a l e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n gave r i s e to a 
tenancy: (a) Passages from L i t t l e t o n ( 3 5 ) ; (b) cases 
where poss e s s i o n taken under an agreement f o r s a l e or f o r 
- a l e a s e were held to give r i s e to a tenancy at w i l l ( 3 6 ) ; 
(c) cases concerned with the p o s i t i o n of a mortgagor i n 
^ , i., v possession( 37) ; and (d) s i x t e e n cases concerned with S.7 
. of L i m i t a t i o n Act 1833.(38) However, as C u l l i t y ( 3 9 ) has 
J already pointed out, the L i m i t a t i o n Act cases are not 
a^*iC very strong a u t h o r i t i e s f o r Hargreaves 1 p r o p o s i t i o n , as 
the outcome of most of these cases would not have been 
d i f f e r e n t i f a possessory l i c e n c e had been found and i n 
any case, i n some of them, a tenancy was found to e x i s t 
at the t r i a l stage and t h i s f i n d i n g was not challenged on 
appeal. Furthermore, one of the L i m i t a t i o n Act c a s e s , 
DAY v DAY (40) a r g u a b l y d e t r a c t s from H a r g r e a v e s 1 
p r o p o s i t i o n i n that the P r i v y C o u n c i l seemed to imply an 
i n t e n t i o n was r e q u i r e d to c r e a t e a tenancy. Nevertheless 
DAY v DAY i s h a r d l y a s i g n i f i c a n t a u t h o r i t y t o the 
contrary, f o r the statement was c l e a r l y o b i t e r dic^taJ as A 
both p a r t i e s had conceded a t e n a n c y a t w i l l " ' and 
furthermore, although c i t e d with approval by D a r l i n g J . 
i n the l a t e r case of JARMAN v HALE ( 4 1 ) , Channell J . 
disapproved of the viewpoint expressed. R e f e r r i n g to the 
passage i n DAY v DAY which seemed to suggest i n t e n t i o n 
was required f o r a tenancy to a r i s e , he s a i d : 
" I am not c l e a r m y s e l f t h i s p a ssage i s w e l l 
founded. I t seems to me that i f you f i n d a 
d e f i n i t e acknowledgement from the tenant t h a t he 
i s holding by the permission of the other, t h a t i s 
a l l you need."(42) 
Apart from the d e c i s i o n i n DAY v DAY, the cases c i t e d by 
Hargreaves l a r g e l y support h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . What then of 
the f u r t h e r cases c i t e d by C u l l i t y which arguably d e t r a c t 
from the apparently harmonious view that s o l e p o s s e s s i o n 
i n f a c t was c o n c l u s i v e of a tenancy? C u l l i t y d i v i d e s 
these i n t o three groups: (a) cases he c a l l s the Poor Law 
cases ( 4 3 ) ; (b) r a t i n g c a s e s ( 4 4 ) : and ( c ) d e c i s i o n s where 
the c r u c i a l t e s t of a tenancy was not s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n 
f a c t , but the question of whether there was an i n t e n t i o n 
to grant a r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . ( 4 5 ) 
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The Poor Law d e c i s i o n s of R v INHABITANTS OF HORDON ON 
THE HILL (46) and R v INHABITANTS OF STANDON(47) are 
a u t h o r i t i e s f o r f i n d i n g a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e 
possession without a l e g a l or e q u i t a b l e e s t a t e . Both 
cases were concerned with whether a settlement had been 
created and were s i t u a t i o n s where the occupiers were 
c l e a r l y i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . I n R v INHABITANTS OF 
STANDON (where a f a t h e r loaned h i s son some money to buy 
some land on the understanding t h a t he would b u i l d a 
cottage f o r h i s mother and f a t h e r to l i v e i n so long as 
e i t h e r l i v e d ) , Lord Ellenborough s a i d : 
"no e s t a t e e i t h e r l e g a l or e q u i t a b l e was conveyed 
to the f a t h e r or mother .... they had nothing more 
than a c o n d i t i o n a l and q u a l i f i e d l i c e n c e by p a r o l 
to occupy."(48) 
Perhaps the cases may be explained on the b a s i s t h at the 
word ' l i c e n c e ' was being used i n the very broad sense to 
co n t r a s t with the i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d to give r i s e to a 
settlement. In any case the s i g n i f i c a n c e of these two 
d e c i s i o n s i s weakened by the f a c t t h a t the Poor Law cases 
of R v INHABITANTS OF EATINGTON (49) and R v INHABITANTS 
OF CHEDISTON (50) seem to exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . 
To turn now to so c a l l e d the r a t i n g cases c i t e d by 
C u l l i t y . I t i s submitted t h a t these are of no r e a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e as again and again the point i s made i n 
these cases, that l i a b i l i t y f o r r a t i n g does not depend on 
t i t l e but o n l y on o c c u p a t i o n ; whether a person i n 
possession as a l i c e n s e e or a tenant at w i l l i s concerned 
with t i t l e . For example, i n KITTOW v LISKEARD UNION, 
Mellor J . s a i d : 
"... .the p a r i s h has nothing to do with t,it,i<=>: 
they look to the f a c t of b e n e f i c i a l occupation and 
when they f i n d i t , although i t may be there i s no 
a c t u a l t i t l e which might s t a n d a g a i n s t the 
s u p e r i o r t i t l e , t h a t i s i m m a t e r i a l t o the 
p a r i s h . " ( 5 1 ) 
Again i n HOLYWELL UNION AND HALKYN PARISH v HALKYN 
DRAINAGE CO., Lord H e r s h a l l L . J . s a i d : 
"The question of whether a person i s an occupier 
or not w i t h i n the r a t i n g law i s a question of f a c t 
and does not depend upon l e g a l t i t l e . " ( 5 2 ) 
and i n WESTMINSTER CORPORATION v SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO., 
Lord R u s s e l l , admittedly without c r i t i c i s i n g the notion 
of a l i c e n s e e i n de f a c t o occupation, s a i d : 
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" r a t e a b i l i t y does not depend on t i t l e to occupy, 
but on the f a c t of occupation."(53) 
and f i n a l l y Lord Wright M.R. observes of the agreements 
in question: 
"Some are i n the form of a demise or tenancy 
agreement, others purport to grant a l i c e n c e . But 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e i r e f f e c t i s the same so f a r as 
i t concerns what i s m a t e r i a l to t h i s appeal."(54) 
L a s t l y , to consider the d e c i s i o n s which C u l l i t y maintains 
are a u t h o r i t i e s f o r the view t h a t a tenancy only arose 
when there was an i n t e n t i o n to grant e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n 
and t h e r e f o r e d i d not a u t o m a t i c a l l y a r i s e where there 
was s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t . The f i r s t of t h e s e i s 
PROVINCIAL BILL POSTING CO. v MOOR IRON CO. ( 5 5 ) . T h i s 
concerned an a c t i o n f o r wrongful d i s t r e s s i n r e l a t i o n to 
the grant of an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of p u t t i n g up a d v e r t i s i n g 
h o ardings and p o s t i n g b i l l s on s p e c i f i e d l a n d . The 
a c t i o n succeeded on the ground t h a t t h e a d v e r t i s i n g 
boards were merely c h a t t e l s and c o n s e q u e n t l y not 
d i s t r a i n a b l e . This was the only ground Kennedy L . J . was 
prepared to consider, but Buckley L . J . d i d a l s o consider 
whether the a c t i o n should f a i l on the ground that there 
was no l e a s e i n re s p e c t of which an a c t i o n f o r d i s t r e s s 
l a y . I n t h i s connection, he asked: 
"What d i d the p l a i n t i f f s t a k e under t he 
agreements? They took the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of 
using the land and a f f i x i n g the hoardings and 
using them f o r b i l l - p o s t i n g purposes. I think 
t h i s amounted to nothing more than a l i c e n c e to go 
upon the land and do s p e c i f i e d things on i t . The 
p l a i n t i f f s had no e s t a t e i n any d e f i n i t e p a r c e l of 
la n d nor had the y the ^xcl'. 1.?! 1" 3 r i a h t t n t h e 
occupation of any d e f i n i t e p o r t i o n of i t . " ( 5 6 ) 
Admittedly, t h i s passage seems to r e f e r to i n t e n t i o n but 
s u r e l y what B u c k l e y L . J . i s a s k i n g i s whether t he 
p l a i n t i f f had s o l e possession i n f a c t or merely r i g h t s to 
enter the land short of ta k i n g p o s s e s s i o n of i t , f o r i t 
should be remembered the concept of possession i n i t s e l f 
r e q u i r e s i n t e n t i o n . Thus the d e c i s i o n i s not an 
a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , assuming s o l e 
possession i n f a c t e x i s t s , a tenancy only a r i s e s where 
t h e r e i s an i n t e n t i o n t o g i v e a r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e 
possession. The same would seem to be true of a l l the 
other cases c i t e d by C u l l i t y except MOSS v BROWN(57) 
which w i l l be considered l a t e r . To consider f i r s t WELLS 
v KINGSTON-ON-HULL(58) . Here the owners of a dock 
contracted to allow the p l a i n t i f f use of the dock f o r 
r e p a i r i n g a ship. The defendants subsequently refused to 
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l e t the ship i n . As the agreement was merely o r a l , the 
question arose as to whether the c o n t r a c t was f o r an 
i n t e r e s t i n land, i n which case i t would be not be 
enforceable as the Sta t u t e of Frauds r e q u i r e d w r i t i n g . 
At one point i n h i s judgement Lord Coleridge C.J. s a i d : 
"Whether a c o n t r a c t i n w r i t i n g was e s s e n t i a l 
depends on whether, by the terms of the agreement 
between the p a r t i e s , i t was intended to confer an 
i n t e r e s t i n land."(59) 
However, he continued: 
"Now prima f a c i e i t appears to me that such an 
agreement as t h i s i s not what would be g e n e r a l l y 
understood as d e a l i n g with an i n t e r e s t i n land. 
I n o r d i n a r y language i t i s a 
con t r a c t f o r useof a graving dock. I t i s p o s s i b l e 
that i n a c o n t r a c t f o r use of such a dock such an 
e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to the poss e s s i o n of the dock as 
to amount to an i n t e r e s t i n land might be intended 
to be given .... I cannot think that there was 
any such i n t e n t i o n here."(60) 
In other words, Lord Coleridge was saying the wording of 
the c o n t r a c t s u g g e s t e d no i n t e n t i o n t o g i v e s o l e 
possession of the dock to the p l a i n t i f f s or, put another 
way, the defendants never parted with p o s s e s s i o n . T h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s backed up by the judgement of Denman 
J . , who a f t e r a g r e e i n g w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g of L o r d 
Coleridge, added: 
" I t seems to me t h a t l o o k i n g to the whole 
agreement, i t does not amount to a demise of the 
dock or a c o n t r a c t f o r an i n t e r e s t i n land, but 
only to an agreement f o r n s e n f th<=« dnp.k f o r 
r e p a i r i n g the ship s u b j e c t to the c o n t r o l of the 
C o r p o r a t i o n and w i t h o u t d e p r i v i n g them f o r a 
moment of the f u l l r i g h t to p o s s e s s i o n and 
property over i t . " ( 6 1 ) 
The next case c i t e d by C u l l i t y as a u t h o r i t y f o r use of 
the t e s t of the r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n f o r the 
c r e a t i o n of a tenancy i s GLENWOOD LUMBER CO. v PHILLIPS 
i n which Lord Davey s a i d , on the question of whether a 
l i c e n c e to occupy land had a r i s e n : 
" I t i s not a question of words but of substance. 
I f the e f f e c t of the instrument i s to give the 
holder an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of occupation .... i t i s 
i n law a demise of the land i t s e l f . " ( 6 2 ) 
However, once again, w i t h i n the context of the f a c t s , i t 
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a p p e a r s t h e r e f e r e n c e t o an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of o c c u p a t i o n 
i s d i r e c t e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e i n s t r u m e n t i n 
q u e s t i o n m e r e l y gave a r i g h t t o go on t h e l a n d t o c u t 
t i m b e r o r a c t u a l s o l e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e l a n d i t s e l f , t h e 
c o n c e p t of p o s s e s s i o n r e q u i r i n g i n t e n t i o n . I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t i n t h e r e c e n t House of L o r d s 
d e c i s i o n i n STREET v MOUNTFORD ( 6 3 ) , L o r d Templeman 
a p p e a r e d t o ha v e i n t e r p r e t e d GLENWOOD LUMBER CO. v 
P H I L L I P S a s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e r e 
was an i n t e n t i o n t o g r a n t s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t . 
F i n a l l y , t o TAYLOR v PENDLETON ( 6 4 ) , c i t e d by C u l l i t y a s 
an a u t h o r i t y f o r u s e o f t h e t e s t o f t h e r i g h t t o 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . T h i s was c o n c e r n e d w i t h l i a b i l i t y 
f o r poor law r a t e s , w h i c h was s a i d t o depend upon whether 
t h e agreements i n q u e s t i o n c o n f e r r e d e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n 
so a s t o c r e a t e a t e n a n c y . C e r t a i n l y W i l l s J . a d d r e s s e d 
h i m s e l f t o t h e q u e s t i o n of how t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d t h e 
agreements t o o p e r a t e but o n l y a f t e r f o r m u l a t i n g t h e 
q u e s t i o n i n i s s u e a s b e i n g "whether t h e p l a i n t i f f had 
e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n of t h e s o i l ( 6 5 ) i n o t h e r 
words, was t h e p l a i n t i f f i n s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t . 
T h e r e f o r e , out of t h e f i v e d e c i s i o n s c i t e d by C u l l i t y 
f o u r do not seem t o s u p p o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e t e s t 
of a t e n a n c y a s compared t o a l i c e n c e was t h a t of t h e 
r i g h t t o e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . MOSS v BROWN(66), 
however, does. The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e were t h a t d u r i n g 
t h e war, w h i l s t t h e t e n a n t of a c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y was 
abroad, h i s w i f e a l l o w e d some f r i e n d s of h e r s t o go i n t o 
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e f l a t he r e n t e d , t h e f r i e n d s p a y i n g r e n t 
t o t h e w i f e . The q u e s t i o n was whether t h e f r i e n d s were 
l i c e n s e e s , p e r i o d i c t e n a n t s , o r t e n a n t s a t w i l l f o r t h e 
p u r p o s e of n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s . B o t h A s q u i t h a n d 
S o m e r v e l l L . J J . e x p r e s s e d t h e v i e w an i n t e n t i o n was 
r e q u i r e d t o c r e a t e a r i g h t t o e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and, 
as t h e r e was s u c h i r t s i t i c i t h e f r i e n d s w r p 
l i c e n s e e s . Morton L . J . d i s s e n t e d . He c o n s i d e r e d t h e 
f a c t of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n t o be c o n c l u s i v e t o t h e 
f i n d i n g o f , a t minimum, a t e n a n c y a t w i l l . 
Thus a r e v i e w of t h e d e c i s i o n s c i t e d by C u l l i t y shows 
t h a t p r i o r t o ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON v e r y few c a s e s r e a l l y 
d e t r a c t from t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t whenever an o c c u p i e r was 
found t o be i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , a t e n a n c y a r o s e . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e n a r r o w e r m e a n i n g o f t h e p h r a s e 
' e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n ' , namely, an o c c u p i e r w i t h a r i g h t 
t o e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , was adopted o n l y i n one c a s e 
(MOSS v BROWN) as t h e t e s t f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o r o t h e r w i s e 
of a t e n a n c y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , so f a r , i t would appear t h a t 
the v i e w t h a t ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON marks a development 
i n t h e law, on a c c o u n t of t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h e young 
c o u p l e were l i c e n s e e s i n s o l e o c c u p a t i o n i n f a c t , i s 
c o r r e c t . However, i t s t i l l r e m a i n s t o d i s c u s s t h e 
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d e c i s i o n s r e l i e d upon i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON i t s e l f a s 
a u t h o r i t i e s f o r t he f i n d i n g of a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n of l a n d . 
The f i r s t o f t h e s e was MARCROFT WAGONS LTD v SMITH 
d e c i d e d not l o n g b e f o r e ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON. I t q u i t e 
c l e a r l y s u p p o r t s t h e f i n d i n g of a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n . The c a s e was c o n c e r n e d w i t h whether t h e 
dau g h t e r of a d e c e a s e d s t a t u t o r y t e n a n t was a t e n a n t o r a 
l i c e n s e e when she was a l l o w e d t o remain i n o c c u p a t i o n 
a f t e r h e r mother's d e a t h , p a y i n g a w e e k l y sum t o t h e 
l a n d l o r d s . The Cou r t of A p p e a l (Denning L . J . , E v e r s h e d 
M.R. and Roxburgh J . ) , u n d o u b t e d l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e 
consequences of Rent A c t p r o t e c t i o n ( 6 8 ) , u p h e l d t h e 
d e c i s i o n of t h e county c o u r t judge t h a t t h e d a u g h t e r was 
a l i c e n s e e . The v a l i d i t y of t h e o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s r e l i e d 
upon by Denning L . J i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON i s l e s s 
c l e a r . He s t a r t e d by p l a c i n g r e l i a n c e on d i c t a of L o r d 
A b i n g e r ' s C.B. i n HOWARD v SHAW ( 6 9 ) . T h i s c a s e 
c o n c e r n e d a c l a i m f o r r e n t on a c c o u n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s 
b e n e f i c i a l u se and o c c u p a t i o n of l a n d when he was l e t 
i n t o p o s s e s s i o n under, what t u r n e d out t o be, an a b o r t i v e 
c o n t r a c t of s a l e of t h e l a n d . L o r d A b i n g e r e x p r e s s e d t h e 
o p i n i o n t h a t w h i l s t t h e d e f e n d a n t was i n o c c u p a t i o n under 
a v a l i d c o n t r a c t of s a l e , he c o u l d not be r e g a r d e d a s a 
t e n a n t . He d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , s a y e x p r e s s l y t h e 
defe n d a n t was a l i c e n s e e , a l t h o u g h t h i s i s t h e ob v i o u s 
i m p l i c a t i o n . I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e c a s e i s a v e r y 
weak a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e f i n d i n g of a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n f o r t h r e e main r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y , t h e o t h e r 
members of t h e c o u r t ( P a r k e and A l d e r t o n B.B.) were of 
the o p i n i o n t h a t t h e de f e n d a n t was a t e n a n t a t w i l l t h e 
moment he went i n t o p o s s e s s i o n . The r e a s o n g i v e n by L o r d 
A b i n g e r f o r f i n d i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t was not a t e n a n t a t 
c o u l d n o t c o n v e r t t h e c o n t r a c t o f p u r c h a s e i n t o a 
c o n t r a c t f o r a t e n a n c y . " ( 7 0 ) T h i s r e a s o n i n g seems 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e vi e w n o r m a l l y adopted a t t h e tim e 
t h a t a t e n a n c y a t w i l l a r i s e s from t h e f a c t of e n t r y i n t o 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . S e c o n d l y , t h e s t a t e m e n t of L o r d 
A b i n g e r was c l e a r l y o b i t e r d i c t a a s t h e s o l e i s s u e was 
whether a p e r s o n i n p o s s e s s i o n under a c o n t r a c t of s a l e 
w h i c h i s abandoned must pay r e a s o n a b l e compensation t o 
t h e owner f o r b e n e f i c i a l e n j o y m e n t . F i n a l l y , a s 
P r o f e s s o r H a r g r e a v e s p o i n t s out (71) when t h e problem of 
use and o c c u p a t i o n was not i n i s s u e i n BALL v CULLIMORE 
( 7 2 ) , L o r d A b i n g e r h i m s e l f e x p r e s s e d t h e view t h a t a 
p u r c h a s e r l e t i n t o p o s s e s s i o n was, a t common l a w , a 
t e n a n t a t w i l l . 
The n e x t c a s e r e l i e d upon by Denning i n ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON was BOOKER v PALMER. ( 7 3 ) The f a c t s o f t h e 
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d i s p u t e a r o s e out of t h e war-time s p i r i t . The d e f e n d a n t ' s 
house had been d e s t r o y e d i n an a i r r a i d and one of h i s 
r e l a t i v e s was a b u t l e r t o one Mrs. G, who knew a 
landowner w i t h an empty c o t t a g e on h i s e s t a t e . The 
landowner t o l d Mrs. G. t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t , among o t h e r s , 
c o u l d remain i n t h e c o t t a g e r e n t - f r e e f o r t h e r e s t of t h e 
war. Some time l a t e r t h e landowner l e a s e d t h e l a n d , 
w h i c h i n c l u d e d t h e c o t t a g e , t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , who brought 
an a c t i o n f o r p o s s e s s i o n . I t s h o u l d be no t e d t h a t t h e 
i s s u e i n t h e c a s e was whose l i c e n s e e o r t e n a n t was t h e 
d e f e n d a n t , Mrs. G's o r t h e l a n d o w n e r ' s , n o t was t h e 
de f e n d a n t a l i c e n s e e o r a t e n a n t . C l e a r l y t h e C o u r t of 
App e a l ( l e a d i n g judgement, L o r d Greene M.R.) was of t h e 
o p i n i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a l i c e n s e e but t h i s may 
w e l l have been because t h e d e f e n d a n t was o c c u p y i n g a l o n g 
w i t h o t h e r s a nd c o n s e q u e n t l y d i d n o t h a v e e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n . The a u t h o r i t y of t h e c a s e i s f u r t h e r weakened 
by t h e f a c t t h e s t a t u s of t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t i n i s s u e ; 
and t h e outcome of t h e c a s e would have been t h e same even 
i f he was found t o have been a t e n a n t a t w i l l . Moreover, 
i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, Denning p l a c e d r e l i a n c e on t h e 
f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t of L o r d Greene M.R.: 
"There i s one go l d e n r u l e w h i c h i s of v e r y g e n e r a l 
a p p l i c a t i o n , namely t h a t t h e law does not impute 
i n t e n t i o n t o e n t e r i n t o l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s where 
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and c o n d u c t o f t h e p a r t i e s 
n e g a t i v e any i n t e n t i o n of t h e k i n d . " ( 7 4 ) 
I t h a s b e e n p o i n t e d o u t by many w r i t e r s ( 7 5 ) t h a t 
dependence on t h i s q u o t a t i o n a s a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e f i n d i n g 
of d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t u s a s l i c e n s e e i s e r r o n e o u s , a s L o r d 
G r e e n e M.R. was a t t h i s s t a g e r e f e r r i n g t o t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between Mrs. G. and t h e landowner and not 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e p l a i n t i f f and t h e d e f e n d a n t 
l i c e n s e e . N a t u r ? l l y , t h e r e v.7ss no cru??^ i on n f M r s . a. 
b e i n g a t e n a n t a t w i l l f o r she was not i n p o s s e s s i o n and 
no r e n t was p a y a b l e . 
Denning L . J . n e x t p l a c e d r e l i a n c e upon t h r e e war-time 
r e q u i s i t i o n i n g c a s e s w h e r e an o c c u p i e r i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n was found t o be a l i c e n s e e . I n one of t h e s e , 
MINISTER OF HEALTH v BELLOTTI ( 7 6 ) , i t was conceded t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s were l i c e n s e e s and t h e r e f o r e t h e i s s u e of 
whether t h e o c c u p i e r s c o u l d be l i c e n s e e s i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n was not r a i s e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , a l t h o u g h i t 
a p p e a r s t h a t t h e f i n d i n g o f a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n i n t h e r e m a i n i n g two c a s e s , SOUTHGATE BOROUGH 
COUNCIL v WATSON ( 7 7 ) and MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND 
F I S H E R I E S v MATTHEWS (78) was dependent on t h e s p e c i a l 
words of a s t a t u t e , t h e r e q u i s i t i o n i n g c a s e s do show 
f u r t h e r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e c o n c e p t o f a l i c e n s e e i n 
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e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . 
To t u r n now t o t h e f i n a l c a s e r e l i e d upon by Denning L . J 
i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON f o r t h e f i n d i n g of a l i c e n s e e i n 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , FOSTER v ROBINSON ( 7 9 ) . I n t h i s 
c a s e , a farm c o t t a g e had been l e t t o a farm employee a s a 
y e a r l y t e n a n t . When t h e t e n a n t r e t i r e d , h i s l a n d l o r d and 
employer t o l d him he c o u l d l i v e i n t h e c o t t a g e r e n t - f r e e 
f o r t h e r e s t of h i s l i f e . T h i s t h e t e n a n t d i d . A f t e r 
t h e t e n a n t had d i e d , t h e q u e s t i o n a r o s e a s t o whether t h e 
a r r a n g e m e n t o p e r a t e d a s a s u r r e n d e r o f h i s o r i g i n a l 
y e a r l y t e n a n c y so as t o d e s t r o y t h e Rent A c t p r o t e c t i o n . 
The C o u r t of A p p e a l d e c i d e d t h e arrangement amounted t o 
th e g r a n t of a l i c e n c e w h i c h operated-J:o e x t i n g u i s h t h e 
o r i g i n a l t e n a n c y . However, t h e Q i s s u e d of whether t h e 
d e c e a s e d was a l i c e n s e e o r a tenant,,- - a f t e r s u r r e n d e r of 
t h e y e a r l y t e n a n c y , was o b i t e r ( d i c t a , a s i t was n o t 
c e n t r a l t o t h e outcome of t h e d e c i s i o n . " N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e 
d e c i s i o n o n c e a g a i n i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t t h e i d e a o f a 
l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was g a i n i n g momentum. 
Two members of t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l , namely E v e r s h e d M.R. 
and S i n g l e t o n L . J . , made c l e a r s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e e f f e c t 
t h a t o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e p r e m i s e s was a s l i c e n s e e s , 
a l t h o u g h E v e r s h e d M.R. d o e s a d m i t t e d l y add t h a t he 
r e g a r d e d t h e c a s e a s one w h i c h t u r n e d v e r y much on i t s 
own f a c t s , s u c h t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i e d by t h e c o u r t 
s h o u l d not be r e g a r d e d a s of g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n . 
From t h i s , i t can be s e e n t h a t ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON was 
not an e n t i r e l y n o v e l d e c i s i o n i n f i n d i n g a l i c e n s e e i n 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , a l t h o u g h on t h e whole, p r i o r t o 
t h i s , e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was r e g a r d e d as c o n c l u s i v e of 
a t e n a n c y , a t minimum a t e n a n c y a t w i l l . T h i s i s 
acknowledged by L o r d Scarman i n HESLOP v BURNS, when, i n 
r e f e r r i n g t o ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, he commented o f 
" T h i s c o n c e p t has been d e v e l o p e d by t h e c o u r t s so 
t h a t now i t i s p r e s e n t as a p o s s i b l e mode of l a n d -
h o l d i n g - a mode w h i c h had c e r t a i n l y n o t been 
d e v e l o p e d w i t h a n y t h i n g l i k e i t s c u r r e n t m a t u r i t y 
i n t h e 19th c e n t u r y . " ( 8 0 ) 
FOSTER v ROBINSON and MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH mark 
th e b e g i n n i n g s of a new t e n d e n c y t o r e c o g n i s e an o c c u p i e r 
i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n by v i r t u e of a l i c e n c e o n l y . 
T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g b e c a u s e , by t h i s s t a g e i n t i m e , 
t h e f a c t o r s w h i c h i t w i l l be shown i n f l u e n c e d t h e 
development of t h e p o s s e s s o r y l i c e n c e were a l r e a d y i n 
e x i s t e n c e . 
Having t h e r e f o r e a g r e e d t h a t b e f o r e ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
t h e r e i s v e r y l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e f i n d i n g of a 
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l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , i t re m a i n s t o a s s e s s 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e s t e p f o r w a r d . F o r t h i s i t i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o lo o k c l o s e l y a t t h e c o n c e p t of a t e n a n c y and 
i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e n a t u r e of a t e n a n c y a t w i l l ; f o r , as 
has been shown, t h e v i e w e x p r e s s e d i n by f a r t h e v a s t 
m a j o r i t y of c a s e s p r i o r t o FOSTER v ROBINSON, MARCROFT 
WAGONS LTD v SMITH and ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON was t h a t 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n gave r i s e t o a t e n a n c y b e c a u s e a t 
minimum a t e n a n c y a t w i l l would a r i s e out of t h e f a c t of 
e n t r y i n t o e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . The aim of t h e e x e r c i s e 
i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e n a t u r e of a t e n a n c y a t w i l l i s t o 
d e c i d e whether i t amounts t o a n y t h i n g more t h a n what was 
r e f e r r e d t o a s 'a p e r s o n a l p r i v i l e g e ' t o o c c u p y i n 
ERRINGTON V ERRINGTON. 
L i t t l e t o n d e f i n e d a t e n a n t a t w i l l i n t h e f o l l o w i n g 
t e r m s : 
"Tenant a t w i l l i s where l a n d s o r tenements a r e 
l e t by one man t o a n o t h e r t o have and t o h o l d t o 
him a t t h e w i l l o f t h e l e s s o r , by f o r c e of w h i c h 
l e a s e t h e l e s s e e i s c a l l e d t e n a n t a t w i l l , b e c a u s e 
he h a t h no c e r t a i n o r s u r e e s t a t e f o r t h e l e s s o r 
may p u t him o u t a t w h i c h t ime " i t ~ p l e a s e t h 
him'."''(81) 
A t e n a n c y a t w i l l a r i s e s , t h e r e f o r e , when one p e r s o n 
o c c u p i e s t h e l a n d of a n o t h e r on t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t 
e i t h e r p a r t y may t e r m i n a t e t h e t e n a n c y a t any t i m e . The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p may a r i s e e x p r e s s l y ( 8 2 ) o r by i m p l i c a t i o n , 
s u c h as where a t e n a n t h o l d s o v e r a f t e r t h e e x p i r y of a 
l e a s e o r goes i n t o p o s s e s s i o n under a v o i d l e a s e o r a 
c o n t r a c t f o r a l e a s e w i t h o u t an agreement t o pay r e n t on 
a p e r i o d i c b a s i s , ( 8 3 ) o r i n some c a s e s where a p u r c h a s e r 
goes i n t o p o s s e s s i o n p r i o r t o c o m p l e t i o n ( 8 4 ) o r d u r i n g 
v > / - v ^ f / - v - t - T -P^-v- f Q K \ rpVto f o n a n m r a +- Y.TT "I 1 T r i a l / " — — ^ -•- w ~ - . v i j_ •• _t 
a l s o be d e t e r m i n e d e x p r e s s l y o r by i m p l i c a t i o n . Examples 
of d e t e r m i n a t i o n by i m p l i c a t i o n a r e where e i t h e r p a r t y 
does some a c t wh i c h i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s c o n t i n u a n c e , 
s u c h a s a l i e n a t i o n by t h e l a n d l o r d o r t e n a n t ( 8 6 ) o r d e a t h 
of t h e l a n d l o r d o r t e n a n t . ( 8 7 ) Moreover when r e n t i s p a i d 
on a r e g u l a r b a s i s i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s where t h e t e n a n c y a t 
w i l l was c r e a t e d w i t h o u t a g r e e m e n t t o p a y r e n t , t h e 
t e n a n c y w i l l be d e t e r m i n e d and be r e p l a c e d by a p e r i o d i c 
t e n a n c y . ( 8 8 ) 
Megarry and Wade e x p l a i n t h e co n c e p t i n t h e s e t e r m s : 
"A t e n a n c y a t w i l l i s a t e n a n c y w h i c h i n v o l v e s 
t e n u r e , i . e . r e l a t i o n s h i p of l a n d l o r d and t e n a n t 
but no d e f i n i t e e s t a t e f o r t h e r e i s no d e f i n e d 
d u r a t i o n of i n t e r e s t . " ( 8 9 ) 
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I n WHEELER v MERCER, L o r d Simonds o b s e r v e d : 
"A t e n a n c y a t w i l l , though c a l l e d a t e n a n c y , i s 
u n l i k e a n y o t h e r t e n a n c y e x c e p t a t e n a n c y a t 
s u f f e r e n c e t o w h i c h i t i s n e x t of k i n . I t has 
been p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d as a p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between l a n d l o r d and t e n a n t ; i t i s d e t e r m i n e d by 
the d e a t h of e i t h e r of them o r by one of a v a r i e t y 
of a c t s , even by an i n v o l u n t a r y a l i e n a t i o n w h i c h 
w o u l d n o t a f f e c t t h e s u b s t a n c e o f any o t h e r 
t e n a n c y . 1 1 ( 9 0 ) 
I n e f f e c t , what L o r d Simonds s a i d about a t e n a n c y a t w i l l 
amounts t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a p e r s o n a l p r i v i l e g e , 
t o be i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n o f l a n d . T h i s i s 
tantamount t o s a y i n g t h a t a t e n a n c y a t w i l l i s s i m p l y a 
l i c e n c e t o be i n e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n of l a n d . However, 
C u l l i t y a t t e m p t s t o draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between a l i c e n c e 
and a t e n a n c y a t w i l l , a l t h o u g h he a d m i t s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n 
" i s c l e a r e r i n p r i n c i p l e t h a n i n p r a c t i c e " . (91) _ I t i s 
s u b m i t t e d _ t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i s n o n - e x i s t e n t . C u l T l i t y 
m a i n t a i n s a I T c e n s e e " h a s a mere p r i v i l e g e of d o i n g a c t s 
of c o n t r o l s u b j e c t t o a power of r e v o c a t i o n v e s t e d i n t h e 
l i c e n s o r . C o n s e q u e n t l y , w h i l s t t h e l i c e n c e s u b s i s t s , t h e 
l i c e n s e e cannot o b j e c t t o t h e l i c e n s o r i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h 
h i s p o s s e s s i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e r e a p p e a r s t o be no 
a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o a l i c e n s e e 
i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , WOOD v LEADBITTER does e s t a b l i s h 
t h e p r i n c i p l e , i n r e l a t i o n t o a l i c e n s e e not i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n , and t h e r e would seem t o be no r e a s o n why t h e 
p o s i t i o n s h o u l d be a n y d i f f e r e n t f o r a l i c e n s e e i n 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . On t h e o t h e r hand, s a y s C u l l i t y , a 
t e n a n t a t w i l l has a r i g h t t o do a c t s of c o n t r o l c o-
r e l a t i v e t o a dut y of t h e l e s s o r not t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h 
t h e d o i n g of s u c h a c t s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , a l t h o u g h t h e 
l s s s n r ' s pr»T.TQT™ Qr™.^ » ^ ^ ^ ^ T _ C e i m i l c i r ^ ~ r > f-ho 
l i c e n s o r ' s power, a t e n a n t a t w i l l c a n , i n p r i n c i p l e , sue 
th e l a n d l o r d f o r t r e s p a s s on t h e grounds of i n t e r f e r e n c e 
w i t h p o s s e s s i o n . He, however, a d m i t s s u c h a r i g h t i s of 
l i t t l e i m p o r t a n c e i n p r a c t i c e a s any i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h 
t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e t e n a n t a t w i l l w o u l d n o r m a l l y 
amount t o an i m p l i e d e x e r c i s e of t h e l a n d l o r d ' s power of 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and he c i t e s TURNER v DOE D. BENNETT(92) 
where L o r d Denman C . J . s u g g e s t e d a l a n d l o r d can n e v e r be 
l i a b l e i n t r e s p a s s a t t h e s u i t of a t e n a n t a t w i l l a s t h e 
c o u r t w o u l d a l w a y s r e g a r d t h e a c t a s i m p l i e d 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e t e n a n c y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , C u l l i t y goes 
on t o g i v e t h r e e r e a s o n s why a t e n a n t a t w i l l s h o u l d be 
r e g a r d e d a s h a v i n g a r i g h t t o do a c t s of c o n t r o l g i v i n g 
him an a c t i o n i n t r e s p a s s . 
The f i r s t i s t h i s : i f , f o r some r e a s o n , t h e l a n d l o r d 
does not w i s h t o t e r m i n a t e t h e t e n a n c y ( e . g . i f t h e 
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t e n a n t ' s p r e s e n c e a t t r a c t e d some b e n e f i t t o t h e l e s s o r ) , 
i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o s e e why t h e l a n d l o r d ' s e n t r y 
s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d a s t e r m i n a t i n g t h e t e n a n c y . 
However, i f one l o o k s a t t h e f a c t s of DOE D. BENNETT v 
TURNER, t h i s v e r y p o i n t seems t o be d i s p r o v e d . On t h e 
f a c t s , t h e p l a i n t i f f had l e t l a n d s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t a s 
t e n a n t a t w i l l . Ten y e a r s l a t e r t h e p l a i n t i f f e n t e r e d 
and took some s t o n e from a q u a r r y on t h e l a n d l e t , 
w i t h o u t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s e n t . The d e f e n d a n t was 
a l l o w e d t o remain on t h e l a n d f o r a f u r t h e r t w e l v e y e a r s , 
a f t e r w h i c h an a c t i o n f o r e j e c t m e n t was brought by t h e 
p l a i n t i f f . The d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s t i t l e 
was s t a t u t e b a r r e d a s he had been a t e n a n t a t w i l l f o r 
ov e r twenty y e a r s . I t would seem t h e a c t of t a k i n g 
s t o n e s from t h e q u a r r y a f t e r t e n y e a r s d i d not i n v o l v e 
a n y d e s i r e t o e j e c t t h e t e n a n t a t t h a t s t a g e . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s t i t l e was 
not s t a t u t e b a r r e d a s t h e e n t r y had t e r m i n a t e d t h e f i r s t 
t e n a n c y a t w i l l , a nd t h e t e n a n t h ad o n l y b e e n i n 
p o s s e s s i o n under t h e new t e n a n c y t w e l v e y e a r s . L o r d 
Denman C . J . commented: 
". . . . i n t h e c a s e o f a t e n a n c y a t w i l l 
w h a t e v e r t h e i n t e n t of t h e l a n d l o r d i f he do an a c t 
upon t h e l a n d f o r w h i c h he would o t h e r w i s e be 
l i a b l e f o r an a c t i o n i n t r e s p a s s a t t h e s u i t of 
the t e n a n t s u c h a c t i s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e w i l l 
f o r so o n l y c a n i t be l a w f u l and not a w r o n g f u l 
a c t . " ( 9 3 ) 
To c o n s i d e r C u l l i t y ' s s e c o n d r e a s o n f o r r e g a r d i n g a 
t e n a n t a t w i l l a s h a v i n g a r i g h t t o b r i n g an a c t i o n i n 
t r e s p a s s a g a i n s t h i s l a n d l o r d . He c i t e s t h e d e c i s i o n of 
the High C o u r t of A u s t r a l i a i n LANDALE v MENZIES(94) 
( B a r t o n C . J . , G r i f f i t h C . J . , w i t h I s a a c s C . J . d i s s e n t i n g ) 
n h s r s t h e T . a j o r i ^ y ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ * ^ T-J^^^T^ f v i o r o upcr ^-n -Imr->i H 
p r o m i s e t o t e r m i n a t e a t e n a n c y a t w i l l a f t e r r e a s o n a b l e 
n o t i c e , an a c t i o n i n t r e s p a s s l a y a g a i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d , 
i f no n o t i c e was g i v e n . I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h i s 
d e c i s i o n s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t 
s u s p i c i o n . F i r s t l y , i t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t B a r t o n C . J . 
a d m i t t e d t h e r e was no a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s v i e w . S e c o n d l y , 
he t h e n went on t o j u s t i f y h i s d e c i s i o n by e r o n e o u s l y 
r e l y i n g on LOWE v ADAMS ( 9 5 ) , i n w h i c h c a s e i t was h e l d 
t h a t r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e was r e q u i r e d t o t e r m i n a t e a non-
e x c l u s i v e l i c e n c e of c e r t a i n s p o r t i n g r i g h t s . B a r t o n 
C . J . argued t h a t i f r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e was r e q u i r e d i n t h e 
c a s e of a non e x c l u s i v e r i g h t , i t must be r e q u i r e d where 
e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n i s g i v e n . However, t h e q u e s t i o n of 
r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e i n LOWE v ADAMS was f o r t h e purpose of 
an a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t i n r e s p e c t o f a 
r e c o g n i s e d i n t e r e s t i n l a n d . T h e r e f o r e i t i s no more 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a n t h e e x i s t e n c e of an a c t i o n i n t r e s p a s s 
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a g a i n s t a l a n d l o r d who e n t e r s on t o l a n d d u r i n g a f i x e d 
term of p e r i o d i c t e n a n c y . 
The t h i r d r e a s o n f o r s u s p i c i o n i s t h a t G r i f f i t h C . J . 
a d m i t t e d b e i n g a l i t t l e d o u b t f u l about t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a 
t e n a n c y a t w i l l i s n o t d e t e r m i n a b l e i n s t a n t e r . He 
t h e r e f o r e added,(96) i f t h e t e n a n c y was t e r m i n a b l e a t 
law , w i t h o u t r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e , t h e a g r e e m e n t w o u l d 
n e v e r t h e l e s s be e n f o r c e a b l e i n e q u i t y ; p resumably t h i s 
would have t o be on t h e b a s i s of b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t . 
F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s t h e s t r o n g d i s s e n t i n g judgement of 
I s a a c s C . J . He a d h e r e d t o t h e v i e w t h a t by v e r y 
d e f i n i t i o n a t e n a n c y a t w i l l m u st be d e t e r m i n a b l e 
i n s t a n t e r and, a s s u c h , no a c t i o n i n t r e s p a s s c o u l d be. 
He s a i d : 
". . . . i t was argued t h a t even a t e n a n c y of t h i s 
n a t u r e may y e t be i m p l i c i t l y n o n - d e t e r m i n a b l e 
e x c e p t a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n of r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e t o 
q u i t . T h i s a p p e a r s t o i n v o l v e a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . . . " 
(97) 
I t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t i n FOSTER v ROBINSON ( 9 8 ) , L o r d 
E v e r s h e d M.R a l s o c o n s i d e r e d t h e n o t i o n of a t e n a n t a t 
w i l l , w i t h t h e pr o m i s e t h a t t h e t e n a n c y a t w i l l would not 
be d e t e r m i n e d , but app e a r e d t o d i s m i s s t h e i d e a . 
I n h i s j u d g e m e n t i n LANDALE v MENZIES, I s a a c s C . J . 
p r o c e e d e d t o e x p l a i n t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f t h e i m p l i e d 
agreement not t o t e r m i n a t e w i t h o u t r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e was 
not t o p r e s e r v e t h e t e n a n c y a f t e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e 
w i l l , but t o r e n d e r t h e p a r t y who d e t e r m i n e d i t w i t h o u t 
n o t i c e l i a b l e f o r damages f o r b r e a c h of agreement and not 
f o r t r e s p a s s . He c i t e d DOE D. BENNETT v TURNER(99) on 
t h i s p o i n t , and c o n c l u d e d : 
"As I u n d e r s t a n d t h e law, t h e l a n d l o r d of a t e n a n t 
can n e v e r t r e s p a s s on t h e p r o p e r t y l e t . I f t h e 
a c t c o m p l a i n e d o f i s w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e 
t e n a n t o r i n p u r s u a n c e o f t h e a g r e e m e n t o f 
t e n a n c y , i t i s of c o u r s e not a t r e s p a s s b e c a u s e i t 
i s l a w f u l I f i t i s opposed t o o r w i t h o u t 
t h e t e n a n t 1 s c o n s e n t i t i s r e g a r d e d by t h e law a s 
i p s o f a c t o d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e t e n a n c y and 
e q u a l l y f r e e from l i a b i l i t y t o t r e s p a s s . " ( 1 0 0 ) 
I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e b e t t e r v i e w i s t h a t a 
t e n a n t a t w i l l d o e s n o t h a v e an a c t i o n i n t r e s p a s s 
a g a i n s t h i s l a n d l o r d u n d e r a n y c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y t h i s d e t r a c t s from t h e vie w t h a t a t e n a n t a t 
w i l l i s i n a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n from a l i c e n s e e w i t h 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . 
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F i n a l l y , C u l l i t y m a i n t a i n s , even i f i t i s t r u e a t e n a n t 
a t w i l l has no a c t i o n i n t r e s p a s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r 
a u t h o r i t y t h a t s u c h a t e n a n t h a s a r i g h t t o s o l e 
p o s s e s s i o n w h i c h cannot be s a i d of a l i c e n s e e . He c i t e s 
L o r d Denman i n DOE D. BENNETT v TURNER a s making s u c h a 
s t a t e m e n t and r e f e r s t o COKE ON LITTLETON.(101) To t h i s 
may be added s t a t e m e n t s made i n HESLOP v BURNS. Stamp 
L . J . i m p l i e d a t e n a n t a t w i l l has a r i g h t t o e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n when he s a i d : 
" I n my judgement t h e p r o p e r i n f e r e n c e i s t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s a t t h e o u t s e t e n t e r e d i n t o o c c u p a t i o n 
of t h e p r e m i s e s a s l i c e n s e e s and n o t as t e n a n t s a t 
w i l l ; not w i t h a r i g h t t o e x c l u d e t h e d e c e a s e d 
from p o s s e s s i o n . " ( 1 0 2 ) 
as d i d Scarman L . J . when he s a i d of a t e n a n t a t w i l l : 
"He i s t h e r e and can keep out t r e s p a s s e r s ; he i s 
t h e r e w i t h the c o n s e n t of t h e l a n d l o r d and can 
keep out t h e l a n d l o r d a s l o n g a s t h a t c o n s e n t i s 
m a i n t a i n e d . " ( 1 0 3 ) 
However, w i t h r e s p e c t t o L o r d Scarman's s t a t e m e n t , i t has 
a l r e a d y been noted t h a t any e n t r y by t h e l a n d l o r d w i l l be 
r e g a r d e d a s i m p l i c i t l y d e t e r m i n i n g t h e t e n a n c y a t w i l l . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e i s no r i g h t t o keep t h e l a n d l o r d out. 
Moreover, t o speak of a t e n a n t a t w i l l a s h a v i n g a r i g h t 
t o e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n w h i l s t a t t h e same t i m e t h e 
l a n d l o r d has a r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e t e n a n c y a t any 
t i m e , makes a nonsense i n H o h f e l d i a n t e r m s . 
From t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n , i t w o u l d seem t h a t a 
t e n a n c y a t w i l l i s n o t h i n g more t h a n o c c u p a t i o n w i t h a 
p r i v i l e g e of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and, a s s u c h , i s v e r y 
f o r f i x e d o r p e r i o d i c t e r m s . A t e n a n c y a t w i l l would, i n 
f a c t , seem i n e s s e n c e n o t h i n g more t h a n what t o d a y i s 
r e f e r r e d t o as a b a r e l i c e n c e . Gray and Symes i n t h e i r 
book, " R e a l P r o p e r t y and R e a l P e o p l e " r e a c h t h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n . ( 1 0 4 ) Moreover t h e c o n c e p t of a t e n a n c y a t 
w i l l p r e d a t e s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t s a s 
p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s . The a u t h o r s m a i n t a i n : 
"At f i r s t t h e t h r e e e s t a t e s of f r e e h o l d were t h e 
s o l e e s t a t e s r e c o g n i s e d by law; t h e o n l y o t h e r 
l a w f u l r i g h t t o t h e p o s s e s s i o n of l a n d was known 
as a t e n a n c y a t w i l l , under w h i c h t h e t e n a n t c o u l d 
be e j e c t e d a t any t i m e , and w h i c h t h e r e f o r e gave 
him no e s t a t e a t a l l . " 4 ( 1 0 5 ) 
T h i s r e i n f o r c e s t h e n o t i o n t h a t a t e n a n c y a t w i l l i s 
something d i s t i n c t from a l e a s e h o l d e s t a t e and i s i n f a c t 
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m e r e l y a l i c e n c e t o occupy. I t would a p p e a r i t was o n l y 
l a t e r when l e a s e h o l d s became a c c e p t e d a s p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t s t h a t t e n a n c i e s a t w i l l came t o be g e n e r a l l y 
t r e a t e d a s p a r t o f t h e l a w r e l a t i n g t o l e a s e h o l d 
e s t a t e s . ( 1 0 6 ) T h e r e i s a l s o j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s 
f a c t . F o r example, i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH, Lord) >C 
J u s t i c e Denning commented: 1 
" A c c o r d i n g t o t h e common law as i t s t o o d b e f o r e 
t h e R e n t R e s t r i c t i o n s A c t s when t h e d e f e n d a n t 
s t a y e d on w i t h t h e c o n s e n t of t h e l a n d l o r d s , she 
would have become a t e n a n t a t w i l l . . . . " ( 1 0 7 ) 
He c o n t i n u e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e : 
" I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t i s no l o n g e r p r o p e r f o r 
th e c o u r t s t o i n f e r a t e n a n c y a t w i l l . . . . a s t h e y 
w o u l d h a v e done f r o m t h e mere a c c e p t a n c e o f 
r e n t . " ( 1 0 8 ) 
/Denning makes s i m i l a r s t a t e m e n t s i n FACCHINI v BRYSON 
/N^109) and COBB v LANE, i n the l a t t e r c a s e becoming a l m o s t 
e x p l i c i t on t h e p o i n t , when he o b s e r v e d : 
"Under t h e o l d c a s e s t h e r e would have been some 
c o l o u r f o r s a y i n g t h a t t h e b r o t h e r was a t e n a n t a t 
w i l l , b u t t h e o l d c a s e s c a n n o t be r e l i e d 
on " ( 1 1 0 ) 
O t h e r jud g e s a r e q u i t e p r e p a r e d t o admit t h e r e had been a 
change i n t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e c o u r t s t o t h e f i n d i n g of a 
t e n a n c y a t w i l l but do n o t e x p l i c i t l y s u g g e s t t h e c o u r t 
i s now f i n d i n g a p a r t y t o be a l i c e n s e e , where i n t h e 
p a s t t h e c o u r t would have found t h e p a r t y t o be a^ t e n a n t ^ 
a t w i l l . F o r example, i t i s i m p l i c i t i n t h e judgement of A 
S o m e r v e l l L 3 i i COBB v LANE T.-7^er he sale?: ' 
"No doubt, i n for m e r d a y s , e x c e p t f o r t h e q u e s t i o n 
of t h e s t a t u t e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a t e n a n c y 
whether a t w i l l o r f o r a p e r i o d , and a l i c e n c e was 
not so i m p o r t a n t a s i t has become s i n c e t h e Rent 
R e s t r i c t i o n s A c t s came i n t o o p e r a t i o n .... t h a t 
f a c t h a s l e d t o an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n . " ( 1 1 1 ) 
and L o r d S c a r m a n , p e r h a p s , g e t s n e a r e s t t o s u c h a 
s u g g e s t i o n when i n HESLOP v BURNS he acknowledged: 
" . . . . u n d e r t h e i m p a c t o f c h a n g i n g s o c i a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e t e n a n c y a t w i l l has s u f f e r e d a 
c e r t a i n change, a t any r a t e i n i t s purpose and 
f u n c t i o n . " ( 1 1 2 ) 
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I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, 
L o r d Templeman d e f i n e d a t e n a n c y i n c o n t r a s t t o a l i c e n c e 
i n a way w h i c h e x c l u d e d a t e n a n c y a t w i l l : 
"To c o n s t i t u t e a t e n a n c y t h e o c c u p i e r must be 
g r a n t e d e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n f o r a f i x e d o r 
p e r i o d i c t e r m c e r t a i n i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a 
premium o r p e r i o d i c a l p a y m e n t s . " ( 113) 
As a t e n a n t a t w i l l i s n o t h i n g more t h a n a p e r s o n i n 
a c t u a l e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of l a n d under a b a r e l i c e n c e 
t o occupy, i n one s e n s e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t of a 
l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
does not mark a s i g n i f i c a n t development i n t h e law; i t 
i s s i m p l y a m a t t e r of a^chahgfi of l a b e l . However, t h e 
r e a s o n i n g adopted by ( D e n n i n g ^ i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
shows t h a t u n d e r l y i n g -the'" c h a n g e o f name i s a more 
profound and s i g n i f i c a n t development. Denning c o n s i d e r e d 
t h r e e p o s s i b l e b a s e s on w h i c h t h e c o u p l e w e r e i n 
o c c u p a t i o n of t h e house, namely, t h e y were t e n a n t s a t 
w i l l , o r t e n a n t s under t h e Rent A c t s o r l i c e n s e e s . He 
r i g h t l y r e j e c t e d t h e n o t i o n t h e c o u p l e were t e n a n t s under 
th e Rent A c t s , a s t h i s was a f a m i l y arrangement and t h e r e 
appeared t o be no i n t e n t i o n t o be l e g a l l y bound t o pay 
th e mortgage i n s t a l m e n t s , assuming t h e s e were i n any c a s e 
c a p a b l e of b e i n g r e g a r d e d a s r e n t . ( 1 1 4 ) But was Denning 
r i g h t i n h i s r e j e c t i o n of t h e s t a t u s of t h e c o u p l e as 
t e n a n t s a t w i l l ? He d e c i d e d t h e y were not t e n a n t s a t 
w i l l a s t h e e s s e n c e of s u c h a t e n a n c y was t h a t i t s h o u l d 
be d e t e r m i n a b l e by e i t h e r p a r t y on demand, and he 
c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r c o u l d not have d e t e r m i n e d t h e 
c o u p l e ' s o c c u p a t i o n a t any t i m e . However, t h i s r e a s o n i n g 
i s . . - e n t i r e l y e r r o n e o u s and o c c u r r e d on a c c o u n t o f 
/Dinning'"s f a i l u r e t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s i t i o n both a t common 
. law" and i n e q u i t y . T h e r e w o u l d h a v e b e e n n o t h i n g 
i n c o n s i s t e n t about f i n d i n g a t coiunon la1.*.7 t h e c o u p l e were 
t e n a n t s a t w i l l , but t h a t i n e q u i t y t h e p o s i t i o n was 
d i f f e r e n t . I f t h e agreement ( w h a t e v e r i t s n a t u r e ) was 
c a p a b l e of s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e , e q u i t y would r e g a r d i t 
as c r e a t i n g e q u i t a b l e r i g h t s i n rem and, a s s u c h , t h e 
ag-reement would not have been d e t e r m i n a b l e . (115) Had 
/Denning^ looked upon t h e c a s e i n i t s more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
( way, h i s f e a r s t h a t f i n d i n g a t e n a n c y a t w i l l would l e a d 
v- t o ~the u n d e s i r a b l e outcome of t h e f a t h e r ' s t i t l e b e i n g '" 
d e f e a t e d under the L i m i t a t i o n A c t s a f t e r a l a p s e of 13 
y e a r s ( i . e . b e f o r e a l l t h e i n s t a l m e n t s were p a i d ) would 
h a v e b e e n u n f o u n d e d ; t h e p o s i t i o n i n e q u i t y b e i n g 
d i f f e r e n t , t h e L i m i t a t i o n A c t s would not have o p e r a t e d a t 
a l l . 
I t w i l l be a r g u e d i n a l a t e r S e c t i o n t h a t e x i s t i n g 
c o n c e p t s c o u l d have been u s e d t o p r o t e c t t h e c o u p l e i n 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON.(116) Why t h e n , a f t e r f a i l i n g t o 
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a p p l y t h e o l d common law and e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s , d i d 
D e n n i n g open up a m a j o r d e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e l a w by 
e x t e n d i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e by a n a l o g y ( i n s a y i n g a l i c e n c e 
i s r e v o c a b l e a t w i l l a t law, but i n e q u i t y not so i f 
c o n t r a c t u a l ) t o h i s new c o n c e p t o f a l i c e n s e e i n 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of l a n d ? I t would seem he had 
a l r e a d y p e r c e i v e d , p e r h a p s from e x p e r i e n c e of MARCROFT 
WAGONS LTD.v SMITH,(117) t h e v a l u e of t h e c o n c e p t of a 
l i c e n c e t o occupy a s a d e v i c e f o r a v o i d i n g t r o u b l e s o m e 
s t a t u t e s . I n l a t e r S e c t i o n s , an e x a m i n a t i o n w i l l be made 
of t h e use t o w h i c h t h e l i c e n c e has been p u t i n a v o i d i n g 
s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s s u c h a s t h o s e 
between l a n d l o r d and t e n a n t and i n r e s p e c t of l i m i t a t i o n 
of a c t i o n s . Thus t h r o u g h a f a i l u r e t o d e f i n e p r e c i s e l y 
t h e meaning of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and a f a i l u r e t o 
r e c o g n i s e t h a t a t e n a n c y a t w i l l i s i n e s s e n c e no more 
th a n a l i c e n c e t o occupy, t h e co n c e p t of a l i c e n s e e i n 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s a b l e t o t a k e on a s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
fundamental i m p o r t a n c e . 
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(b) Development beyond ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
Having d e c i d e d i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON(1) t h a t t h e t e s t 
of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was not c o n c l u s i v e to the f i n d i n g 
of a tenancy, what c r i t e r i a were developed to d i s t i n g u i s h 
between a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and a tenant 
i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n ? F u r thermore, how much 
importance was a t t a c h e d t o the f i n d i n g of e x c l u s i v e 
possession? By the time of MAR CHANT v CHARTERS, Lord 
Denning was a b l e t o say, w i t h accu-racy, on the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a tenant and a licenc-e'e: 
"The law on t h i s s u b j e c t has been developed 
g r e a t l y i n the l a s t 25 y e a r s . I might say 
r e v o l u t i o n i s e d . . . " ( 2 ) 
The present p o s i t i o n i s governed by the recent House of 
L o r d s ' d e c i s i o n i n STREET v MOUNTFORD (3) which 
undoubtedly has not only put a stop to the development 
but has to some extent reversed the trend, narrowing the 
circumstances i n which an occupier w i l l be found to be i n 
e x c l u s i v e possession with merely a l i c e n c e . The case was 
concerned with a w r i t t e n agreement de s c r i b e d as a l i c e n c e 
which, i t was conceded, gave e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of a 
furnish e d room. The agreement s t a t e d t h a t the r i g h t s 
g r a n t e d were p e r s o n a l and not a s s i g n a b l e and t h a t 
f o u r t e e n days' n o t i c e was r e q u i r e d to t e r m i n a t e the 
agreement. I n a d d i t i o n , the a p p e l l a n t s i g n e d a 
d e c l a r a t i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t she u n d e r s t o o d and 
accepted the l i c e n c e d i d not, and was not intended to, 
give Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . This was not, t h e r e f o r e , a 
case where the 'wool was being p u l l e d over the eyes' of 
the occupier; the a p p e l l a n t was f u l l y aware she was not 
intended to have Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . Despite t h i s , 
however, she subsequently applied f o r a ' f a i r r e n t ' ; the 
1 t a r ^ ^ T /-^ r- s-i tr> •>-•/-« r-« w /-> v-\ /-^  s-\ s3 K T T r< ^  *-V 1r I « -a a v n f i A n i n +- V\ <c\ 
w. i v-v J_ ^ — J _ «_i £^  W S-* JJ > »w W J ^  .1. 4. A ^ <wk vi w^rf-*-*^w*w^-Wi* _._ j. j. — j. j. w 
county court that the agreement was merely a l i c e n c e and, 
as such, the ' f a i r r e n t ' p r o v i s i o n s d i d not apply. The 
county court judge decided, de s p i t e the l a b e l s used, the 
agreement amounted to a tenancy. The l a n d l o r d appealed 
to the Court of Appeal which, f o l l o w i n g the more l i b e r a l 
approach which had been developed s i n c e the 1950s, 
decided the agreement was a l i c e n c e , because t h a t was 
what i t was intended to c r e a t e . However, on appeal to 
the House of L o r d s ( L o r d Scarman, L o r d K e i t h , L o r d 
Bridge, Lord Brightman and Lord Templeman), the court 
decided the agreement amounted to a tenancy. 
The judgement of the c o u r t was d e l i v e r e d by Lord 
TemplemarvC He s t a t e d t h a t e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i v e i s not 
d e c i s i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s w i t h r e s p e c t to r e s i d e n t i a l 
accommodation,where there i s an i n t e n t i o n to enter i n t o a 
le g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s given f o r 
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a f i x e d or p e r i o d i c term c e r t a i n i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a 
premium or p e r i o d i c a l payments, there i s a tenancy unless 
the r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e possession i s r e f e r a b l e to some 
l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p other than a tenancy so as to negative 
the grant of an e s t a t e i n land. Lord Templeman gave the 
foll o w i n g examples of the l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n ; p o s s e s s i o n 
under a c o n t r a c t f o r the s a l e of l a n d ; o c c u p a t i o n 
pursuant to a c o n t r a c t of employment; or occupation 
r e f e r a b l e to the holding of an o f f i c e . I n reviewing 
e a r l i e r cases, Lord Templeman over-ruled the d e c i s i o n i n 
MURRAY BULL AND CO v MURRAY (4)and disapproved of three 
more recent d e c i s i o n s , namely: SOMMA v HAZLEHURST ( 5 ) ; 
ALDRINGTON GARAGES LTD v FIELDER(6) and STUROLSON AND CO 
v WENIZ.(7) Many other d e c i s i o n s were explained. 
I t i s proposed to examine the cases s i n c e and i n c l u d i n g 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON i n which t h e t e s t f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a tenancy and a l i c e n c e has been 
i n i s s u e . The aim of t h i s e x e r c i s e i s t h r e e f o l d . 
F i r s t l y , to consider Lord Templeman's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the cases reviewed i n STREET v MOUNTFORD; secondly, to 
t r a c e the development of and a s c e r t a i n how l i b e r a l the 
t e s t f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between te n a n c i e s and l i c e n c e s 
had become; and f i n a l l y , to decide whether the t e s t s 
developed, and that c u r r e n t l y adopted, are workable. The 
maj o r i t y of cases i n which there i s a d i s c u s s i o n of the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between l e a s e s and l i c e n c e s are concerned 
with the Rent R e s t r i c t i o n Acts. However, s p e c i f i c p o i nts 
which a r i s e out of the consequences of the t e s t adopted, 
i n r e l a t i o n to s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n f o r tenants, the 
operation of the L i m i t a t i o n Acts or fa m i l y and domestic 
arrangements w i l l be d e f e r r e d u n t i l the a p p r o p r i a t e 
Section. 
In ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, Denning L . J . s t a t e d : "the t e s t 
Nevertheless, i t seems on the whole u n t i l the l a t e 1960s 
and e a r l y 1970s, the t e s t of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was 
s t i l l regarded as being of v i t a l importance. I t i s true 
to say that i n COBB v LANE, (9) Denning L . J . made no 
r e f e r e n c e to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
between a tenancy a t w i l l and a l i c e n c e . However, 
Somervell L . J . agreed with counsel's submission t h a t : 
"...where there i s e x c l u s i v e occupation f o r an 
i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d a t e n a n c y a t w i l l must be 
implied u n l e s s there i s something i n the f a c t s to 
prevent t h a t conclusion."(10) 
Despite the f a c t t h a t i n MURRAY BULL v MURRAY,(11) McNair 
J . f a i l e d to ask about e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , an example 
of the continued importance of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s 
seen i n the judgement of Jenkins L . J . where he s a i d , i n 
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ADDISCOMBE GARDEN PROPERTIES v CRABBE: 
"...the law remains t h a t the f a c t of e x c l u s i v e 
possession i f not d e c i s i v e a g a i n s t the view t h a t 
there i s a mere l i c e n c e as d i s t i n c t from a tenancy 
i s , a t a l l e v e n t s , a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of f i r s t 
importance."(12) 
and a l i t t l e l a t e r he added that e x c l u s i v e possession 
was : 
" . . . a t lowest a strong circumstance i n favour of 
the view t h a t there i s a tenancy as opposed to a 
l i c e n c e . " ( 1 3 ) 
The f i r s t r e a l s i g n s of a diminution i n the importance of 
the t e s t of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n can perhaps be detected 
i n the judgement of Lord Denning M.R. i n CRANE v MORRIS 
where he commented: 
" I t was a l s o s a i d that the d i f f e r e n c e between a 
l i c e n c e and a tenancy was t h a t i n a tenancy the 
occupier had e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n but on a l i c e n c e 
he had not e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . We have gone 
past those days. I t i s now w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a 
man may be a l i c e n s e e (and not tenant) even though 
he has e x c l u s i v e p ossession."(14) 
Once again i n ABBEYFIELD (HARPENDEN) SOCIETY LTD v WOODS, 
Lord Denning d i d not seem to emphasise e x c l u s i v e 
possession, f o r he s a i d : 
"The modern c a s e s show t h a t a man may be a 
l i c e n s e e even though he has e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , 
.... the court must look at the agreement as a 
intended."(15) 
However, the f i r s t c l e a r d e p a r t u r e from the prime 
importance of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , as a t e s t f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e s and l i c e n c e s , comes i n the 
judgement of Sachs L . J . i n BARNES v BARRETT where he s a i d 
of e x c l u s i v e possession: 
"That however i s a f a c t o r which i s no l o n g e r 
con c l u s i v e and indeed appears nowadays to have 
diminishing weight."(16) 
In the following year, i n SHELL MEX AND B.P. LTD v 
MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD, Lord Denning appears to support 
t h a t view when he s a i d : 
"At one time e x c l u s i v e possession was a d e c i s i v e 
35 
f a c t o r , but t h a t i s not so now. I t depends on 
broader c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a l t o g e t h e r . . . . " ( 1 7 ) 
F i n a l l y , i n MARCHANT v CHARTERS ( 1 8 ) , Lord Denning 
re l e g a t e d e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n to a mere f a c t o r to be 
considered along with other f a c t o r s such as whether the 
occupancy i s of a permanent or temporary nature, and the 
l a b e l the p a r t i e s put on the agreement. 
Given t h a t the t e s t of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n became of 
dimin i s h i n g importance i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e s 
and l i c e n c e s , i t i s necessary to consider the a l t e r n a t i v e 
t e s t which was developed to take i t s p l a c e . I n ERRINGTON 
v ERRINGTON, h a v i n g r e j e c t e d t h e t e s t of e x c l u s i v e 
possession as being d e c i s i v e , Denning L . J . concluded: 
"The r e s u l t of a l l these cases i s th a t although a 
person who i s l e t i n t o e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s 
prima f a c i e to be considered a tenant n e v e r t h e l e s s 
he w i l l not be held to be i f the circumstances 
negative any i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a tenancy."(19) 
This passage marks the ' b i r t h ' of the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n . 
The question then a r i s e s , i n t e n t i o n to do what? Denning 
L . J . went on to e x p l a i n : 
" I f the c i r c u m s t a n c e s and the conduct of the 
p a r t i e s show t h a t a l l t h a t was intended was a 
personal p r i v i l e g e with no i n t e r e s t i n land, he 
w i l l be held only to be a l i c e n s e e . . . . " ( 2 0 ) 
Was he r e a l l y saying, as the quotation suggests, t h a t 
d e s p i t e the f a c t t h at an agreement may s a t i s f y a l l the 
recognised c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a tenancy and so be an 
i n t e r e s t i n land, the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s can a l t e r 
with no i n t e r e s t i n land'. I f so the negative nature of 
l i c e n c e s r e l a t i n g to land has been l o s t . As the point 
was made i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , a l i c e n c e i n r e l a t i o n to 
land i s a judgement on what the i n t e r e s t i s not, r a t h e r 
than what i t might be. That such a f i n d i n g i s absurd was 
pointed out by Lord Templeman i n STREET v MOUNTFORD when 
he s a i d : 
the consequences i n law of the agreement, 
once concluded, can o n l y be determined by 
con s i d e r a t i o n of the e f f e c t of the agreement. I f 
the agreement s a t i s f i e d a l l the requirements of a 
tenancy, then the agreement produced a tenancy and 
the p a r t i e s cannot a l t e r the e f f e c t of the 
agreement by i n s i s t i n g t h a t they only c r e a t e d a 
l i c e n c e . The manufacture of a f i v e - p r o n g e d 
implement f o r manual digging r e s u l t s i n a fork 
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even i f the m a n u f a c t u r e r , u n f a m i l i a r w i t h the 
E n g l i s h language, i n s i s t s t h a t he intended to make 
and has made a spade."(21) 
To decide what Denning intended by h i s t e s t of i n t e n t i o n 
i t i s necessary to look a t the a u t h o r i t y he c i t e d to 
j u s t i f y applying such a t e s t . T h i s was i n f a c t the often 
quoted statement of Lord Greene M.R. i n BOOKER v PALMER: 
"There i s one golden r u l e which i s of very general 
a p p l i c a t i o n , namely t h a t the law does not impute 
i n t e n t i o n to enter i n t o l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s where 
the circumstances and the conduct of the p a r t i e s 
negative any i n t e n t i o n of the kind."(22) 
The f a c t s of BOOKER v PALMER have a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d 
(23) and i t was noted t h a t Denning erroneously r e f e r r e d 
to an arrangement between a c e r t a i n Mrs . G and the 
landowner as though i t was an arrangement between owner 
and occupier. From the context i n which Lord Greene made 
the above s t a t e m e n t i t i s q u i t e c l e a r he was not 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a tenancy and a l i c e n c e a t a l l ; 
he was merely deciding whether an arrangement between a 
c e r t a i n woman, who never took, and was never intended to 
take possession, of the cottage i n question, was intended 
to c r e a t e a l e g a l l y binding agreement so as to make her a 
tenant, or whether i t was merely a f r i e n d l y arrangement 
with no binding e f f e c t . Lord Templemah i n STREET v 
MOUNTFORD i n t e r p r e t e d Lord Greene's judgement i n t h i s way 
fo r he s a i d : / 
"The observations of Lord Greene M.R. were not 
d i r e c t e d to the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c o n t r a c t u a l 
tenancy and a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e . The conduct of 
the p a r t i e s (not t h e i r p r o f e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s ) 
i n ( ? i c ? t 9 c ' th.2.*- t ^ s " c?ic3. "ot i^te^c? to co n t r a c t at 
a l l . " ( 2 4 ) 
That t h i s i s a c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a l s o q u i t e 
apparent from the judgement of Lord Greene M.R. where he 
st a t e d : / 
"Whether or not the p a r t i e s intend to c r e a t e as 
between themselves the r e l a t i o n s h i p of l a n d l o r d 
and tenant under which an e s t a t e i s creat e d i n the 
tenant and c e r t a i n mutual o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s e by 
i m p l i c a t i o n of law, must i n the l a s t r e s o r t be a 
question of i n t e n t i o n . Where the p a r t i e s enter 
i n t o a formal document the i n t e n t i o n to enter i n t o 
formal l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s obvious; but when 
a l l t h a t happens i s a q u i t e c a s u a l conversation on 
the telephone i t i s very much more d i f f i c u l t to 
i n f e r t h a t the p a r t i e s were intending to enter a 
l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p a t a l l , and i n p a r t i c u l a r such 
a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p as l a n d l o r d and 
tenant,"(25) 
Thus i t would seem Denning/ was qu i t e wrong i f he was 
r e l y i n g on BOOKER' v__PALMER as a u t h o r i t y f o r the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e as opposed to a ( c o n t r a c t u a l ) tenancy 
as the question of i n t e n t i o n was t h a t of whether there 
was an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p a t 
a l l , the assumption being such an i n t e n t i o n was necessary 
f o r a tenancy. 
/ \ 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how Denning could have understood 
BOOKER v PALMER i n the way i t was" intended f o r he decided 
t h a t the p a r t i e s i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON were 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y the t e s t of 
i n t e n t i o n seems to be whether the p a r t i e s intended a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e g i v i n g only a 'personal p r i v i l e g e ' or 
a c o n t r a c t u a l t e n a n c y g i v i n g an i n t e r e s t i n l a n d . 
D e s p i t e t h i s , i n STREET v MOUNTFORD Lor d Templeman 
e x p l a i n e d the f i n d i n g of a l i c e n c e i n ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON on the b a s i s t h a t there was no i n t e n t i o n to 
enter a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
I t should be r e i t e r a t e d at t h i s point t h a t a t e s t of 
i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p can be ambiguous 
i n the context of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between owner and 
o c c u p i e r of l a n d , f o r whenever one p e r s o n i s i n 
p o s s e s s i o n of p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g t o a n o t h e r a l e g a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p must a r i s e be i t that of t r e s p a s s e r , owner, 
l i c e n s e e or tenant. T h i s point was made by Scarman L . J . 
i n HESLOP v BURNS(26) where he p o i n t e d out the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of l i c e n s e e l i c e n s o r i s i n a sense a l e g a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
To turn now to the next case i n which the t e s t of 
i n t e n t i o n was d i s c u s s e d , namely COBB v LANE.(27) T h i s 
was a L i m i t a t i o n Act case. An e l d e r s i s t e r had allowed 
her brother to l i v e i n a house bought i n her name. He 
had l i v e d i n i t f o r t h i r t e e n years before she died, 
l e a v i n g the property to someone e l s e . The executors 
consequently sought poss e s s i o n of the property from the 
brother who claimed to be a tenant a t w i l l and, as such, 
to have extinguished h i s s i s t e r ' s t i t l e to the property 
under the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939. Denning L . J . r e i t e r a t e d 
the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n he had l a i d down i n ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON. However, as the agreement between the brother 
and s i s t e r was o b v i o u s l y n o t h i n g more than a f a m i l y 
arrangement, the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n a p p l i e d by Denning 
could, i n r e l a t i o n to the f a c t s , be i n t e r p r e t e d to mean, 
was there any i n t e n t i o n to cr e a t e a l e g a l , c o n t r a c t u a l 
agreement? T h i s i s how the d e c i s i o n was i n t e r p r e t e d by 
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Lord Templeman i n STREET v MOUNTFORD. Moreover, when one 
turns to the d e c i s i o n which follows COBB v LANE, that of 
FACCHINI v BRYSON,(28) Denning a g a i n seemed to be 
applying the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n i n the manner i t was 
i n t e n d e d i n BOOKER v PALMER. I n the af o r e m e n t i o n e d 
case, an employer and h i s a s s i s t a n t had entered i n t o an 
agreement which allowed the a s s i s t a n t to occupy a house 
i n r e t u r n f o r a weekly payment, on terms which conferred 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . The a s s i s t a n t was c l e a r l y not a 
s e r v i c e occupier because he was not r e q u i r e d to be on the 
premises f o r the b e t t e r performance of h i s d u t i e s . The 
agreement ended w i t h the words, " n o t h i n g i n t h i s 
agreement s h a l l be construed to c r e a t e a tenancy between 
employer and a s s i s t a n t " . The Court of Appeal, 
nonetheless, decided the agreement was a tenancy. I n the 
c o u r s e of h i s judgment, Denning L . J . gave some 
e x p l a n a t i o n s about the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n . A f t e r 
r e f e r r i n g to the e a r l i e r cases of FOSTER v ROBINSON,(29) 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON and COBB v LANE, he s a i d : 
" I n a l l the cases where an occupier has been held 
to be a l i c e n s e e there has been something i n the 
circumstances such as a f a m i l y arrangement, an a c t 
of f r i e n d s h i p or g e n e r o s i t y or such l i k e t o 
n e g a t i v e any i n t e n t i o n t o c r e a t e a t e n a n c y 
"(30) 
He then added: 
". . . . the p a r t i e s cannot by mere words of t h e i r 
c o n t r a c t t u r n i t i n t o something e l s e . The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s determined by the law and not by 
the l a b e l which they choose to put on i t . " ( 3 1 ) 
I t would seem t h e r e f o r e t h a t , a t l e a s t i n FACCHINI v 
""YSON, Denninc r u ? s a o o l y i n g a d i f f e r e n t t e s t of 
i n t e n t i o n from t h a t which he a p p l i e d i n ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON. He had c e r t a i n l y modified h i s view, as was 
l a t e r o bserved by J e n k i n s L . J . i n ADDISCOMBE GARDEN 
PROPERTIES v CRABBE (32) when the l a t t e r expressed the 
view that ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON needed to be read s u b j e c t 
to the comments of Denning L . J . i n FACCHINI v BRYSON (as 
quoted above). The reason f o r Denning's apparent change 
of a t t i t u d e was t h a t on the f a c t s of FACCHINI v BRYSON he 
saw widespread evasion of the Rent A c t s . (33) On the 
o t h e r hand, i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, a f a m i l y 
arrangement case, he could at the time see no way of 
p r o t e c t i n g the occupation of the young couple other than 
by f i n d i n g a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e . Had he found a bare 
l i c e n c e , the agreement would have been revocable at law 
and the f i n d i n g of a tenancy, whether at w i l l or f o r a 
f i x e d term, was e q u a l l y f r a u g h t w i t h problems. H i s 
thoughts were b l i n k e r e d as to the scope a v a i l a b l e i n 
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equity f o r providing p r o t e c t i o n . ( 3 4 ) 
I t i s j u s t p o s s i b l e t h a t the statement of Denning L . J . i n 
FACCHINI v BRYSON i s not i n l i n e w i t h the t e s t of 
in t e n t i o n to enter i n t o a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s e t down i n 
BOOKER v PALMER by reason of Denning's refe r e n c e not only 
to 'family arrangements' and 'acts of f r i e n d s h i p ' , but 
a l s o to a c t s of generosity. What may be described as an 
act of generosity i s qu i t e c o n s i s t e n t with a c o n t r a c t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , as i s c l e a r from an examination of CRANE v 
MORRIS (35) and ABBEYFIELD (HARPENDEN) SOCIETY LTD v 
WOODS. (36) The f a c t s of CRANE v MORRIS i n some ways 
resemble those of MARCROFT WAGONS LTD v SMITH. The 
defendant l i v e d i n a cottage r e n t f r e e as an employee of 
the p l a i n t i f f . He l a t e r obtained f a c t o r y work and the 
p l a i n t i f f farmer allowed him to s t a y on i n the cottage 
u n t i l the end of the month. When t h i s p e r i o d had 
expired, the defendant refused to leave and claimed to 
have s e c u r i t y of tenure on account of h i s s t a t u s as a 
tenant. The Court of Appeal decided he was merely a 
l i c e n s e e . C l e a r l y , a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p had 
e x i s t e d between the p l a i n t i f f and the defendant. 
ABBEYFIELD (HARPENDEN) SOCIETY LTD. v WOODS was concerned 
with an old people's home run by a c h a r i t y . Again there 
was a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p l a i n t i f f s and 
the defendant i n that an unfurnished room was l e t to the 
defendant at a weekly payment, with a p r o v i s i o n t h a t the 
Soc i e t y had d i s c r e t i o n to take p o s s e s s i o n on one month's 
no t i c e . The So c i e t y sought to e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n 
and the question arose, i n connection with the i s s u e of 
s e c u r i t y of t e n u r e , as to whether the e x c l u s i v e 
possession of the room was as a l i c e n s e e or tenant. The 
Court of Appeal d e c i d e d the defendant was merely a 
l i c e n s e e , because, i n the words of Lord Denning, the 
a r f r 9 6 T N 9 N ^ - T.Tac? " a TTO. "v~ T T p o r c A n a 1 :=> r r a n r f o m o n f " TAT H a +- Q 
meant by a " p e r s o n a l " arrangement i s u n c l e a r but i t 
c e r t a i n l y d i d not mean a non-contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Perhaps "personal" was a ref e r e n c e to the f a c t t h a t the 
home was not run on a commercial b a s i s but as a c h a r i t y , 
"personal" t h e r e f o r e meaning non-commercial. C e r t a i n l y 
the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n a p p l i e d i s not one of whether there 
was an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p but the 
t e s t of i n t e n t i o n has s h i f t e d to become a t e s t of whether 
the arrangement was intended to be 'personal' or not. I n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD, Lord Templeman c o n s i d e r e d the 
pr o v i s i o n of board and s e r v i c e s i n the case to make the 
occupier a lodger. C e r t a i n l y , i t i s apparent from the 
judgement of Lord Denning, the court was in f l u e n c e d by 
the f a c t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was p r o v i d e d w i t h 
considerable s e r v i c e s , meals and a r e s i d e n t housekeeper, 
but t h i s d id not lead him to discount a f i n d i n g of 
e x c l u s i v e possession. A s i m i l a r approach was taken by 
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Lord Denning i n the l a t e r case of MARCHANT v CHARTERS, 
(37) which L o r d Templeman c o n s i d e r e d t o be o n l y 
s u s t a i n a b l e on the grounds t h a t the o c c u p i e r was a 
'lodger'. I n that case, a b e d - s i t t i n g room was occupied 
on terms that the l a n d l o r d cleaned the rooms d a i l y and 
provided c l e a n l i n e n each week. I t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t 
Lord Templeman s a i d of MARCHANT v CHARTERS t h a t a 
consequence of the occupier being a lodger was th a t he 
did not have e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . He did not, however, 
make t h i s c l e a r i n h i s a n a l y s i s of ABBEYFIELD (HARPENDEN) 
SOCIETY LTD. v WOODS, although he d i d say e a r l i e r i n h i s 
judgement: 
" E x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s not d e c i s i v e because an 
occupier who enjoys e x c l u s i v e possession i s not 
n e c e s s a r i l y a t e n a n t . The o c c u p i e r may be a 
lodger or s e r v i c e o c cupier...."(38) 
Yet on the other hand, when, l a t e r i n h i s judgement, Lord 
Templeman summarised the p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down, he does 
not mention lodgers i n h i s c a t e g o r i e s of s i t u a t i o n s where 
t h e r e i s a g r a n t of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n but the 
surrounding circumstances suggest a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
other than a tenancy. Are we to conclude, t h e r e f o r e , a 
lo d g e r may be i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i n some 
circumstances and not others? I f so, given t h a t the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of f i r s t i mportance i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e i s once a g a i n t o be 
e x c l u s i v e possession, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the concept of 
a lodger would seem to be most unhelpful. Perhaps the 
problem once a g a i n l i e s w i t h a f a i l u r e to d e f i n e 
p r e c i s e l y the c r u c i a l term ' e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n ' , and a 
tendency to confuse i t with e x c l u s i v e occupation or s o l e 
p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t ( 3 9 ) . There appear t o be t h r e e 
s i t u a t i o n s : 
( i ) an occupier may be i n e x c l u s i v e occupation with no 
co n t r a c t u a l or other r i g h t to be there. T h i s i s 
c o n s i s t e n t with the f i n d i n g of a l i c e n c e although 
formerly i t would have been regarded as a tenancy 
at w i l l ; or 
( i i ) an o c c u p i e r may have ___§___£. i-g.h.t~ - t - o — e x c l u s i v e 
o c c u p a t i o n but no e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n as 
' coniTro"F r of the p r e m i s e s remains w i t h t h e 
fr e e h o l d e r / l a n d l o r d . T h i s , i t i s submitted, i n 
the case of r e s i d e n t i a l premises, i s the lodger 
s i t u a t i o n . Whether such a f i n d i n g can be made i n 
cases other than t h a t of the lodger i s debateable. 
I n CRANCOUR v DA SILVAESA (40) Ralph Gibson L . J . 
expressed the view t h a t i n the case of r e s i d e n t i a l 
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accommodation, where an occupier was i n e x c l u s i v e 
o c c u p a t i o n and t h e r e were no a t t e n d a n c e and 
s e r v i c e s , i n the absence of e x c e p t i o n a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o u t l i n e d by Lord Templeman, a 
tenancy must be found. However,it i s i m p l i c i t i n 
the judgment of N i c h o l l s L . J i n the same case t h a t 
f a c t o r s other than attendance and s e r v i c e s may 
negate a f i n d i n g of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . He was 
influeunced by c l a u s e s i n the " l i c e n c e " agreement 
such as t h a t p r o v i d i n g the o c c u p i e r was o n l y 
authorised to use the room i n question f o r twenty 
two and a h a l f out of twenty four hours, and t h a t 
s t a t i n g that management and c o n t r o l were vested i n 
the l i c e n s o r . S i m i l a r l y i n ROYAL PHILANTHROPIC 
SOCIETY v COUNTY(41), the f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t from 
the judgment of Fox L . J s u g g e s t s t h e r e a r e 
circumstances other than that of the lodger i n 
which an occupier has e x c l u s i v e occupation but no 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n as the l a n d l o r d r e t a i n s 
" c o n t r o l " . I n t r y i n g to d e c i d e whether the 
occupier i n question was a tenant he observed: 
"He p l a i n l y was not a lodger; no s e r v i c e s 
were p r o v i d e d , and the l a n d l o r d d i d not 
r e t a i n u n r e s t r i c t e d access to the premises or 
otherwise have e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of them." 
(42) 
Furthermore outside the r e s i d e n t i a l sphere where 
the l o d g e r concept i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e , L o r d 
Templeman's a n a l y s i s of SHELL MEX AND B.P LTD. v 
MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD.(43) which he explained on 
the b a s i s t h a t no r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e possession 
had been granted, would seem to be a s i t u a t i o n 
where an o c c u p i e r has the r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e 
nnpnnaH nn Knf n «-> ovnlnci i fo nnocoscinn a. <3 t" Vl O 
£ - - — • — i. l a n d l o r d r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l . F i n a l l y 
( i i i ) An o c c u p i e r may have a r i g h t t o e x c l u s i v e 
possession i f a con t r a c t a r i s e s and rent i s paid; 
t h i s , according to Lord Templeman i n STREET v 
MOUNTFORD i s o n l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a tenancy, 
s u b j e c t to the s p e c i a l c a t e g o r i e s of s i t u a t i o n s 
where the surrounding circumstances negative the 
c r e a t i o n of a tenancy. 
I t should be noted at t h i s point t h a t Lord Templeman's 
s p e c i a l circumstances i n c l u d e "occupancy pursuant to a 
contr a c t of employment or occupancy r e f e r a b l e to the 
holding of an o f f i c e " . ( 4 4 ) T h i s f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e s h i s 
f a i l u r e to consider c a r e f u l l y the notion of e x c l u s i v e 
possession; a s e r v i c e occupier i s another category of 
person who, though g e n e r a l l y i n e x c l u s i v e occupation of 
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property, does not have e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , as h i s 
occupancy i s t r e a t e d as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h i s employer. 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e misTe~ad±ng to consider s e r v i c e occupiers 
under the heading of s i t u a t i o n s where a l i c e n c e may be 
found to e x i s t even though there has been a grant of 
e x c l u s i v e possession. 
I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the d e c i s i o n i n STREET v 
MOUNTFORD does not r e s t o r e the t e s t of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e to e x a c t l y the t r a d i t i o n a l 
p o s i t i o n . As has been s e e n , ( 4 5 ) i n the n i n e t e e n t h 
century, s o l e possession i n f a c t was g e n e r a l l y found to 
give r i s e to a t minimum a tenancy at w i l l . L a t e r a 
d i s t i n c t i o n seems t o have a r i s e n between e x c l u s i v e 
occupation i n f a c t and a r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e occupation, 
only the l a t t e r being regarded as e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . 
Lord Templeman appears i n p a r t s of h i s judgement to take 
t h i s one step f u r t h e r by providing the r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e 
o c c u p a t i o n may not be e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i f the 
' l a n d l o r d ' r e t a i n s ' c o n t r o l ' of the p r e m i s e s i n the 
sense, at l e a s t , of providing s e r v i c e s and attendance. 
In t h i s case, the occupation i s as a lodger. I t i s 
sub m i t t e d t h a t t h i s new c a t e g o r y , of a l o d g e r , i s 
unhelpful and p o s s i b l y c a r r i e s dangers with i t . The t e s t 
of 'lodger' has, i n the p a s t , been appl i e d f o r d i f f e r e n t 
purposes and found to be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y as i t s meaning 
changed from time to time with s o c i a l circumstances, 
l e a d i n g t o a r b i t r a r y r e s u l t s . ( 4 6 ) Furthermore, i t i s 
p o s s i b l e t h at the very vague t e s t of i n t e n t i o n s e t down 
i n MARCHANT v CHARTERS (47) and r e j e c t e d by the House of 
Lords, by which the "nature and q u a l i t y " of the occupancy 
i s considered i n order to decide whether a 'personal 
permission to occupy' ( l i c e n c e ) or an ' i n t e r e s t i n land' 
(tenancy) i s created, may r e v i v e and become the c r i t e r i a , 
not f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e as 
such, but, c's step relieved to decide T',7het^er t^e^e i s 
e x c l u s i v e possession or not. The very r e a l danger of 
t h i s approach i s apparent from Lord Templeman's statement 
on MARCHANT v CHARTERS: 
"But i n my opinion, i n order to a s c e r t a i n the 
nature and q u a l i t y of the occupancy and to see 
whether the occupier has or has not a stake i n the 
room or only permission f o r himself p e r s o n a l l y to 
occupy, the court must decide whether on i t s t r u e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n the agreement confers on the occupier 
e x c l u s i v e possession."(48) 
The danger i s a l s o apparent from an examination of the 
de c i s i o n s where the courts have t r i e d to define a lodger. 
For example i n MORTON v PALMER, a lodger i s defined by 
Li n d l e y L . J . as: 
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"a personal r e l a t i o n of someone lodging somewhere 
with somebody...."(49) 
and i n NESS v STEPHENSON, F i e l d J . , i n a speech somewhat 
r e m i n i s c e n t of L o r d Denning's s t a t e m e n t of the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e i n MARCHANT v 
CHARTERS s a i d : 
" I t i s reasonably c l e a r t h a t the mere r i g h t of 
e x c l u s i v e occupation.... i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t with 
the e x i s t e n c e of the r e l a t i o n of l a n d l o r d and 
lodger, nor does the f a c t t h a t the la n d l o r d does 
not e i t h e r by himself or h i s agent s l e e p or r e s i d e 
i n the house p r e v e n t the e x i s t e n c e of t h a t 
r e l a t i o n , so a l s o the nature or extent of the 
landlord's enjoyment of the po r t i o n of the house 
r e t a i n e d by him or the separate and unc o n t r o l l e d 
power of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s g r a n t e d t o the 
respondent by the use of a door other than the 
front or shop door w i l l not prevent the e x i s t e n c e 
of the r e l a t i o n . Neither i s i t m a t e r i a l t h a t the 
l a n d l o r d does not r e n d e r any s e r v i c e t o h i s 
tenant. A l l these are matters which may be taken 
i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r the purpose of answering 
the q u e s t i o n t o be d e c i d e d , but t h e y a r e a l l 
c o n s i s t e n t with the r e t a i n i n g of such c o n t r o l and 
dominion over the house by the la n d l o r d as i s 
u s u a l l y r e t a i n e d by m a s t e r s of houses l e t i n 
lo d g i n g s as d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from l a n d l o r d s 
a b s o l u t e l y l e t t i n g the tenements, and t h a t 
r e t e n t i o n of c o n t r o l and dominion i n d i c a t e s the 
ex i s t e n c e of the r e l a t i o n of l a n d l o r d and lodger 
between himself and h i s tenants."(50) 
I t may w e l l be such ambiguity and confusion could be 
le a s e and l i c e n c e , the c r u c i a l c r i t e r i a were those of 
"att e n d a n c e and s e r v i c e s " . T h i s appears to be the 
approach ta k e n by the Court of Appeal i n ROYAL 
PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETY V COUNTY where Fox L . J . s a i d : 
"He w i l l be a lodger i f the l a n d l o r d provides 
attendances or s e r v i c e s which r e q u i r e the la n d l o r d 
or h i s s e r v a n t s to have u n r e s t r i c t e d a ccess to the 
premises."(51) 
and moreover, went on to warn t h a t i t i s not a question 
of what the agreement for m a l l y s t a t e s but the substance 
of the matter i n a l l the circumstances. T h i s has not 
been applied i n CRANCOUR LTD. v DA SILVAESA (52) where a 
cla u s e i n an agreement, c a l l e d a l i c e n c e , r eserved to the 
l i c e n s o r possession, management and c o n t r o l of the room 
and gave him an absolute r i g h t of entry a t a l l times f o r 
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the purpose of providing attendances and enabling him to 
remove f u r n i t u r e . The l i c e n s o r was to provide, i n t e r 
a l i a , a housekeeper, window c l e a n i n g , room c l e a n i n g , 
laundering and bed l i n e n and c o l l e c t i o n of rubbish. On 
ev i d e n c e t h a t the r e l e v a n t c l a u s e s had neve r been 
e n f o r c e d , the Court of Appeal con c l u d e d t h a t the 
p r o v i s i o n s were "shams" and a c c o r d i n g l y d e c i d e d the 
occupiers were tenants not lodgers, as they would have 
been had the agreements represented the agreement between 
the p a r t i e s . ( 5 3 ) 
To r e t u r n now to a c t s of gen e r o s i t y and benevolence. I t 
has been seen t h a t t h e House of Lor d s i n STREET v 
MOUNTFORD did not regard ABBEYFIELD (HARPENDEN) SOCIETY v 
WOODS (54) as a case where an occupier had a r i g h t to 
e x c l u s i v e possession. However, the question a r i s e s as to 
whether a c t s of gene r o s i t y or benevolence alone, i n an 
o t h e r w i s e c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p where e x c l u s i v e 
possession i s granted, w i l l be taken to cr e a t e l i c e n c e s 
s i n c e the d e c i s i o n i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, f o r , i f such 
a c t s are not t r e a t e d i n some d i f f e r e n t way, as Evershed 
M.R. pointed out i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD.v SMITH 
"land l o r d s , who have ordinary human i n s t i n c t s of 
k i n d l i n e s s and courtesy, may often be a f r a i d to 
a l l o w a t e n a n t the b e n e f i t of th o s e n a t u r a l 
i n s t i n c t s i n case i t may afterwards turn out th a t 
the t e n a n t a c q u i r e d a p o s i t i o n from which he 
cannot subsequently be dislodged."(55) 
Contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n v o l v i n g generosity or an a c t 
of benevolence were not included i n Lord Templeman's 
ca t e g o r i e s of s p e c i a l circumstances but, a t the same 
time, there i s nothing to suggest that h i s l o r d s h i p was 
l a y i n g down a c l o s e d l i s t of ex c e p t e d c a t e g o r i e s . 
Templeman viewed the d e c i s i o n i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v 
SMITH, which involved an a c t of gene r o s i t y , as a case of 
no i n t e n t i o n to cre a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p a t a l l . With 
re s p e c t , t h i s appears t o t a l l y unfounded, given the f a c t s 
and judgements i n th a t case. I t would seem t h a t payment 
and acceptance of rent f o r a period of s i x months between 
p a r t i e s a t arm's length must give r i s e to a c o n t r a c t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . The o n l y o t h e r c a s e where t h e r e i s 
a r g u a b l y a c o n t r a c t u a l arrangement and an a c t of 
'generosity' i s FOSTER v ROBINSON (56) where occupation 
was found to be as l i c e n s e e . T h i s was not c i t e d i n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD but i t may w e l l have been t r e a t e d (as 
i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH), as a c a s e of no 
in t e n t i o n to cre a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thus, u n l e s s 
the c o u r t s a r e p r e p a r e d t o extend the c a t e g o r i e s of 
s p e c i a l circumstances i t seems landlords may w e l l have to 
supress t h e i r ordinary human i n s t i n c t s of k i n d l i n e s s and 
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courtesy, l e s t they are to be i n danger of g i v i n g more 
than they intended. 
R e t u r n i n g to the r e v i e w of c a s e s s i n c e ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON, the next d e c i s i o n of s i g n i f i c a n c e , f o l l o w i n g 
FACCHINI v BRYSON, was MURRAY BULL v MURRAY. (57) T h i s 
f i r s t i n s t a n c e d e c i s i o n a ppears to mark a dr a m a t i c 
departure from e a r l i e r c a s e s . The f a c t s involved an 
a c t i o n f o r p o s s e s s i o n of a f l a t a f t e r a c o n t r a c t u a l 
tenant had held over paying a q u a r t e r l y r e n t . There was 
a d e f i n i t e i n t e n t i o n to e n t e r i n t o a c o n t r a c t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of some s o r t or ano t h e r c o n c e r n i n g 
occupation of the f l a t , but McNair J . found t h a t d e s p i t e 
the grant of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n : 
"Both p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
should be th a t of l i c e n s e e and no more.... The 
primary c o n s i d e r a t i o n on both s i d e s was th a t the 
defendant as occupant of th a t f l a t should not be a 
con t r o l l e d tenant."(58) 
Whereas i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, the Court of Appeal 
somewhat vaguely a p p l i e d a t e s t of i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a 
personal p r i v i l e g e as opposed to an i n t e r e s t i n land, 
McNair J . i s c l e a r and d i r e c t . Consequently he decided 
the defendant was merely a l i c e n s e e . I n e f f e c t , he was 
not only allowing the p a r t i e s to co n t r a c t out of the Rent 
Acts but a l s o accepting t h a t the p a r t i e s can a l t e r the 
l e g a l e f f e c t s of t h e i r agreement by forming an 
al t e r n a t i v e i n t e n t i o n . T h i s , as has alrea d y been pointed 
out, (59) makes nonsense. I t i s t h e r e f o r e not s u r p r i s i n g 
that the House of Lords, i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, overruled 
the d e c i s i o n i n MURRAY BULL v MURRAY. 
In GRAND JUNCTION CO v BATES,(60) where the d i s t i n c t i o n 
h o f U Q o n 1 "i r * Q n c niTi f onartf v-r\a a c? a enViei a v—tr -i c c n a 
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a s i m i l a r view of the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n to th a t expressed 
i n MURRAY BULL v MURRAY appears to have been taken. Once 
again there was c l e a r l y a c o n t r a c t u a l agreement ( a l b e i t a 
temporary one) between the p a r t i e s involved concerning 
occupation. Upjohn J . commented of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n 
and payment of ren t : 
" N e i t h e r of t h e s e f a c t o r s i s d e c i s i v e but 
a u t h o r i t i e s make i t c l e a r t h a t prima f a c i e the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of la n d l o r d and tenant i s cre a t e d , 
but the p a r t i e s may, of course, have expressed 
some d i f f e r e n t i n t e n t i o n , such that i t would only 
be a l i c e n c e f o r a l i m i t e d time."(61) 
In the next three c a s e s , ADDISCOMBE GARDEN PROPERTIES v 
CRABBE,(62) BRACEY v READ (63) and FINBOW v AIR 
MINISTRY,(64) there appears to be a re t u r n to the more 
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t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t of the d i s t i n c t i o n between l e a s e and 
l i c e n c e , g r e a t e r importance being attached to e x c l u s i v e 
possession. T h i s may w e l l be because these cases do not 
involve r e s i d e n t i a l property.(65) 
Considering f i r s t l y , the d e c i s i o n i n ADDISCOMBE GARDEN 
ESTATES v CRABBE: the case was concerned with whether 
occupation of a t e n n i s court i n r e t u r n f o r p e r i o d i c a l 
payments amounted to a b u s i n e s s t e n a n c y under the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. E x t e n s i v e r e l i a n c e was 
placed on the judgement of Denning L . J . i n FACCHINI v 
BRYSON, i n which, i t has a l r e a d y been observed, Jenkins 
L . J . noted t h a t a narrower view of the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n 
was taken than that expressed i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON. 
Also, g r e a t e r emphasis i s put on e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . 
However, des p i t e t h i s , both Jenkins L . J . and Parker L . J . 
go through, c l a u s e by c l a u s e , what i s q u i t e obviously a 
c o n t r a c t u a l document to decide whether a tenancy or a 
l i c e n c e i s created. T h i s process i s explained by Lord 
Templeman i n STREET v MOUNTFORD as being necessary to 
decide whether e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was granted at a l l . 
But some of the statements of Jenkins L . J . do seem to 
suggest that a wider t e s t of i n t e n t i o n i s being a p p l i e d . 
For example, he s a i d of the d i s t i n c t i o n between a tenancy 
and a l i c e n c e : 
" I t does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t a document 
described as a l i c e n c e i s , merely on t h a t account, 
to be regarded as amounting only to a l i c e n c e i n 
law. The whole document must be looked at and 
a f t e r i t has been examined the r i g h t conclusion 
appears to be t h a t whatever l a b e l may have been 
attached to i t , i t i n f a c t conferred and imposed 
on the g r a n t e e i n s u b s t a n c e the r i g h t s and 
o b l i g a t i o n s of a tenant, and on the grantor i n 
s u b s t ^ r c ? t ^  9 r i c ^ t s s.n c[ o ^ l i c s t i o n ? of 5 
landl o r d , then i t must be given the appropriate 
e f f e c t , t h a t i s to say, i t must be t r e a t e d as a 
t e n a n c y agreement as d i s t i n c t from a mere 
l i c e n c e . " ( 6 6 ) 
The very f a c t that he was prepared to e n t e r t a i n t h a t a 
document of t h i s nature could c r e a t e merely a l i c e n c e 
suggests he conceived i t i s p o s s i b l e to be a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . However i t i s p o s s i b l e 
that the terms of the document are examined to a s c e r t a i n 
whether or not e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n has been given. Thus, 
although the d e c i s i o n a p p l i e s a s t r i c t e r t e s t than t h a t 
a p p l i e d i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e cases immediately preceding 
i t , i t i s questionable whether there had been a complete 
r e t u r n to FACCHINI v BRYSON. 
BRACEY v READ(67) concerned an arrangement whereby the 
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p l a i n t i f f agreed to " l e t or l e a s e " to the defendant the 
r i g h t to t r a i n and e x e r c i s e racehorses on the ga l l o p s 
belonging to the defendant, the question being whether 
the agreement f e l l w i t h i n the c o n t r o l of the Landlord and 
Tenant Act 1954 so as to c r e a t e a business tenancy. 
Cross J . decided a tenancy was create d and was somewhat 
doubtful about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l i c e n c e where there 
was c l e a r l y e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n granted and an i n t e n t i o n 
to c r e a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r he s a i d : 
" I n the case of a business t r a n s a c t i o n l i k e t h i s , 
I think that the question of whether a man ought 
to be considered a l i c e n s e e or a tenant depends 
p r i n c i p a l l y , i f not e n t i r e l y , on whether he has 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of the p r o p e r t y i n 
question."(68) 
The other d e c i s i o n which seems to apply a s t r i c t e r t e s t 
of i n t e n t i o n during t h i s period i s FINBOW v AIR MINISTRY. 
(69) T h i s f i r s t i n s t a n c e d e c i s i o n concerned a l i c e n c e to 
occupy and use as a g r i c u l t u r a l land portions of s e r v i c e 
a i r f i e l d s no longer used f o r a c t i v e m i l i t a r y operations. 
The agreements were des c r i b e d as l i c e n c e s ; i f they were 
tenancies the r i g h t s of the occupants would be governed 
by the A g r i c u l t u r a l H o l d i n g s A ct 1948. McNair J . 
summarised what he saw to be the e f f e c t of e a r l i e r 
d e c i s i o n s on the d i s t i n c t i o n between a tenancy and a 
l i c e n c e (making an i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r a s t with h i s d e c i s i o n 
i n MURRAY BULL v MURRAY), and concluded they e s t a b l i s h e d 
t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s : ( i ) t h a t the agreement must be 
c o n s t r u e d as a whole and t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
determined by the law and not by the l a b e l s which the 
p a r t i e s put on i t though the l a b e l i s a f a c t o r to be 
taken i n t o account i n determining the true r e l a t i o n s h i p ; 
( i i ) t h a t the grant of e x c l u s i v e possession, i f not 
^ f ^ n o l ^ n c T ^ T r ^ si f t -i n c« +- 4- V> r> tr A AT.T 4- V-« +- 4- V» /-\ >~*rv -i o m tr* -r- m 1 •! r t Q n n o 
i s a t any r a t e a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of f i r s t i m portance; 
( i i i ) (quoting from FACCHINI v BRYSON) i n a l l the cases 
where a l i c e n c e has been found there has been "a fami l y 
arrangement, a c t of f r i e n d s h i p or gen e r o s i t y or such 
l i k e " , which negatives an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a tenancy. 
On the f a c t s , he decided t h i s was a s p e c i a l circumstance, 
w i t h i n FACCHINI v BRYSON, as the occupied land was p a r t 
of a Royal A i r Force a i r f i e l d and the S e c r e t a r y of State 
had no power to grant a tenancy. He went on to e x p l a i n , 
had the landowner been a p r i v a t e landowner, then he would 
have found a tenancy to have been granted. I t i s not 
t o t a l l y c l e a r where t h i s d e c i s i o n , and other d e c i s i o n s 
where the grantor was found to have no power to grant a 
tenancy, stand i n the l i g h t of STREET v MOUNTFORD, as 
they were not d i s c u s s e d by the House of Lords. However, 
maybe t h e y f a l l w i t h i n t h e c a t e g o r i e s of s i t u a t i o n 
o u t l i n e d by Lord Templeman, i n which an occupant may be 
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i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n but the surrounding circumstances 
show that the r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s r e f e r a b l e 
to a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p other than a tenancy. T h i s i s s u e 
w i l l be considered f u r t h e r i n a l a t e r S e c t i o n . ( 7 0 ) 
A f t e r the arguably s t r i c t e r approach of the l a s t three 
d e c i s i o n s , a more l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e seems to be once again 
r e v i v e d i n ABBEYFIELD (HARPENDEN) SOCIETY v WOODS (71) 
and i n BARNES v BARRETT,(72) where a l i c e n c e was found to 
e x i s t d e s p i t e e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n and an i n t e n t i o n to 
c r e a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . E x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of p a r t 
of a house, i n c l u d i n g the k i t c h e n of the house, had been 
given to the defendant i n r e t u r n f o r the s e r v i c e s of 
c l e a n i n g and cooking and payment of gas and f u e l b i l l s 
f o r the whole of the house. No monetary sum described as 
a rent was payable. The question before the court, on 
the death of the owner of the house, was whether the 
defendant had a tenancy or a l i c e n c e to occupy f o r the 
purpose of Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . The Court of Appeal 
( S a c h s , R u s s e l l and C r o s s L . J J . ) c o n c l u d e d the 
arrangement was c l o s e l y akin to a f a m i l y arrangement to 
share a house and t h e r e f o r e occupation was by means of a 
personal l i c e n c e . ( 7 3 ) I t i s submitted t h a t the s i t u a t i o n 
was very d i f f e r e n t from a family arrangement i n one v i t a l 
r e s p e c t , namely there was c l e a r l y an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e 
a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Moreover, the explanation given by 
Sachs L . J . f o r the f i n d i n g of a p e r s o n a l l i c e n c e seems 
erroneous. He asked what the p o s i t i o n would have been 
had the defendant been unable to provide s e r v i c e s through 
permanent i l l n e s s or death or had simply been u n w i l l i n g 
to do so. He concluded t h a t , i n the event, both p a r t i e s 
would have i n t e n d e d the defendant s h o u l d l e a v e . 
Otherwise, with the s i t u a t i o n as i t was, the deceased 
would have been l e f t w i t h o u t a k i t c h e n or a cook. 
Surely, however, i f the s e r v i c e s e t c . were capable of 
defendant f a i l e d or been unable to provide the s e r v i c e s , 
t h i s would be a breach of covenant and, as such, a ground 
f o r repossession i n accordance with the procedure s e t 
down by S.146 Law of P r o p e r t y Act 1925. I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g to consider where t h i s case which was not 
c i t e d stands s i n c e the d e c i s i o n i n STREET v MOUNTFORD. 
I t would seem to f a l l w i t h i n Lord Templeman's 'lodger' 
category, i n the sense that although the defendant had i n 
f a c t e x c l u s i v e occupation of p a r t of the house, 'control* 
remained with the owner. Accordingly, the defendant was 
not i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n . 
The Court of Appeal d e c i s i o n i n SHELL MEX AND B.P. LTD v 
MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD. (75) c o n t i n u e d the o v e r t 
departure from the p r i n c i p l e t h a t , apart from e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n , the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n t o c r e a t e a l e g a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p was the major f a c t o r used by the courts to 
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d i s t i n g u i s h between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e . The case 
concerned a c o n t r a c t u a l arrangement i n the form of a 
document described as a l i c e n c e i n which the defendants 
were given the r i g h t to occupy premises i n r e t u r n f o r a 
rent and an agreement to buy the p l a i n t i f f ' s p e t r o l . 
C e r t a i n l y , a l l t h r e e judges i n the C o u r t of Appeal 
expressed the view t h a t no e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n had been 
granted on account of a c l a u s e i n the agreement which 
p r o v i d e d t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s remained i n p o s s e s s i o n 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the agreement, a l t h o u g h B u c k l e y L . J . 
seemed to have some doubts as to whether the p l a i n t i f f s 
r e a l l y maintained p o s s e s s i o n or whether t h i s was simply a 
device to avoid the consequences of the Landlord and 
Tenant Act 1954. (76) Nevertheless the court, and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r Lord Denning, d i d give a f u l l explanation as 
to how i t approached d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a tenancy and 
a l i c e n c e . Lord Denning s a i d : 
" I t u r n , t h e r e f o r e , t o the p o i n t ; was t h i s 
t r a n s a c t i o n a l i c e n c e or a tenancy? T h i s does not 
depend on the l a b e l which i s put on i t . I t 
depends on the nature of the t r a n s a c t i o n i t s e l f 
.... Broadly speaking, we have to see whether i t 
i s a personal p r i v i l e g e given to a person i n which 
case i t i s a l i c e n c e , or whether i t grants an 
i n t e r e s t i n land, i n which case i t i s a tenancy. 
At one time e x c l u s i v e possession was a d e c i s i v e 
f a c t o r , but t h a t i s not so. I t depends on broader 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a l t o g e t h e r . P r i m a r i l y on whether 
i t i s personal i n i t s nature or not...."(77) 
C l e a r l y , the Court of Appeal was prepared to e n t e r t a i n 
the i d e a of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n . The t e s t of i n t e n t i o n n e c e s s a r y f o r a 
t e n a n c y as compared w i t h a l i c e n c e was t h e r e f o r e 
e n t e r i n t o a c o n t r a c t u a l agreement f o r e x c l u s i v e 
possession. Neither was the i n t e n t i o n to grant e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n i t s e l f . I f t h e s e two fundamental 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a l e a s e were not at the centre of the 
t e s t of i n t e n t i o n , what was? I n the words of Lord 
Denning, i t depended on "broader c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " . A f t e r 
making t h i s statement he then proceeded to consider the 
various c l a u s e s of the agreement and thereby to adopt the 
"substance t e s t " approach which seems to have i t s o r i g i n s 
i n the judgement of Lord J u s t i c e Somervell i n FACCHINI v 
BRYSON, where he s t a t e d : 
" I f l o o k i n g a t the o p e r a t i v e c l a u s e s i n the 
agreement one comes to the conclusion t h a t the 
r i g h t s of the occupier.... are those of l e s s e e , 
the p a r t i e s cannot t u r n i t i n t o a l i c e n c e by 
s a y i n g a t the end, " t h i s i s deemed to be a 
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l i c e n c e . " ( 7 8 ) 
A s i m i l a r approach was a l s o adopted by the Court of 
Appeal i n ADDISCOMBE GARDEN ESTATES v CRABBE.(79) I n 
that case, Jenkins L . J . s a i d i t was a matter of deciding 
whether the agreement imposed " i n substance the r i g h t s 
and o b l i g a t i o n s of a tenant" and " i n substance the r i g h t s 
and o b l i g a t i o n s of a land l o r d " . ( 8 0 ) There are, however, 
a number of drawbacks to t h i s approach. F i r s t l y , i f t h i s 
kind of t e s t i s ap p l i e d i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand i n 
what sense the term ' i n t e n t i o n ' i s used. I t cannot mean 
the a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s i n the sense of the 
goal the p a r t i e s are aiming f o r i n making the agrement, 
s i n c e the aim of the i n t e n t i o n i s a l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 
namely, e i t h e r a tenancy c l a s s i f i e d as an i n t e r e s t i n 
land, or a l i c e n c e , not t r a d i t i o n a l l y c l a s s i f i e d as an 
i n t e r e s t i n land. P a r t i e s do not normally intend to 
contract to cr e a t e a p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a 
property r i g h t but are concerned with the consequences of 
such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . For example, one does not wish an 
agreement by deed f o r a r i g h t of way to be an easement 
f o r the sake of being given the l e g a l l a b e l of a l e g a l 
easement, but because i t c r e a t e s a r i g h t enforceable 
against a l l t h i r d p a r t i e s . 
The question then a r i s e s , i f i n t e n t does not r e f e r to the 
a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s , does i t r e f e r to the 
nominal i n t e n t i o n a s c e r t a i n e d by means of the terms of 
the agreement and the words used. C e r t a i n l y , as regards 
the words used, many cases such as FACCHINI v BRYSON 
(81) , ADDISCOMBE GARDEN ESTATES V CRABBE(82) and SHELL-
MEX v MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD.(83) make i t c l e a r t h a t the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not determined by the l a b e l used but by 
the law. However, as to the terms, many l a t e r cases 
assume, i n the even t of a w r i t t e n agreement f o r 
r e f l e c t the i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s . ( 8 4 ) T h i s i s 
u n f o r t u n a t e because i t f a i l s to t a k e account of 
i n e q u a l i t y of bargaining p o s i t i o n s a t a time of shortage 
of accommodation. That t h e c o u r t s do make such an 
assumption i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the judgement of S i r John 
Pennycuick i n BUCHMANN v MAY. (85) T h i s c a s e was not 
a c t u a l l y concerned with the l e a s e / l i c e n c e d i s t i n c t i o n but 
with whether a l e t t i n g was a hol i d a y l e t , but the same 
p r i n c i p l e s a p p l y . s i r John made i t c l e a r t h a t the 
occupier bears the burden of proving the agreement i s 
otherwise than s t a t e d i n the w r i t t e n agreement: 
"where p a r t i e s t o an i n s t r u m e n t e x p r e s s t h e i r 
purpose i n e n t e r i n g i n t o the t r a n s a c t i o n e f f e c t e d 
by i t , . . . . t h i s expression of purpose i s a t l e a s t 
prima f a c i e evidence of t h e i r t r u e purpose and as 
such can only be d i s p l a c e d by evidence t h a t the 
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e x p r e s s purpose does not r e p r e s e n t t h e i r t r u e 
purpose."(86) 
The presumption was applie d again i n SOMMA v HAZELHURST 
w h i c h d i d i n v o l v e the d i s t i n c t i o n between l e a s e and 
l i c e n c e ; Cumming-Bruce s t a t e d : 
" We s t a r t from the b a s i s t h a t i t i s to the 
documents we must look and the documents 
alone."(87) 
The second c r i t i c i s m of the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n i s t h a t , 
given that i t has repeatedly been s t a t e d t h a t the nature 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s determined by the law, and given 
a l s o that what i s being considered i s whether there i s an 
in t e n t i o n to c r e a t e the r i g h t and o b l i g a t i o n s of la n d l o r d 
and t e n a n t r e s p e c t i v e l y , one would have thought the 
fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a tenancy ( i . e . e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n f o r a f i x e d term, i n t e n t i o n t o e n t e r a 
co n t r a c t u a l agreement, the making of f i x e d p e r i o d i c a l 
payments) would have been of v i t a l importance. As Lord 
Templeman p o i n t e d out i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, on the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e to be drawn from the hallmarks of e x c l u s i v e 
possession, weekly payments and a p e r i o d i c a l term: 
"Unless the three hallmarks are d e c i s i v e i t r e a l l y 
becomes impossible to d i s t i n g u i s h a c o n t r a c t u a l 
t e n a n c y from a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e save by 
r e f e r e n c e t o the p r o f e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s of the 
p a r t i e s or by the judge awarding marks f o r 
d r a f t i n g " . ( 8 8 ) 
Perhaps t h e ultimate i l l u s t r a t i o n of how meaningless the 
t e s t of i n t e n t i o n adopted by the courts had become p r i o r 
to STREET v MOUNTFORD, i s the statement of Lord Denning 
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s i n c e ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, he asked: 
"What i s the t e s t to see whether the occupier of 
one room i n a house i s a tenant or a l i c e n s e e . I t 
does not depend on whether he or she has e x c l u s i v e 
p ossession or not. I t does not depend on whether 
the room i s fu r n i s h e d or not. I t does not depend 
on whether the o c c u p a t i o n i s permanent o r 
temporary. I t does not depend on the l a b e l s which 
the p a r t i e s put upon i t . A l l these are f a c t o r s 
which may i n f l u e n c e the d e c i s i o n but none of them 
i s c o n c l u s i v e . A l l the circumstances have to be 
worked out. E v e n t u a l l y the answer depends on the 
na t u r e and q u a l i t y of the occupancy. Was i t 
intended the occupier should have a stake i n the 
room or d i d he have only permission f o r himself 
p e r s o n a l l y to occupy the room whether under a 
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c o n t r a c t or not? I n which c a s e he i s a 
l i c e n s e e . . . . " ( 8 9 ) 
I n e f f e c t Lord Denning i s saying the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e i s t h a t i n the case of a l i c e n c e 
t h e r e i s an i n t e n t i o n m e r e l y to c r e a t e a p e r s o n a l 
p r i v i l e g e and i n the case of a l e a s e an i n t e r e s t i n land. 
The way one decides what has been crea t e d i s by deciding 
whether the p a r t i e s intend a personal p r i v i l e g e or a 
stake i n the land. ^n^"aimNDf the t e s t has thus become r^> 
the means. I t i s /down to jthe pure i n t u i t i o n of the f N judge. As H a r r i s obs^rrvecL:—J [ 
" I n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a tenancy when contrasted 
with i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l i c e n c e i s a spurious 
concept which conceals a simple development i n the 
law brought about by j u d i c i a l e v o l u t i o n , namely, 
that there are c e r t a i n circumstances to which the 
courts w i l l not apply the s t a t u t o r y and common law 
of l a n d l o r d and tenant."(90) 
To turn back to the study of the progression of the t e s t 
of i n t e n t i o n , the t o t a l s h i f t i n the nature of the t e s t 
of i n t e n t i o n by the 1970s i s next i l l u s t r a t e d by the 
d e c i s i o n i n HESLOP v BURNS.(91) Here, the deceased had 
met the defendant at a time when she was l i v i n g i n an 
a t t i c w i t h her husband, and e x p e c t i n g a baby. The 
deceased had been so concerned by t h e i r l i v i n g c onditions 
he bought a cottage f o r the f a m i l y to l i v e i n and then 
l a t e r moved them i n t o a house of which he was the 
f r e e h o l d e r and which they occupied at the time of h i s 
death, r a t e and r e n t f r e e . Throughout t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , the defendant and her f a m i l y remained very 
c l o s e f r i e n d s of the deceased: he became a godfather to 
t h e i r daughter and paid f o r her education. However, on 
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who sought possession of i t . The defendant claimed to 
have extinguished the deceased's t i t l e to the house under 
the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939, on account of occupation f o r 
more than 13 years as a tenant at w i l l . The Court of 
Appeal decided the defendant was i n f a c t a mere l i c e n s e e 
and, as such, was not covered by the L i m i t a t i o n Acts. 
C l e a r l y , the case i s c o n s i s t e n t with STREET v MOUNTFORD, 
i n that the court found there was no i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e 
a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , the arrangement merely amounting to 
an a c t of f r i e n d s h i p . Nevertheless, the reasoning of 
Lord J u s t i c e Scarman goes much f u r t h e r f o r he goes on to 
s a y , even i f he made two a s s u m p t i o n s , namely, t h a t 
e x c l u s i v e possession was granted by the agreement and 
there was an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
the court need not f i n d a tenancy at w i l l . He continued: 
"Had counsel f o r the defendants been addressing 
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t h i s court a hundred years ago and on the two 
assumptions I have made, I think he would have 
succeeded.... Today, however, a v e r y d i f f e r e n t 
approach appears to be adopted."(92) 
and he concluded: 
"ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON i s now an a u t h o r i t y binding 
on t h i s court to the e f f e c t t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e may confer on a l i c e n s e e an e x c l u s i v e 
r i g h t of occupation of land.... "(93) 
Perhaps even more s t a r t l i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the t o t a l 
change i n the nature of the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n are the 
family arrangement cases of TANNER v TANNER (94) and 
HARDWICK v JOHNSON.(95) I n both these c a s e s , the court 
assumes, without any d i s c u s s i o n whatsoever, that a pa r t y 
may be i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n w h i l s t a t the same time 
being a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e . I n the same y e a r a s 
HARDWICK v JOHNSON, Cummings-Bruce L . J . c o n c l u d e d i n 
SOMMA v HAZELHURST, a f t e r r e f e r r i n g to the s p e c i a l 
circumstances i n which the court i n FACCHINi v BRYSON 
thought e x c l u s i v e possession compatible with a l i c e n c e : 
"We can see no reason why an ordinary l a n d l o r d not 
i n any of the s p e c i a l c a t e g o r i e s should not be 
able to grant a l i c e n c e to occupy an ordinary 
house. 1 1 (96) 
From t h i s survey of the cases from ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
to STREET v MOUNTFORD, i t would appear the t e s t f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e had 
developed to a f a r g r e a t e r extent than the judgment of 
Lord Templeman may have one b e l i e v e . By the time of 
STREET v MOUNTFORD, the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n was based on 
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was incapable of d e f i n i t i o n . STREET v MOUNTFORD has once 
again l a i d down a s c e r t a i n a b l e c r i t e r i a to enable the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n 
and a tenant to be drawn. But two main questions now 
a r i s e . F i r s t l y , how f a r i s i t true to say th a t STREET v 
MOUNTFORD has r e s t o r e d the t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e s and l i c e n c e s to occupy and 
how workable i s the t e s t adopted i n STREET v MOUNTFORD. 
Secondly, bearing i n mind the possessory l i c e n c e would 
seem to be a j u d i c i a l c r e a t i o n a r i s i n g to meet c e r t a i n 
perceived needs, how f a r can these needs be s a t i s f i e d by 
other means, and what remains of the possessory l i c e n c e 
s i n c e STREET v MOUNTFORD? T h i s second question w i l l be 
examined i n d e t a i l i n each of the l a t e r S e c t i o n s . 
To consider though, the f i r s t i s s u e here, namely, whether 
the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between l e a s e and l i c e n c e to 
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occupy has been t o t a l l y r e v i v e d . The answer to a c e r t a i n 
e x t e n t depends upon what one u n d e r s t a n d s by "the 
t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t " . Taking t h i s to be the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between l e a s e s and l i c e n c e s a p p l i e d i n the v a s t m a j o r i t y 
of cases p r i o r to ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, there would 
appear to be t h r e e s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e s from the 
t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t . To begin with, i n the o r i g i n a l t e s t 
e x c l u s i v e possession was regarded as d e c i s i v e : i f there 
was e x c l u s i v e possession there was a tenancy; i f there 
was no e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , the occupier had merely a 
l i c e n c e . Now, according to Lord Templeman, although: 
" E x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s of f i r s t importance i n 
considering whether an occupier i s a tenant.... 
E x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n i s not d e c i s i v e . . . . " ( 9 7 ) 
The second d i f f e r e n c e i s , whereas under the t r a d i t i o n a l 
t e s t e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was the s o l e c r i t e r i a f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e and l i c e n c e , according to 
Lord Templeman, there are three hallmarks of a tenancy: 
"To c o n s t i t u t e a tenancy the occupier must be 
granted e x c l u s i v e possession f o r a f i x e d term or 
p e r i o d i c term c e r t a i n i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a 
premium or p e r i o d i c a l payments ....11 ( 98) 
The requirement of a f i x e d or p e r i o d i c term c e r t a i n 
c o n v e n i e n t l y e x c l u d e s a t e n a n c y a t w i l l from the 
d e f i n i t i o n of a tenancy and the requirement of a premium 
or p e r i o d i c a l payment appears to be a new and moreover 
t o t a l l y unsubstantiated requirement. The d e f i n i t i o n of a 
'term of years' i n S e c t i o n 205 Law of Property Act 1925 
does not r e q u i r e payment of r e n t , and, as Anderson p o i n t s 
out, (99) such a requirement makes a l e a s e unique among 
the e s t a t e s i n land, as i t follows t h a t a l e a s e can only 
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introduce t h i s requirement, e s p e c i a l l y as, i n reviewing 
the case law s i n c e ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, Lord Templeman 
explained the d e c i s i o n s where no payment was made f o r 
occupation as s i t u a t i o n s where there was no i n t e n t i o n "to 
e n t e r i n t o l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s a t a l l " (ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON); "of any l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p " (HESLOP v 
BURNS); of "entering i n t o a c o n t r a c t " (COBB v LANE); 
"to c o n t r a c t at a l l " (HESLOP v BURNS)? F i r s t l y , maybe 
t h i s was because Lord Templeman was aware t h a t a t e s t of 
i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s was spurious, as 
any r e l a t i o n s h i p between owner and occupier of land must 
be d e s c r i b e d as a " l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p " . S e c o n d l y , 
l o o k i n g a t L o r d Templeman's " s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s " , 
where an occupier i s i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , but the 
circumstances negative the f i n d i n g of a tenancy, the 
examples given were c o n s i s t e n t with the f i n d i n g of a 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , namely p o s s e s s i o n under a 
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c o n t r a c t f o r the s a l e of l a n d or a c o n t r a c t of 
employment/holding of an o f f i c e . A consequence of the 
requirement of payment of rent or a premium d e t r a c t s from 
the t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e s 
and l i c e n c e s to occupy i n an a d d i t i o n a l r e s p e c t , f o r i t 
follows that e x c l u s i v e possession i s now being used i n 
the sense of the ' r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e possession' r a t h e r 
than the broader sense of s o l e p o s s e s s i o n i n f a c t . 
The t h i r d departure from the o r i g i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n , drawn 
betweem l e a s e and l i c e n c e to occupy a r i s e s out of the 
f i r s t , namely t h a t the t e s t of e x c l u s i v e possession i s no 
longer d e c i s i v e . Thus des p i t e STREET v MOUNTFORD, i t 
follows that the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s must remain 
r e l e v a n t to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t . I t has a l r e a d y been 
pointed out that problems may w e l l be experienced as a 
f i n d i n g of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n a ppears to r a i s e 
questions of i n t e n t i o n but, as Lord Templeman e n t e r t a i n s 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t there may be: 
". . . . l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s to which the grant of 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n might be r e f e r a b l e and which 
would or might negative the grant of an e s t a t e or 
i n t e r e s t i n the land...."(100) 
t h i s would a l s o seem to g i v e r i s e t o independent 
questions as to i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s , which could 
cause d i f f i c u l t i e s . Thus i t would seem t h a t , although 
STREET v MOUNTFORD has c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t questions 
of i n t e n t i o n as to what l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ( i . e . net 
r e s u l t ) the p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d to b r i n g about a r e 
i r r e l e v a n t , t h e i r a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s ( i . e . the g r o s s 
product) are r e l e v a n t . I t would t h e r e f o r e appear that 
the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s are r e l e g a t e d to enabling a 
c o u r t t o d e c i d e i n c a s e s of a m b i g u i t y whether an 
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tenancy or not, as opposed to being a means by which 
those hallmarks may be d i s p l a c e d even though present i n 
substance. I t w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g to see how f a r the 
professed i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s w i l l , however, be 
regarded as being of a s s i s t a n c e i n determining t h e i r 
a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s . 
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SECTION I I 
L i c e n c e s and l e g i s l a t i o n c o n t r o l l i n g the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between l a n d l o r d and tenant. 
In h i s book, "The P o l i t i c s of the J u d i c i a r y " , G r i f f i t h 
observes: 
"The a t t i t u d e of the j u d i c i a r y to l e g i s l a t i o n 
which s e r i o u s l y i n t e r f e r e s with the r i g h t s to the 
enjoyment of property - e s p e c i a l l y ownership of 
land - has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been one of s u s p i c i o n . . . . 
changes brought about by Acts of Parliament have 
not always been welcomed...."(1) 
In the sphere of l a n d l o r d and tenant, Gray and Symes are 
of the opinion t h a t the courts have: 
" . . . i n f l i c t e d s e r i o u s harm upon the s o c i a l 
philosophy expressed i n the Rent A c t s . . . , " 
by: 
a more g e n e r a l r e t r e n c h i n g of j u d i c i a l 
opinion i n favour of the e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l i n t e r e s t 
as opposed to the r e s i d e n t i a l t e n ant."(2) 
Moreover, i t i s the view of Robson and Watchman t h a t , with 
regard to the Rent Acts, the: 
"... j u d i c i a r y have i n d u l g e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
p e r n i c i o u s form of j u d i c i a l sabotage. At times 
stopping short of squeezing the l i f e from the 
p o l i c y . " ( 3 ) 
Thp u a v i_p_ which Rots on snd Watchman argue the a c t of 
sabotage has been achieved i s by means of the development 
of the 'weapon', the possessory l i c e n c e , l i c e n c e s only 
enjoying l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n i n the case of r e s i d e n t i a l 
property and no p r o t e c t i o n at a l l outside r e s i d e n t i a l 
property.(4) 
In t h i s Section, i t i s proposed to examine c r i t i c a l l y the 
manner i n which and the extent to which the concept of a 
l i c e n c e has been used to m i t i g a t e the e f f e c t s of 
l e g i s l a t i o n a f f e c t i n g the r i g h t s of l a n d l o r d and tenant. 
In a d d i t i o n , i n the l i g h t of the House of Lords d e c i s i o n 
i n STREET v MOUNTFORD ( 5 ) , i t i s proposed to examine how 
u s e f u l the l i c e n c e remains i n a v o i d i n g s t a t u t o r y 
c o n t r o l s . 
In the f i r s t S e ction of t h i s t h e s i s , a study was made of 
the development of the concept of a possessory l i c e n c e . 
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I t was seen that the concept l a r g e l y developed from the 
d e c i s i o n s of the courts i n the e a r l y 1950s and t h a t , 
through a l t e r a t i o n i n the nature and a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
t e s t of i n t e n t i o n , by the 1970s the circumstances i n 
which an occupier was found to be i n e x c l u s i v e possession 
with a possessory l i c e n c e had s u b s t a n t i a l l y widened. I n 
l a t e r S e c t i o n s , c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l be given to how f a r 
importance a t t a c h e d to g i v i n g e f f e c t t o f a m i l y 
arrangement, and a v o i d i n g the consequences of the 
L i m i t a t i o n s A c t s and the S e t t l e d Land Act 1925, 
contributed to t h i s development. F i r s t , however, an 
assessment w i l l be made of the c o n t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u t o r y 
c o n t r o l s on the l a n d l o r d and tenant r e l a t i o n s h i p . From 
the o u t s e t , i t s h o u l d be a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t i t i s 
impossible to consider s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g to 
landlo r d and tenant from a pu r e l y l e g a l point of view. 
Housing p o l i c y and the law which attempts to give e f f e c t 
to that p o l i c y has throughout been a matter of acute 
p o l i t i c a l controversy. A b r i e f glance a t the h i s t o r y of 
such l e g i s l a t i o n , w ith i t s frequent changes of d i r e c t i o n 
from i n c r e a s e i n c o n t r o l to decontrol, shows how the 
p r i v a t e housing s e c t o r a t l e a s t has been a c o n s t a n t 
p o l i t i c a l f o o t b a l l . 
From the very outset, the j u d i c i a r y have been h i g h l y 
aware of the impact of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . There are 
numerous statements s c a t t e r e d throughout judgements i n 
cases concerned with the l e a s e / l i c e n c e d i s t i n c t i o n i n 
which judges have maintained the impact of s t a t u t o r y 
c o n t r o l was a r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . For example, i n 
MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH E v e r s h e d M.R. s t a t e d , 
r e f e r r i n g to the Rent R e s t r i c t i o n s Acts: 
" I n judging of the inf e r e n c e to be drawn from such 
events as those which took pla c e here, i t seems to 
background a g a i n s t which people must now d i s c u s s 
and regulate t h e i r a f f a i r s . " ( 6 ) 
And, i n FACCHINI v BRYSON, Lord Denning s t a t e d : 
" I n my opinion.... i t i s not r i g h t to consider the 
common law p o s i t i o n s e p a r a t e l y from the Rent 
R e s t r i c t i o n s A c t s . " ( 7 ) 
In c o n t r a s t , the House of Lords, i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, 
was of the view t h a t the impact of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n 
on the landl o r d and tenant r e l a t i o n s h i p was an i r r e l e v a n t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . As an a u t h o r i t y of the highest importance 
i t i s l i k e l y i n fu t u r e t h a t judges w i l l not openly admit 
t h i s as being of relevance i n drawing the l e a s e / l i c e n c e 
d i s t i n c t i o n . Nevertheless, they w i l l not be able to 
d i s c a r d the s t a t u t o r y background from t h e i r d e c i s i o n -
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making p r o c e s s , assuming t h i s i n any c a s e to be a 
d e s i r a b l e approach.(8) 
Furthermore, i n the pa s t , judges have made no s e c r e t of 
the f a c t they have a l t e r e d t h e i r understanding of the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e on account of 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s . For example, i n 
MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH, Lord Evershed commented: 
" U n t i l i n the p r e s e n t c e n t u r y the Rent 
R e s t r i c t i o n s Acts came i n t o play, the law broadly 
s p e a k i n g n e c e s s a r i l y i n f e r r e d when e x c l u s i v e 
possession was granted to one, of the property of 
another at a rent payable to t h a t other, a tenancy 
had been created. The law d i d not recognise t h a t 
those conditions were compatible with any other 
kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p . " ( 9 ) 
Denning L . J . , i n the same c a s e , made a s i m i l a r 
observation: 
"According to the common law as i t stood before 
the Rent R e s t r i c t i o n s Acts, when the defendant 
stayed on with the consent of the la n d l o r d s , she 
would have become a tenant a t w i l l . . . . I n my 
opinion, however, i t i s not c o r r e c t to consider 
the common law p o s i t i o n s e p a r a t e l y from the Rent 
R e s t r i c t i o n s A c ts...."(10) 
And i n FACCHINI v BRYSON, h i s view remained un a l t e r e d f o r 
he s a i d : 
" I t must be remembered a t common law, the 
l a n d l o r d s would have had a c l e a r u n d i s p u t a b l e 
r i g h t to t u r n her out.... I n t h a t s t a t e of 
a f f a l r s i •h u s e i r a r\r n r n n o r f Q i n f e r a t?n?r.Cy 5.t 
w i l l , or a weekly tenancy. . . . But i t i s very 
d i f f e r e n t when the r i g h t s are obscured by the Rent 
R e s t r i c t i o n s Acts and the consequences of granting 
her a c o n t r a c t u a l tenancy would be f a r reaching, 
because she would be clothed with the s t a t u s of 
i r r e m o v a b i l i t y conferred by the Rent Acts.... I n 
these circumstances, i t i s no longer proper f o r 
the courts to i n f e r a tenancy a t w i l l or a weekly 
tenancy as they p r e v i o u s l y would have done, from 
the mere acceptance of r e n t . " ( 1 1 ) 
Again, i n HESLOP v BURNS, Scarman L . J . s a i d : 
"To d e a l with changed s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s the Rent 
R e s t r i c t i o n s s i n c e 1914-15 have introduced a new 
dimension to the law of l a n d l o r d and tenant and 
there has a l s o emerged i n t o prominence the l i c e n c e 
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to occupy. T h i s concept has been developed by the 
courts so t h a t now i t i s present as a p o s s i b l e 
mode of land-holding - a mode which had c e r t a i n l y 
not developed i n t o a n y t h i n g l i k e i t s c u r r e n t 
maturity i n the nineteenth century."(12) 
I t i s q u i t e an a c c e p t a b l e approach to j u d i c i a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s t a t u t e s to take i n t o account and thus 
to be aware of the purpose of the l e g i s l a t i o n . But the 
aim of such e x e r c i s e s i s to ensure t h a t the judge gives 
e f f e c t to the s t a t u t e . I t i s intended to examine whether 
the courts have achieved t h i s aim and got the balance 
r i g h t i n l a n d l o r d and tenant c a s e s . C e r t a i n l y Sachs L . J . 
thought they had done so. I n c o n s i d e r i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between a l e a s e and a l i c e n c e i n BARNES v BARRETT and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r commenting on the j u d i c i a l approach to the 
t e s t of i n t e n t i o n , he observed: 
" I n t h i s way the law has adapted i t s e l f so as to 
d e a l w i t h the c o m p l e x i t i e s of the Rent A c t s 
without causing p a t e n t l y unintended i n j u s t i c e to 
l a n d l o r d s , w h i l s t g u a r d i n g a g a i n s t improper 
avoidance by the l a t t e r of the p r o v i s i o n s of those 
Acts."(13) 
S t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s of the l a n d l o r d tenant r e l a t i o n s h i p 
operate i n three main spheres: d w e l l i n g houses (the 
p r i n c i p a l governing s t a t u t e being the Rent Act 1977 and, 
f o r c o u n c i l housing, the Housing Act 1980); a g r i c u l t u r a l 
holdings (now governed by the A g r i c u l t u r a l Holdings Act 
1986 which cons o l i d a t e d the A g r i c u l t u r a l Holdings Act 
1948 and the A g r i c u l t u r a l Holdings (Notices to Quit) Act 
1977); and business t e n a n c i e s (now governed by P a r t I I 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, as amended by P a r t I of Law 
of Property Act 1969). U n t i l about a hundred years ago, 
p\"t- leas -*" i 1 " * +~hio r e s i d s P t i s . 1 s p h e r e t h s r e l a t i o n s h i p c f 
l a n d l o r d and t e n a n t was almost e n t i r e l y based on 
c o n t r a c t . ( 1 4 ) Today, however, the c o n t r a c t u a l aspect of 
l e a s e s has receded very much i n t o the background and i t 
i s true to say t h a t the r i g h t s of l a n d l o r d and tenant are 
now l a r g e l y l a i d down by s t a t u t e .The problem i n any 
sphere of l a n d l o r d and tenant i s one of i n e q u a l i t y of 
bargaining p o s i t i o n . The p r e c i s e d e t a i l s and extent of 
the s t a t u t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n v a r i e s c o n s i d e r a b l y from one 
sphere to another. However, a l l three spheres of c o n t r o l 
o u t l i n e d above have c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s i n common. 
F i r s t l y , t e n a n t s a r e g i v e n a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree of 
s e c u r i t y of tenure. Secondly, there i s p r o t e c t i o n f o r 
t e n a n t s from l a n d l o r d s ' c h a r g i n g e x c e s s i v e r e n t s or 
imposing u n f a i r i n c r e a s e s . T h i r d l y , except to a l i m i t e d 
e x t e n t i n r e s p e c t of d w e l l i n g houses, the s t a t u t o r y 
p r o t e c t i o n does not extend to l i c e n s e e s of premises. 
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Herein l a y the p o t e n t i a l f o r the possessory l i c e n c e as a 
means of avoiding p r o t e c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n . The m a j o r i t y 
of cases which came before the courts i n which la n d l o r d s 
attempted to use the l i c e n c e to avoid p r o t e c t i v e c o n t r o l s 
are concerned with d w e l l i n g houses as opposed to business 
tenancies or a g r i c u l t u r a l holdings. Thus more empphasis 
w i l l be put on r e s i d e n t i a l t e n a n c i e s . 
The o r i g i n s of r e s i d e n t i a l c o n t r o l stem from a temporary 
measure introduced during the f i r s t world war, occasioned 
by the d e v e l o p i n g s h o r t a g e of accommodation which 
r e s u l t e d l a r g e l y from the d e c l i n e of s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g 
and the d e s t r u c t i o n caused by the war. The I n c r e a s e of 
Rent and Mortgage I n t e r e s t (War R e s t r i c t i o n s ) Act 1915, 
was passed at a time when four f i f t h s of the population 
l i v e d i n the p r i v a t e rented s e c t o r . The Act only covered 
property where the r a t e a b l e value was low and, as such, 
protected only comparatively poor people. The Act was 
l a t e r r e p e a l e d and r e p l a c e d by a s e r i e s of s t a t u t e s 
commencing i n 1920, c o l l e c t i v e l y known as the Rent A c t s . 
These g r a d u a l l y extended c o n t r o l ( 1 7 ) u n t i l the Housing 
Repairs and Rent Act 1954 and the Rent Act 1957 which 
made s i g n i f i c a n t movements towards g r a d u a l d e c o n t r o l . 
However, problems i n the a p p l i c a t i o n and e f f e c t of the 
d e r e g u l a t o r y measures l e d to new i n t e r v e n t i o n a r y 
p r o v i s i o n s , which reversed the process and r e s u l t e d i n 
the P r o t e c t i o n from E v i c t i o n Act 1964 and the 
in t r o d u c t i o n of the ' f a i r r e n t 1 scheme by the Rent Act 
1965 . 
During the period of s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s up u n t i l 1964 
there were a number of d e c i s i o n s on the l e a s e / l i c e n c e 
d i s t i n c t i o n . I t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t the courts showed 
considerable awareness t h a t the l i c e n c e could be used as 
a means of avoiding Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n and were anxious 
it - should not i n e f f e c t bsco^s 2. d s v i c s foir c o n t r a . c t i n c r 
out of the Rent Acts. ( 1 8 ) T h i s i s apparent, f o r example, 
from the comment of Evershed M.R. i n FOSTER v ROBINSON, 
when f i n d i n g the occupant to be a l i c e n s e e , he s a i d : 
" I r e g a r d the c a s e as one which t u r n s on a 
question of f a c t . . . . I say t h a t although I am not 
unmoved by the p o i n t made.... t h a t , i f t h i s 
d e c i s i o n i s sup p o r t e d , l a n d l o r d s who make a 
p r a c t i c e of studying d e c i s i o n s under the Rent Acts 
may seek to improve t h e i r p o s i t i o n by making 
arrangements w i t h t h e i r t e n a n t s based on t h i s 
d e c i s i o n so as to deprive them of the p r o t e c t i o n 
which the Acts are intended to give them."(19) 
S i m i l a r l y , i n FACCHINI v BRYSON, Denning L . J . r e a l i s e d 
the p o t e n t i a l scope of the l i c e n c e when he observed, i n 
what turned out to be a h i g h l y prophetic statement: 
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" E l s e we might f i n d a l l l a n d l o r d s g r a n t i n g 
l i c e n c e s and not tenancies and we should make a 
hole i n the Rent Acts though which could be dri v e n 
- I w i l l not i n these days say a coach - but an 
a r t i c u l a t e d v e h i c l e . . . . " ( 2 0 ) 
Again i n R v BATTERSEA, WANDSWORTH, MITCHAM AND WIMBLEDON 
RENT TRIBUNAL ex parte PARIKH,(21) the court was on i t s 
guard not to allow the concept of a l i c e n c e to be used to 
avoid the s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n of tenants. The case 
concerned whether an agreement to be a "paying guest" of 
the P a r i k h family under which the landlady could enter 
the room ' l e t ' a t a l l times, was a tenancy or a l i c e n c e . 
Lord Goddard commented: 
" I f a landlady t h i n k s t h a t by use of c e r t a i n words 
she can avoid the p r o v i s i o n s of the Act of 1946, 
she i s mistaken...."(22) 
However, there were some s i g n s of h o s t i l i t y too, or a t 
l e a s t l a c k of enthusiasm f o r , the s t a t u t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
The very f a c t t h a t i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH, 
E v e r s h e d M.R. r e f e r r e d to a s t a t u t o r y t e n a n c y as a 
"monstrum horrendum, informe, i n g e n s " (23) may be 
i n d i c a t i v e of t h i s , and i n SAMROSE PROPERTIES LTD. v 
GIBBARD, where there was an attempt (which f a i l e d ) to 
avoid Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n by charging a lump sum a t the 
outset and then a very low q u a r t e r l y rent which amounted 
to l e s s than two t h i r d s of the r a t e a b l e value of the 
property, so as to f a l l outside the I n c r e a s e of Rent and 
Mortgage I n t e r e s t ( R e l i e f ) A c t 1920, L o r d E v e r s h e d 
commented: 
" I , of course, f u l l y accept the p r o p o s i t i o n . . . 
f haf => l=nd^ "~>'>"'^  s e r t i t l s d so to ?_rr?.ncre h i s 
a f f a i r s t h a t the l e g a l r e s u l t s w i l l b r i n g him 
outside the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n . . . . I f they f a i l , 
t hat does not t h e r e f o r e r e f l e c t upon the e t h i c s of 
t h e i r business methods."(24) 
Also, i n the period up to 1964, i t became apparent t h a t 
Rent C o n t r o l c o u l d l e a d t o unwarranted p r o t e c t i o n , 
e s p e c i a l l y where t h e r e was an a c t of ' k i n d n e s s ' or 
'generosity' on the p a r t of the la n d l o r d . The problem 
f i r s t had to be faced i n FOSTER v ROBINSON ( 2 5 ) , where a 
land l o r d had allowed a former employee and tenant to 
remain i n h i s cottage, a f t e r retirement, rent f r e e f o r 
the r e s t of h i s l i f e . Again i n MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v 
SMITH (2 6 ) , out of kindness a la n d l o r d had allowed a 
daughter to remain i n occupation of property a f t e r the 
death of her mother, a s t a t u t o r y tenant. I n both c a s e s , 
Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n was claimed, i t would seem q u i t e 
u n j u s t i f i a b l y . The point has a l r e a d y been made t h a t on a 
s t r i c t reading of STREET v MOUNTFORD (27) use of l i c e n c e 
concepts w i l l not a l l e v i a t e the i n j u s t i c e which could be 
caused to a lan d l o r d , f o r i n future where an occupier i s 
i n e x c l u s i v e possession paying a f i x e d rent a tenancy 
w i l l a r i s e and consequently Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . Thus i n 
a s i t u a t i o n such as th a t of MARCROFT WAGONS LTD. v SMITH, 
there would seem to be no way out f o r the lan d l o r d , 
unless perhaps he could r a i s e some kind of estoppel; i f 
a t e n a n t t a k e s advantage of an a c t of k i n d n e s s or 
generosity on the p a r t of h i s l a n d l o r d , to the extent he 
has so taken advantage, he w i l l be estopped from denying 
p r o t e c t i o n under the Rent Ac t s . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , FOSTER v ROBSINSON and MARCROFT WAGONS 
LTD. v SMITH, may be looked upon not as 'generosity' 
c a s e s but as temporary arrangements and under t h i s 
heading f a l l w i t h i n the 'excepted c a t e g o r i e s ' o u t l i n e d by 
Lord Templeman i n STREET v MOUNTFORD(28). However,it i s 
necessary to consider whether the d e c i s i o n i n EASTLEIGH 
BOROUGH COUNCIL v WALSH(29) i s l i k e l y to stand i n the way 
of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . T h i s case concerned a homeless man 
f o r whom the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y p r o v i d e d emergency 
accommodation under a s t a t u t o r y duty l a i d down i n the 
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. Despite h i s being 
given the keys to a c o u n c i l house and a document headed 
'Conditions of Tenancy', the Court of Appeal decided a 
l i c e n c e only was created, a t t a c h i n g importance to the 
f a c t that "emergency s h e l t e r " was being provided. I n the 
wake of STREET v MOUNTFORD, the House of Lords reversed 
the d e c i s i o n but, i t appears, p u r e l y as a matter of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n on the unambiguous w r i t t e n agreement 
involved i n the f a c t s of the case. Consequently, the 
case does not d e t r a c t from the p o s s i b i l i t y of a court 
f i n d i n g , i n other circumstances where an agreement i s 
in-t-onrioH only to be temporary, t h ? t t h i s i s w i t h i n T.nrd 
Templeman's excepted c a t e g o r i e s whereby the grant of an 
es t a t e or i n t e r e s t i n land i s negatived. 
In the cases up u n t i l 1964, i t would appear to be f a i r to 
say the judges had taken steps to give e f f e c t to the 
p o l i c y of the Rent Acts and, a t the same time, made 
j u s t i f i a b l e use of the concept of the l i c e n c e to ensure 
c o n t r o l was not extended to unwarranted agreements. I t 
has already been noted t h a t the P r o t e c t i o n from E v i c t i o n 
Act 1964 and the Rent Act 1965 reversed a process of 
decontrol which had been begun before. Extension of 
c o n t r o l c o n t i n u e d i n the form of the Rent A c t 1968 
( l a r g e l y c o n s o l i d a t o r y ) , Housing A c t 1969, Housing 
Finance Act 1972, C o u n t e r - I n f l a t i o n Act 1973 and the Rent 
Act 1974. Of these, the Rent Act 1974 was the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t . P r i o r to t h i s Act there had been an easy 
escape route f o r landlords wishing to avoid the f u l l 
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r i g o u r s of the Rent Ac t s : f u r n i s h e d accommodation was 
not a f f e c t e d by many of the most s i g n i f i c a n t r e g u l a t o r y 
measures. Consequently, the p r a c t i c e grew up amongst 
landlords, of providing tenants with some poor q u a l i t y , 
second-hand f u r n i t u r e , the v a l u e of which formed a 
s u b s t a n t i a l part of the r e n t . T h i s major loophole i n the 
Rent Acts was, however, e f f e c t i v e l y c l o s e d o f f by the 
Rent Act 1974, which extended p r o t e c t i o n to f u r n i s h e d 
accommodation. Since the Act, v a r i o u s d e v i c e s have been 
developed by those a d v i s i n g l a n d l o r d s wishing to avoid 
Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . For example, deposit and instalment 
" s a l e s " , use of "holiday l e t s " , and p r o v i s i o n s of board, 
the l a t t e r g i v i n g r i s e to an a r t i c l e i n the Glasgow 
Herald e n t i t l e d "Beating the Rent Acts - with Bacon and 
E g g s " . ( 3 0 ) Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t of t h e s e , 
however, has been the tendency to d r a f t agreements so as 
to c r e a t e l i c e n c e s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t 
before 1979, the F r a n c i s Report (31) observed t h a t l i t t l e 
attempt had been made to avoid the Rent Acts by means of 
l i c e n c e s . However, a survey by Paley ( 3 2 ) , of areas 
where there was a dense population of p r i v a t e rented 
s e c t o r t e n a n t s , i n 1976, showed two y e a r s a f t e r the 
passing of the 1974 Act, 48% of the sampled l e t t i n g s w ith 
company landlords had a l t e r e d t h e i r l e t t i n g p o l i c i e s . Of 
these 15% r e - l e t , on l i c e n c e , s e r v i c e agreements or r e n t -
f r e e , w h i l s t a f u r t h e r 14% would only enter i n t o holiday 
l e t s . 
Since 1974, f u r t h e r s t a t u t e s of l e s s s i g n i f i c a n c e than 
the Rent Act 1974 have been introduced but have been 
consolidated along with e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n i n t o the 
main s t a t u t e at present governing r e s i d e n t i a l t e n a n c i e s , 
namely the Rent Act 1977. A tenancy who r e c e i v e s f u l l 
p r o t e c t i o n under t h i s Act i s known as a p r o t e c t e d 
tenancy(33). However, more r e c e n t l y the Rent Act 1977 has 
v-iecsn cunenclecl by the Housing Act 1980 which o n r , p a n r'Hp i g e n e r a l l y moves i n the d i r e c t i o n of decontrol, although 
i t does f o r the f i r s t time p l a c e c o u n c i l tenants i n 
v i r t u a l l y the same p o s i t i o n as p r i v a t e s e c t o r tenants as 
regards s e c u r i t y of t e n u r e ( 3 4 ) . Deregulatory measures 
include the a b o l i t i o n of c o n t r o l l e d t e n a n c i e s so t h a t , 
s u b j e c t to p r o v i s i o n s f o r phasing the i n c r e a s e , a l l r e n t s 
under the Act a r e deemed to be ' f a i r r e n t s ' , the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the concept of a "protected shorthold" 
tenancy under which a l a n d l o r d i s guaranteed po s s e s s i o n 
a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n of the o r i g i n a l term and the 
"assured tenancy" which i s one of a house which has been 
b u i l t s i n c e the p a s s i n g of the Act. I t i s proposed to 
consider whether, a f t e r the Rent Act 1974, when Rent Act 
avoidance became d i f f i c u l t , j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e s to l i c e n c e 
agreements softened u n t i l the recent s t r i c t approach i n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD, decided a t a time when the s h i f t i s 
once again towards decontrol. 
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There i s some evidence of a change i n j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e s 
towards Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n a f t e r 1974, to be drawn from 
overt statements which i n d i c a t e a high degree of sympathy 
f o r l a n d l o r d s . For example, i n ALDRINGTON GARAGES v 
FIELDER, Geoffrey Lane L . J . expressed the opinion: 
"There seemed to be nothing wrong i n t r y i n g to 
escape onerous p r o v i s i o n s or i n c r e a s e one's p r o f i t 
i f one could l e g i t i m a t e l y do so...."(35) 
and, i n DUMUREN AND ADEFOBE v SEAL ESTATES, Megaw L . J . 
commented: 
"Owners of p r o p e r t y a r e s e e k i n g , perhaps 
understandably i n the circumstances, to get the 
maximum f i n a n c i a l advantage from t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s 
and to avoid what they no doubt regard as the 
irksome f e t t e r s of the Rent Act."(36) 
Whether t h i s apparent s o f t e n i n g of a t t i t u d e s can be so 
d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t e d to the pass i n g of the 1974 Act i s 
questionable. For, i n 1971, i n the business tenancy case 
Of SHELL MEX AND B.P. LTD V MANCHESTER GARAGES, Lord 
Denning had made the ultimate statement of h o s t i l i t y 
towards p r o t e c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n . A f t e r f i n d i n g a l i c e n c e , 
he says: 
11 I r e a l i s e t h a t t h i s means that the p a r t i e s can, 
by agreeing on a l i c e n c e , get out of the Act 
[Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, as amended by the 
Law of Property Act 1969] but so be i t ; i t may be 
no bad thing...."(37) 
Be that as i t may, apart from overt statements, the 
g r p a l - p r evid.9nC9 Of ?. l e s s Sym.OB.thet i c a H ' i t n f l p trt R p n t 
Act p r o t e c t i o n i s apparent from the e n t i r e approach the 
j u d i c i a r y adopted towards l i c e n c e agreements ( 3 8 ) . F i r s t 
of a l l , as has a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d i n the f i r s t 
S e c tion of t h i s t h e s i s , by a l t e r i n g the nature of the 
t e s t of i n t e n t i o n , a c l e a r view had emerged by the e a r l y 
1970s that i t was p o s s i b l e to be a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e 
i n e x c l u s i v e possession of property. Moreover, the f a c t 
t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e t e s t of i n t e n t i o n which was 
developed proved very unhelpful and by the time of Lord 
Denning's s t a t e m e n t i n MARCHANT v CHARTERS(39) was 
t o t a l l y d e v o i d of meaning, p r o v i d e d e x t r a scope f o r 
j u d i c i a l c r e a t i v i t y . 
The second aspect of the general approach taken by judges 
which i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of a marked l a c k of enthusiasm to 
ensure the Rent Acts were not avoided, was by allowi n g 
o b s t a c l e s which made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r o c c u p i e r s t o 
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e s t a b l i s h t h a t the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s was to c r e a t e 
a tenancy, i n circumstances where they had signed w r i t t e n 
agreements purporting to be l i c e n c e s which d i d not grant 
e x c l u s i v e possession. Here, the p a r o l evidence r u l e was 
allowed to become a stumbling block. T h i s r u l e provides 
a general p r i n c i p l e t h a t n e i t h e r v e r b a l nor documentary 
evidence i s admissible to add to or s u b t r a c t from or 
a l t e r a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t . Following t h i s p r i n c i p l e , i n 
both BUCHMANN v MAY(40) and SOMMA v HAZLEHURST(41), i t 
was made c l e a r t h a t the courts would s t a r t by looking a t 
the w r i t t e n agreement and presume t h a t t h i s expressed the 
i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s . The consequence of t h i s 
approach i s that the burden of proof l i e s with the tenant 
to prove the agreement reached was not t h a t represented 
by the document signed. The question t h e r e f o r e arose as 
to how a tenant could rebut the presumption t h a t the 
agreement expresses the i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s , and 
how e a s i l y t h i s may be achieved. The court w i l l admit 
e x t r i n s i c evidence i n two circumstances: f i r s t l y , where 
the agreement i s on the face of i t ambiguous. For 
ins t a n c e , i n FACCHINI v BRYSON ( 4 2 ) , the document under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n was described as a l i c e n c e and included the 
words "Nothing i n t h i s agreement s h a l l be construed to 
c r e a t e a tenancy", y e t o t h e r c l a u s e s r e f e r r e d t o a 
tenancy. I t i s arguable, i n the case of ambiguity a t 
l e a s t , t h a t the burden of proof should r e s t w ith the 
landlo r d to e s t a b l i s h the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s on the 
b a s i s of the contra proferentum r u l e . T h i s r u l e a p p l i e s 
where a party to a c o n t r a c t seeks to r e l y on an exemption 
c l a u s e f o r h i s own b e n e f i t ; as the terms of l i c e n c e 
agreements are constructed p u r e l y f o r the b e n e f i t of the 
landlord , there seems no reason why the p r i n c i p l e should 
not operate here too. 
The second s i t u a t i o n where e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e i s 
^d i " i s 1 5 i b i s i c •'•o s^ov t^2.t •'-'•'s v/rittsr* agreement doss not 
put i n t o e f f e c t the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s . For t h i s 
purpose, i t appears t h a t e v i d e n c e of s u r r o u n d i n g 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , namely t he f a c t u a l background a g a i n s t 
which the agreement i s signed, i s a d m i s s i b l e ( 4 3 ) . Thus 
e v i d e n c e of a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , c o n v e r s a t i o n s and 
correspondence p r i o r to s i g n i n g would be ad m i s s i b l e under 
t h i s heading. Also, i t seems t h a t evidence of events 
subsequent to s i g n i n g are a d m i s s i b l e ( 4 4 ) , although the 
e x t e n t to which t h i s i s so has not been p r e c i s e l y 
defined. A l l t h i s seemed very hopeful f o r the occupier 
t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h a tenancy, but how h e l p f u l d i d i t 
prove to be? I t i s necessary to prove to the court t h a t 
the document signed was a "sham" i n the sense t h a t , a t 
the time the document was s i g n e d , the p a r t i e s ' r e a l 
i n t e n t i o n s were d i s t o r t e d by the document. The 
expression " r e a l " i n t e n t i o n i s here used i n the o b j e c t i v e 
sense to r e f e r to the i n t e n t i o n which was manifested to 
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the other party. Within a comparatively short period, 
there was a s u c c e s s i o n of s i x cases i n which the courts 
were c a l l e d upon to decide whether or not the documents 
should be given e f f e c t to on the b a s i s t h a t they were 
"shams". I n three of these c a s e s , the occupier succeeded 
i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t a tenancy was created, whereas i n 
the remaining three he d i d not so succeed. I t i s thus 
proposed to examine the cases i n question and to t r y and 
account f o r the d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s , p o i n t i n g out the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c e d by o c c u p i e r s where t h e i r c l a i m s 
f a i l e d . 
To c o n s i d e r f i r s t the c a s e s i n which t h e o c c u p i e r 
succeeded i n showing the documents signed d i d not embody 
the true i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s . The f i r s t of these 
was the County Court d e c i s i o n of WALSH v GRIFFITHS-
JONES (4 5 ) . Here, the p a r t i e s entered i n t o two i d e n t i c a l 
n o n - e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n agreements, d e s c r i b e d as 
l i c e n c e s , each of which provided t h a t use was to be i n 
common with the l i c e n s o r and other persons. Despite 
t h i s , Judge McDonnell held t h a t the i n t e n t i o n of the 
p a r t i e s had been to c r e a t e a tenancy. He appeared to be 
infl u e n c e d by three main f a c t o r s : f i r s t l y , the f a c t t h a t 
the occupiers had come looking f o r a j o i n t tenancy and 
that the one defendant would not have entered i n t o the 
agreement without the other; secondly, the defendants 
were assured t h a t there was no danger whatsoever of the 
landlady or any other person seeking occupation of the 
f l a t ; and f i n a l l y , the agent had explained the c l a u s e 
concerning use i n common with the l i c e n s o r and others as 
" j u s t a l e g a l f o r m a l i t y " . The next case i n which the 
occupier succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a tenancy was the 
Court of Appeal d e c i s i o n of O'MALLEY v SEYMOUR(46). 
U n l i k e the f i r s t c a s e or subsequent c a s e s to be 
disc u s s e d , t h i s d i d not concern a sh a r i n g agreement; the 
However, there was a p r o v i s i o n i n the c o n t r a c t which 
provided i n e f f e c t t h a t e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was not 
granted and the p l a i n t i f f could share the premises with 
the defendant or introduce others to share the premises. 
The Court of Appeal decided ( l e a d i n g judgement Stephenson 
L.J.) t h a t , although the w r i t t e n agreement crea t e d a 
l i c e n c e , there had been a f i r m o r a l agreement reached two 
days p r i o r to s i g n i n g , which e s t a b l i s h e d a tenancy. The 
c o u r t r e a c h e d t h i s c o n c l u s i o n on the b a s i s of the 
evidence given by the p l a i n t i f f i n cross-examination, i n 
which she, on s e v e r a l occasions, r e f e r r e d to a tenancy, 
and the County Court judges' opinion t h a t the defendant 
was a r e l i a b l e witness to what had t r a n s p i r e d between the 
p a r t i e s before s i g n i n g . The f i n a l case, i n which the 
occupier was s u c c e s s f u l i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a tenancy d e s p i t e 
s i g n i n g an agreement c o n s i s t e n t with only a l i c e n c e , was 
DEMUREN AND ADEFOPE V SEAL E S T A T E S ( 4 7 ) . Here, two 
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Nigerian post-graduate students, who had j u s t a r r i v e d i n 
the c o u n t r y , s i g n e d two i d e n t i c a l n o n - e x c l u s i v e 
o c c u p a t i o n agreements, s i m i l a r t o t h a t c o n s i d e r e d i n 
WALSH v GRIFFITHS-JONES, f o r t he s h a r i n g of a f l a t 
together. Once again, there was evidence of a p r i o r o r a l 
agreement, and the Court of Appeal ( l e a d i n g judgement, 
Megaw L. J . ) decided t h a t there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to 
prove the o r a l agreement was not given e f f e c t to i n the 
wr i t t e n agreement l a t e r signed. The court appeared to be 
influenced, i n f i n d i n g the agreement a "sham", by the 
f a c t t h a t the advertisement had been f o r a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d 
f l a t , the terms of the agreement were not explained to 
the p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the d i s t i n c t i o n between a l e a s e 
and a l i c e n c e , and the occupiers had to give post-dated 
cheques f o r each month's payment, but the owner could 
terminate on one week's n o t i c e ; the owner could thus end 
the agreement before the end of the month f o r which the 
occupiers had paid. O v e r a l l , the Court of Appeal seemed 
very concerned by the imbalance between the p a r t i e s ' 
r i g h t s , as s e t out i n the document and the apparent 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s of i t , so much so t h a t Megaw L . J . 
commented: 
"There i s something which i s so badly wrong with 
t h i s agreement t h a t one i s bound to look a t i t 
with the gravest s u s p i c i o n . " ( 4 8 ) 
To turn now to the d e c i s i o n s i n which the occupier f a i l e d 
to e s t a b l i s h t h a t the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s was to 
crea t e a tenancy. The f i r s t of these was the Court of 
Appeal d e c i s i o n i n SOMMA v HAZLEHURST(49). T h i s concerned 
i d e n t i c a l w r i t t e n agreements f o r l i c e n c e s under a sha r i n g 
arrangement, v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h a t c o n s i d e r e d by the 
County Court i n WALSH v GRIFFITHS-JONES(50) to which the 
Court of Appeal gave e x p l i c i t approval. Once again, there 
wsR a c l a u s e i n each sgrsemsnt to the e f f e c t that user 
was to be i n common with the l i c e n s o r and other persons. 
The f a c t s were a d d i t i o n a l l y s i m i l a r to WALSH v GRIFFITHS-
JONES i n t h a t t h e r e was e v i d e n c e t h a t when, b e f o r e 
s i g n i n g the co n t r a c t Mr. Hazlehurst had asked what the 
non-exclusive occupation c l a u s e meant, he was "brushed 
o f f " . How, then, was the r e s u l t d i f f e r e n t ? I t seems 
that a larg e p a r t of the d i f f e r e n c e l a y i n the f a c t t h a t 
i n SOMMA v HAZLEHURST, there was no p r i o r o r a l agreement 
against which to judge whether the w r i t t e n agreement was 
a sham. Cummings-Bruce L . J . , t h e r e f o r e , approached the 
case by asking two questions: f i r s t l y , d i d the p a r t i e s 
intend to be bound by the w r i t t e n agreement? I n f i n d i n g 
that they d i d intend to be bound, he was very much 
influe n c e d by the f a c t t h a t one of the defendants, Mr. 
Hazlehurst, was an educated man who knew what he was 
l e t t i n g himself i n f o r . The second question asked was, 
could i t be s a i d , from the words used i n the agreement 
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that there was an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a tenancy. Given 
t h a t , on the f a c t s , the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s could 
only be a s c e r t a i n e d from the w r i t t e n agreement and that 
the approach of the courts to f i n d i n g the i n t e n t i o n of 
the p a r t i e s was the " s u b s t a n c e t e s t " , i . e . t h a t of 
a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
terms of the agreement, i t was i n e v i t a b l e , where there 
were two separate agreements, n e i t h e r purporting to give 
e x c l u s i v e occupation, t h a t the Court of Appeal would f i n d 
a l i c e n c e was intended. 
The second d e c i s i o n , where the court found t h a t there was 
no i n t e n t i o n to cr e a t e a tenancy, was ALDRINGTON GARAGES 
v FIELDER(51). This again concerned the s i g n i n g of two 
i d e n t i c a l n o n - e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n agreements f o r the 
sharing of a f l a t . The d e c i s i o n followed the approach 
taken i n SOMMA v HAZLEHURST and found t h a t l i c e n c e s were 
created. The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i s and other s i m i l a r 
cases where tenancies were found to e x i s t , again seems to 
be based on the f a c t t h a t there was no evidence given of 
a p r i o r o r a l agreement and thus the court was confined to 
a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the documents themselves to f i n d the 
in t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s . 
The remaining d e c i s i o n where the court found a l i c e n c e 
and not a tenancy had been crea t e d was STUROLSON AND CO.v 
WENIZ(52). Here, a married couple and a f r i e n d of t h e i r s 
wanted to share a f l a t . Each signed agreements on the 
same day i n i d e n t i c a l terms. I t was, however, conceded 
t h a t , as a matter of c o n s t r u c t i o n , each agreement was a 
l i c e n c e , not a tenancy, but the husband argued t h a t the 
agreements were shams. T h i s was r e j e c t e d by the Court of 
Appeal; the p a r t i e s were caught out by the same t r a p as 
in SOMMA v HAZLEHURST. E v e l e i g h L . J . s a i d t h a t , as the 
husband r e a l i s e d t h a t the l a n d l o r d would not l e t the f l a t 
t n thp>m i f -hhp Pent- A r t 1 Q77 a n n l i e f l 1-r> the* 3orria«aTnpnt a n d 
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a p p r e c i a t e d the consequences of t h i s , t h e agreements 
could not be descr i b e d as shams, as the o b j e c t i v e s of 
both p a r t i e s had c l e a r l y been achieved. 
D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t i n t h r e e of the s i x c a s e s 
considered, occupiers who signed non-exclusive occupation 
agreements managed to e s t a b l i s h t e n a n c i e s , i t would seem 
to have been very much of an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e to e s t a b l i s h 
a t e n a n c y . T h i s i s because f i r s t l y s u c h a f i n d i n g 
depended on evidence of the p r e c i s e f a c t s which occurred 
b e f o r e s i g n i n g the agreement and, as much of t h i s 
evidence centred around o r a l agreements, the c r e d i b i l i t y 
of the i n d i v i d u a l w i t n e s s e s was of v i t a l importance. 
Therefore success depended very much on the i n d i v i d u a l 
circumstances of the case. T h i s very point was made by 
R o s k i l l L . J . i n ALDRINGTON GARAGES v FIELDER(53), where 
he s a i d that n e i t h e r the case before him nor SOMMA v 
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HAZLEHURST s h o u l d be tak e n t o l a y down g e n e r a l i s e d 
p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s was obviously an unde s i r a b l e approach 
as an i n d i v i d u a l occupier d i d not know p r e c i s e l y where he 
stood and thus the approach encouraged l i t i g a t i o n . 
The second f a c t o r which seemed to a f f e c t the occupier's 
chances of success i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a tenancy was how w e l l 
the agreement to avoid the Rent Acts was constructed. I f 
i t was c o n v i n c i n g l y constructed, he was more l i k e l y to 
f a i l , whereas i f i t was badly constructed, as i n DEMUREN 
AND ADEFOPE v SEAL ESTATES(54), t h i s i n f l u e n c e d the court 
i n f i n d i n g the agreement to be a "sham". F i n a l l y , the 
chances of an o c c u p i e r e s t a b l i s h i n g a te n a n c y would 
appear to be reduced i f the n e g o t i a t i o n s were s k i l f u l l y 
concluded. Here, the p r i n c i p l e would seem to be, the 
l e s s s a i d the b e t t e r , because, i f the i n t e n t i o n of the 
p a r t i e s c o u l d o n l y be e s t a b l i s h e d from the w r i t t e n 
agreements, the l a n d l o r d was a c e r t a i n w inner; t h e 
"substance t e s t " would r e q u i r e an examination of the 
i n d i v i d u a l terms of the agreements which c l e a r l y d i d not 
have the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a tenancy. I t was t h e r e f o r e 
obviously impossible to e s t a b l i s h t h a t the agreements 
were "shams" when the c o u r t was c o n f i n e d t o an 
exam i n a t i o n of the w r i t t e n documents t h e m s e l v e s . 
Moreover, i t has a l r e a d y been p o i n t e d out t h a t any 
attempt to a s c e r t a i n the a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s 
i s i l l u s o r y ( 5 5 ) . The l a n d l o r d ' s o n l y i n t e n t i o n i n 
ente r i n g i n t o a l i c e n c e agreement i s to make sure the 
agreement i s o u t s i d e the Rent A c t s . The t e n a n t i s 
u n l i k e l y to have a common i n t e n t i o n : i f he i s aware of 
the consequences of the d i s t i n c t i o n between a l e a s e and a 
l i c e n c e , he i s forced i n t o p a s s i v e acceptance of the f a c t 
t h a t the l a n d l o r d does not want to allow him Rent Act 
p r o t e c t i o n . STUROLSON AND CO. v WENIZ (56) i s a c l a s s i c 
example of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . However, although the courts 
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the p a r t i e s , they have been unprepared to consider the 
motives of the p a r t i e s . T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y where the 
argument that the agreement was a "sham" broke down i n 
STUROLSON AND CO. v WENIZ. Moreover, the courts were 
quite e x p l i c i t i n t h e i r acknowledgement t h a t the non-
e x c l u s i v e occupation agreements considered were designed 
purely to avoid Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . For example, i n 
SOMMA v HAZLEHURST, Cummings-Bruce L . J . explained: 
"The attempt which has l e d to t h i s appeal i s made 
by a document drawn up by one or a combination of 
those who seem to have s t u d i e d a l l the e f f o r t s , 
recorded i n a we l t e r of cases decided i n every 
court from the County Court to the House of Lords, 
to avoid l e t t i n g a dwelling-house or p a r t of i t by 
arranging to l i c e n c e or to share the occupation of 
i t . " ( 5 7 ) 
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He n e v e r t h e l e s s proceeded to f i n d the agreement i n 
q u e s t i o n amounted to a l i c e n c e , even though the 
i n e v i t a b l e consequence of so doing was t o a l l o w the 
e n t i r e p o l i c y of the Rent Acts to be undermined. The 
need f o r caution expressed by Evershed M.R. i n FOSTER v 
ROBINSON(58) about the dangers of l a n d l o r d ' s studying 
l i c e n c e cases f o r t h i s very purpose seemed to have been 
abandoned. Not only were judges q u i t e e x p l i c i t about the 
aims of landlords i n drawing up l i c e n c e agreements, they 
were a l s o e x p l i c i t about the f a c t t h a t the tenants who 
signed them f r e q u e n t l y d i d so r e l u c t a n t l y , accepting the 
l o s s of t h e i r s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n only out of urgent 
need. For example, i n ALDRINGTON GARAGES v FIELDER(59), 
Geoffrey Lane L . J . acknowledged t h a t the occupier, Mr. 
F i e l d e r , was " r e l u c t a n t t o s i g n " , y e t t h i s was not 
considered to be a r e l e v a n t f a c t o r any more than the 
motive of the l a n d l o r d . Thus, d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t Rent 
Act p r o t e c t i o n a r i s e s out of a need to p r o t e c t the weaker 
party, the tenant, at a time when there i s a shortage of 
accommodation, the j u d g e s , a f t e r 1974 a t l e a s t , 
c o n s i s t e n t l y f a i l e d to take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the s o c i a l 
background a g a i n s t which the Rent Acts operated and out 
of which the cases arose, choosing i n s t e a d to take a 
f o r m a l i s t i c approach, which, coupled w i t h a somewhat 
dubious t e s t of i n t e n t i o n , succeeded i n " d r i v i n g a hole 
through the Rent Acts". The a t t i t u d e to l i c e n c e s was 
s t r a n g e l y very much at odds with t h a t taken i n QUENNELL v 
MALTBY(60) case concerned with the r i g h t s and remedies of 
a mortgagee. The mortgagor i n t h i s case had l e t a tenant 
i n t o possession i n breach of a covenant a g a i n s t l e a s i n g . 
He l a t e r wished to s e l l h i s house with vacant p o s s e s s i o n . 
I n o r d e r t o a s s i s t i n e f f e c t i n g t h i s purpose, the 
mortgagor asked the mortgagee to e x e r c i s e h i s r i g h t to 
t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of the p r o p e r t y from the s t a t u t o r y 
tenant- i-ho i - o n a n r v nnt- b ^ i n r f hindina on the mortaaaees. 
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The mortgagee refused to co-operate i n t h i s way but d i d 
agree to a s s i g n the mortgage to the mortgagor's wife, who 
thereupon sought pos s e s s i o n of the premises. The Court 
of Appeal refused to allow the order f o r p o s s e s s i o n . One 
of the i n f l u e n c i n g f a c t o r s i n not a l l o w i n g p o s s e s s i o n 
which was greeted with sympathy was that the device could 
lead to widespread evasion of the Rent Acts. I t was s a i d 
t h a t , where a mortgagee acted as agent of the mortgagor 
i n s e e k i n g p o s s e s s i o n , he s h o u l d not be a l l o w e d t o 
s u c c e e d u n l e s s he was a c t i n g bona f i d e f o r h i s own 
purposes. Thus the court was prepared to consider the 
motives of the mortgagee and mortgagor. I n c o n t r a s t , i n 
l i c e n c e cases, the courts were unprepared to consider 
motive, t a k i n g a s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e to t h a t i n o t h e r 
spheres i n which s t a t u t e law operates, f o r example tax 
avoidance; that i s , u n t i l FURNISS v DAWSON.(61) 
76 
Thus, the review of ca s e s , decided s i n c e the c l o s i n g of 
major loopholes i n p r o t e c t i o n by the Rent Act 1974, does, 
as Robson and Watchman have o b s e r v e d ( 6 2 ) , appear t o 
re v e a l a change i n a t t i t u d e . Perhaps, out of f e a r s t h a t 
the p r i v a t e rented s e c t o r would dry up, the j u d i c i a r y d id 
r e s o r t to a p a s s i v e acceptance of Rent Act avoidance. 
How w h o l e h e a r t e d t h i s a c c e p t a n c e had become i s more 
debatable. I t i s questionable whether the non-exclusive 
l i c e n c e cases d i s c u s s e d are t r u l y r e c o n c i l a b l e . The very 
f a c t t h a t , whether a t e n a n c y or a l i c e n c e had been 
created depended on the p r e c i s e f a c t s of the case, d i d 
enable c e r t a i n judges to draw d i s t i n c t i o n s when faced 
with remarkable s i m i l a r agreements to those considered i n 
e a r l i e r c a s e s , and f i n d t e n a n c i e s . Perhaps, p a r t of the 
problem, to give some judges the b e n e f i t of the doubt, 
was t h a t , when presented with "sham documents", they 
became v i c t i m s of t h e i r own t e s t of i n t e n t i o n . 
Given that STREET v MOUNTFORD now l a y s down t h a t , s u b j e c t 
to c e r t a i n exceptions, when an occupier i s i n e x c l u s i v e 
possession i n r e t u r n f o r payment of a ren t , a tenancy 
w i l l a r i s e , what scope remains f o r the possessory l i c e n c e 
to be used as a means of avoiding p r o t e c t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n ? 
The p o s s i b i l i t i e s appear to be l i m i t e d and d e c i s i o n s 
immediately subsequent to STREET v MOUNTFORD suggested 
the courts intended to maintain a s t r i c t l i n e . However, 
more recent cases show some evidence of new l i f e f o r the 
l i c e n c e concept. To begin with, f o l l o w i n g the s t r i c t 
l i n e , t h e c a s e s of ROYAL PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETY v 
COUNTY(63) and BRETHERTON v PATEN(64) i l l u s t r a t e t h a t the 
courts may w e l l be u n w i l l i n g to extend the "excepted 
c a t e g o r i e s " o u t l i n e d by L o r d Templeman. I n ROYAL 
PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETY v COUNTY, the defendant was a 
teacher and an employee of a l o c a l a u t h o r i t y , working i n 
a school owned by the p l a i n t i f f s . O r i g i n a l l y , under an 
w i t h board and accommodation i n a room a d j o i n i n g a 
dormitory w i t h i n the school complex f o r which a sma l l 
payment was deducted from h i s s a l a r y . Subsequently, the 
defendant married and the school agreed to provide him 
with a house a couple of mi l e s away. The terms on which 
he occupied the house were r e f e r r e d to as a "tenancy" i n 
correspondence, " r e n t " was deducted from h i s s a l a r y , and 
no s e r v i c e s were provided. I t was accepted t h a t the 
defendant had e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n but, when t he 
defendant l e f t the school, n o t i c e to q u i t was served and 
p o s s e s s i o n p r o c e e d i n g s begun on the b a s i s t h a t t h e 
defendant was merely a l i c e n s e e . The Court of Appeal 
d e c i d e d t h a t the defendant was a t e n a n t and not a 
l i c e n s e e . One of the arguments put fo r w a r d by the 
p l a i n t i f f s was t h a t t h e defendant f e l l w i t h i n t h e 
"exceptional circumstances" of Lord Templeman on account 
of ( i ) the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p a r t i e s ; ( i i ) the 
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f a c t t h a t the previous room was occupied as a lodger a t a 
low rent; ( i i i ) the i n f o r m a l i t y of the paperwork and 
( i v ) the absence of p r o v i s i o n s concerning s u b l e t t i n g and 
assignment. T h i s was r e j e c t e d by the Court of Appeal f o r 
reasons which w i l l be explained below. 
BRETHERTON v PATON(65) i s perhaps a more s t r i k i n g 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the co u r t s ' r e l u c t a n c e to breath back 
l i f e i n t o l i c e n c e s by means of Lo r d Templeman's 
"exceptional circumstances". Here, the defendant had 
wanted to rent a p a r t i c u l a r house from the p l a i n t i f f who 
had i n d i c a t e d that he was not prepared to l e t the house 
but only to s e l l i t . I t was e v e n t u a l l y agreed t h a t the 
defendant should move i n s t r a i g h t away and c a r r y out 
r e p a i r s i n order to enable her to obtain a mortgage and 
so buy the property. On t h i s b a s i s , she went i n t o 
e x c l u s i v e possession of the premises and paid £1.20 per 
week to the p l a i n t i f f to cover c o s t s of insurance. There 
was no w r i t t e n agreement concerning p o s s e s s i o n of the 
property and, when the p a r t i e s were subsequently unable 
to agree the s a l e p r i c e , the p l a i n t i f f served a no t i c e to 
qu i t and began proceedings f o r p o s s e s s i o n . The a s s i s t a n t 
r e c o r d e r a t the County Court h e l d t h a t the t h r e e 
h a l l m a r k s of a tena n c y e x i s t e d ( t h e i n s u r a n c e c o s t s 
c o n s t i t u t i n g r e n t ) , but th a t the s i t u a t i o n came w i t h i n 
the excepted c a t e g o r i e s l i s t e d i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, as 
the d e f e n d a n t ' s o c c u p a t i o n was r e f e r a b l e t o an 
arrangement ( a l b e i t i n e f f e c t i v e ) f o r the s a l e of the 
land. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal, w h i l s t 
admitting t h a t the i n t e n t i o n behind occupation was th a t 
the defendant s h o u l d buy the house, h e l d t h a t the 
s i t u a t i o n was not one of occupation p r i o r to a con t r a c t 
of s a l e , as the agreement was void f o r u n c e r t a i n t y , no 
purchase p r i c e having been agreed. T h i s may w e l l be so 
but the f a c t t h at Lord Templeman uses the word " i n c l u d e " 
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the courts to add to the examples he provided. There 
should be no danger of t h i s kind of an arrangement being 
used as a device to avoid the Rent Acts , as i t i s open to 
the courts to f i n d the agreement a "sham" i f there was no 
a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n t o occupy p r i o r t o a genuine s a l e . 
Consequently, the approach appears to be u n n e c e s s a r i l y 
s t r i c t and u n f a i r on the free h o l d e r . 
S t i l l c o n s i dering cases which have taken a s t r i c t l i n e 
s i n c e STREET v MOUNTFORD, one way i n which the d e c i s i o n 
of the House of Lords could be s i g n i f i c a n t l y l i m i t e d , i s 
by a fi n d i n g t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down were only 
intended to be d i r e c t e d to r e s i d e n t i a l accommodation as 
opposed to the commercial sphere. T h i s i s because i n 
l a y i n g down the t e s t f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e s 
and l i c e n c e s , L o r d Templeman f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d 
s p e c i f i c a l l y to r e s i d e n t i a l accommodation. For example he 
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s t a t e d : 
" I f on the other hand r e s i d e n t i a l accommodation i s 
gr a n t e d f o r a term a t a r e n t w i t h e x c l u s i v e 
p o ssession, t h e l a n d l o r d p r o v i d i n g n e i t h e r 
attendance o r s e r v i c e s , t h e g r a n t i s a 
tenancy.(66) 
However,it i s also t r u e , i n reviewing e a r l i e r d ecisions, 
n o n - r e s i d e n t i a l lease/licence cases such as ADDISCOMBE 
GARDEN ESTATES v CRABBE(67) and SHELL MEX AND BP LTD. v 
MANCHESTER GARAGES(68) were discussed, suggesting t h a t 
the p r i n c i p l e s were intended t o be of wider a p p l i c a t i o n . 
A g a i n s t t h i s background, i n LONDON AND ASSOCIATED 
INVESTMENT TRUST PLC. v CALOW(69), i t was argued t h a t 
STREET v MOUNTFORD only a p p l i e d t o r e s i d e n t i a l property. 
On the f a c t s of the case, the occupier was somewhat 
unusually claiming t o have merely a l i c e n c e t o occupy, 
w h i l s t the l a n d l o r d was clai m i n g t h a t a business tenancy 
e x i s t e d i n order t o j u s t i f y a claim f o r r e n t and service 
charges a f t e r the occupier had l e f t the premises without 
g i v i n g formal n o t i c e . The basis of the landlor d ' s claim 
was, i f the agreement was a lease i t remained i n force 
u n t i l p r o p e r l y determined i n compliance w i t h the Landlord 
and Tenant Act 1954. However, Judge Baker expressed the 
view t h a t Lord Templeman's express r e f e r e n c e s t o 
r e s i d e n t i a l accommodation were explainable on the grounds 
t h a t t h e f a c t s of STREET v MOUNTFORD r e l a t e d t o 
r e s i d e n t i a l property. This would seem t o be a c o r r e c t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r there i s no j u s t i f i a b l e reason f o r 
s e t t i n g down a d i f f e r e n t t e s t f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 
leases and licences i n the commercial sphere, except on 
the grounds of the e f f e c t s of the d i f f e r e n t s t a t u t o r y 
c o n t r o l s i n each sphere, and Lord Templeman was adament 
t h i s c onsideration was i r r e l e v e n t . ( 7 0 ) Nevertheless i n 
i - h o r o r o n f d e c i s i o n of DRESDEN E S T A T E S T.TFl . \r 
C0LLINS0N(71), G l i d e w e l l L.J expressed some doubt as t o 
whether the p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i e d i n the r e s i d e n t i a l and 
commercial sectors should be the same. 
I t has already been noted(72) t h a t the i n t e n t i o n of the 
p a r t i e s remains r e l e v a n t i n deciding whether an agreement 
creates a lease or a l i c e n c e t o the extent of determining 
whether the three hallmarks of a tenancy e x i s t . Both 
ROYAL PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETY V COUNTY(73) and UNIVERSITY 
OF READING v JOHNSON-HOUGHTON(74) suggested t h a t t h e 
courts were not going t o provide scope f o r the possessory 
li c e n c e by a l l o w i n g i n by the back door o l d approaches t o 
at t a c h i n g relevance t o the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s . I n 
the f i r s t mentioned case, the reason why Fox L.J. was not 
persuaded by t h e evidence p u t f o r w a r d f o r t h e case 
f a l l i n g w i t h i n Lord Templeman's "excepted categories" was 
because t h i s amounted: 
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" r e a l l y t o an attempt t o go back t o the approach 
disapproved of by the House of Lords i n STREET v 
MOUNTFORD of examining the circumstances w i t h a 
view t o a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e 
pa r t i e s . " ( 7 5 ) 
Lord J u s t i c e Fox went on t o r e i t e r a t e t h a t the only 
r e l e v a n t i n t e n t i o n was the i n t e n t i o n demonstrated by the 
agreement t o g r a n t e x c l u s i v e possession a t a r e n t . 
S i m i l a r l y , i n the f i r s t instance d e c i s i o n of Leonard J. 
i n UNIVERSITY OF READING V JOHNSON-HOUGHTON, a case 
s i m i l a r i n f a c t s t o BRACEY v READ(76), being concerned 
w i t h a grant of r i g h t s t o g a l l o p s , although the learned 
judge analyses the agreement clause by clause, he does so 
on l y w i t h t h e aim of a s c e r t a i n i n g whether e x c l u s i v e 
possession i s granted. 
However, the recent d e c i s i o n i n DRESDEN ESTATES LTD. v 
COLLINSON(77) showed i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t the de c i s i o n i n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD had not t o t a l l y l a i d t o r e s t notions 
of a t t a c h i n g undue s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the i n t e n t i o n of the 
p a r t i e s . This case concerned a w r i t t e n , agreement 
described as a l i c e n c e , f o r the occupation of businesss 
premises. The agreement expressly s t a t e d t h a t i t was not 
a tenancy and was only personal t o the p a r t i e s . Moreover 
the agreement provided i t could be determined by three 
months n o t i c e on e i t h e r s i d e and f u r t h e r t h a t t h r e e 
months n o t i c e was t o be given f o r a u n i l a t e r a l d e c i s i o n 
by the owner t o increase the lice n c e fee. I n a d d i t i o n a 
clause i n the agreement enabled the owners t o r e q u i r e the 
licensees t o be moved t o other premises w i t h i n the same 
property without determining the agreement. The occupier 
subsequently claimed t h a t the agreement f e l l w i t h i n Part 
I I of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The Court of 
A n n p R 1 r l e » r i H o r l f h p a g r ^ f i m f » n t w a s a genuine non exclusive 
l i c e n c e . The court was p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h r 
f a c t t h a t t h e owner c o u l d i n c r e a s e t he l i c e n c e f e e 
u n i l a t e r a l l y and could move the occupier t o other p a r t s 
of the property without the agreement being determined. 
I n the leading judgment, G l i d e w e l l L.J placed r e l i a n c e 
( i n t e r a l i a ) on the d e c i s i o n of Lord Denning M.R i n SHELL 
-MEX AND BP LTD. V MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD (78) and 
passages from Halsbury's Law of England(79). I n SHELL-MEX 
AND BP LTD v MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD i t w i l l be 
remembered(80) Denning M.R st a t e d : 
"We have t o see whether i t i s a personal p r i v e l e g e 
given, or. . . an i n t e r e s t i n land. At one time i t 
used t o be thought t h a t exclusive possession was a 
decis i v e f a c t o r but t h i s i s not so now. I t depends 
on broader considerations a l t o g e t h e r . . . " ( 8 1 ) 
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The passage from Halsbury ( w r i t t e n before the d e c i s i o n i n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD) quoted by Gl i d e w e l l L.J s t a t e d : 
" I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether an agreement c r e a t e s 
between the p a r t i e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of l a n d l o r d 
and tenant or merely l i c e n s o r and licensee the 
decisive c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s the i n t e n t i o n of the 
p a r t i e s . . . . The f a c t t h a t the agreement grants a 
r i g h t of excl u s i v e occupation i s not i n i t s e l f 
evidence of the existance of a tenancy, but i s a 
considera t i o n of the f i r s t imprtance, although of 
l e s s e r s i g n i f i c a n c e than t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e 
pa r t i e s . " ( 8 2 ) 
Taking the words of Halsbury l i t e r a l l y , i f i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o see how e x c l u s i v e possession can be of f i r s t 
importance i f i t i s of l e s s e r s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t t h e 
i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s . Moreover, i t i s submitted, the 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s b e i n g o f 
greater s i g n i f i c a n c e than the existence of a r i g h t t o 
exclusive possession i s out of l i n e w i t h statements of 
Lord Templeman i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, i n c l u d i n g 
statements from h i s judgment a c t u a l l y quoted by 
G l i d e w e l l . A l t h o u g h Lord Templeman s a i d e c l u s i v e 
possession was n o t d e c i s i v e b ut merely of f i r s t 
importance(83), t h i s needs t o be i n t e r p r e t e d i n the l i g h t 
of h i s c r i t i c i s m s of the meaningless t e s t of i n t e n t i o n 
which had been developed p r i o r t o STREETv MOUNTFORD(84) . 
I t i s , f u r t h e r , u n l i k e l y t h a t Lord Templeman would have 
agreed t h a t the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s was the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n the l i g h t of his statement t h a t : 
"...the only i n t e n t i o n which i s r e l e v e n t i s the 
i n t e n t i o n demonstrated by the agreement t o grant 
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Thus the court i n DRESDEN ESTATES LTD. v COLLINSON should 
have only considered the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s i n 
order t o decide whether exclusive possession had been 
granted. I f i t appeared not t o have been the court should 
have gone on t o decide whether t h e agreement was a 
"sham". The case i s s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i n t h a t i t 
shows t h a t the House of Lords has not f i n a l l y k i l l e d o f f 
the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n l e a v i n g scope f o r the re-emergence 
of the possessory l i c e n c e . 
I n the l i g h t of STREET v MOUNTFORD, f o u r p o s s i b l e ways of 
u s i n g t he possessory l i c e n c e t o a v o i d t h e Rent Act 
p r o t e c t i o n need t o be considered. F i r s t l y , would an 
express term i n any agreement, t h a t e x c l u s i v e possession 
had not been g r a n t e d t o the o c c u p i e r w i t h o u t more, 
s u f f i c e t o allow the co u r t t o f i n d t h a t t here was merely 
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a licence t o occupy? I n SHELL-MEX AND B.P. LTD. v 
MANCHESTER GARAGES LTD.(86) , the agreement contained a 
term by which the occupier agreed "Not t o impede i n any 
way the o f f i c e r s servants or agents of the [ f r e e h o l d e r ] 
i n the exercise by them of the [ f r e e h o l d e r ' s ] r i g h t s t o 
possession and c o n t r o l of the premises". The decisi o n 
was approved i n STREET v MOUNTFORD except f o r Lord 
Denning's reasoning, based upon the personal nature of 
the t r a n s a c t i o n . Furthermore, i t has already been noted 
t h a t the a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s are re l e v a n t i n 
as c e r t a i n i n g whether exclusive possession has i n f a c t 
been granted. Would an express term negative such a c t u a l 
i n t e n t i o n ? The answer would seem t o be: only provided 
the evidence showed, as i t d i d i n the " SHELL-MEX" case, 
t h a t the express term was not a "sham", t h a t i s t o say, 
whatever the agreement f o r m a l l y s t a t e s , the "substance" 
of the matter i s t h a t the l a n d l o r d r e t a i n s such c o n t r o l 
as t o negative a f i n d i n g of exclusive possession. This 
was the approach taken i n ROYAL PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETY v 
COUNTY (87). 
A second possible opening f o r the possessory li c e n c e post 
STREET v MOUNTFORD i s t o allow an occupier t o go i n t o 
e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n , b ut t o draw up an agreement 
expressly b i n d i n g i n honour only so t h a t there i s no 
i n t e n t i o n t o create a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . The 
pr o v i s i o n f o r payment could be couched i n terms t o make 
i t o p t i o n a l . This should lack the three hallmarks of a 
tenancy, there being no payment of ren t and no r i g h t t o 
exclusive possession, but merely a p r i v i l e g e of exclusive 
occupation. The occupier should then be regarded as a 
bare l i c e n s e e and t h e f r e e h o l d e r c o u l d c o n s e q u e n t l y 
ob t a i n possession a t any time. There would appear t o be 
two drawbacks t o such an arrangement. F i r s t l y , i t i s 
t o t a l l y i m p r acticable f o r a commercial l a n d l o r d t o allow 
snmpnnp n n c q o c c ^ n n <-\£ pro p e r t y on t h i s b?.sis 5.S h? would 
have no r i g h t t o sue f o r arrears of " r e n t " and no a c t i o n 
f o r breach of covenant. Secondly, i t may w e l l be t h a t 
the courts w i l l i n any case decide the a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s 
of t h e p a r t i e s are d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r p r o f e s s e d 
i n t e n t i o n s . 
The t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the possessory l i c e n c e as a 
means of Rent Act avoidance i s by ensuring the grantor 
lacks the l e g a l capacity t o create a lease. Cases such 
as MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES V MATTHEWS(88) 
and FINBOW v AIR MINISTRY(89), where licences were found 
on account of the f a c t t h a t the p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y g r a n t i n g 
the l i c e n c e had no estate or i n t e r e s t i n the land out of 
which t o grant a tenancy, were not discussed by the House 
of Lords i n STREET v MOUNTFORD. Scammell(90) d r a f t e d a 
means of c r e a t i n g business l i c e n c e s t o a v o i d t h e 
provi s i o n s of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part I I , 
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t h a t comprised a clause f o r i n s e r t i o n i n t o the memorandum 
of a s s o c i a t i o n of a l i m i t e d company, r e s t r i c t i n g i t s 
powers t o dea l i n g w i t h licences and sub-licences, but 
de p r i v i n g i t of power t o acquire or hold any l e g a l or 
equi t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n the land i n respect of which the 
licen c e i s granted. Such a device would seem t o have 
j u d i c i a l support i n the judgement of Lord Denning i n 
TORBETT v FAULKNER, where he observed: 
"Now the company had no estate or i n t e r e s t i n the 
land a t a l l . I t had nothing out of which i t could 
carve a tenancy. I t was i n t h i s respect i n the 
same p o s i t i o n as a r e q u i s i t i o n i n g a u t h o r i t y . I t 
could only grant a lice n c e not a tenancy."(91) 
In the same case, Evershed M.R. seemed also t o support 
t h i s view. However, P e t t i t ( 9 2 ) p o i n t s out t h a t there 
e x i s t s a series of cases which l a y down an i n c o n s i s t e n t 
p r i n c i p l e , there being no cross-references from one l i n e 
of cases t o another. I n the l i n e of cases he c i t e s where 
the grantor has no est a t e or i n t e r e s t out of which t o 
grant a tenancy, as between the p a r t i e s , a tenancy by 
estoppel a r i s e s . I n CUTHBERTSON v IRVING, the p r i n c i p l e 
was l a i d down t h a t : 
"...when a lessor without any l e g a l estate or 
t i t l e demises t o another, the p a r t i e s themselves 
are estopped from d i s p u t i n g the v a l i d i t y of the 
lease on t h a t ground; i n other words, a tenant 
cannot deny h i s l a n d l o r d ' s t i t l e nor can t h e 
lessor dispute the v a l i d i t y of the lease."(93) 
Bearing i n mind t h a t Lord Templeman i n STREET v MOUNTFORD 
considered t h a t the courts should be astute enough t o see 
t h a t " a r t i f i c a l t r a n s a c t i o n s " were not used t o evade the 
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i n the estoppel l i n e of cases, t o close the loophole. 
However, what would be the p o s i t i o n i f the clause d r a f t e d 
by Scammell was a l t e r e d so as t o provide t h a t the company 
has no power t o be a landlord? This would not give r i s e 
t o a s i t u a t i o n caught by the estoppel cases, as i t would 
not be r e l y i n g on the i n a b i l i t y of the company t o hold a 
l e g a l or equ i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n the land. But, as P e t t i t 
p o i n t s out, t h i s would seem t o be eq u a l l y doomed t o 
f a i l u r e on account of S.35 of the Companies Act 1985, 
which provides t h a t : " I n favour of a person d e a l i n g w i t h 
a company i n good f a i t h , any t r a n s a c t i o n decided on by 
the d i r e c t o r s s h a l l be deemed t o be one which i t i s 
w i t h i n the capacity of the company t o enter i n t o . . . . " . 
Thus, i f the occupier d e a l t i n "good f a i t h " w i t h the 
company, an agreement which gave exclusive possession i n 
r e t u r n f o r payment of a r e n t would be regarded as a v a l i d 
lease. There may, however, be one way out: a p a r t y only 
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deals w i t h a company i n "good f a i t h " i f he does not know 
or ought not t o know the co n t r a c t i s u l t r a v i r e s . I f , 
th e r e f o r e , the company t e l l s the occupier t h a t they have 
no power t o act as l a n d l o r d s , but only as l i c e n s o r s , i t 
i s arguable t h a t no tenancy agreement could be bi n d i n g on 
the company. 
The f i n a l and most serious p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the l i c e n c e , 
i n avoidng the Rent Acts i s the non-exclusive occupation 
agreement. Such agreements have not been t o t a l l y r u l e d 
out by the House of Lords i n STREET v MOUNTFORD, despite 
Lord Templeman's disapproval of SOMMA v HAZLEHURST(94), 
ALDRINGTON GARAGES LTD V FIELDER (95) and STUROLSON AND 
CO v WENIZ(96), f o r the House of Lords s t i l l adhered t o 
the p r i n c i p l e t h a t e x c l u s i v e possession i s necessary f o r 
the c r e a t i o n of a tenancy. The grounds of disapproval of 
these three decisions was t h a t they were "shams" and, i n 
the opinion of Lord Templeman, the court should: 
"...be astute t o detect and f r u s t r a t e sham devices 
and a r t i f i c a l t r a n s a c t i o n s whose only o b j e c t i s t o 
disguise the grant of a tenancy and t o evade the 
Rent Acts...."(97) 
However, t h i s passage i s unclear and open t o at l e a s t two 
possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , the narrower of which may leave 
the way open f o r f i n d i n g licences i n f u t u r e cases. The 
un c e r t a i n t y i s created by the f a c t t h a t Lord Templeman 
f a i l s t o explore p r e c i s e l y what i s t o be understood by a 
"sham" and, f u r t h e r , does not c o n s i d e r n o n - e x c l u s i v e 
occupation agreements which could not be explained away 
as "shams". The narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Lord 
Templeman's approach i s t h a t he was merely saying t h a t , 
as a matter of f a c t , the cases involved "shams", so t h a t 
i n SOMMA v HAZLEHURST and ALDRINGTON GARAGES LTD v 
enjoying exclusive possession. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
supported by the f a c t t h a t Lord Templeman p o i n t s out, of 
SOMMA v HAZLEHURST, t h a t , i f the l a n d l o r d had served a 
no t i c e t o q u i t on the man and asked the woman of the p a i r 
t o share w i t h a strange man, t h i s would have, i n e f f e c t , 
have been n o t i c e t o them both. Also he expresses the 
opinion t h a t the purpose of l e t t i n g the premises was t h a t 
the couple might l i v e together i n what he describes as 
" u n d i s t u r b e d q u a s i - c o n n u b i a l b l i s s " . Such a narrow 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may not be s u f f i c i e n t t o ex p l a i n Lord 
Templeman's reference t o STUROLSON AND CO. v WENIZ, where 
i t was conceded t h a t the agreements were licences but 
argued t h a t they were "shams" i n order t o avoid Rent Act 
p r o t e c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i f Lord Templeman merely 
disapproved of the three named decisions on the basis 
t h a t , i n r e a l i t y , e x c l u s i v e possession e x i s t e d and, f o r 
t h i s reason alone, the agreements were "shams", i t does 
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not f o l l o w t h a t a l l non-exclusive occupation agreements 
are "shams". I t would seem t h a t , i f a l a n d l o r d was t o 
i n t r o d u c e s t r a n g e r s i n t o s h a r i n g agreements w i t h one 
another, p o s s i b l y a t d i f f e r e n t times, under non-exclusive 
o c c u p a t i o n agreements, t h e c o u r t s c o u l d n ot f a i r l y 
d e s c r i b e such agreements as "shams". P r a c t i c a l l y , 
however, t h i s provides l i m i t e d scope f o r use of licences 
because there i s a l i m i t e d market f o r sharing on such a 
basis. 
The much w i d e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Lord Templeman's 
approach i s t h a t the House of Lords disapproves of any 
t r a n s a c t i o n t h e purpose o f which i s avoidance o f 
s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l . This would be t o adopt the k i n d of 
approach taken by the House of Lords i n FURNISS v DAWSON 
(98) t o tax avoidance. Under such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the 
courts would be able t o dis r e g a r d t r a n s a c t i o n s which were 
not i n the s t r i c t sense "shams", thus i n c l u d i n g non-
e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n agreements between s t r a n g e r s . 
Support f o r t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may perhaps be obtained 
from the f a c t t h a t Lord Templeman d i d not merely make 
reference t o "shams", but also r e f e r r e d t o " a r t i f i c a l 
t r a n s a c t i o n s " , a term which would appear t o be much 
wider. A w e l l known d e f i n i t i o n of a "sham" i s t h a t of 
D i p l o c k L.K. i n SNOOK V LONDON AND WEST RIDING 
INVESTMENTS LTD, where he sa i d i t : 
".... means acts done or documents executed by the 
p a r t i e s t o the "sham" which are intended by them 
t o g i v e t h i r d p a r t i e s o r t o t h e c o u r t t h e 
appearance of c r e a t i n g between the p a r t i e s l e g a l 
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s d i f f e r e n t from the a c t u a l 
l e g a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s ( i f any) which the 
p a r t i e s i n t e n d t o create."(99) 
Rnrh PI d s f n i t i < " > r | would, not cover ? s i t u a t i o n v.'h^ .T? s 
pa r t y intended not t o grant exclusive possession i n order 
t o avoid Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n and d i d not i n f a c t grant 
e x c l u s i v e possession because t h e agreement c l e a r l y 
envisaged, and the p a r t i e s i n f a c t understood, strangers 
may be introduced i n t o the premises l e t from time t o time 
under a s h a r i n g arrangement. However, " a r t i f i c i a l 
t r a n s a c t i o n " may be s u f f i c i e n t l y wide t o cover t h i s k i n d 
of s i t u a t i o n . 
The recent decision of the Court of Appeal i n HADJILOUCAS 
v CREAN(IOO) f a v o u r s a narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 
concept of a "sham" and furthermore i l l u s t r a t e s there i s 
s t i l l some scope l e f t f o r n o n - e x c l u s i v e o c c u p a t i o n 
agreements. A couple of f r i e n d s s i g n e d s e p a r a t e b ut 
i d e n t i c a l agreements described as lic e n c e s . The terms of 
the agreement provided ( i n t e r a l i a ) the licensee s h a l l 
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accept a lice n c e t o share w i t h one other person and t h a t 
the i n t e n t i o n was t h a t t he l i c e n s e e s h o u l d n ot have 
exclusive possession. The licen c e r e n t a l was st a t e d t o be 
£260 a calender month, but t h a t the t o t a l l i c e n c e fee 
paid by a l l the licensees was not t o exceed £260. On 
these f a c t s Mt .^ JTikt-±-C'e T i b b e r had decided t h e 
agreements were not "shams". The Court of Appeal 
( M u s t i l l , Cumming-Bruce and Purchas L.JJ) was of the view 
t h a t despite STREET v MOUNTFORD i t was not a u t o m a t i c a l l y 
t o be assumed t h a t i f two or more persons were occupying 
premises a t the same time they had exclusive possession 
between them. A l l t h a t Lord Templeman's judgment had l a i d 
down was t h a t the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p had t o be 
ascertained from a c o n s t r u c t i o n of the documents in v o l v e d 
againnst the background of the f a c t u a l m a t r i x r e l e v e n t t o 
t h a t exercise i n accordance w i t h the o r d i n a r y r u l e s of 
co n s t r u c t i o n of agreements. However on the f a c t s of the 
case the court f e l t unable t o make a de c i s i o n w i t h o u t a 
clos e r examination of the f a c t u a l m a t r i x . The scope f o r 
non-exclusive occupation agreements may s t i l l be l i m i t e d 
f o r Lord J u s t i c e Purchas d i d also say i n considering the 
i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e agreement t h e c o u r t 
s h o u l d bear i n mind t h e i n t e n t i o n o f P a r l i a m e n t i n 
passing the Rent Acts and should not be astute t o f i n d 
ways of circumventing i t . 
I t would t h e r e f o r e seem, on account of the de c i s i o n i n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD, t h a t the possessory l i c e n c e has met a 
near death as a device f o r avoiding Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n . 
The scope of the li c e n c e had been so widened by the 
development of an "any meaning" t e s t of i n t e n t i o n t h a t , 
had the House of Lords not taken steps t o r e s t r i c t i t s 
sphere, t h i s would have allowed unacceptably widespread 
evasion of the Rent Acts at a time when there has, i n any 
case, been a s i g n i f i c a n t move towards d e c o n t r o l i n favour 
n f ths l 9 r , c ' l o r d . Nevertheless, i t hoc been cccn thcit 
Lord Templeman d i d not take the o p p o r t u n i t y t o destroy 
the l i c e n c e completely. Although the courts a t present 
seem w i l l i n g only t o a l i m i t e d extent t o breathe l i f e 
back i n t o the concept i n t h i s sphere, the p o t e n t i a l j u s t 
about remains and one wonders whether, under a f u t u r e 
government, i n c r e a s i n g s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l on r e n t e d 
property, the possessory l i c e n c e may be r e s u s c i t a t e d t o 
p l a y a s i m i l a r r o l e t o t h e one developed f o r i t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y since 1974. 
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SECTION I I I 
Possessory licences and the L i m i t a t i o n Acts. 
I n t h i s Section, i t i s proposed t o consider the use t o 
which the possessory l i c e n c e has been put i n avoiding a 
f i n d i n g of adverse possession and whether such use i s 
b o t h j u s t i f i a b l e and d e s i r a b l e . Adverse possession 
a r i s e s out of the p r i n c i p l e of l i m i t a t i o n of actions 
which a p p l i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c i v i l law. Under t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e , no a c t i o n may be brought i n respect of a l e g a l 
wrong s u f f e r e d a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n of c e r t a i n p r e s cribed 
periods from which the cause of a c t i o n a r i s e s . These are 
now set down i n the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1980(1). The e f f e c t of 
the operation of the r u l e s r e l a t i n g t o l i m i t a t i o n of 
actions t o claims f o r recovery of possession of land from 
a trespasser, i s t o take away the t i t l e holder's r i g h t t o 
sue f o r possession. I n e f f e c t , the t i t l e holder's r i g h t s 
over the land are extinguished by the r e q u i s i t e p e r i o d of 
adverse possession. I n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h adverse 
possession, one of two s i t u a t i o n s must be proved: 
(1) d i s p o s s e s s i o n of t h e paper owner f o l l o w e d by 
adverse possession of another, or 
(2) discontinuance ( i . e . abandonment) of possession by 
the paper owner f o l l o w e d by adverse possession of 
another.(2) 
I t would seem t h a t , t o prevent what judges have regarded 
as an u n j u s t o p e r a t i o n of t h e L i m i t a t i o n Acts i n 
i n d i v i d u a l cases i n r e l a t i o n t o actions f o r recovery of 
land, the j u d i c i a r y have developed, and are arguably 
c o n t i n u i n g t o develop ( 3 ) , v a r i o u s d e v i c e s t o a v o i d 
r e a c h i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e has been adverse 
n o s s 9 s s i o n o^~ the ls.nd i n q uestio". I t r . - . T i l l be srcjuiscl 
t h a t the concept of a l i c e n c e has been u s e f u l i n t h i s 
respect, as i t i s c l e a r t h a t time cannot begin t o run 
under the L i m i t a t i o n Acts so long as no wrong i s being 
committed a g a i n s t t h e t i t l e h o l d e r . I f t h e r e i s 
permission t o be on the land, there i s no wrong and 
t h e r e f o r e no adverse possession. Amendments contained i n 
the L i m i t a t i o n Amendment Act 1980 ,now consolidated i n t o 
the L I m i t a t i o n A c t 1980 have c l e a r l y diminished the scope 
f o r using the possessory l i c e n c e t o avoid a f i n d i n g of 
adverse possession. However, i t i s proposed b r i e f l y t o 
o u t l i n e the two main ways t h a t judges u t i l i s e d licences 
i n adverse possession cases before the passing of the Act 
and then t o consider the present scope f o r so doing. 
(a) The f i n d i n g of a possessory l i c e n c e as opposed t o a 
tenancy at w i l l . 
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The f i r s t method involved d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between the 
possessory li c e n c e and a tenancy a t w i l l . Under S.9 (1) 
of the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939, where a person was found t o 
be occupying land as a tenant a t w i l l , i n the absence of 
the l a n d l o r d determining the tenancy, provided the tenant 
p a i d no f u r t h e r r e n t o r o t h e r w i s e acknowledged t h e 
landlord's t i t l e , time began t o run a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n 
of one year from t h e commencement of t h e tenancy. 
Accordingly, i f the l a n d l o r d d i d nothing which amounted 
t o a p o s i t i v e a c t of d e t e r m i n a t i o n , h i s t i t l e was 
extinguished a f t e r t h i r t e e n years from the beginning of 
the tenancy. To prevent such a f i n d i n g i n a ser i e s of 
cases, namely ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON ( 4 ) , COBB v LANE ( 5 ) , 
HUGHES v GRIFFEN (6) and HESLOP v BURNS ( 7 ) , the courts 
found o c c u p a t i o n was not as t e n a n t a t w i l l b u t as 
l i c e n s e e . That t h i s was i n f a c t t h e aim was made 
abundantly c l e a r by Denning L.J. i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
where, a f t e r f i n d i n g t h e couple were l i c e n s e e s , he 
concluded: 
" I confess t h a t I am glad t o reach t h i s r e s u l t 
because i t would appear t h a t , i f the couple were 
held t o be tenants a t w i l l , the f a t h e r ' s t i t l e 
would have been d e f e a t e d a f t e r t h e lapse o f 
t h i r t e e n years...."(8) 
The court was able t o place r e l i a n c e on the t e s t of 
i n t e n t i o n , which was b e i n g developed as a t e s t f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between tenancies and licences i n order t o 
avoid, among other t h i n g s , the r i g o u r s of the Rent Acts. 
(9) I t has already been argued t h a t , p r i o r t o ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON, on the whole, very few cases d e t r a c t e d from 
the p r i n c i p l e t h a t , whenever an occupier was found t o be 
i n exclusive possession, a tenancy a t w i l l a t minimum 
arose: thp H -i s f i n nt- i on between t^n^n^y l i p p n r o H -i H 
not i n v o l v e an occupier having a r i g h t of occupation as 
opposed t o a p r i v i l e g e and, as such, d i d not in v o l v e 
i n t e n t i o n but pu r e l y evidence of sole occupation i n f a c t . 
(10) Thus, the reasons given f o r the f i n d i n g of a li c e n c e 
by Stamp L.J. i n HESLOP v BURNS would have been i n v a l i d 
p r i o r t o ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON. The f i r s t reason given 
was: 
"On t h e f a c t s o f t h i s case, i t i s , i n my 
judgement, abundantly c l e a r t h a t the p a r t i e s d i d 
not e n t e r i n t o any arrangement, f a r l e s s any 
arrangement i n t e n d e d t o c r e a t e a l e g a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . . . . " ( 1 1 ) 
A tenancy at w i l l , however, d i d not re q u i r e an i n t e n t i o n 
t o create a " l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p " , by which i t i s assumed 
Stamp L.J. means t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p or a t 
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l e a s t a r e l a t i o n s h i p c r e a t i n g an i n t e r e s t i n land, as the 
point has a l r e a d y been made, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between any 
occupier and owner of land must, i n the broadest sense, 
be a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p as l e g a l consequences follow. 
The second reason given by Stamp L . J . was: 
" . . t h a t the defendants a t the outset entered i n t o 
occupation of the premises as l i c e n s e e s and not 
tenants at w i l l ; not with a r i g h t to exclude the 
deceased [ p l a i n t i f f ] from possession."(12) 
but, f o r a tenancy at w i l l to a r i s e , a r i g h t to e x c l u s i v e 
possession was not required, even i f i t makes sense to 
t a l k of a r i g h t to p o s s e s s i o n where occupation i s on 
terms under which the l a n d l o r d can determine the tenancy 
at any time.(13) 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n h i s judgement, L o r d J u s t i c e Scarman 
e x p r e s s l y r e c o g n i s e d t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e and l i c e n c e have developed 
s i n c e ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON. I t i s , however, submitted 
that the developments make n o n s e n s i c a l and c i r c u l a r the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a tenancy at w i l l and a l i c e n c e i n 
L i m i t a t i o n Act c a s e s . The development of a t e s t of 
i n t e n t i o n allows f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l i c e n s e e i n 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n where p r e v i o u s l y e x c l u s i v e 
possession was c o n c l u s i v e of a tenancy; but, i n so f a r 
as a l i c e n s e e i s i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n with merely a 
" p e r s o n a l p r i v i l e g e " t o be i n o c c u p a t i o n , the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t h a t which would i n former times have 
been c a l l e d a tenancy at w i l l . Yet, i n the L i m i t a t i o n 
Act c a s e s , used the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n i s used to avoid 
the f i n d i n g of a tenancy a t w i l l ! I n t h i s context, i t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g to speculate as to why Lord Templeman i n 
STRKRT v MnnMTvnpri(14) defined 5. t^n^noy ?.f? ? " f i x ^ d or 
p e r i o d i c term c e r t a i n . . . . " thereby excluding a tenancy 
at w i l l . I t may w e l l be t h a t he appreciated t h a t i t was 
i n essence nothing more than a personal p r i v i l e g e or 
l i c e n c e to occupy. I t i s now unnecessary to make use of 
the concept of a p o s s e s s a r y l i c e n c e as S . 9 ( i ) of the 
L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939 was repealed i n 1980(15). Time now 
o n l y runs i n f a v o u r of a t e n a n t a t w i l l from the 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s t e n a n c y . I n the l i g h t of t h i s 
p r o v i s i o n i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the recent d e c i s i o n 
Of BP PROPERTIES LTD V BUCKLER(16). There, occupation 
r e n t f r e e w i t h the c o n s e n t of the l a n d l o r d was not 
c l a s s i f i e d as c r e a t i n g a t e n a n c y a t w i l l , but a 
u n i l a t e r a l l i c e n c e . Since the l i c e n c e being g r a t u i t o u s 
could have been determined a t any time, i t i s submitted, 
i n former times the r e l a t i o n s h i p would have been 
d e s c r i b e d as a t e n a n c y a t w i l l . C o n s e q u e n t l y the 
s i t u a t i o n would now come w i t h i n the p r o v i s i o n s of the 
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L i m i t a t i o n Act 1980 and t h i s would prevent the p o s s e s s i o n 
from b e i n g a d v e r s e . A d m i t t e d l y , L o r d J u s t i c e D i l l o n 
expressed some h e s i t a t i o n as to whether the l i c e n c e could 
have been determined a t any time, but he gave no 
i n d i c a t i o n as to why t h i s should be the case. 
(b) The doc t r i n e of an impli e d l i c e n c e . 
The second way i n which judges made use of the l i c e n c e 
concept and so avoided a f i n d i n g of adverse p o s s e s s i o n 
was by developing the d o c t r i n e of the implied l i c e n c e . 
T h i s d o c t r i n e began o b s c u r e l y i n L o r d Denning's 
d i s s e n t i n g judgement i n HAYWARD v CHALLONER(17), but was 
f i r s t put forward with f o r c e and formed the b a s i s of h i s 
d e c i s i o n i n WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. v 
SHELL-MEX AND B.P. LTD(18). I n HAYWARD V CHALLONER, a 
small area of land had o r i g i n a l l y been rented to the 
r e c t o r of B i l s t h o r p e on a y e a r l y b a s i s . However, a f t e r 
1942 no f u r t h e r r e n t was paid f o r the use of the land as 
a garden. I n 1966 , t h e p l a i n t i f f s who were t h e 
fre e h o l d e r s of the disputed land i n question brought an 
a c t i o n f o r possession of the land a g a i n s t the defendant, 
the then incumbent of B i l s t h o r p e . The defendant claimed 
t h a t he and h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s had been i n a d v e r s e 
possession f o r more than twelve years s i n c e the end of 
the period covered by the l a s t payment of re n t , and 
consequently the p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t of a c t i o n was s t a t u t e 
barred under the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939. There was evidence 
t h a t the o n l y r e a s o n why the p l a i n t i f f s and t h e i r 
predecessors i n t i t l e had not asked f o r the rent i n 
respect of the land was because they d i d not f e e l , as 
l o y a l churchmen, they could make such a request of the 
r e c t o r of the c h u r c h . I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , L o r d 
Denning i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgement, d e c l i n i n g to f i n d 
" I n any case, a c t s of user are not enough 
to take the t i t l e and of the p l a i n t i f f u n l e s s they 
are " i n c o n s i s t e n t with the enjoyment of the s o i l 
f o r the purpose of which he intended to use i t " 
(see LEIGH v JACK (3) per B r e t t L . J . ) . The user 
of t h i s l i t t l e p i e c e as a garden was not 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w ith the owner's enjoyment. He was 
content to l e t i t be so used; j u s t as i f he had 
permitted i t to be used i n t h i s way under l i c e n c e 
(see COBB v LANE ( 4 ) . . . . " ( 1 9 ) 
I n WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD.V SHELL-MEX AND 
B.P. LTD(20), Lord Denning elaborated on the idea of an 
implied l i c e n c e , t h i s time gaining the support of Ormrod 
L . J . and thus forming the m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n . B r i e f l y , 
the f a c t s of the case may be s t a t e d as f o l l o w s . The 
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l o c a l a u t h o r i t y decided to re-route a major road (A165) 
through a caravan s i t e and a f i e l d . A garage p r o p r i e t o r 
bought the s t r i p of land which formed p a r t of the f i e l d 
(the disputed land) between the e x i s t i n g road and the 
proposed new road, intending to r e - p o s i t i o n the garage 
when the road development took p l a c e . But i n 1961, he 
s o l d the garage and disputed land to the defendants. 
Also i n 1961, the p l a i n t i f f s , who ran a holiday camp, 
bought the r e s t of the f i e l d , the conveyance excluding 
the s t r i p of land running through i t which represented 
the proposed new road and a l s o excluding the disputed 
land. However, there was nothing i n the f i e l d to mark 
the new bo u n d a r i e s or to d i s t i n g u i s h between the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s and defendant's land. For ten y e a r s , the 
p l a i n t i f f s , through a s u b s i d i a r y farming company, used 
the f i e l d , i n c l u d i n g the disputed land, f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p u r p o s e s , which i n c l u d e d g r a z i n g c a t t l e and growing 
wheat. A f t e r ten y e a r s , they used the whole area as a 
h o l i d a y camp and the d i s p u t e d l a n d formed a " v i s u a l 
f r o n t a g e amenity". I n 1972, the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
abandoned t h e i r p l a n s to b u i l d the new road. 
Consequently, as the disputed s t r i p was s u r p l u s to the 
defendant's requirements, they decided to s e l l i t and 
wrote o f f e r i n g i t to the p l a i n t i f f s . The p l a i n t i f f s took 
l e g a l advice and d i d not r e p l y to the o f f e r . I n June 
1973 , the de f e n d a n t s f e n c e d o f f the boundary of the 
disputed land and the p l a i n t i f f s then claimed t h a t they 
had acquired a possessory t i t l e under the L i m i t a t i o n Act 
1939. 
On t h e s e f a c t s , L o r d Denning m a i n t a i n e d t h a t a c t u a l 
possession of the disputed land by the p l a i n t i f f s was not 
s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a t i t l e based on a d v e r s e 
possession. He s t a t e d : 
" - P o B s ^ s s i ^ " Vw i t s e l f i s not" ^nc'/jh to rjivs 
t i t l e . I t must be adverse p o s s e s s i o n . . . . When 
the true owner of land intends to use i t f o r a 
p a r t i c u l a r purpose i n the f u t u r e , but meanwhile 
has no immediate use f o r i t , and so le a v e s i t 
unoccupied, he does not l o s e h i s t i t l e t o i t 
simply because some other person enters on i t and 
uses i t f o r some temporary purpose, l i k e s t a c k i n g 
m a t e r i a l s or s e a s o n a l purpose, l i k e growing 
vegetables.... see LEIGH v JACK (1879) 5 Ex D 264; 
WILLIAMS BROTHERS DIRECT SUPPLY LTD V RAFTERY 
[1958] 1 QB 159; and TECBILD LTD V CHAMBERLAIN 
(1969) 20 P + CR 633. The reason i s not because 
the user does not amount to a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n . 
The l i n e between a c t s of u s e r and a c t s of 
possession i s too f i n e f o r words. The reason 
behind the d e c i s i o n i s because i t does not l i e i n 
that other person's mouth to a s s e r t t h a t he used 
97 
the l a n d of h i s own wrong as a t r e s p a s s e r . 
Rather, h i s user i s to be a s c r i b e d to the l i c e n c e 
or permission of the true owner. By using the 
land, knowing t h a t i t does not belong to him, he 
im p l i e d l y assumes t h a t the owner w i l l permit i t ; 
and the owner, by not tur n i n g him o f f , i m p l i e d l y 
gives permission."(21) 
From the above, i t can be seen t h a t , i n r e l y i n g on LEIGH 
V J A C K ( 2 2 ) , WILLIAMS BROTHERS DIRECT SUPPLY LTD V 
RAFTERY(23) and TECBILD v CHAMBERLAIN(24), Lord Denning 
i n t e r p r e t e d the cases not, as they have been g e n e r a l l y 
understood as drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t s of user 
and a c t s of posse s s i o n f o r the purpose of a s c e r t a i n i n g 
whether the t i t l e holder had been d i s p o s s e s s e d , but as 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a p r i n c i p l e t h a t , where a person e n t e r s on 
to the l a n d of an o t h e r w i t h o u t t h a t o t h e r ' s e x p r e s s 
permission, and the use he makes of the land i s not 
i n c o n s i s t e n t with the paper owner's present or f u t u r e use 
or enjoyment of i t , i t may be implied, as a matter of 
law, that the user i s by l i c e n c e or permission.(25) 
Ormrod L . J . ' s judgement seems to support the d o c t r i n e of 
an i m p l i e d l i c e n c e , p r e v e n t i n g , i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , a 
f i n d i n g of adverse p o s s e s s i o n , f o r he s t a t e d : 
" I n my judgement, the a c t s of the p l a i n t i f f s i n 
c u t t i n g the g r a s s or hay, g r a z i n g c a t t l e and 
o c c a s i o n a l l y ploughing the defendants' s t r i p of 
la n d , i n no way p r e j u d i c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' 
enjoyment of i t f o r the purposes f o r which they 
had o r i g i n a l l y a c q u i r e d i t , namely, f o r 
development as a garage or f i l l i n g s t a t i o n when 
the time was r i p e . T h e i r t r e s p a s s , r e l a t i v e to 
the defendants' p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s land, 
nan n r n n o r l y ho r o r r a r H o ^ a<= t r i v i a l . TVi H c rnay Vio 
t e s t e d by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i r probable response to a 
request by the p l a i n t i f f s f o r permission to do 
what i n f a c t was done on the l a n d . The 
overwhelming i n f e r e n c e i s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s 
would have responded i n the same way as the North 
Riding County C o u n c i l i n respec t of t h e i r s t r i p s , 
by r e a d i l y agreeing and asking, a t most, a nominal 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , so long as no s o r t of protected 
tenancy was created."(26) 
There was however a strong d i s s e n t i n g judgment from Stamp 
L . J i n which he d e n i e d a l i c e n c e c o u l d be found. 
Moreover, the Law Reform Committee, i n i t s Twenty F i r s t 
Report, " F i n a l Report on L i m i t a t i o n of A c t i o n s " ( 2 7 ) , 
considered that WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. v 
SHELL-MEX AND B.P. LTD and GRAY V WYKEHAM-MARTIN AND 
G0ODE(28), ( an unreported case of the Court of Appeal, 
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which followed i t ) i n applying the d o c t r i n e of an implied 
l i c e n c e where a c t s of the i n t r u d e r are not i n c o n s i s t e n t 
with the present jDr._future user of the t i t l e holder,, 
amounted to jud-i'cial r e p e a l ^ f the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939.} 
Consequently^'paragraph 8 (4) \ f the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1980 
now p r o v i d e s ^ 
"For the purposes of determining whether a person 
occupying any land i s i n adverse p o s s e s s i o n of the 
land, i t s h a l l not be assumed by i m p l i c a t i o n of 
law t h a t h i s occupation i s by permission of the 
person e n t i t l e d to the land merely by v i r t u e of 
the f a c t t h a t h i s occupation i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t 
with the l a t t e r ' s present or f u t u r e enjoyment of 
the land." 
However, paragraph 8 (4) C o n t i n u e s : 
". . . r~~^fTTs p r o v i s i o n s h a l l not be t a k e n as 
p r e j u d i c i n g a f i n d i n g t o the e f f e c t t h a t a 
p e r s o n ' s o c c u p a t i o n of l a n d i s by i m p l i e d 
permission of the person e n t i t l e d to the land i n 
any case where such a f i n d i n g i s j u s t i f i e d on the 
a c t u a l f a c t s of the case." 
Consequently, i t i s apparent t h a t , d e s p i t e the changes 
brought about by paragraph 8 (4) i t remains open to a 
judge to f i n d as a matter of f a c t an implied l i c e n c e to 
be on the land e x i s t e d and thus, i t i s very much open to 
question how f a r the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1980 has prevented 
the use of implied l i c e n c e s as a means of avoiding a 
f i n d i n g of adverse p o s s e s s i o n . I t i s t h e r e f o r e proposed 
to examine the notion of an implied l i c e n c e i n adverse 
p o s s e s s i o n c a s e s more c l o s e l y , f i r s t l y to t r y t o 
a s c e r t a i n the circumstances i n which i t may be p o s s i b l e 
to i T T m l v Pi 1 i f.pnr-P a s a maH-pr n f f a r f . s i n f P the* 1 QRD 
Act, and secondly, to consider whether the r e t e n t i o n of 
i m p l i e d l i c e n c e s to p r e v e n t the r u n n i n g of time i s 
j u s t i f i e d i n the l i g h t of the whole purpose behind the 
concept of adverse p o s s e s s i o n . 
To consider f i r s t the circumstances i n which a l i c e n c e 
may be implied as a matter of f a c t . Some a s s i s t a n c e i n 
a s c e r t a i n i n g the c r i t e r i a f o r implying a l i c e n c e may be 
o b t a i n e d from a l i n e of c a s e s concerned w i t h an 
occupier's l i a b i l i t y i n the law of t o r t . From such 
d e c i s i o n s , i t i s apparent t h a t at l e a s t where the l i c e n c e 
does not i n v o l v e p e r m i s s i o n to remain i n e x c l u s i v e 
possession of the land, an implied l i c e n c e may be r e a d i l y 
i n f e r r e d . Admittedly, however, the d e c i s i o n s should be 
viewed with s u s p i c i o n as there i s evidence that the whole 
concept of an i m p l i e d l i c e n c e has been a r t i f i c i a l l y 
extended i n these cases to avoid the s e v e r i t y of the 
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common law before BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD v HERRINGTON, 
which l a i d down a minimal duty of c a r e owed by an 
o c c u p i e r to a t r e s p a s s e r , as opposed to the h i g h e r 
standard which could be expected by a l i c e n s e e . T h i s was 
recognised by Lord Diplock i n BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD v 
HERRINGTON, where he went as f a r as saying t h a t , i n 
e a r l i e r c ases: 
"...the " l i c e n c e " t r e a t e d as having been granted 
.... was a l e g a l f i c t i o n employed to j u s t i f y 
extending to mer i t o r i o u s t r e s p a s s e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i f they were c h i l d r e n , the b e n e f i t of the duty 
which a t common law an o c c u p i e r owed t o h i s 
l i c e n s e e s . . . . " ( 2 9 ) 
I t may w e l l be that the courts w i l l not i n fut u r e go out 
of t h e i r way to i n f e r a l i c e n c e i n occupier's l i a b i l i t y 
cases as the duty of care owed to t r e s p a s s e r s was made 
more j u s t by the d e c i s i o n i n BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD v 
HERRINGTON and p r o t e c t i o n i s now given by the Occupier's 
L i a b i l i t y Act 1984. C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e c r i t e r i a f o r 
implying a l i c e n c e , now to be d i s c u s s e d , w i l l be narrowed 
down. 
In EDWARDS V RAILWAY EXECUTIVE(30) and PHIPPS V ROCHESTER 
CORPORATION(31), the c r i t e r i a to be adopted f o r implying 
a l i c e n c e were p a r t i c u l a r l y f u l l y d i s c u s s e d . I n the 
f i r s t mentioned case, the p l a i n t i f f , a boy aged 9, was 
h i t by a passing t r a i n , w h i l s t r e t r i e v i n g a b a l l from the 
other s i d e of the r a i l w a y l i n e , a f t e r g e t t i n g through a 
fence which separated a r e c r e a t i o n ground from a r a i l w a y 
embankment. The c o u r t had t o d e c i d e whether t h e 
p l a i n t i f f was a l i c e n s e e or a t r e s p a s s e r f o r the purpose 
of a s c e r t a i n i n g the standard of the duty i n t o r t owed to 
him by the occupier. I t was found t h a t the defendants 
h a d b*???n ?j!*7?rs f o r "i?."'"' y s ? r s t h ? t c h i l d r e n .T?|9pi?',.t':?d.lv 
climbed through the fence by breaking the wire to gain 
access to the embankment but they were able to show th a t 
they had r e p a i r e d the fence whenever they saw the damage. 
On these f a c t s , the court reached the conclusion t h a t no 
l i c e n c e could be implied to enter onto the defendant's 
land. Lord Po r t e r had t h i s to say about i n f e r r i n g a 
l i c e n c e : 
". . . . even assuming t h a t the respondent has 
knowledge of the i n t r u s i o n of c h i l d r e n on the 
embankment, t he s u g g e s t i o n t h a t knowledge of 
i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e s the c h i l d r e n l i c e n s e e s , i n my 
opinion c a r r i e s the d o c t r i n e of an implied l i c e n c e 
much too f a r ; though no doubt where the owner of 
the premises knows th a t the p u b l i c or some po r t i o n 
of i t i s accustomed to t r e s p a s s over h i s land he 
must take steps to show t h a t he r e s e n t s i t and 
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w i l l t r y to prevent the i n v a s i o n ... "(32) 
Lord Po r t e r went on to r e f e r to the e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n of 
LOWERY v WALKER(33) and commenting on the f a c t s of that 
case, expressed the view t h a t knowledge of constant use 
of a p a r t i c u l a r t r a c k coupled with f a i l u r e to take steps 
to i n d i c a t e t h a t the i n g r e s s i s not permitted may w e l l 
amount to a t a c i t l i c e n c e . However, he added t h a t he d i d 
not think i t would be necessary to take every p o s s i b l e 
step to keep out an i n t r u d e r to prevent a l i c e n c e from 
b e i n g i n f e r r e d . T h i s p o i n t was p i c k e d up by L o r d 
Goddard, who s t a t e d : 
".... the owner of a park i n the neighbourhood of 
a town knows probably only too w e l l t h a t i t w i l l 
be raided by young and old to gather flowers, nuts 
or mushrooms whenever they get an opportunity. 
But because he does not cover h i s park w a l l with a 
chevaux de f r i s e or post a number of keepers to 
chase away i n t r u d e r s , how i s i t to be s a i d t h a t he 
has l i c e n s e d what he cannot prevent?"(34) 
To what e x t e n t then must the o c c u p i e r a c t to show 
ob j e c t i o n to the presence of persons on h i s land to 
p r e v e n t a l i c e n c e from b e i n g i m p l i e d ? L o r d Goddard 
sugg e s t e d i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o show t h a t the 
landowner had so conducted himself t h a t he cannot be 
heard to say t h a t he has not given h i s permission. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t Lord Oaksey(35) considered 
the s t a t e of mind of the l i c e n s e e to be r e l e v a n t . He 
suggested t h a t , i f the circumstances i n d i c a t e d t h a t the 
l i c e n s e e could have thought and d i d t h i n k t h a t he was not 
t r e s p a s s i n g , but was on the property i n question by leave 
of the owner, then a l i c e n c e should be i m p l i e d . I t i s 
snhmi t - t - f h a f T"T^2.t Lord Q2.kssy i n t s n d s d V.*2.E to cxprccc s 
view s i m i l a r to t h a t of Lord Goddard, j u s t s t a t e d ; that 
i s , a l i c e n c e should be implied, i f the l i c e n s e e has been 
l e d to think t h a t he i s not t r e s p a s s i n g on the property 
by reason of the f a c t t h a t the owner has so conducted 
himself that he cannot be heard to say he d i d not give 
h i s permission. I n any other context, i t seems t o t a l l y 
inappropriate to imply a l i c e n c e from the s t a t e of mind 
of the l i c e n s e e . 
I n PHIPPS v ROCHESTER CORPORATION(36), D e v l i n J . 
d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r f a c t o r s to be taken i n t o account i n 
deciding whether a l i c e n c e should be implied. The f a c t s 
of the case were concerned with an a c t i o n i n t o r t a g a i n s t 
the owners of a p i e c e of waste land, s i t u a t e d behind a 
h ousing e s t a t e , and undergoing development. The 
p l a i n t i f f , a f i v e y e a r - o l d , f e l l i n t o a trench which had 
been dug f o r a sewer, w h i l s t c r o s s i n g the l a n d i n 
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q u e s t i o n w i t h h i s o l d e r s i s t e r on a b l a c k b e r r y i n g 
expedition. I t was decided, i n the circumstances, t h a t a 
l i c e n c e could be implied, although, on the f a c t s of the 
case, t h i s d i d not help the p l a i n t i f f as the defendants 
were e n t i t l e d to assume t h a t h i s parents would have acted 
more prudently before a l l o w i n g a c h i l d of t h a t age to 
wander o f f , and t h i s being the case, they were not i n 
breach of t h e i r duty to him. 
In reaching h i s d e c i s i o n , D e v l i n J . drew a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between t o l e r a t i o n on the one hand and permission on the 
other. He provided an example; the owner of moorland or 
downland, he s a i d , may be w e l l aware t h a t people walk on 
h i s land f o r pl e a s u r e , but knowledge of t h i s f a c t alone 
would not be s u f f i c i e n t to imply a l i c e n c e . T h i s would 
simply be a matter of t o l e r a t i o n of t r e s p a s s e r s . He then 
goes on to draw the d i s t i n c t i o n between what he c a l l s a 
" c a s u a l " t r e s p a s s by an i n d i v i d u a l who comes once, and 
perhaps never r e t u r n s , and a t r e s p a s s by an i n d i v i d u a l or 
c l a s s of person who form something of a h a b i t of using 
the land f o r a given purpose. According to D e v l i n J . , i t 
i s i n the l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n only t h a t the question, of 
whether f a i l u r e to take steps to prevent the i n v a s i o n has 
induced the b e l i e f i n those who use the land t h a t they 
have the occupier's t a c i t permission to be ther e , becomes 
r e l e v a n t . 
D evlin J . f u r t h e r considered the question of the extent 
to which the occupier should be expected to prevent the 
in v a s i o n , i n order to rebut the in f e r e n c e of a l i c e n c e . 
He decided that t h i s was a matter of degree depending on 
the circumstances of the case. On the f a c t s before him, 
he suggested t h a t a n o t i c e s t a t i n g t h a t no ent r y was 
permitted would have been s u f f i c i e n t . 
A d e c i s i o n w^ic^ Wets c o ^ c s r ^ s d '/'if - 1 ? r i i ^ . p l i ^ d l i c ^ n c ^ to 
remain i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n of l a n d was MORRIS v 
TARRENT(37). I n t h i s case, the p l a i n t i f f , who was the 
defendant's former w i f e , owned a farmhouse which had been 
the matrimonial home p r i o r to the breakdown of t h e i r 
marriage. I n 1963, the p l a i n t i f f l e f t the house under 
p r o t e s t . A f t e r the marriage was d i s s o l v e d , the defendant 
remained i n the property, although the p l a i n t i f f a t no 
time granted him an express l i c e n c e to do so. Between 
March 1964 and December 1967 , the p l a i n t i f f on many 
occasions asked f o r poss e s s i o n of the house from the 
defendant, as he was u n w i l l i n g to f i x a p r i c e f o r which 
to purchase i t from her. E v e n t u a l l y , i n December 1967, 
he l e f t . I t was necessary to e s t a b l i s h whether the 
defendant's occupation was as an implied l i c e n s e e as the 
p l a i n t i f f was c l a i m i n g compensation f o r h i s use and 
enjoyment of the property up u n t i l the date he vacated 
the premises. On these f a c t s , Lane J . held t h a t one 
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could not imply that the p l a i n t i f f had granted a l i c e n c e 
to the defendant simply on account of her acquiescence. 
He f u r t h e r commented: 
" I f a s t r a n g e r with no cl a i m whatsoever to bo on 
the land of another t r e s p a s s e s thereon, he does 
not become the l e s s a t r e s p a s s e r because the 
landowner does not immediately e x e r c i s e h i s r i g h t 
to e j e c t him."(38) 
A f t e r making a refe r e n c e to the f a c t t h a t t i t l e would be 
b a r r e d under the L i m i t a t i o n A c t s e v e n t u a l l y , he 
continued: 
"Mere f a i l u r e to e v i c t a t r e s p a s s e r w i l l not be 
s u f f i c i e n t reason i n i t s e l f to imply a l i c e n c e , 
although no doubt a s i t u a t i o n might a r i s e i n which 
f a i l u r e to take steps to e v i c t a t r e s p a s s e r whose 
presence i s known may amount to t a c i t permission 
to remain."(39) 
For the sake of c l a r i t y , i t i s now proposed to summarise 
the p r i n c i p l e s taken from the case law o u t l i n e d above, as 
to when a l i c e n c e to be on land may be implied. F i r s t l y , 
knowledge by an occupier t h a t h i s land i s being used f o r 
any purpose i s not i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t to imply a l i c e n c e ; 
t h i s o n l y amounts to t o l e r a t i o n not p e r m i s s i o n . 
Secondly, permission may, however, be implied where: (a) 
a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l or group of i n d i v i d u a l s 
h a b i t u a l l y make use of the land; and (b) the occupier 
f a i l s to take the necessary steps w i t h i n the appropriate 
period of time i n the circumstances, to show he r e s e n t s 
the i n v a s i o n . 
Applying these p r i n c i p l e s to adverse p o s s e s s i o n c a s e s , i t 
would PJPPTTI f i r s t f h a t ; •Hrs i ^ p l " s. l i c e n c e , knowledge of 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t r u d e r would be e s s e n t i a l . 
Secondly, and perhaps r a t h e r i r o n i c a l l y , the longer the 
t i t l e h o l d e r a c q u i e s c e s i n the p o s s e s s i o n of the 
i n t r u d e r , and the nearer i t s end the l i m i t a t i o n period 
draws, the e a s i e r i t becomes t o imply a l i c e n c e t o 
prevent a f i n d i n g of adverse p o s s e s s i o n . T h i r d l y , the 
longer the i n t r u d e r remains i n p o s s e s s i o n , the g r e a t e r 
the steps that are nece s s a r y to show resentment of the 
in v a s i o n to prevent a l i c e n c e from being implied. I n 
MORRIS v TARRENT, repeatedly asking f o r p o s s e s s i o n over a 
p e r i o d of f o u r and a h a l f y e a r s , and e v e n t u a l l y 
t h r e a t e n i n g court proceedings was s u f f i c i e n t to show no 
l i c e n c e to remain i n p o s s e s s i o n c o u l d be i m p l i e d . 
However, i t was i n d i c a t e d t h a t , had the p e r i o d been 
longer, these a c t s may not have been s u f f i c i e n t to show 
resentment of the defendant's presence. 
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To consider now the e f f e c t of these p r i n c i p l e s on decided 
adverse possession c a s e s , i n which a l i c e n c e has been 
implied as a matter of law, to e s t a b l i s h i f i t would have 
been e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e to have implied a l i c e n c e as a 
mat t e r of f a c t . I t would seem, from the f a c t s of 
WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. V SHELL-MEX AND 
B.P. LTD.(40) (although t h i s i s not made c l e a r i n any of 
the judgements i n the Court of Appeal d e c i s i o n ) , t h a t the 
defendants did not a c t u a l l y know of the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
p l a i n t i f f s throughout the l i m i t a t i o n period. I f t h i s was 
so, c l e a r l y no l i c e n c e could be implied. On the other 
hand, had t h e r e been knowledge on the p a r t of the 
defendants, on the b a s i s of the extent of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a c t i v i t i e s and the long period of acquiescence, i t i s 
arguable that nothing short of excluding the p l a i n t i f f s 
from the land would be s u f f i c i e n t to prevent the f i n d i n g 
of a l i c e n c e I t should be noted t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s on 
which Lord Denning and Lord J u s t i c e Ormrod implied a 
l i c e n c e i n t h i s case could not support the f i n d i n g of an 
implied l i c e n c e i n f a c t . Both judges considered the 
defendants' probable response, had they been asked by the 
p l a i n t i f f s f o r permission to use the disputed land, and 
concluded that they would have allowed such user i n these 
circumstances, where they had no present use f o r the 
land. An implied l i c e n c e i n f a c t cannot a r i s e out of a 
f i n d i n g t h at a t i t l e holder, i f asked, would have given 
h i s permission; t h i s would only amount to an imputed 
l i c e n c e . 
POWELL v McFARLAND(41) f o l l o w e d WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY 
HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. V SHELL-MEX AND B.P. LTD i n implying a 
l i c e n c e i n law where the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t r u d e r were 
not i n c o n s i s t e n t with the present or fu t u r e enjoyment of 
the f r e e h o l d e r . Very b r i e f l y , the disputed land was 
a g r i c u l t u r a l land. W h i l s t the fr e e h o l d e r was abroad i n 
f h p ni ITi i c ? r " i c 9 U n a olai r , ,*~ i f f s " t s r s d the land and 
grazed the family cow on i t . He l a t e r fenced i t i n and 
used i t f o r v a r i o u s p u rposes i n c l u d i n g c l a y pigeon 
shooting and t e t h e r i n g a goat. At one stage, he a l s o put 
a business a d v e r t i s i n g board on the land. During the 
l i m i t a t i o n period, the f r e e h o l d e r s , or t h e i r agents, only 
v i s i t e d the land on a couple of occ a s i o n s . Slade J . 
accepted the evidence t h a t the f r e e h o l d e r s were not aware 
of the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t r u d e r s , and consequently, on 
these f a c t s , he concluded: 
" . . . . i t i s m a n i f e s t l y i m p o s s i b l e under any 
general p r i n c i p l e s of law to imply any l i c e n c e or 
conse n t g i v e n t o the p l a i n t i f f .... by [ t h e 
defendant], who a t th a t time was i n Germany and 
had no knowledge of [ t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s ] 
e x i s t e n c e . . . . " ( 4 2 ) 
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I t t h e r e f o r e follows t h a t no l i c e n c e could now be implied 
under Schedule 1 paragraph 8 (4) of the L i m i t a t i o n Act 
1980. 
On the other hand, -it i s q u i t e c l e a r , on the basis- of the 
c r i t e r i a d i s c u s s e d , a l i c e n c e could have i n f a c t been 
implied i n the circumstances of HAYWARD v CHALLONER(43), 
the f r e e h o l d e r s being completely aware of the posse s s i o n 
of the land by the defendant and h i s predecessors i n 
t i t l e , and a c q u i e s c i n g i n i t on ac c o u n t of t h e i r 
a l l e g i a n c e to the Church. I t i s arguable t h a t the same 
f i n d i n g could be made on the f a c t s of TRELOAR v NUTE(44), 
where the defendant succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t i t l e based 
on adverse possession, and i n which S i r John Pennycuick, 
d e l i v e r i n g a leading judgement i n the Court of Appeal, 
launched a s t r o n g a t t a c k on the d o c t r i n e of i m p l i e d 
l i c e n c e s s e t down i n the e a r l i e r Court of Appeal d e c i s i o n 
of WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. V SHELL-MEX AND 
B.P. LTD. I n TRELOAR v NUTE, the defendant and, before 
him, h i s f a t h e r , b e l i e v i n g the disputed land (which was 
d e r e l i c t ) was included i n the purchase by them of land 
adjacent to that of the p l a i n t i f f , used i t f o r va r i o u s 
a c t i v i t i e s , namely g r a z i n g a n i m a l s , dumping s p o i l , 
storage of m a t e r i a l s , r i d i n g motor c y c l e s , and e v e n t u a l l y 
they l e v e l l e d i t o f f and, s h o r t l y before the a c t i o n , s e t 
about the foundations f o r a bungalow. On a number of 
o c c a s i o n s , the p l a i n t i f f had p r o t e s t e d about t h e s e 
a c t i v i t i e s through her s o l i c i t o r and, on one occasion 
when the defendants e r e c t e d a fence on the disputed land, 
she had i t removed. However, i t was not u n t i l a f t e r the 
e x p i r a t i o n of the l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d t h a t c o u r t 
proceedings were brought f o r an i n j u n c t i o n to prevent 
f u r t h e r t r e s p a s s on the land by the defendants. I f one 
a c c e p t s the p r i n c i p l e s put fo r w a r d i n MORRIS v 
TARRENT (45 ) , i t i s arguable t h a t , i n the l i g h t of the 
extent of th<=> ar.-M v-i t-i *»« of th"? d?»f?nd?_n'|"5 t'h0 long 
period of acquiescence on the p a r t of the p l a i n t i f f , a 
l i c e n c e c o u l d have been i m p l i e d so as t o p r e v e n t a 
f i n d i n g of adverse p o s s e s s i o n . 
TRELOAR v NUTE i s a l s o an i n t e r e s t i n g d e c i s i o n on account 
of the r e f e r e n c e s made t o i t by the Law Reform 
Committee's " F i n a l Report on L i m i t a t i o n of A c t i o n s " . 
(46) A f t e r c r i t i c i s i n g WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP 
LTD. v SHELL-MEX AND B.P. LTD and the d e c i s i o n s which 
followed i t i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the d o c t r i n e of an implied 
l i c e n c e , the Committee went on to say: 
"We consider t h a t the law should be r e s t o r e d to 
the law as s t a t e d i n TRELOAR v NUTE. There can, 
i n our view, be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r implying a 
l i c e n c e or other s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n , i n any case i n 
which t h e r e i s no f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r such 
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i m p l i c a t i o n . . . . " ( 4 7 ) 
What i s somewhat confusing about t h i s view i s t h a t , i n 
the course of h i s judgement, S i r John Pennycuick made 
refere n c e to a " s p e c i a l type" of adverse p o s s e s s i o n ease. 
A p a r t from t h i s " s p e c i a l t y p e " of s i t u a t i o n , he 
considered the law to be as f o l l o w s : 
". . . . i f a s q u a t t e r takes p o s s e s s i o n of land 
belonging to another and remains i n p o s s e s s i o n f o r 
twelve years to the e x c l u s i o n of the owner, t h a t 
represents adverse p o s s e s s i o n and, a c c o r d i n g l y , a t 
the end of the twelve y e a r s , the owner's t i t l e i s 
extinguished.... The simple question i s , "Did the 
s q u a t t e r a c q u i r e and remain i n e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n ? " ( 4 8 ) 
According to S i r John Pennycuick, the " s p e c i a l type" of 
s i t u a t i o n a r i s e s where the owner of a p i e c e of land had 
r e t a i n e d i t with a view to i t s u t i l i s a t i o n f o r some 
s p e c i f i c purpose i n the f u t u r e and, meanwhile, some other 
person had p h y s i c a l p o s s e s s i o n of i t ; i n t h i s type of 
case, i t was necessary to show t h a t the a c t s done by the 
i n t r u d e r inconvenienced i n some way the t i t l e holder. He 
then quoted LEIGH v JACK(49), WILLIAMS BROTHERS DIRECT 
SUPPLY LTD V RAFTERY(50) and WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY 
CAMP LTD V SHELL-MEX AND B.P. LTD ( 5 1 ) , as examples of 
cases f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h i s category. L a t e r , he went on 
a l s o to observe: 
" . . . t h a t a l l these cases were concerned with a 
narrow s t r i p of land of such a c h a r a c t e r t h a t the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of a possessory t i t l e to i t would not 
f a l l w i t h i n the ordinary purview of the s t a t u t e 
and the court was c l e a r l y anxious not to put too 
i i t p r s i a c o n s r u e t i o " u^o" t ^ s v.'ords of t h s 
s t a t u t e . " ( 5 2 ) 
In the l i g h t of the Law Reform Committee's approval of 
the d e c i s i o n i n TRELOAR v NUTE, the question a r i s e s as to 
whether S i r John Pennycuick's " s p e c i a l type" of case i s 
one of the circumstances i n which the Committee envisaged 
a l i c e n c e may be implied as a matter of f a c t . However, 
i f the c r i t e r i a on which a l i c e n c e may be implied i n 
f a c t , as a n a l y s e d above, a r e a c c e p t e d , i t does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t i n a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s a 
l i c e n c e may be implied i n the " s p e c i a l type" of case 
r e f e r r e d to i n TRELOAR v NUTE. For example, i f the t i t l e 
h o l d e r w i t h a f u t u r e purpose f o r h i s l a n d has no 
knowledge of the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t r u d e r , no l i c e n c e 
could be implied as a matter of f a c t even though the 
a c t i v i t i e s were not i n c o n s i s t e n t with the t i t l e holder's 
future purpose. 
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I t would seem t h e r e f o r e t h a t i n the " s p e c i a l type" of 
s i t u a t i o n , the grant of a l i c e n c e i s being imputed to the 
paper owner r a t h e r than implied as a matter of f a c t . 
Consequently, the question a r i s e s as- to whether t h i s — i - s 
what the Law Reform Committee intended to preserve i n 
Schedule 1 paragraph 8 (4) of the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1980. 
Moreover, the " s p e c i a l type" of case i s o l a t e d by S i r John 
Pennycuick c a r r i e s with i t problems i n i t s e l f . F i r s t of 
a l l , the s p e c i a l type of s i t u a t i o n only a r i s e s where an 
owner of land has futu r e i n t e n t i o n s f o r a "narrow s t r i p " , 
how narrow does the s t r i p have to be to f a l l w i t h i n the 
exception? I n TRELOAR v NUTE, i t was one-seventh of an 
acre; i n WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. V SHELL-
MEX AND B.P. LTD., i t was 1.33 a c r e s . Secondly, what 
evidence from the owner of futu r e plans f o r the land i s 
necessary? Can the owner simply a s s e r t t h a t he had a 
f u t u r e purpose f o r the l a n d or must t h e r e be some 
concrete evidence of h i s i n t e n t i o n s ? I f the former i s 
t r u e , then t h i s would l e a d to the u n d e s i r a b l e s i t u a t i o n 
where the owner could stand by and allow an i n t r u d e r the 
use of the land, and then any time l a t e r c l a i m t h a t the 
user was c o n s i s t e n t with the purpose which was only known 
to him. 
Thus d e s p i t e paragraph 8 ( 4 ) , there i s s t i l l scope f o r 
judges to use the concept of a l i c e n c e to avoid a f i n d i n g 
of adverse possession, although the p r e c i s e l i m i t s of the 
p o t e n t i a l remain u n c e r t a i n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t would 
appear to be e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e to avoid a f i n d i n g of 
adverse possession by other means such as by p l a c i n g a 
heavy burden on the i n t r u d e r to e s t a b l i s h an i n t e n t i o n to 
possess. T h i s approach was taken by Slade J . i n POWELL v 
McFARLAND(53) where he expressed the view t h a t i n t e n t i o n 
to possess must be made c l e a r to the world a t l a r g e . 
P i i r f h p r m n r o H +• T O m i i 4- o r-v« =••=••) v> 1 +• <-> /i« « +• •< yi vi t r r : 
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d o c t r i n e of necessary inconvenience, but to detach i t 
from the concept of an implied l i c e n c e , and a t t a c h i t 
i n s t e a d to the requirement t h a t the t i t l e holder must 
have discontinued p o s s e s s i o n or have been disp o s s e s s e d . 
Thus, r a t h e r than saying t h a t the t i t l e holder i m p l i e d l y 
gives h i s permission ( l i c e n c e ) when another e n t e r s h i s 
land and uses i t i n a manner which i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t 
with the present or f u t u r e i n t e n t i o n s of the owner, i t 
could be argued, on t h i s account, t h a t the owner remains 
i n p o ssession. T h i s approach seems to have been taken i n 
LEIGH v J A C K ( 5 4 ) . L e i g h owned l a n d though which a 
thoroughfare ran. He intended to develop i t i n t o a 
p u b l i c highway. I n the meanwhile, he s o l d o f f p a r t of 
the land to Jack, the other p a r t he s o l d to a t h i r d p a r t y 
who e v e n t u a l l y s o l d t h e l a n d to J a c k a l s o . J a c k 
t h e r e f o r e owned a p l o t of land with the narrow s t r i p 
intended as thoroughfare running through i t . He began to 
107 
dump waste from an i r o n foundry on the narrow s t r i p and 
e v e n t u a l l y fenced i t . The court had to decide whether 
these a c t s amounted to adverse p o s s e s s i o n . Cockburn C.J. 
had the following to say: 
". . . . t h o s e a c t s do not amount t o 
d i s p o s s e s s i o n . . . . The p l a i n t i f f .... d i d not 
intend to abandon ownership of the s o i l .... h i s 
[defendant's] a c t s were those of a man who d i d not 
intend to be a t r e s p a s s e r or to i n f r i n g e upon 
another's r i g h t s . The defendant simply used the 
land u n t i l the time should come f o r c a r r y i n g out 
the object o r i g i n a l l y contemplated. I f a man does 
not use h i s land, .... he does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
discontinue p o s s e s s i o n of i t . " ( 5 5 ) 
Consequently, i t i s arguable t h a t the same ends can be 
achieved by d i f f e r e n t means and without the concept of a 
l i c e n c e . The d e c i s i o n i n BP PROPERTIES, v BUTLER(56) has 
r e v e a l e d a new r o l e f o r l i c e n c e c o n c e p t s i n a d v e r s e 
p o s s e s s i o n c a s e s , t h i s time the g r a n t of an e x p r e s s 
u n i l a t e r a l l i c e n c e to occupy. The f a c t s of the case were 
as f o l l o w s . P r o c e e d i n g s f o r p o s s e s s i o n of a c e r t a i n 
farmhouse and garden had been brought i n 1962 w e l l before 
there had been twelve y e a r s adverse p o s s e s s i o n , although 
i t was not disputed t h a t the p o s s e s s i o n there had been 
was a d v e r s e . A p o s s e s s i o n o r d e r was g r a n t e d but no 
attempt was made to enforce u n t i l 1974 when the then 
freeh o l d e r s t a r t e d a f r e s h a c t i o n f o r p o s s e s s i o n a g a i n s t 
the defendant's mother and her family. At the time the 
mother argued t h a t she had by 1974 a l r e a d y been i n 
adverse possession f o r twelve years and consequently the 
f r e e h o l d e r ' s t i t l e was barred by the L i m i t a t i o n Act 1939. 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s the 1974 a c t i o n f o r p o s s e s s i o n was 
never heard but i n s t e a d the f r e e h o l d e r obtained leave to 
pn f o r r p tha 19^2 "Dosssssio" order, but the defendant 
lodged an appeal f o r a s t a y of execution of the order. 
Against t h i s background, two l e t t e r s were w r i t t e n to the 
d e f e n d a n t ' s mother, the f i r s t from t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s 
predecessor i n t i t l e informing her t h a t the f r e e h o l d was 
to be s o l d and s a y i n g t h a t her appeal f o r a s t a y of 
e x e c u t i o n was u n n e c e s s a r y . The second was from the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s as p r o s p e c t i v e purchasers of the property and 
s a i d t h at they were prepared to allow her to remain rent 
f r e e as long as she wished adding t h a t they would not 
r e q u i r e her to give p o s s e s s i o n during her l i f e t i m e or 
u n t i l she chose no longer to l i v e t h e r e . These l e t t e r s 
were presented to the judge by the mother's s o l i c i t o r and 
the judge s t a y e d the e x e c u t i o n on the w a r r a n t f o r 
p o s s e s s i o n pending t h e mother's agreement to the 
proposals i n the l e t t e r . However the f r e e h o l d e r s withdrew 
the warrant f o r p o s s e s s i o n so t h a t the mother was never 
i n f a c t required to accept or r e j e c t the terms of the 
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l e t t e r and she remained i n the house u n t i l her death. 
On these f a c t s the Court of Appeal ( D i l l o n , M u s t i l l L . J J 
and S i r Edward E v e l e i g h ) decided, a f t e r a judgment f o r 
posse s s i o n had been given- -in -1962, w i t h i n the l i m i t a t i o n 
period, the p l a i n t i f f had twelve years from the date of 
judgment to enforce the order. Consequently, the leave 
given i n 1974 to enforce the 1962 order, being w i t h i n 
t w e l v e y e a r s , was v a l i d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t was s t i l l 
n e cessary to consider whether the poss e s s i o n s i n c e 1974 
had been a d v e r s e . The p l a i n t i f f c l a i m e d i t was not 
because the defendant's mother had a u n i l a t e r a l l i c e n c e 
to occupy u n t i l her death i n 1983. She was t h e r e f o r e no 
longer i n adverse p o s s e s s i o n and time ceased to run i n 
her favour. I t was pointed out by Lord J u s t i c e D i l l o n 
t h a t to allow a u n i l a t e r a l l i c e n c e to occupy to stop time 
running would enable a person who was not prepared to 
i n c u r the obloquy of b r i n g i n g proceedings f o r po s s e s s i o n 
or of enforcing a p o s s e s s i o n order, to keep a l i v e h i s 
t i t l e f o r many years u n t i l i t s u i t e d him to e v i c t the 
p a r t y i n p o s s e s s i o n . D e s p i t e t h i s he c o n s i d e r e d 
possession could not be adverse i f i t were l a w f u l , as was 
p o s s e s s i o n by l i c e n c e . T h i s was so even though the 
defendant's mother d i d not "accept" the terms of the 
l e t t e r . T his was because the p l a i n t i f f would have been 
bound to t r e a t her as i n poss e s s i o n as l i c e n s e e i n the 
absence of any rep u d i a t i o n by her of the l e t t e r s , and 
could only have e v i c t e d her by determining the l i c e n c e . 
The question remains whether the f i n d i n g of an implied 
l i c e n c e as a matter of f a c t or an express u n i l a t e r a l 
l i c e n c e should i n any event be allowed to prevent the 
ru n n i n g of time i n a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n c a s e s . T h i s 
r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the whole purpose behind the 
concept of adverse p o s s e s s i o n and whether i t s t i l l s e r v e s 
a n c ; p - f i ii n u r n o c i o TVIo " n l i c y bsl?ind t h s p r i n c i p l s cf 
l i m i t a t i o n of a c t i o n s and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , of adverse 
possession, seems to be b a s i c a l l y t h r e e f o l d . F i r s t l y , i t 
i s to avoid i n j u s t i c e from l o s s of documents, wi t n e s s e s 
e t c . which may make i t d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h a defence 
to negative a claim to p o s s e s s i o n . T h i s point was made 
by L o r d S t . Leonards i n DUNDEE HARBOUR TRUSTEES v 
DOUGLAS: 
" A l l s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n have f o r t h e i r o b j e c t 
the prevention of the r e a r i n g up of claims a t 
great d i s t a n c e s of time when evidences are l o s t , 
and i n w e l l - r e g u l a t e d c o u n t r i e s the granting of 
p o s s e s s i o n i s h e l d an im p o r t a n t p a r t of 
p o l i c y . " ( 5 7 ) 
However, owing to the continuing extension of r e g i s t e r e d 
c o nveyancing throughout England and Wales, t h i s 
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p a r t i c u l a r purpose f o r r e t a i n i n g the p r i n c i p l e of adverse 
p o s s e s s i o n i s undoubtedly d e c l i n i n g i n i m p ortance. 
Secondly, given t h a t c e r t a i n t y i s v i t a l i n the sphere of 
property r i g h t s , and given a l s o the s i g n i f i c a n c e which 
the law has attached to p o s s e s s i o n of land as opposed to 
a b s o l u t e t i t l e , i t remains i m p o r t a n t , d e s p i t e the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing, that de f a c t o 
possession should c o i n c i d e with t i t l e to land. T h i s was 
recognised by the Law Reform Committee i n t h e i r report on 
a c q u i s i t i o n of Easements and P r o f i t s by P r e s c r i p t i o n when 
i t commented: 
c e r t a i n l y , i f t i t l e to land i s a s o c i a l need 
o c c u p a t i o n of l a n d which has long been 
unchallenged should not be d i s t u r b e d . " ( 5 8 ) 
In r e l a t i o n to u n r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing, c e r t a i n t y of 
t i t l e i s f u r t h e r important as the p r i n c i p l e of adverse 
possession serves to cure conveyancing e r r o r s . I f one 
accepts that c e r t a i n t y i s one of the main reasons f o r 
r e t a i n i n g the concept of adverse p o s s e s s i o n , i t seems 
u n j u s t i f i a b l e to allow the f i n d i n g i n f a c t of an implied 
l i c e n c e to prevent the running of time, f i r s t l y because 
i t leads to a s i t u a t i o n where the de f a c t o p o s s e s s i o n of 
the land does not c o i n c i d e with the paper t i t l e , and 
secondly the whole vague notion of an implied l i c e n c e 
i t s e l f leads to u n c e r t a i n t y . 
The t h i r d main reason f o r the p r i n c i p l e of l i m i t a t i o n of 
a c t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to land i s t h a t i t i s considered 
u n j u s t that a p a r t y should be at the r i s k of s t a l e 
demands, the e x i s t e n c e of which he may w e l l be q u i t e 
unaware of, or owing to a change i n circumstances he i s 
no l o n g e r i n a p o s i t i o n t o s a t i s f y . I n A'COURT v 
CROSS(59), Best C.J. d e s c r i b e d the s t a t u t e i n c o r p o r a t i n g 
the O T O V I R i n n s -roi a t .incf t o 1 in>it?.t i o n = s " = s Act of 
Peace" and pointed out "that long dormant claims have 
often more c r u e l t y than j u s t i c e i n them". S i m i l a r l y , i n 
R.B. P O L I C I E S AT LLOYDS v BUTLER, S t r e a t f i e l d J . 
explained: 
" I t i s the p o l i c y of the L i m i t a t i o n Acts t h a t 
those who go to s l e e p upon t h e i r claims should not 
be a s s i s t e d by the c o u r t s r e c o v e r i n g t h e i r 
p r o p e r t y , but a n o t h e r , I t h i n k , e q u a l p o l i c y 
behind the Acts i s that there should be an end to 
l i t i g a t i o n . " ( 6 0 ) 
From the a n a l y s i s provided of the circumstances i n which 
a l i c e n c e may be i m p l i e d i n f a c t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t a 
degree of acquiescence i s e s s e n t i a l . S u r e l y , t h i s i s a 
form of "going to s l e e p upon one's c l a i m " , and t h e r e f o r e 
p r e c i s e l y one of the t h i n g s the concept of a d v e r s e 
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possession seeks to p r o t e c t a g a i n s t . However, i t i s 
obvious from some judgements i n adverse p o s s e s s i o n c a s e s , 
that the importance attached to the " j u s t i c e " purpose f o r 
maintaining a p r i n c i p l e of adverse p o s s e s s i o n has e i t h e r 
-been- diminished or t o t a l l y ignored. T h i s i s l a r g e l y 
because the j u d i c i a r y have tended to look e x c l u s i v e l y a t 
the s t r i c t m o r a l i t y of the s i t u a t i o n between the p a r t i e s 
at the expense of the p o l i c i e s behind adverse p o s s e s s i o n . 
For example, Ormrod L . J . , i n re s p e c t of the a c t i v i t i e s of 
the p l a i n t i f f s i n WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. v 
SHELL-MEX AND B.P. LTD., commented: 
the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e are not served by 
enco u r a g i n g l i t i g a t i o n t o r e s t r a i n h a r m l e s s 
a c t i v i t i e s merely to preserve l e g a l r i g h t s , the 
enjoyment of which i s f o r good r e a s o n , b e i n g 
deferred."(61) 
S i m i l a r sentiments were expressed by S e l l e r s L . J . i n 
WILLIAMS BROTHERS DIRECT SUPPLY STORES LTD.V RAFTERY: 
"The t r u e owners can, i n the circumstances, make 
no immediate use f o r the land and, as the years go 
by, I cannot accept t h a t they would l o s e t h e i r 
r i g h t s as owners merely by reason of t r i v i a l a c t s 
of t r e s p a s s or u s e r which i n no way would 
i n t e r f e r e with a comtemplated subsequent user. I 
am g l a d to t h i n k t h a t t h i s a p p e a l must be 
allowed."(62) 
Moreover, turning back to the judgement of Ormrod L . J . i n 
WALLIS'S CAYTON BAY HOLIDAY CAMP LTD. V SHELL-MEX AND 
B.P. LTD., i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to observe t h a t a t one point 
when he was con s i d e r i n g the probable response of the 
defendants, had they been approached by the p l a i n t i f f s 
wit-h 3 rortnoat- - F r \ p s n r i i s s " * n r y to " s s t h s land, Onrircd 
L . J . expressed the view t h a t the defendants would have 
responded: 
". . . . by r e a d i l y agreeing and asking a t most a 
nominal c o n s i d e r a t i o n so lon g as no s o r t of 
protected tenancy was created."(63) 
I n other words, he was i n e f f e c t acknowledging t h a t they 
would p r o b a b l y have responded by t y i n g up t h e i r 
permission i n a proper way so as to p r o t e c t t h e i r own 
l e g a l r i g h t s . S u r e l y t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what the concept 
of adverse p o s s e s s i o n should encourage i n the i n t e r e s t s 
of promoting both j u s t i c e and c e r t a i n t y . I t i s t h e r e f o r e 
submitted that time should not be prevented from running 
by s t a t u t e , where a l i c e n c e may be implied as a matter 
of f a c t , as landowners should be encouraged to, and only 
be protected i f they do, give proper l e g a l e f f e c t to 
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arrangements regarding p o s s e s s i o n of t h e i r land. 
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SECTION IV 
Informal f a m i l y and q u a s i - f a m i l y arrangements 
f o r occupation of property. 
(a) The need f o r l i c e n c e concepts. 
I n the f i r s t S ection of t h i s t h e s i s , the development of 
the possessory l i c e n c e was t r a c e d and, i n the second 
s e c t i o n , i t was seen how t h i s development was i n f l u e n c e d 
and used i n order to avoid g i v i n g Rent Act p r o t e c t i o n to 
c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of occupier. For t h i s purpose t h e r e f o r e 
the l i c e n c e was not being used as a v e h i c l e to safeguard 
occupational r i g h t s . I n c o n t r a s t , i n t h i s f i n a l S e c t i o n , 
i t i s intended to study how the l i c e n c e has been f u r t h e r 
developed, outside the rented s e c t o r f o r p r e c i s e l y the 
opposite o b j e c t , namely to provide r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y . 
T h i s study w i l l i n v o l v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether the 
development was necessary and d e s i r a b l e and w i l l look at 
p r e s e n t and p o s s i b l e f u t u r e t r e n d s i n v o l v i n g use of 
l i c e n c e concepts. 
The p r o v i s i o n of r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y by means of the 
development of the occupational l i c e n c e along with other 
concepts (e.g. c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t ) has become necessary 
on account of the f a c t t h a t the e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e and 
machinery of r e a l property r i g h t s as embodied i n the 1925 
l e g i s l a t i o n ( 1 ) i s d i r e c t e d towards p r o t e c t i o n of the 
investment value of land r a t h e r than to i t s use value. 
The p r i n c i p l e s of the 1925 l e g i s l a t i o n were e s t a b l i s h e d 
a g a i n s t a background i n which only a small percentage of 
homes were owner-occupied. Family homes were often the 
s u b j e c t matter of a f a m i l y t r u s t . They were, as such, 
held by t r u s t e e s as a c a p i t a l a s s e t y e i l d i n g income, to 
be d i s t r i b u t e d i n accordance with the terms of the t r u s t 
vrhich only i n ccmc cecee empowered the t r u s t e e s t c permit 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s to occupy a house which was the s u b j e c t 
m a t t e r of the t r u s t . F urthermore, d u r i n g the 19th 
century, the p r o p e r t i e d c l a s s e s had taken advantage of 
the demand f o r houses f u e l l e d by the I n d u s t r i a l 
Revolution and population growth(2), by s e t t i n g out and 
b u i l d i n g e s t a t e s which t h e r e a f t e r provided a source of 
revenue through r e n t s . The primary concern t h e r e f o r e of 
the 1925 l e g i s l a t o r s was t o f a c i l i t a t e t he f r e e 
a l i e n a t i o n of l a n d ( 3 ) . However, changes had a l r e a d y 
begun to occur i n the l a t e 19th century and e a r l y 20th 
century the e f f e c t s of which were subsequently to be 
f e l t . The purchase of land as an investment d e c l i n e d i n 
p o p u l a r i t y f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s . The i d e a of 
b u i l d i n g e s t a t e s f o r r e n t i n g became l e s s a t t r a c t i v e , 
owing to s t a t u t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n , f i r s t l y i n the form of 
p u b l i c h e a l t h l e g i s l a t i o n ( 4 ) which i n t e r f e r e d with the 
developers' freedom to b u i l d as he pleased, and l a t e r 
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more e x t e n s i v e l y i n the development of a comprehensive 
system of planning l a w ( 5 ) . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of t a x a t i o n 
of l a n d ( 6 ) undoubtedly added t o the a c c u m u l a t i n g 
d i s i n c e n t i v e s and a f u r t h e r blow was s t r u c k with the 
in t r o d u c t i o n of the -Rent- -Acts { 7 ) , p u t t i n g l i m i t a t i o n s on 
ren t s and providing tenants with s e c u r i t y of tenure. 
The r e s u l t of these d i s i n c e n t i v e s to i n v e s t i n land was 
that land became a v a i l a b l e f o r s a l e . Coupled with t h i s , 
a f t e r the f i r s t World War, the B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s had 
alr e a d y begun to develop as an important f o r c e , enabling 
many who would not otherwise have had the opportunity of 
becoming owner-occupiers, to acquire a house by means of 
a mortgage. The d e s t r u c t i o n caused by the f i r s t World 
War had l e d post-war governments to s u b s i d i s e p r i v a t e 
house b u i l d i n g as w e l l as p u b l i c s e c t o r b u i l d i n g . Real 
incomes rose f o r those who were i n work and f a l l i n g 
p r i c e s and b u i l d i n g c o s t s boosted the supply of houses, 
both f a c t o r s which c r e a t e d a favourable environment f o r 
B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s . I n 1933 the c l i m a t e f o r the 
development of the B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s f u r t h e r improved 
when government s u b s i d i e s were withdrawn from the p u b l i c 
s e e t o r ( 8 ) . I n v estment i n B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s became 
a t t r a c t i v e owing to the s e c u r i t y of the S o c i e t i e s and 
favourable i n t e r e s t r a t e s . I n consequence, mortgages 
became cheaper and t h e i r terms e a s i e r e n a b l i n g more 
people to g r a n t them. The movement towards owner-
o c c u p a t i o n has been c o n t i n u o u s l y s u p p o r t e d by 
Conservative governments i n the form of tax s u b s i d i e s to 
home o w n e r s ( 9 ) , and, more r e c e n t l y , by the s a l e of 
c o u n c i l houses(10), as w e l l as tax and other i n c e n t i v e s 
to B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s , a l t h o u g h t a x i n c e n t i v e s f o r 
B u i l d i n g S o c i e t i e s have now been abolished. Today over 
60 per cent of homes are owner-occupied, approximately 
h a l f of these have outstanding mortgages of which i n 1978 
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occupation has t r i p l e d from 4m i n 1951 to n e a r l y 14m i n 
1985 ( " S o c i a l Trends'* 17 1987) 
The changes i n the s t r u c t u r e of ownership of property 
have been noted by the j u d i c i a r y . F o r example, i n 
PETTITT v PETTITT, Lord Diplock commented t h a t recent 
years had seen the: 
"...emergence of a property-owning, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
r e a l p r o p e r t y - m o r t g a g e d - t o - a - b u i l d i n g - s o c i e t y -
owning democracy."(11) 
and, i n WILLIAMS AND GLYN'S BANK LTD v BOLAND, Lord 
Wilberforce noted t h a t the great a f f l u e n c e f o l l o w i n g the 
two World Wars has brought about: 
"the extensions, beyond the pater f a m i l i a s , of 
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r i g h t s of ownership; i t s e l f f o l l o w i n g from the 
d i f f u s i o n of property and earning c a p a c i t y . " ( 1 2 ) 
A number of t h e o r i s t s ( 1 3 ) argue t h a t the changes i n the 
s t r u c t u r e of ownership i n -the 20th century have brought 
about a more s u b t l e transformation i n property r i g h t s . 
"Ownership" of t a n g i b l e r i g h t s i s no longer so important 
as the "ownership" of i n t a n g i b l e non-assignable a s s e t s of 
a personal nature such as job s e c u r i t y , r i g h t s to a 
pension and the undisturbed p o s s e s s i o n of a house. T h i s 
they c a l l the "new property". Thus, i n an essay e n t i t l e d 
"Changes i n the Bonding. _--of the Employment 
R e l a t i o n s h i p " (14) Gleiidoir^and E.R. Lev'^argue t h a t , 
whereas, i n the past, "economic" s e c u r i t y l a y w i t h i n the 
f a m i l y , now, i n an age of d i v o r c e and i n c r e a s i n g l y 
attenuated family t i e s , the primary source of economic 
s e c u r i t y no longer l i e s with the f a m i l y but with an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s employment o r , i f he has none, i n h i s 
dependency r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the government through 
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . T h e r e f o r e , t h e y o b s e r v e , l e g a l 
p r i n c i p l e s have a l t e r e d so t h a t , whereas i n the past i t 
was very easy f o r an employee to be dismissed and very 
d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n a d i v o r c e , the p o s i t i o n i s now 
reversed. So, i n an age of great i n s e c u r i t y , due to the 
housing shortage, economic r e c e s s i o n , the unprecedented 
r a t e of family breakdown, r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y has become 
a top p r i o r i t y . T h i s f a c t o r has been recognised by the 
l e g i s l a t u r e i n the Rent A c t s ( 1 5 ) , the Housing Act 
1 9 8 0 ( 1 6 ) , w i t h r e s p e c t t o p u b l i c s e c t o r r e n t e d 
accommodation, the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983(17) S.36, 
Administration of J u s t i c e Act 1970 as amended by S.8 of 
the 1973 A c t ( 1 8 ) , and the domestic v i o l e n c e l e g i s l a t i o n , 
namely the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1976 and the Domestic Proceeding and Magistrates' 
Court Act 1978(19), to mention only the main p r o v i s i o n s . 
I t 1R a l s n 3 n n a re-n +- -(-Via-)- 1-ho n o o r l f n r r o a i ( l o n f i a l 
x i _ . ~—. — . — — s e c u r i t y has been j u d i c i a l l y acknowledged i n the area of 
recognised property r i g h t s . For example, i n the sphere 
of co-ownership of f a m i l y property, t h i s i s apparent from 
the manner i n which the courts e x e r c i s e t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n 
under S.30 of the Law of Property Act 1925 i n d e c i d i n g 
whether to order a s a l e of property held i n t r u s t f o r 
s a l e ; a l s o from the f a c t t h a t the d o c t r i n e of conversion 
has been i n c r e a s i n g l y l e s s r i g i d l y a p p l i e d (20) i n cases 
of ownership of property under an implied t r u s t f o r s a l e 
where the primary purpose of a c q u i s i t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y f o r 
occupation and not as a form of investment; and, from 
t h i s , the somewhat dubious f i n d i n g by the Court of Appeal 
i n BULL v BULL(21) (followed i n WILLIAMS AND GLYN'S BANK 
v BOLAND(22)) that a tenant i n common under a s t a t u t o r y 
t r u s t f o r s a l e has a r i g h t to possession before s a l e . 
A f u r t h e r example of j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
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importance of r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y may be drawn from the 
law r e l a t i n g to mortgages. I n a d d i t i o n to the s t a t u t o r y 
powers p r o t e c t i n g the mortgagor's p o s s e s s i o n of the 
mortgaged property, some judges have sought to impose 
l i m i t s or even t o t a l l y abrogate the mortgagee's r i g h t to 
p o s s e s s i o n of the property. (23) 
L i c e n c e p r i n c i p l e s have an important r o l e to p l a y i n the 
p r o t e c t i o n of r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y where no p r o t e c t i o n by 
v i r t u e of a t r a d i t i o n a l l y recognised p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t 
i n the property e x i s t s , although i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to 
note t h a t l i c e n c e c o n c e p t s o r i g i n a l l y began t h e i r 
development i n the sphere of commercial r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e to c a t e g o r i s e i n t o c t h r e e the areas i n which l i c e n c e s have been u t i l i s e d to p r o t e c t occupation. 
F i r s t "of a l l / b e t w e e n 1952 (24) and 1965 ( 2 5 ) , l i c e n c e 
concepts were used to p r o t e c t a g a i n s t t h i r d p a r t i e s the 
deserted w i f e ' s occupation of the matrimonial home. 
The leading case was the d e c i s i o n of the Court of Appeal 
i n BENDALL v McWHIRTER(26) . A husband, who was s o l e 
owner of the matrimonial home, had deserted h i s wife, 
and, on l e a v i n g , had s a i d she could have the house and 
f u r n i t u r e . He was, however, l a t e r d e c l a r e d bankrupt and 
the t r u s t e e i n bankruptcy sued the wife f o r p o s s e s s i o n i n 
order to enable a s a l e of the property. A p o s s e s s i o n 
order was refused on the grounds t h a t the c o u r t ' s power 
under S.17 of the Married Woman's Property Act 1882, to 
permit a wife to remain i n the matrimonial home, could be 
e x e r c i s e d not only between husband and wife but a l s o 
between wife and purchaser from the husband who took with 
n o t i c e of the w i f e ' s r i g h t s . Romer L . J . whose judgement 
was approved by Somervell L . J . , held t h a t the deserted 
wife was "a l i c e n s e e with a s p e c i a l r i g h t " under which 
the husband could not t u r n her out except by order of the 
c o u r t . anr? a s i-ho +"ru5te is i n bankruptcy was i n no b e t t e r 
p o s i t i o n than the husband, he took s u b j e c t to the c l o g or 
f e t t e r which bound the bankrupt. Denning L . J . ' s 
judgement was more f a r - r e a c h i n g and c o n t r o v e r s i a l . He 
maintained t h a t the w i f e ' s l i c e n c e to occupy, analogous 
to a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , was an " e q u i t y " which the 
t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y took s u b j e c t t o and c o u l d not 
revoke. I t resembled the w i f e ' s r i g h t to pledge her 
husband's c r e d i t f o r n e c e s s a r i e s and flowed from the 
s t a t u s of marriage, coupled with the f a c t of s e p a r a t i o n 
and the husband's misconduct. He went on to support h i s 
d e c i s i o n by, somewhat dubiously, comparing the negative 
covenant of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s o r not to revoke the 
l i c e n c e , w i t h a r e s t r i c t i v e covenant, c l a i m i n g the 
deserted w i f e ' s e q u i t y was binding i n the same way. The 
approach of the C o u r t of Appeal c r e a t e d numerous 
conceptual and p r a c t i c a l problems. For example, i t was 
u n c l e a r whether the " e q u i t y " a r o s e on m a r r i a g e or 
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d e s e r t i o n , which i n turn r a i s e d questions of p r i o r i t i e s . 
I f the "equity" arose on d e s e r t i o n , t h i s would r e q u i r e 
the t h i r d p a r t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e whether the complex 
matrimonial cause of d e s e r t i o n had been s a t i s f i e d . I t 
was a l s o u n c l e a r whether the "equity" would a r i s e on the 
occurrence of not only d e s e r t i o n but other matrimonial 
offences which e x i s t e d a t the time, such as a d u l t e r y and 
c r u e l t y , and the d u r a t i o n of the " e q u i t y " was a l s o 
undefined. For i n s t a n c e , would i t determine i f the wife 
committed a matrimonial offence or the husband returned? 
These questions need not concern us, as the deserted 
w i f e s ' equity was s h o r t l i v e d , the notion being o v e r r u l e d 
by the House of Lords i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD. v 
AINSWORTH(27). The Law Lords were e s p e c i a l l y c r i t i c a l of 
the vague nature of the deserted wives' i n t e r e s t and i t s 
repercussions f o r e s t a b l i s h e d r e a l property law concepts. 
Lord Hodson, for example, commented: 
"Equity may not be past the age of c h i l d - b e a r i n g 
but an i n f a n t of the kind suggested would l a c k 
form and shape."(28) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t L o r d W i l b e r f o r c e 
considered "the u l t i m a t e question" to be whether deserted 
wives could: 
"...be g i v e n t h e p r o t e c t i o n which s o c i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of humanity e v i d e n t l y d i c t a t e 
without i n j u s t i c e to t h i r d p a r t i e s and a r a d i c a l 
d e p a r t u r e from the sound p r i n c i p l e s of r e a l 
property law."(29) 
With resp e c t to deserted wives, the Law Lords considered 
the p r i c e of j u s t i c e to be too high. But on account of 
the d e c i s i o n i n NATIONAL PROVINICAL BANK LTD v 
AINSWORTH; t h ^ M a h r i m r i n i . a . l Home? Art 1967 Was passed to 
prot e c t occupation of the matrimonial home by spouses who 
had no p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t i n the p r o p e r t y . 
Nevertheless, d e s p i t e i t s demise, the deserted w i f e ' s 
l i c e n c e remains of i n t e r e s t , to the extent t h a t i t has 
influenced the development of l i c e n c e p r i n c i p l e s and f o r 
the purpose of drawing comparisons between the conceptual 
and p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t i o n s which l e d the House of Lords to 
deny the e x i s t e n c e of an "equity" with other areas where 
the occupational l i c e n c e has been allowed to f l o u r i s h 
with regard to r e s i d e n t i a l property. 
Secondly, and more r e c e n t l y , l i c e n c e p r i n c i p l e s have been 
used and continue to be used, to p r o t e c t occupation of 
the quasi-matrimonial home by„ cohabitants. There i s 
evidence t h a t c o h a b i t a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s are on the 
i n c r e a s e ( 3 0 ) C e r t a i n l y , such r e l a t i o n s h i p s now e x i s t 
openly and t h e i r general acceptance a c r o s s s o c i e t y has 
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given r i s e to a w i l l i n g n e s s i n E n g l i s h law to give e f f e c t 
to f a m i l y t i e s " i n the widest sense". For i n s t a n c e , i n 
the 20th century, l e g i s l a t i o n has g r a d u a l l y a s s i m i l a t e d 
the r i g h t s of an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d w ith those of a 
l e g i t i m a t e - c h i l d ( 3 1 ) a l t h o u g h s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s 
s t i l l remain as regards support o b l i g a t i o n s , s u c c e s s i o n 
r i g h t s and custody i s s u e s ( 3 2 ) ; the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 has given cohabitants 
s i m i l a r p r o t e c t i o n from domestic v i o l e n c e to t h a t 
a v a i l a b l e to spouses; the I n h e r i t a n c e ( P r o v i s i o n f o r 
Family and Dependants) Act 1975 has afforded a cohabitee 
c e r t a i n r i g h t s to the e s t a t e of a deceased partner; and 
the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of J u s t i c e Act 1982, amending the 
F a t a l Accidents Act 1976, gives a cohabitant r i g h t s to 
c l a i m under the 1976 Act i n the ev e n t of a f a t a l 
a c c i d e n t . 
Moreover, i t i s not only the l e g i s l a t u r e which has been 
prepared to recognise r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g out 
of c o h a b i t a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but the j u d i c i a r y have 
a l s o proved w i l l i n g i n t h i s r e s p e c t . For example, i n 
DYSON v FOX ( 3 3 ) , the Court of Appeal was prepared to 
accept that the notion of the "family" as used i n the 
Rent A c t s i n r e l a t i o n t o r i g h t s of s u c c e s s i o n of a 
s t a t u t o r y tenant, had a l t e r e d s i n c e 1950. The court held 
t h a t a woman who had cohabited with a man f o r 21 years i n 
a house rented by the man came w i t h i n the ambit of the 
word "family", even though, on very s i m i l a r f a c t s , the 
Court of Appeal i n G AMMAN S v EKINS(34), had not been 
w i l l i n g to accept t h a t such a woman was protected by the 
Acts. Bridge L . J . commented: 
"... between 1950 and 1975 , t h e r e has been a 
complete r e v o l u t i o n of s o c i e t y ' s a t t i t u d e s t o 
unmarried p a r t n e r s h i p s of the k i n d under 
cnnRi flpration S'ich unions =>r° f s r conunoner th2.11 
they once used to be. The s o c i a l stigma attached 
to them has al m o s t , i f not e n t i r e l y , 
disappeared."(35) 
Furthermore, i n the sphere of co-ownership of property, 
the c o u r t s have, i n v a r y i n g d e g r e e s , r e c o g n i s e d t h e 
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g from c o h a b i t a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I n cases concerned with e s t a b l i s h i n g an 
i n t e r e s t i n property, Lord Denning, i n p a r t i c u l a r , when 
presented with the problem of the breakdown of such a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , had a tendency to employ the p r i n c i p l e s of 
r e s u l t i n g and c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t s , so as to obtain an 
analogous r e s u l t t o t h a t o b t a i n e d by judges i n the 
e x e r c i s e of t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n under the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 on div o r c e . For example, i n COOKE v HEAD, Lord 
Denning commented: 
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" I do not think i t i s r i g h t to approach t h i s case 
by looking a t the money c o n t r i b u t i o n s and d i v i d i n g 
up the b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t a c c o r d i n g to t h o s e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s . The matter should be looked at 
more broadly, j u s t -as we do i n husband and -wife 
cases."(36) 
S i m i l a r l y , i n EVES v EVES, i n the c o u r s e of h i s 
judgement, Lord Denning commented, of the p l a i n t i f f : 
" I t i s c l e a r t h a t her c o n t r i b u t i o n was such t h a t 
i f she had been a wife she could have had a good 
c l a i m t o have a s h a r e i n [ t h e house] on 
di v o r c e . . . . "(37) 
Taking t h i s i n t o account, he concluded that the p l a i n t i f f 
had a quarter share i n the property. I n BERNARD v 
JOSEPHS, Lord Denning was even more d i r e c t : 
" I n my opinion, i n a s c e r t a i n i n g the r e s p e c t i v e 
shares, the c o u r t s should normally apply the same 
co n s i d e r a t i o n s to couples l i v i n g together (as i f 
m a r r i e d ) as t h e y do to c o u p l e s who a r e t r u l y 
married. The share may be h a l f and h a l f , or any 
such proportion as i n the circumstances of the 
case appears to be f a i r and j u s t . " ( 3 8 ) 
He l a t e r added: 
"...these cases about the homes of couples l i v i n g 
together are so s i m i l a r to those of husband and 
wife t h a t . . . . they should be s t a r t e d i n the Family 
D i v i s i o n or t r a n s f e r r e d to i t , r a t h e r than the 
Chancery D i v i s i o n . " ( 3 9 ) 
G r i f f i t h ? ; T i . ,T . w a s m n r e r > a n t - j n n o flo pointed O U t ! 
"There are many reasons why a man and a woman may 
l i v e together without marrying, and one of them i s 
that each values h i s independence and does not 
wish to make the commitment of marriage; i n such 
a case, i t w i l l be misleading to make the same 
assumptions and to draw the same i n f e r e n c e s from 
t h e i r b e h a v i o u r as i n the c a s e of a m a r r i e d 
couple. The judge must look most c a r e f u l l y a t the 
nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , and, only i f s a t i s f i e d 
t h a t i t was intended to involve the same degree of 
commitment as marriage, w i l l i t be l e g i t i m a t e to 
r e g a r d them as no d i f f e r e n t from a m a r r i e d 
couple."(40) 
Admittedly, the d e c i s i o n i n BURNS v BURNS(41), followed 
i n WALKER v HALL(42), shows c l e a r s i g n s of a move away 
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from using r e s u l t i n g and c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t p r i n c i p l e s i n 
cases concerned with breakdown of a r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
cohabitees to achieve s i m i l a r r e s u l t s to p r i n c i p l e s of 
d i v i s i o n of property on d i v o r c e . I n BURNS v BURNS, May 
L . J . expressed the view t h a t : -
"As Parliament has not l e g i s l a t e d f o r unmarried 
couples as i t has f o r those who have been married, 
the court should be slow to attempt i n e f f e c t to 
l e g i s l a t e themselves."(43) 
Nevertheless, the j u d i c i a r y have more c o n s i s t e n t l y been 
w i l l i n g to give e f f e c t to o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g out of 
c o h a b i t a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r 
d i s c r e t i o n to order a s a l e under S.30 of the Law of 
Property Act, where the cohabitants are co-owners of 
property under a s t a t u t o r y t r u s t f o r s a l e . The present 
trend began with the d e c i s i o n of the Court of Appeal i n 
RE EVERS(44). S. 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
s e t s out the ex t e n s i v e powers of the divorce court to 
make property adjustment orders on di v o r c e , n u l l i t y or 
j u d i c i a l s e p a r a t i o n . Although Ormrod L . J . e x p r e s s l y 
d e n i e d the r e l e v a n c e of c a s e s d e c i d e d under S.24 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, he was prepared to f i n d t h a t 
the p r o v i s i o n of a f a m i l y home, where c h i l d r e n were 
i n v o l v e d or r e s u l t e d from the r e l a t i o n s h i p , may 
c o n s t i t u t e , i n the same way as between s p o u s e s , a 
"continung purpose" j u s t i f y i n g the court i n r e f u s i n g an 
order f o r s a l e under S.30 of the Law of Property Act 
1925. He considered t h a t such an approach, adopted i n 
r e l a t i o n to s e c t i o n 30 case s , enabled the court to brin g 
the e x e r c i s e of i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t o l i n e w i t h t h e 
d i s c r e t i o n given under S.24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973, and so: 
" rfn qnmo t . i a T F t^rj e l i m i n a t i n g ths d i f f s r s n c s s 
between l e g i t i m a t e and i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n i n 
accordance with present l e g i s l a t i v e p o l i c y . " ( 4 5 ) 
This a s s i m i l a t i o n i s f u r t h e r added to by the w i l l i n g n e s s 
of the court i n s e c t i o n 30 cases beginning with DENNIS v 
MCDONALD(46), to order payment of an occupation r e n t by 
the party remaining i n the property on breakdown of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , and a l s o to give a t l e a s t some i n d i c a t i o n s 
of the circumstances i n which a s a l e may be ordered, 
comparable with the so c a l l e d Mesher order(47) once 
popular i n matrimonial c a s e s . 
The possessory l i c e n c e has a l s o been used by the courts 
to achieve a s i m i l a r o b j e c t i v e of r e s o l v i n g property 
disputes on breakdown of c o h a b i t a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
where an i n t e r e s t i n property on t r u s t p r i n c i p l e s cannot 
be e s t a b l i s h e d ; o r , a r g u a b l y ( 4 8 ) , s i m p l y a s an 
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a l t e r n a t i v e device f o r balancing out the i n t e r e s t s of the 
p a r t i e s i n breakdown to r e s u l t i n g or c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t 
p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s of course questionable whether the 
j u d i c i a r y should, by means of t r u s t or l i c e n c e concepts, 
impose s i m i l a r o b l i g a t i o n s on c o h a b i t e e s t o t h o s e 
undertaken by persons who have chosen to marry. To do so 
i s an a t t a c k on the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l because, i n 
e f f e c t , i t deprives a person of the r i g h t to c o n t r a c t out 
of marriage. Deech expresses the view: 
"The c r e a t i o n of s p e c i a l laws f o r cohabitants of 
the extension of m a r i t a l laws to them r e t a r d s the 
empancipation of women, degrades the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
and i s too expensive f o r s o c i e t y i n general and 
men i n p a r t i c u l a r "(49) 
However, to deny t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s ever a r i s e out of such 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s would undoubtedly l e a d to u n j u s t r e s u l t s i n 
some case s , given t h a t many women are i n f a c t s t i l l i n a 
p o s i t i o n of economic dependency, not to mention the 
i n c r e a s e d burden of support f o r the weaker p a r t y on the 
p u b l i c purse. Moreover, as G r i f f i t h L . J . recognised, i n 
BERNARDS v JOSEPH(50), c o h a b i t a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s may 
e x i s t f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons and the i n t e n t i o n s of the 
p a r t i e s towards one another may consequently be very 
d i f f e r e n t . I t may w e l l be t h a t one or both of the 
p a r t i e s are a l r e a d y married to someone e l s e or do not 
w i s h to remarry because they may l o s e on f i n a n c i a l 
p r o v i s i o n from an a l r e a d y d i v o r c e d spouse, but 
n e v e r t h e l e s s intend t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to be permanent. 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e c o u r t s s h o u l d c o n t i n u e to 
s c r u t i n i s e c l o s e l y the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the p a r t i e s as they have done i n some cas e s ( 5 1 ) and, only 
i f s a t i s f i e d t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p amounts to a de f a c t o 
marriage, should they use the e x i s t i n g l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s 
to impose q u a s i - s p o u s a l Riinpnrt- nhl i g*t- i n n s ni-r<H o n <=ly, 
an assessment of the b a s i s of the p a r t i e s ' r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to make, but, even i f l e g i s l a t i o n were 
to be p a s s e d to impose o b l i g a t i o n s of q u a s i - s p o u s a l 
support on cohabitees, l i n e s would have to be drawn and 
judgements made about the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
I t has a l r e a d y been noted t h a t BURNS v BURNS(52) may mark 
a movement away from the p r a c t i c e by the j u d i c i a r y of 
r e s o l v i n g p r o p e r t y d i s p u t e s on breakdown of a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p on r e s u l t i n g and c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t 
p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t , i n BURNS v BURNS, a l l 
three judges (Waller, Fox and May L . J J . ) , r a t h e r than 
p u r e l y i n d u l g i n g i n a g e n e r a l i s e d a t t a c k on the 
shortcomings of the "new model" c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t ( 5 3 ) , 
emphasised the f a c t t h a t Parliament had not l e g i s l a t e d to 
provide machinery to r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s between unmarried 
couples on breakdown of a r e l a t i o n s h i p , and expressed the 
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view that the courts should a c c o r d i n g l y be r e l u c t a n t 
themselves to do so. Consequently, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t 
the courts may a l s o be l e s s w i l l i n g to employ l i c e n c e 
p r i n c i p l e s as a method of a c h i e v i n g the same end. An 
a l t e r n a t i v e - p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t the--removal of r e s u l t i n g 
and c o n s t r u c t i v e p r i n c i p l e s from the armoury may l e a d the 
courts to r e s o r t to l i c e n c e concepts more f r e q u e n t l y . 
Assuming th a t , at l e a s t i n some circumstances, i t i s 
d e s i r a b l e to impose o b l i g a t i o n s of support on unmarried 
p a r t n e r s , i t i s intended, i n the course of the general 
d i s c u s s i o n of the development of l i c e n c e s , to examine how 
s u i t a b l e l i c e n c e p r i n c i p l e s are f o r t h i s purpose. 
The t h i r d sphere i n which l i c e n c e s have proved u s e f u l i n 
p r o t e c t i n g r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y i s i n r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s 
a r i s i n g out of informal family, and domestic arrangements' 
(other than those"*"Between c o h a b i t e e s ) . I t appears from 
case law that such informal agreements are a l s o on the 
i n c r e a s e . C e r t a i n l y , more di s p u t e s a r i s i n g out of such 
agreements a r e coming b e f o r e the c o u r t s . T h i s i s 
undoubtedly p a r t l y to do with the a v a i l a b i l i t y of L e g a l 
A i d ( 5 4 ) , although other f a c t o r s are of s i g n i f i c a n c e . For 
i n s t a n c e , the h i g h e r s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g e n j o y e d by 
s o c i e t y as a whole, and the w i d e r a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
mortgages as a means of buying property has r e s u l t e d i n 
owner-occupation becoming an option extending beyond the 
bounds of the e l i t e p r o p e r t i e d c l a s s e s of the 19th 
century. A l l c l a s s e s of s o c i e t y now have a s p i r a t i o n s to 
become owner-occupiers. Young couples who i n previous 
g e n e r a t i o n s would have been c o n t e n t t o s t a r t t h e i r 
m a r r i e d l i v e s i n p r i v a t e or p u b l i c s e c t o r r e n t e d 
accommodation now a s p i r e , or f e e l compelled on account of 
the shortage of rented accommodation, to become owner-
occupiers from the o u t s e t . I n r e a l i t y , many of them are 
unable to a f f o r d a mortgage without p a r e n t a l backing and, 
u h p r p i~\\<? support do? s not tsk.6 th 1? f.OTV\ of. ?. 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d loan, informal arrangements may a r i s e , 
the p r e c i s e nature and terms of which are often d i f f i c u l t 
to a s c e r t a i n . I n a d d i t i o n , whereas t h e younger 
generation are f r e q u e n t l y i n need of f i n a n c i a l support, 
owing to the f a c t t h a t people a r e t e n d i n g to l i v e 
longer(55) the older generation r e q u i r e accommodation i n 
s i t u a t i o n s where they can be cared f o r by r e l a t i v e s when 
n e c e s s a r y . T h i s may w e l l g i v e r i s e t o arrangements 
i n v o l v i n g , often unspoken, r e c i p r o c a l b e n e f i t s , such as 
those which appeared to u n d e r l i e the arrangements of the 
p a r t i e s i n WILLIAMS v STAITE(56), where the mother's 
motive i n allowing her daughter and son-in-law to l i v e i n 
a cottage owned by her, r e n t f r e e , f o r so long as they 
wished, was the hope t h a t they would i n r e t u r n care f o r 
t h e i r ageing parents. Many of the informal arrangements 
which have come before the courts could have been brought 
w i t h i n e s t a b l i s h e d p r o p e r t y c o n c e p t s by u s i n g s u c h 
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devices as t r u s t s , l e a s e s or mortgages, had l e g a l advice 
been sought (although, admittedly, i n the case of l e a s e s , 
owing to the i m p l i c a t i o n of s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l , t h i s may 
have been d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided) . Why, then, i s l e g a l 
a d v i c e not t a k e n ? One e x p l a n a t i o n f o r i n f o r m a l 
arrangements w i t h i n the fam i l y or domestic sphere i s t h a t 
p u t t i n g such agreements on a l e g a l f o o t i n g i s often taken 
to i n d i c a t e a l a c k of t r u s t on the p a r t of t h o s e 
involved. Linked with t h i s , i t i s apparent t h a t , i n many 
s i t u a t i o n s , the p a r t i e s have not c l e a r l y worked out i n 
t h e i r minds the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the arrangement, which 
i n e v i t a b l y causes problems f o r the c o u r t s . They have 
thought only of the present and not what may happen i n 
the f u t u r e , and are motivated only by vague notions of 
the hope of mutual support or r e c i p r o c a l b e n e f i t . As 
Lord Denning observed i n HARDWICK v JOHNSON: 
" I n most c a s e s , the question cannot be solved by 
looking a t the i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s because 
the s i t u a t i o n i s one nev e r e n v i s a g e d by t h e 
p a r t i e s .... so many t h i n g s a r e undecided, 
undiscussed and unprovided f o r , the ta s k of the 
court i s to f i l l i n the blanks."(57) 
A f u r t h e r explanation f o r the number of i n f o r m a l l y agreed 
family arrangements may be t h a t , whereas i t has g e n e r a l l y 
been the p r a c t i c e amongst the wealthy p r o p e r t i e d c l a s s e s 
to seek l e g a l advice before e n t e r i n g i n t o any arrangement 
which has obvious l e g a l consequences, many of the new 
prop e r t i e d c l a s s e s , e i t h e r through l a c k of res o u r c e s , 
experience or a general d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to approach the 
l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n , tend to negotiate without regard to the 
l e g a l e f f e c t of arrangements made. F i n a l l y , i n some 
circumstances, informal agreements i n v o l v i n g occupation 
of p r o p e r t y may a r i s e from l a c k of one p a r t y ' s 
n e a o t i a t i nn s t - r e n n f h _ p a r t i c u l a r l y a problem v.'ith the 
e l d e r l y ; hence, s i t u a t i o n s such as those which arose i n 
GREASLEY v COOKE(58), BINIONS v EVANS(59) and BANNISTER v 
BANNISTER(60). The net r e s u l t of informal arrangements 
f o r occupation of property has been to cause havoc i n the 
r e a l property lawyer's world of n e a t l y c o n c e p t u a l i s e d 
c a t e g o r i e s of e s t a b l i s h e d property i n t e r e s t s . How, f o r 
example, could the arrangement i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
(61) best be explained? I t w i l l be remembered t h a t a 
f a t h e r obtained a B u i l d i n g S o c i e t y loan and had the house 
conveyed i n t o h i s own name but made h i s son and daughter-
i n - l a w r e s p o n s i b l e f o r repayment of the mortgage 
instalments on the understanding that the house would be 
t h e i r s when a l l the instalm e n t s were paid. Were they to 
be regarded as tenants a t w i l l , tenants under the Rents 
A c t s or were t h e y p u r c h a s e r s i n p o s s e s s i o n under a 
con t r a c t of s a l e ? The v a r i e t y of explanations as to the 
t r u e l e g a l n a t u r e of the s i t u a t i o n put f o r w a r d by 
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academics i l l u s t r a t e s t h e e x t e n t of the problem. 
S i m i l a r l y , i n HARDWICK v J0HNS0N(62), where a mother 
bought a house to provide a matrimonial home f o r her son 
and daughter-in-law, the house being conveyed i n t o the 
mother' s-name and- the young couple paying-£28-, was- the 
payment being made towards the purchase p r i c e or was i t 
rent? The d i f f i c u l t y i n c l a s s i f y i n g the l e g a l nature of 
the arrangements between the p a r t i e s i n such cases has 
thrown l a w y e r s back on the r e s i d u a l concept of the 
l i c e n c e , which, a l o n g w i t h o t h e r d e v i c e s , has been 
developed to provide a s u i t a b l e remedy f o r the d i s p u t e s 
a r i s i n g out of family arrangements. 
Given the importance of the "use" value of property i n 
the 1980s and the circumstances i n which l i c e n c e s have 
proved t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e i n p r o t e c t i n g 
occupation, i t i s now intended to consider c r i t i c a l l y how 
accepted l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s regarding l i c e n c e s have been 
manipulated and expanded to achieve t h i s end. At the 
present time, there s t i l l appears to be much u n c e r t a i n t y 
and confusion over v i t a l underlying p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s has 
l e d Browne-Wilkinson J . , i n an often quoted e x t r a c t from 
RE SHARPE, to comment: 
" I do not think t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s l y i n g behind 
these d e c i s i o n s have y e t been f u l l y explored and, 
on occasions, i t seems t h a t such r i g h t s are found 
to e x i s t s i m p l y on the ground t h a t t o h o l d 
o t h e r w i s e would be a h a r d s h i p to t h e 
p l a i n t i f f . " ( 6 3 ) 
The statement seems to h i n t a t the crux of the matter i n 
so f a r i s i t r e c o g n i s e s t h a t the l i c e n c e has been 
employed as a remedial device. As has a l r e a d y been 
noted, the p l a i n t i f f s i n l i c e n c e cases could often have 
r)T~ot"pctp>r\ t- h A m c o i ^ v o o v%ir n c o of e s t s b l i s h s d p r c p s r t y 
concepts but, through inexperience, inadequacy, f i n a n c i a l 
dependence, poverty or o l d age, they have not taken the 
necessary steps to do so, or, i n the case of c e r t a i n 
t y p e s of c o h a b i t e e s , a l t h o u g h p u b l i c o p i n i o n and 
sometimes j u s t i c e seems t o r e q u i r e machinery f o r 
r e s o l u t i o n of disputes on breakdown of a r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
t h e r e a r e no s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s to a c h i e v e t h i s 
end(64). Nevertheless, although a remedial device must 
have f l e x i b i l t y , i t should not be surrounded with the 
c o n f u s i o n and u n c e r t a i n t y Browne-Wilkinson J . wasl/ 
i n d i c a t i n g . Therefore, as the development of the l i c e n c e 
as a means of p r o t e c t i n g r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y i s t r a c e d 
i n t h i s s e c t i o n , the f i r s t aim i s to t r y and account f o r 
and r e s o l v e some of the confusion which has a r i s e n out of 
tha t development. The second aim i s to consider the way 
for w a r d ( i f any) f o r l i c e n c e p r i n c i p l e s a g a i n s t t h e 
background of the problems which have brought t he 
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possessory l i c e n c e to the f o r e f r o n t i n t h i s sphere. As 
i s most eloquently put by W a l l i c e and Grbich: 
"The underlying problem i s to invent a device t h a t 
e n a b l e s the l e g a l s y s t e m t o s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
ameliorate the impact of i t s e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s on 
the t r u s t i n g , t h e f o o l i s h , the aged and the 
i n f a t u a t e d w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g the framework of 
t h o s e r u l e s and the e x p e c t a t i o n s t h e y 
support."(65) 
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(b) The p o s i t i o n of the l i c e n s e e a t common law 
Before looking a t the development of l i c e n c e concepts i n 
equity to meet the needs of, among other t h i n g s , informal 
-f amily and domestic- arrangements, i t i s n e c e s s a r y b r i e f 1-y 
to consider the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a t common law. T h i s may 
s t i l l be r e l e v e n t as the common law governs the p o s i t i o n 
of a l i c e n s e e who has no p r o t e c t i o n i n equity. The common 
law recognised three types of l i c e n c e i n connection with 
l a n d : a bare l i c e n c e , a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e and a 
l i c e n c e coupled with a grant. 
To consider f i r s t l i c e n c e s coupled with a grant. I f the 
l i c e n c e i s a n c i l l a r y to the grant of some p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t i n land or c h a t t e l s on the land, i t i s a l i c e n c e 
coupled with a grant. Two elements are always involved 
i n the case of such l i c e n c e s : f i r s t l y , the permission to 
enter the land, and secondly the grant of the i n t e r e s t , 
namely a p r o f i t a prendre. Examples in c l u d e a permission 
to go onto land f o r the purpose of c u t t i n g and removing 
timber or k i l l i n g animals on the land and t a k i n g them 
away. P r o v i d e d t h e c o r r e c t f o r m a l i t i e s had been 
s a t i s f i e d , namely t h a t the grant was made by deed, a 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , enforceable a g a i n s t the s u c c e s s o r s 
i n t i t l e of the grantor, arose, which even the common law 
regards as i r r e v o c a b l e ( 1 ) . Moreover, a l i c e n c e coupled 
with a grant i s i t s e l f a s s i g n a b l e ( 2 ) , but, as the l i c e n c e 
has no independent e x i s t e n c e apart from the grant, i t 
follows t hat i t may only be assigned i n conjunction with 
the i n t e r e s t with which i t i s coupled. I f the l i c e n c e 
coupled with a grant was not made, observing the r e l e v a n t 
f o r m a l i t i e s , i t was revocable a t common law, although 
equity intervened by analogy with the d o c t r i n e of WALSH v 
LONSDALE(3) and enforced a c o n t r a c t f o r such a grant. For 
example, i n FROGLEY v EARL OF L0VELACE(4) the defendant 
arant.ed a i - p r a n r y to the p l a i n t i f f and endorsed en the 
le a s e an agreement whereby he a l s o gave the p l a i n t i f f 
e x c l u s i v e s p o r t i n g r i g h t s o v e r the l a n d f o r a f i x e d 
p e r i o d . As the agreement was not by deed, i t was 
revocable at common law. However, i n equity, i t operated 
as an agreement f o r a g r a n t which was s p e c i f i c a l l y 
enforceable and a l s o capable of p r o t e c t i o n by means of an 
i n j u n c t i o n u n t i l the grant was executed. 
L i t t l e f u r t h e r need be s a i d about l i c e n c e s coupled with a 
grant because they do not give r i g h t s to occupy land, but 
only to enter on land f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose. As such, 
t h e i r scope i s l i m i t e d and does not enable them to be 
used as a means of p r o t e c t i n g occupation of land under 
informal or family arrangements. Nevertheless, i t i s 
worth noting t h a t there has been some confusion over the 
n a t u r e of the i n t e r e s t to which the l i c e n c e may be 
coupled, so as to make i t i r r e v o c a b l e a t common law. 
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Gases such as VAUGHAN v HAMPS0N(5) and HURST v PICTURE 
THEATRES LTD.(6) seemed to suggest t h a t no recognised 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t i n land i s required. I n HURST v 
PICTURE THEATRES LTD., a l i c e n c e to enter and see a 
cinema--perf ormance - af t e r - a c q u i s i t i o n of- -a ticket—-was 
regarded as a l i c e n c e coupled with a grant, the " r i g h t to 
see the performance", i t seems, erroneously being taken 
as a p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t . The b e t t e r view, however, i s 
t h a t the grant to which the l i c e n c e i s coupled must be a 
recognised p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t ( 7 ) . 
To turn to bare l i c e n c e s and t h e i r treatment at common 
law, The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a bare l i c e n c e i s t h a t i t 
a r i s e s g r a t u i t o u s l y . Once i t has been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
some form of c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been given i n r e t u r n f o r 
the permission granted, the l i c e n c e becomes c o n t r a c t u a l . 
A bare l i c e n c e may give permission to use or occupy land 
along with others or i t may give the e x c l u s i v e p r i v i l e g e 
of occupation of land. P r i o r to the e a r l y 1950s, i f a 
bare l i c e n s e e was i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , he would 
g e n e r a l l y have been d e s c r i b e d as a tenant a t w i l l ( 8 ) . At 
common law, a bare l i c e n c e was revocable a t w i l l . I t 
t h e r e f o r e followed t h a t i t was capable of r e v o c a t i o n 
before or during the a c t or a c t s f o r which the permission 
was e x p r e s s l y or i m p l i e d l y granted. However, the f a c t 
t h a t a bare l i c e n c e may have been revoked during the 
course of the a c t f o r which the permission was granted 
d i d not make the l i c e n s e e a t r e s p a s s e r from the moment of 
revocation. There are s e v e r a l a u t h o r i t i e s to suggest 
that even a bare l i c e n s e e had to be given a reasonable 
period of time to remove himself from the property i n 
question before he became a t r e s p a s s e r . T h i s view was 
taken by Viscount Simon i n WINTER GARDEN THEATRE (LONDON) 
LTD v MILLENNIUM PRODUCTIONS LTD.(9) and by the House of 
Lords i n ROBSON v HALLETT(IO). I n the l a t t e r case, i t 
was a d d i t i o n a l l v he>ld f-hat- a n action i n damages l a y i f 
the l i c e n s o r i n t e r f e r e d w ith the person of the l i c e n s e e 
i n any way during the "packing up" time. The question 
a r i s e s , how long i s a reasonable period of time to leave? 
T h i s would seem to have depended on the circumstances; 
i f the l i c e n c e was to occupy land, one would expect the 
" p a c k i n g up" time to be c o n s i d e r a b l y l o n g e r than a 
l i c e n c e to enter on land merely to communicate with the 
l i c e n s o r . However, even i n the case of a l i c e n c e to 
occupy land, i t i s apparent t h a t a "reasonable time" i s a 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y s h o r t p e r i o d of time and t h u s a f f o r d s 
l i t t l e p r o t e c t i o n t o the l i c e n s e e . F o r example, i n 
HORROCKS v FORRAY(ll), a wealthy man bought a house f o r 
h i s m i s t r e s s and the c h i l d of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to l i v e 
i n , but t i t l e to the property remained i n h i s name. On 
h i s death, the executors sought possession of the house, 
which the m i s t r e s s r e s i s t e d , c l a i m i n g t o have an 
i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to remain. The court 
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was, however, only prepared to i n f e r a bare l i c e n c e i n 
favour of the m i s t r e s s and, s i n c e t h i s had been revoked 
by the executors, they gave her j u s t 28 days to leave the 
premises. T h i s d e c i s i o n was followed i n the unreported 
case of -RE—MILLARD ( 1 - 2 ), with what-would appear-to-be very 
harsh r e s u l t s i n the circumstances. Here a couple had 
cohabited f o r 36 years i n a house bought i n the man's 
name. They had two c h i l d r e n . A f t e r the man's death, a 
possession order was allowed a g a i n s t the woman on the 
ground that she merely occupied the house under a bare 
l i c e n c e which had been determined. 
Thus, i t can be seen t h a t the common law p r i n c i p l e s 
r e l a t i n g to bare l i c e n c e s had no scope f o r providing 
r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y . Furthermore, i t i s q u i t e c l e a r 
t h a t , as, a t common law, a bare l i c e n c e i s revocable a t 
w i l l , i t i s not capable of binding a t h i r d p a r t y whether 
such p a r t y had n o t i c e or otherwise. I t i s u n c l e a r as to 
the p o s i t i o n of the l i c e n s e e a t common law without the 
pr o t e c t i o n of equity as regards "packing up" time, i f the 
l i c e n s o r s o l d h i s land without n o t i f y i n g the l i c e n s e e . 
Would the purchaser be bound to give the l i c e n s e e a 
reasonable period of time to leave before he was able to 
take a c t i o n a g a i n s t him? I t i s arguable that the bare 
l i c e n s e e has i m p l i e d p e r m i s s i o n to remain u n t i l t h e 
assignee of the l i c e n s o r asks him to leave, and, as with 
the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r , he must be given a reasonable time 
to l e a v e . ( 1 3 ) 
To turn, f i n a l l y , to c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s , although i t 
seems t h a t there are some a u t h o r i t i e s f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n 
that i n some circumstances a l i c e n c e , once acted upon, 
may be i r r e v o c a b l e ( 1 4 ) a t common law, t h e s e were 
g e n e r a l l y revocable a t w i l l . The leading a u t h o r i t y i s 
WOOD v LEADBITTER(1 5). The p l a i n t i f f brought an a c t i o n 
f n r a q c s i i i t- wo t">sd purchsssd ?. t i c k s t to i-.'sttch t h s 
races a t Doncaster Race Course and, during the course of 
the events, without any misconduct on h i s p a r t , he was 
ordered by the defendant to leave. When he refused, he 
was f o r c e a b l y e j e c t e d . The success of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
case depended on h i s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t he had a r i g h t , as 
a l i c e n s e e , to be on the land i n question, as opposed to 
becoming a t r e s p a s s e r once he had been asked to leave, as 
a t r e s p a s s e r could be l a w f u l l y e j e c t e d using reasonable 
force i n the circumstances. Alderson B . i n the Court of 
the Exchequer held t h a t an a c t i o n f o r a s s a u l t must f a i l 
as the p l a i n t i f f became a t r e s p a s s e r once a "reasonable" 
time i n which to leave had elapsed. The reason f o r t h i s 
was t h a t a l i c e n c e , not being an i n t e r e s t i n land c r e a t e d 
by deed, was, by i t s very nature, revocable a t w i l l ; the 
f a c t t h a t the l i c e n c e had been g r a n t e d f o r v a l u a b l e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n was considered i r r e l e v a n t to the question 
of whether i t could be revoked. However, Alderson B . d i d 
1 3 6 
suggest t h a t any aggrieved l i c e n s e e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n 
would probably have an a c t i o n f o r breach of c o n t r a c t . ( 1 6 ) 
T h i s view was followed i n THOMPSON v PARK(17). Here, 
a f t e r v a r i o us disagreements,- the defendant- schoolmaster 
was ordered to leave school premises where he l i v e d under 
the same roof as the p l a i n t i f f s c h o o l m a s t e r . The 
defendant refused to leave and some time l a t e r assembled 
a number of f r i e n d s and supporters, entered the school by 
f o r c i n g s e v e r a l l o c k s , and disconnected the water pump, 
lea v i n g the school without water. The defendant was 
descri b e d by Lord Goddard as being: 
" . . . g u i l t y a t l e a s t of r i o t , a f f r a y , w i l f u l 
damage, f o r c i b l e entry and perhaps conspiracy.... 
"(18) 
I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e q u i t y was not p r e p a r e d t o 
i n t e r v e n e t o p r e v e n t r e v o c a t i o n of the d e f e n d a n t ' s 
l i c e n c e to l i v e a t the school, so the outcome depended on 
the p o s i t i o n a t common law. The t r a d i t i o n a l view t h a t a 
l i c e n s o r had no r i g h t to revoke the l i c e n c e but d i d 
n e v e r t h e l e s s have t h e power, was invoked w i t h t h e 
consequence t h a t the defendant became a t r e s p a s s e r 
whether the revocation of the l i c e n c e was i n breach of 
cont r a c t or otherwise. Although the opposite c o n c l u s i o n 
was i n f a c t reached i n HURST v PICTURE THEATRES LTD.(19) 
and, as such, may appear to support the view t h a t a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may have been i r r e v o c a b l e a t common 
law i n some circumstances. T h i s conclusion was l a r g e l y 
reached because, as has al r e a d y been expla i n e d ( 2 0 ) t h e 
court took the f a l l a c i o u s view t h a t there had been a 
grant of a p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t and t h i s grant made the 
l i c e n c e i r r e v o c a b l e . However, Buckley L . J . d i d produce a 
second ground f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the s i t u a t i o n from the 
d o n i s i A n . i " T.'TGGD v LE' VD2 TTTER ( 2 1 ) v.'hich V72LS I s t t s r 
developed by the Court of Appeal i n WINTER GARDEN THEATRE 
(LONDON) LTD v MILLENNIUM PRODUCTIONS LTD.(22) T h i s was 
that the l i c e n c e on the f a c t s was not revocable because: 
"...there was included i n th a t c o n t r a c t a c o n t r a c t 
not to revoke the l i c e n c e u n t i l the pl a y had run 
to i t s termination. 1 1 (23 ) 
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( c ) The i n t e r v e n t i o n of Equity. 
The common law, as has been seen, provided l i t t l e scope 
f o r use of l i c e n c e concepts i n r e l a t i o n to r e a l property. 
How, t h e n 7 did- -the- i n t e r v e n t i o n -of equity- -turn -the l i c e n c e i n t o a va l u a b l e means of p r o t e c t i n g r e s i d e n t i a l 
s e c u r i t y ? The development involved two d i s t i n c t s t e p s . 
F i r s t , the f i n d i n g t h a t i n some circumstances the l i c e n c e 
may be i r r e v o c a b l e a g a i n s t the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r ; and 
secondly, f o l l o w i n g from t h i s , the f i n d i n g t h a t a l i c e n c e 
may a l s o i n some s i t u a t i o n s be i r r e v o c a b l e as a g a i n s t a 
successor of the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r other than a bona f i d e 
purchaser f o r value without n o t i c e . I t i s now proposed 
to d i s c u s s c r i t i c a l l y these two stages i n order to decide 
whether the developments were necessary and d e s i r a b l e to 
p r o t e c t the needs f o r r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y o u t l i n e d 
e a r l i e r ( 2 4 ) and to decide whether the developments were 
achieved i n the best way. 
The n o t i o n , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the o c c u p a t i o n of 
r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y t h a t a l i c e n s e e may have an 
i r r e v o c a b l e r i g h t to remain, owes i t s o r i g i n s i n modern 
times l a r g e l y to the d e c i s i o n of the Court of Appeal i n 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON(25). Here, where a f a t h e r bought a 
house f o r h i s son and daughter-in-law i n h i s own name on 
the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e y p a i d him monthly sums 
equi v a l e n t to the mortgage repayments, i t was decided the 
young couple had an i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to 
remain i n the house so long as they paid the mortgage 
instalments, and t h i s r i g h t was binding on t h i r d p a r t i e s 
who took with n o t i c e . I n the same year, i n BENDALL v 
McWHIRTER(26) the Court of Appeal extended the scope of 
o c c u p a t i o n a l l i c e n c e s , e x p r e s s i n g t he view t h a t a 
deserted wife had a l i c e n c e to occupy the matrimonial 
home "analogous t o a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e " which was 
i r r p v n r s h i p , i r , t i l r^etsr T ni'" ,€id by dsath, d i v c r c s c r — court 
order. T h i s too was binding on t h i r d p a r t i e s who took 
with n o t i c e of the "equity". L a t e r the p r i n c i p l e of 
"equitable estoppel" came to be used i n connection with 
l i c e n c e s , once a g a i n o p e r a t i n g t o make the l i c e n c e 
i r r e v o c a b l e and, i n some c a s e s , binding on t h i r d p a r t i e s , 
other than a bona f i d e purchaser without n o t i c e . An 
examination w i l l f i r s t be made of the use of the concept 
of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i n t h i s sphere, before going on 
to consider the use made of estoppel p r i n c i p l e s . No 
s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n w i l l be given to the "deserted wive s 1 
equity" as t h i s notion was e n t i r e l y destroyed by the 
House of Lords d e c i s i o n i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD v 
AINSWORTH. 
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V i s c o u n t Simon i n MILLENIUM PRODUCTIONS LTD v 
WINTER GARDEN THEATRE (LONDON) LTD [1946] 1 A l l ER 
678. 
17. [1944] KB 408. 
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(d) C o n t r a c t u a l L i c e n c e s . 
( i ) I r r e v o c a b i l i t y and the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r . 
In ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON(l) r e l i a n c e f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n 
that a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may, i n c e r t a i n circumstances, 
be i r r e v o c a b l e as a g a i n s t t h e o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r was 
placed on the d e c i s i o n s of the Court of Appeal and House 
Of L o r d s i n WINTER GARDEN THEATRE (LONDON) LTD V 
MILLENIUM PRODUCTIONS LTD.(2) and on the d e c i s i o n i n 
FOSTER v R0BINS0N(3) i n which Lord Greene M.R. followed 
the views expressed i n the WINTER GARDEN case. The f a c t s 
of t h e l a t t e r c a s e were c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i m p l e . The 
respondent l i c e n s e e s had entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t which 
gave them the r i g h t to present p l a y s a t a t h e a t r e f o r a 
period of s i x months commencing 6th J u l y 1942. There was 
a p r o v i s i o n f o r an extension f o r an unstated period, 
terminable by the respondents a t one month's n o t i c e . No 
p r o v i s i o n was made f o r termination by the l i c e n s o r s , but 
i n September 1945 t h e l i c e n s o r s s e r v e d n o t i c e t o 
terminate the l i c e n c e . The House of Lords, r e v e r s i n g the 
d e c i s i o n of the Court of Appeal, decided, on a proper 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the c o n t r a c t , the l i c e n c e was terminable 
by the l i c e n s o r s a f t e r g i v i n g a reasonable period of 
n o t i c e . However, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
c o n c e r n i n g p r i n c i p l e s of r e v o c a b i l i t y of c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e s was e x p r e s s l y approved by Viscount Simon i n the 
House of Lords, the d e c i s i o n being re v e r s e d merely on a 
co n s t r u c t i o n of the terms of the c o n t r a c t to which the 
p r i n c i p l e s had been a p p l i e d . The lea d i n g judgement i n 
the Court of Appeal was d e l i v e r e d by Lord Greene M.R. He 
e x p r e s s e d the v i e w ( 4 ) t h a t a l i c e n c e c o u l d not be 
regarded as a "thing" determinable a t w i l l , having a 
s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e d i s t i n c t from any c o n t r a c t which 
creat e d i t . A l i c e n c e a r i s i n g out of a c o n t r a c t was not, 
to do c e r t a i n things which would otherwise be a t r e s p a s s . 
C onsequently, the q u e s t i o n of whether a l i c e n c e was 
revocable or not i s a question of c o n s t r u c t i o n of the 
con t r a c t . He went on to e x p l a i n t h a t i n the o l d days an 
a c t i o n f o r damages f o r breach of c o n t r a c t would only have 
a r i s e n , but s i n c e the f u s i o n of law and equ i t y by the 
J u d i c a t u r e A c t s 1873-5 e q u i t a b l e remedies were now 
a v a i l a b l e to prevent, by i n j u n c t i o n , r e v o c a t i o n of a 
l i c e n c e i n breach of c o n t r a c t . 
These p r i n c i p l e s have s u b s e q u e n t l y been a p p l i e d i n 
HOUNSLOW LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL V TWICKENHAM GARDEN 
DEVELOPMENTS LTD.(5) where Megarry J . r e f used to grant an 
i n j u n c t i o n to the f r e e h o l d e r s of a b u i l d i n g s i t e t o 
prevent b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r s continuing to enter the s i t e 
f o r the purpose of f u l f i l l i n g a b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t . The 
b a s i s of the d e c i s i o n was the f i n d i n g t h a t there was a t 
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l e a s t an implied negative o b l i g a t i o n under the co n t r a c t 
on the p a r t of the f r e e h o l d e r s not to revoke any l i c e n c e 
e x c e p t i n ac c o r d a n c e w i t h the c o n t r a c t w h i l s t t h e 
cont r a c t period was s t i l l running. Moreover, on the same 
reasoning, the Court of Appeal has s i n c e decided, i n 
VERRALL v GREAT YARMOUTH B.C.(6) t h a t t h e e q u i t a b l e 
remedy of s p e c i f i c performance may a l s o be a v a i l a b l e to 
enforce a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to be on land. I t i s 
not i c e a b l e t hat the notion t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may 
in some circumstances be i r r e v o c a b l e has developed from 
commercial cases. Before going on to see how these 
p r i n c i p l e s have been a p p l i e d and used to p r o v i d e 
r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y i n fam i l y arrangement ca s e s , i t i s 
d e s i r a b l e to consider more f u l l y the circumstances i n 
which a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may be re g a r d e d as 
i r r e v o c a b l e and the remedies a v a i l a b l e . I n the WINTER 
GARDEN case i n the House of Lords, Lord P o r t e r expressed 
the view: 
"...prima f a c i e l i c e n c e s are r e v o c a b l e " ( 7 ) 
but the other Law Lords d i d not express any c l e a r opinion 
on t h i s . I n the Court of Appeal, however, Lord Greene 
M.R. l a i d down: 
"The general r u l e i s that before e q u i t y w i l l grant 
an i n j u n c t i o n there must be on c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
the c o n t r a c t a n e g a t i v e c l a u s e , e x p r e s s or 
implied."(8) 
An express negative c l a u s e provides few problems, but 
under what circumstances may a court be prepared to imply 
such a negative c l a u s e ? As has al r e a d y been noted i n 
passing i n HOUNSLOW LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL v TWICKENHAM 
GARDEN DEVELOPMENTS LTD.(9), Megarry J . was prepared to 
imnlv a n f m r a f i T ^ O o b l i g a t i o n not to revoke ?. l i c e n c e i n 
the case of b u i l d i n g c o n t r a c t o r s . T h i s he implied from 
the f a c t the c o n t r a c t was one f o r the e x e c u t i o n of 
s p e c i f i c works on a s i t e during a s p e c i f i e d period which 
was s t i l l r u n n i n g i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t the 
contr a c t conferred on each p a r t y s p e c i f i e d r i g h t s on 
s p e c i f i e d e v e n t s t o determine t h e employment of the 
defendant under the c o n t r a c t . S i m i l a r l y , i n the WINTER 
GARDEN case(10) Viscount Simon seemed prepared to imply a 
term not to revoke when he expressed the view t h a t the 
l i c e n c e i n HURST v PICTURE THEATRES LTD.(11), namely a 
l i c e n c e to see a cinema performance, c o u l d not be 
terminated before the event was over so long as the 
l i c e n s e e was behaving properly. I t would thus appear 
that the courts are very w i l l i n g to imply terms not to 
revoke a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e c o n s e q u e n t l y p r o v i d i n g 
p l e n t y of scope i n f a m i l y arrangement c a s e s . I t should 
be noted that even where the l i c e n c e i s revocable on the 
142 
terms of the c o n t r a c t , "reasonable n o t i c e " would seem to 
be required i n order to terminate the permission.(12) 
What i s "reasonable n o t i c e " depends on the circumstances 
of the case. 
To turn to the remedies a v a i l a b l e where the l i c e n c e i s 
found to be i r r e v o c a b l e . The e q u i t a b l e remedies of 
s p e c i f i c performance and i n j u n c t i o n a r e of c o u r s e 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y and h e r e i n t h e r e f o r e l i e s p o t e n t i a l f o r 
t a i l o r i n g to meet the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of the 
case. I t seems an i n j u n c t i o n w i l l not be granted where 
the l i c e n s e e has misbehaved, as the defendant 
s c h o o l m a s t e r i n THOMPSON v PARK(13), or even i f the 
l i c e n s e e has behaved impeccably, to compel persons to 
l i v e under the same roof f o r Goddard L . J . s t a t e d i n 
THOMPSON v PARK t h a t the court would not: 
"...enforce an agreement f o r two people to l i v e 
peaceably under the same roof."(14) 
LUGANDA v SERVICE HOTELS LTD.(15) i s a u t h o r i t y f o r the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of a mandatory i n j u n c t i o n t o a l l o w a 
l i c e n s e e to enter premises and VERRALL v GREAT YARMOUTH 
B.C.(16) f o r the a v a i l a b i l i t y of s p e c i f i c performance to 
enforce even a short term c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , i n t h a t 
case i n v o l v i n g the h i r e of a h a l l f o r two days only.(17) 
I f the court i s u n w i l l i n g to grant an e q u i t a b l e remedy 
then damages w i l l be a v a i l a b l e as compensation. T h i s 
appears to have been recognised even i n common law cases 
where i t was decided the l i c e n s e e could be e v i c t e d , even 
though the e v i c t i o n was i n breach of c o n t r a c t . The 
question d i d not a r i s e i n WOOD v LEADBITTER(18) as the 
a c t i o n was i n t o r t f o r a s s a u l t , but an a c t i o n f o r damages 
for breach of c o n t r a c t succeeded i n KERRISON v SMITH(19) 
f u h p r p 3 "Licence to " e s t b i l l s on ?_ h o a r d i n g v?2.s 
wrongfully revoked i n breach of c o n t r a c t ) and was assumed 
to e x i s t ion HURST v PICTURE THEATRES LTD.(20) 
Having s e t down b r i e f l y the circumstances i n which a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to remain on land came to be regarded 
as i r r e v o c a b l e , i t i s now intended to consider how these 
p r i n c i p l e s were a p p l i e d i n d o m e s t i c and f a m i l y 
arrangement cases to provide r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y . A 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e c l e a r l y cannot e x i s t u n l e s s a 
c o n t r a c t can be e s t a b l i s h e d . The r u l e s of the law of 
c o n t r a c t provide t h a t an agreement may be w r i t t e n or 
o r a l , e x p r e s s or i m p l i e d . The i d e a of an i m p l i e d 
c o n t r a c t u a l arrangement i n domestic and f a m i l y a f f a i r s 
seems to owe i t s o r i g i n s to the d e c i s i o n s i n DILLWYN v 
LLEWELLYN(21) and WARD v BYAM(22) a l t h o u g h the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between express and implied agreements has 
not always been c l e a r l y drawn. For example i n ERRINGTON 
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v ERRINGTON(23) i t i s un c l e a r whether the c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e was regarded as being express or implied, but 
si n c e there was i n f a c t no express agreement to c r e a t e a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i t would appear to have been implied 
by the court. I n HORROCKS v FORRAY(24), Megaw L . J . 
explained i n these terms the d i s t i n c t i o n between express 
and i m p l i e d agreements i n r e f e r r i n g t o the e a r l i e r 
d e c i s i o n of TANNER v TANNER(25): 
"There was not an express c o n t r a c t ; t h a t i s to 
say there was no evidence that one [ p a r t y ] had 
s a i d to the other, " I promise t h a t I w i l l do so 
and so". But of course the court i s e n t i t l e d to 
i n f e r a c o n t r a c t even though i t i s c l e a r t h a t 
words have not been spoken e x p r e s s l y s t a t i n g a 
c o n t r a c t u a l promise or an o f f e r and acceptance i n 
express words. The court i s e n t i t l e d to i n f e r the 
ex i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t . " ( 2 6 ) 
But no matter how i t i s expressed, an agreement must show 
cons e n s u s , c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( s u b j e c t to e x c e p t i o n s ) , an 
i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and c e r t a i n t y of 
terms. T h i s f a c t was r e c o g n i s e d by Megaw L . J . i n 
HORROCKS v FORRAY(27) wi t h r e s p e c t to domestic and fam i l y 
arrangements f o r l i c e n c e s t o occupy l a n d . I t i s 
arguable, however, t h a t i n some of these s i t u a t i o n s the 
judges have somewhat s t r e t c h e d the concept of an implied 
c o n t r a c t to avoid the f i n d i n g of merely a bare l i c e n c e 
and so p r o t e c t the l i c e n s e e from t he o f t e n h a r s h 
consequences of the r e v o c a b i l i t y of bare l i c e n c e s . I t 
w i l l t h e r e f o r e now be considered whether the f i n d i n g of a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e was i n law j u s t i f i e d i n the family 
and domestic arrangement cases i n which t h i s conclusion 
was reached and c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l a l s o be given to the 
f a c t o r s which may w e l l have motivated such a f i n d i n g i n 
C e r t a i n l y i t was not without some degree of h e s i t a n c y 
that a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e was implied i n some of the 
d e c i s i o n s . For example, i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, 
Denning L . J . d e s c r i b e s the young couple's l i c e n c e as a 
" c o n t r a c t u a l or a t any r a t e an e q u i t a b l e r i g h t t o 
remain. ...11 (28) and i n TANNER v TANNER where a m i s t r e s s 
was found to be o c c u p y i n g p r e m i s e s as a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n s e e , Browne L . J . confessed to being "troubled" by 
the d u r a t i o n of the l i c e n c e and o n l y w i t h "some 
h e s i t a t i o n " agreed with i t s terms as o u t l i n e d i n the 
judgement of Lord Denning i n the same c a s e ( 2 9 ) . Lord 
Denning himself appeared i n two minds about implying a 
contr a c u a l l i c e n c e from the f a c t s of TANNER v TANNER as 
he went on to hypothesise t h a t , i f the court could not 
imply a c o n t r a c t , i t c o u l d " i f need be impose t he 
e q u i v a l e n t of a c o n t r a c t . . . . " on the defendant 
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l i c e n s o r ( 3 0 ) . There may, however, have been other motives 
for Lord Denning's o s c i l l a t i o n between c o n t r a c t u a l and 
equitable l i c e n c e s which w i l l be examined l a t e r . ( 3 1 ) 
To turn now to the lea d i n g case of ERRINGTOW v ERRINGTON 
i n which a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to occupy property was 
found to e x i s t . The f a t h e r , i t w i l l be remembered, had 
paid one t h i r d of the purchase p r i c e of the house bought 
f o r h i s son and daughter-in-law to l i v e i n and borrowed 
the balance on a b u i l d i n g s o c i e t y mortgage. He t o l d the 
young couple i f they pa i d the weekly instalm e n t s he would 
convey the house to them when a l l the instalments were 
paid. They duly paid the inst a l m e n t s , although the Court 
of Appeal found they were under no o b l i g a t i o n to do so; 
i f they had not paid them, i t was q u i t e c l e a r from the 
arrangement t h a t the f a t h e r could not sue them; i t simply 
meant that they would not get the house. The question 
a r i s e s as to whether the f i n d i n g t h a t the young couple 
were not bound to pay the instalments i s c o n s i s t e n t with 
the f i n d i n g of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e . A c c o r d i n g t o 
Denning L . J . , i t was. He summarised the p o s i t i o n as 
foll o w s : 
"The f a t h e r ' s promise was a u n i l a t e r a l c o n t r a c t -
a promise of the house i n r e t u r n f o r t h e i r a c t of 
paying the in s t a l m e n t s . I t could not be revoked by 
him once the couple entered on performance of the 
act but i t would cease to bind him i f they l e f t i t 
incomplete and unperformed."(32) 
Although t h e r e has been much academic debate about 
t h i s ( 3 3 ) , the general view seems to be t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l 
a n a l y s i s i s s t i l l s u s t a i n a b l e d e s p i t e the absence of an 
i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e mutual promises, t h a t i s to say, a 
con t r a c t may a r i s e out of a s i t u a t i o n where the o f f e r o r ' s 
a c t . I t i s , however, questionable whether, on the f a c t s 
of ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, there was some confusion with 
estoppel p r i n c i p l e s . ( 3 4 ) 
Nevertheless an e q u a l l y fundamental problem i n f i n d i n g a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e on the f a c t s of ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
i s the re q u i r e m e n t of an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t has a l r e a d y been noted 
t h a t , i n h i s judgement Denning L . J . c o n s i d e r e d t h e 
i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s but only to a s c e r t a i n whether a 
" p e r s o n a l p r i v i l e g e " or "an i n t e r e s t i n l a n d " was 
intended(35). I t would seem d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h an 
i n t e n t i o n to enter a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p on account 
of the presumption a g a i n s t t h i s i n the case of domestic 
and f a m i l y arrangements. A u t h o r i t i e s f o r such a 
presumption a r e SIMPKINS v PAYS(36) and JONES v 
PADAVATTON(37) . The l a t t e r d e c i s i o n i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
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because i t both c o n c e r n s a l i c e n c e t o occupy r e a l 
p r o p e r t y and a p a r e n t / c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . A mother 
wished her daughter to come to England to study to become 
a b a r r i s t e r . She o f f e r e d her a monthly allowance i f she 
agreed to do so. The daughter r e l u c t a n t l y took up the 
o f f e r and the mother bought a house i n London, i n p a r t of 
which the daughter and her c h i l d l i v e d , the r e s t being 
l e t out to tenants. The rent from the tenants was used 
to cover the daughter's maintenance and expenses. A few 
years l a t e r when the daughter was s t i l l studying f o r P a r t 
I of the Bar examinations, the mother and daughter f e l l 
out with one another and the former sought p o s s e s s i o n of 
the house from the l a t t e r . I t was a l l e g e d there were two 
agreements between mother and daughter: the f i r s t , an 
agreement by the daughter to come to England and study 
fo r the Bar i n r e t u r n f o r a f i x e d monthly income, and the 
second, an agreement by the mother to allow her daughter 
to l i v e i n the London house with the rent from the 
tenants providing her maintenance. The Court of Appeal 
granted a poss e s s i o n order i n favour of the mother, being 
unanimous i n the f i n d i n g , i n r e s p e c t of the agreement 
i n v o l v i n g p o s s e s s i o n of the house, t h a t there was no 
i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s i n view of the l a c k 
of p r e c i s i o n of the contents of the agreement. The 
daughter was t h e r e f o r e o n l y a bare l i c e n s e e and 
consequently her l i c e n c e could be revoked a t w i l l . 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s a u t h o r i t y , i t i s arguable t h a t the 
f i n d i n g of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e both i n ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON and HARDWICK v JOHNSON(38) a r e s u s p e c t . 
HARDWICK v JOHNSON a l s o involved an arrangement between 
parent and c h i l d . Here the husband's mother had agreed 
to purchase a house f o r her son and daughter-in-law on 
the understanding they paid her £28 per month. The 
nature of the payments was unc l e a r . The conveyance was 
f a V o n -i r> 4 - V i o m r \ f V i o r ' e n a w o V M I 4 - T.TV-I c»r» - t - V i a V t i i c V ^ a r» H c 
wife, h i s mother sought p o s s e s s i o n of the house from her 
daughter-in-law, d e s p i t e the l a t t e r ' s o f f e r to continue 
paying her monthly sums. R o s k i l l and Browne L . J J . held 
the wife, having a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , was e n t i t l e d to 
remain provided she paid the monthly i n s t a l m e n t s . Lord 
Denning, however, c i t i n g BALFOUR v BALFOUR(39) JONES v 
PADDAVATON (40) refused to imply a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , 
b a s i n g h i s r e a s o n i n g i n s t e a d on the f i n d i n g of an 
equitable l i c e n c e . 
Cases c o n c e r n i n g m i s t r e s s e s and c o h a b i t a n t s , where 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s were found to e x i s t may be e q u a l l y 
suspect on the grounds of the requirement of i n t e n t i o n to 
c o n t r a c t , as suc h r e l a t i o n s h i p s may r e a s o n a b l y be 
described as "domestic r e l a t i o n s h i p s " and, as such, be 
caught by the presumption a g a i n s t an i n t e n t i o n t o 
con t r a c t l a i d down i n SIMPKINS v PAYS(41). For example, 
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i n TANNER v TANNER(42), the occupier of property was 
found t o be a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e on v e r y tenuous 
grounds. The f a c t s were: a married man had formed an 
a s s o c i a t i o n with a s i n g l e woman who had twins by him. The 
man, n e v e r i n t e n d i n g t o marry the woman, ag r e e d t o 
purchase a house on mortgage to provide accommodation f o r 
her and the twins. I n pursuance of t h i s suggestion, the 
woman gave up her rent c o n t r o l l e d f l a t and went to l i v e 
i n the house, the mortgage instalments being p a i d by the 
man. E v e n t u a l l y he had an a f f a i r with another woman whom 
he l a t e r married and he wanted to get the f i r s t woman out 
of the house so he could l i v e there with h i s new wife. 
I n the Court of Appeal, a poss e s s i o n order was refused, 
the view being taken t h a t a c o n t r a c t could be i n f e r r e d 
from the f a c t t h a t the woman gave up her rent c o n t r o l l e d 
f l a t and the man l a t e r o f f e r e d her £4,000 to leave the 
property acquired f o r her. S i m i l a r l y , i n CHANDLER v 
KERLEY(43), the requirement of i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a 
con t r a c t was not seen as an o b s t a c l e to prevent the 
f i n d i n g of a c o n t r a c t . B r i e f l y the defendant became 
m i s t r e s s of the p l a i n t i f f and the p l a i n t i f f purchased a 
house owned by the m i s t r e s s and her husband a t a p r i c e 
lower than the market p r i c e , on the understanding t h a t 
the p l a i n t i f f and the defendant would t h e r e a f t e r l i v e i n 
the house together. The r e l a t i o n s h i p broke down s h o r t l y 
afterwards and the p l a i n t i f f sought p o s s e s s i o n of the 
house from the defendant. The Court of Appeal found a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to occupy had been c r e a t e d , but 
considered i t was terminable on the g i v i n g of reasonable 
n o t i c e , which was put as being twelve months. Perhaps 
such a f i n d i n g i s more j u s t i f i e d on the f a c t s of t h i s 
case, s i n c e the l i c e n c e to occupy was c o l l a t e r a l to the 
con t r a c t of s a l e of the house where there obviously was 
an i n t e n t i o n to c o n t r a c t . 
Even i f the r e l a t i o n e hip bctv:ccn cohabitants or lo"»r »nrf 
m i s t r e s s cannot be de s c r i b e d as a domestic r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h i n SIMPKINS v PAYS, an analogy could w e l l be drawn 
w i t h agreements between husband and w i f e . T h i s i s 
e s p e c i a l l y t r ue with regard to cohabitants where the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s intended to be permanent or long term. 
With r e s p e c t t o husband and wife,BALFOUR v BALFOUR 
e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t , so long as the spouses are cohabiting 
i n amity, there i s a presumption a g a i n s t an i n t e n t i o n to 
e n t e r l e g a l l y b i n d i n g agreements. As A t k i n L . J . 
explained: 
"The common law does not reg u l a t e the form of 
agreement between spouses. T h e i r promises are not 
s e a l e d w i t h s e a l s and s e a l i n g wax. The 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t r e a l l y o b t a i n s f o r them i s 
n a t u r a l l o v e and a f f e c t i o n which coun t s v e r y 
l i t t l e i n these c o l d c o u r t s ( 4 4 ) 
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However, MERRITT v MERRITT(45) e s t a b l i s h e s e q u a l l y 
c l e a r l y the presumption does not operate i n r e l a t i o n to 
agreements where the spouses are l i v i n g apart or are 
e s t r a n g e d and about t o s e p a r a t e . Thus even i f the 
presumptions a p p l i e d i n husband and w i f e c a s e s were 
extended to e x t r a - m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , on t h i s b a s i s , 
on t h e f a c t s of TANNER v TANNER, the f i n d i n g of a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may w e l l have been j u s t i f i e d . 
According to Lord Scarman i n HORROCKS v FORRAY(46), the 
p a r t i e s i n TANNER v TANNER made the arrangement when 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p was on the point of breaking down so 
tha t i n e f f e c t they were making arrangements f o r the 
i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n . T h i s f a c t was used by L o r d 
Scarman to d i s t i n g u i s h TANNER v TANNER from HORROCKS v 
FORRAY. I t was a l s o used i n the recent case of COOMBES v 
SMITH(47) to d i s t i n g u i s h TANNER v TANNER;on the f a c t s of 
the former case where i t had been argued an implied 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e e x i s t e d when a t the time t h e 
arrangements f o r the occupation of a property were made, 
there was a continuing and happy r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Returning to s i t u a t i o n s where agreements are made i n 
c l e a r l y amicable circumstances, i t i s debatable whether, 
even i f extended t o e x t r a - m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e 
p r i n c i p l e s i n BALFOUR v BALFOUR would or should be much 
of a problem. I n BALFOUR v BALFOUR the Court of Appeal 
was c o n s i d e r i n g an agreement under which a husband, who 
was about to go abroad, promised to pay h i s wife £30 per 
month during the time they were forced to l i v e a part. 
The agreement was t h e r e f o r e concerned w i t h e v e r y d a y 
continuing domestic f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n and consequently 
the court held t h a t i t was unenforceable because there 
was no i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s . The case has 
never been doubted but i n PETTITT v PETTITT(48) there are 
— — — * ~ — — — rcir. soirs of ti^e T n s n i b e r s of +^ v^ o H n n s c n f 
Lords that a t l e a s t i n the sphere of a c q u i s i t i o n of 
p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , a narrow view of BALFOUR v BALFOUR 
should be taken. Lord Diplock pointed out: 
"..many of the o r d i n a r y d o m e s t i c arrangements 
between man and wife do not possess the l e g a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a c o n t r a c t . So long as they 
are executory they do not give r i s e to any choice 
i n a c t i o n f o r n e i t h e r p a r t y intended t h a t non-
performance of t h e i r mutual promises should be the 
su b j e c t of s a n c t i o n s i n any co u r t . . . . But t h i s i s 
re l e v a n t to non-performance only. I f spouses do 
perform t h e i r mutual promises the f a c t t h a t they 
could not have been compelled to do so while the 
promises where executory cannot deprive the a c t s 
done of a l l l e g a l consequences i n p r o p r i e t o r y 
r i g h t s , f o r these are i n the f i e l d of the law of 
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property r a t h e r than the law of c o n t r a c t . I t 
would i n my view be err o n e o u s t o ext e n d the 
presumptions i n BALFOUR v BALFOUR .... t o 
a c q u i s i t i o n , improvement or a d d i t i o n to r e a l or 
personal property."(49) 
I t i s submitted t h i s passage should not be considered as 
a u t h o r i t y f o r f r e e l y i m p l y i n g c o n t r a c t s i n t o f a m i l y 
arrangement cases concerning r e a l property. The point 
which Lord Diplock would appear to be making i s one noted 
as causing confusion i n r e l a t i o n to the development of 
the t e s t of i n t e n t i o n f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between l e a s e s 
and l i c e n c e s to occupy, namely t h a t any r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between owner and occupier i s a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thus 
once a s e r i e s of events has occurred, even i f those a c t s , 
when executory, were not intended to be l e g a l l y binding, 
l e g a l consequences i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t , r e q u i r i n g the 
a d j u d i c a t i o n of the court. T h i s seems to be the approach 
t a k e n by Lo r d Denning i n HARDWICK v JOHNSON(50) i n 
r e f e r r i n g to both BALFOUR v BALFOUR and PETTITT v 
PETTITT. The r a t i o n a l e behind the presumption a g a i n s t an 
i n t e n t i o n to co n t r a c t i n the domestic and fa m i l y sphere 
i s t h a t i t i s considered to be ag a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r 
courts to regulate i n matters of domestic convenience 
which a r e or s h o u l d be m o t i v a t e d by suc h i n t a n g i b l e 
things as love, f r i e n d s h i p and a f f e c t i o n . I n r e l a t i o n to 
property, a d j u d i c a t i n g on the l e g a l consequences of a 
c o u r s e of e v e n t s which has a l r e a d y a l t e r e d t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between persons and a p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e of 
property does not d e t r a c t from t h i s r a t i o n a l e as the 
a d j u d i c a t i o n i s not a matter of the law of c o n t r a c t but 
the law of property. 
Apart from the question of i n t e n t i o n , a s p e c i a l problem 
with implying a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i n m i s t r e s s cases i s 
t h a t n f r n n s i f l p r a t - i n " T h e r e a r e a i i r h n r i 1- i p q TPCSt 
notable of which i s UPFILL v WRIGHT(51) which suggest 
arrangements concerning r e a l property to enable v i s i t s by 
a l o v e r to h i s m i s t r e s s are void, being immoral and 
agai n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y . I n th a t case, a house was l e t by 
the p l a i n t i f f with the knowledge t h a t the defendant had 
taken i t f o r the purpose of enabling her l o v e r to v i s i t 
her. The cont r a c t was held to be void and a g a i n s t p u b l i c 
p o l i c y with the consequence that the p l a i n t i f f was unable 
to sue f o r a r r e a r s of r e n t . D a r l i n g J . s a i d : 
" I do not t h i n k t h a t i t makes any d i f f e r e n c e 
whether the defendant was a common p r o s t i t u t e or 
whether she was merely the m i s t r e s s of one man, i f 
the house was l e t t o h e r f o r the purpose of 
committing the s i n of f o r n i c a t i o n there. That 
f o r n i c a t i o n i s s i n f u l and immoral i s c l e a r . " ( 5 2 ) 
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T h i s d e c i s i o n was not r e f e r r e d to i n e i t h e r of the 
l i c e n c e c a s e s c o n c e r n i n g m i s t r e s s e s , namely TANNER v 
TANNER(53) HORROCKS v FORRAY(54)and i t i s d o u b t f u l 
whether, with the change i n moral standards, i t i s s t i l l 
good law. I n DI WELL v FARNES( 56), there was a s l i g h t 
s u g g e s t i o n t h a t c o n t r a c t s between c o h a b i t a n t s may be 
t a i n t e d by i l l e g a l i t y , but t h i s d i d not p r e v e n t t h e 
f i n d i n g of a r e s u l t i n g or c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . 
Even i f i n t e n t i o n to c o n t r a c t or c o n s i d e r a t i o n were not 
ob s t a c l e s to f i n d i n g a c o n t r a c t i n the fa m i l y arrangement 
cases where a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e was implied, there 
would appear i n many s i t u a t i o n s t o be a problem of 
s a t i s f y i n g the requirement of c e r t a i n t y of terms. For 
example, the judgement of Lord Denning i n HARDWICK v 
JOHNSON(56) revealed, from the daughter's evidence, i t 
was u n c e r t a i n whether the payments made were intended as 
a kind of rent or were payments towards the purchase 
p r i c e . Nevertheless R o s k i l l and Browne L . J J . were s t i l l 
prepared to i n f e r a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e . T h i s was so, 
even though the p r e c i s e d u r a t i o n of l i c e n c e was 
u n c e r t a i n . R o s k i l l L . J . d e c l i n e d t o comment on the 
circumstances under which the l i c e n c e might have been 
terminated, but Browne L . J . expressed the view t h a t the 
daughter-in-law was not n e c e s s a r i l y e n t i t l e d to s t a y i n 
the house i n d e f i n i t e l y and circumstances might a r i s e i n 
the futur e which would enable the mother to revoke the 
l i c e n c e . S i m i l a r l y i n TANNER v TANNER the duration of 
the l i c e n c e remained u n c e r t a i n . The terms of the a l l e g e d 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e were t h a t the woman could occupy the 
house as long as the c h i l d r e n were of school age and the 
accommodation was "reasonably r e q u i r e d " . How and by whom 
was t h e l a t t e r t o be d e c i d e d ? T h i s view seems 
i n c o n s i s t e n t with the p r i n c i p l e of the law of c o n t r a c t 
t h a t the courts are not prepared to w r i t e important terms 
c e r t a i n t y was regarded as a problem i n HORROCKS v FORRAY. 
There, c o u n s e l had put forward t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e 
durations f o r the l i c e n c e to occupy: f o r the l i f e of the 
defendant; f o r so long as the defendant's daughter was 
i n f u l l - t i m e education; or f o r so long as the defendant 
and her daughter reasonably needed the accommodation. 
Lord Scarman commented: 
"Since [counsel] i s saying t h a t three or four 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r i s e . . . . one wonders whether these 
p a r t i e s , i n f a c t , entered i n t o a l e g a l l y binding 
agreement or intended to c r e a t e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s on 
the b a s i s of terms s u f f i c i e n t l y formulated to be 
c l e a r and c e r t a i n . " ( 5 7 ) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note i n the same case Megaw L . J . 
expressed the view: 
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" I t may be t h a t the b r i n g i n g i n of the conception 
of c o n t r a c t i n t o s i t u a t i o n s of t h i s s o r t does give 
r i s e to d i f f i c u l t i e s . I t may be some o t h e r 
approach to s i t u a t i o n s of t h i s s o r t would be 
p r e f e r a b l e "(58) 
I t would seem, not only was the approach of implying 
c o n t r a c t s somewhat dubious, i t was a l s o i n c o n s i s t e n t l y 
a p p l i e d ( 5 9 ) . For example, although Lord Denning was 
prepared to imply a c o n t r a c t from the circumstances of 
TANNER v TANNER, he was not so prepared on the f a c t s of 
HARDWICK v JOHNSON where such a f i n d i n g i s a r g u a b l y 
e a s i e r . I n HARDWICK v JOHNSON, the couple a t l e a s t 
agreed to make r e g u l a r payments of £28 per month, whereas 
i n TANNER v TANNER no payments were made, the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , according to the court, being the g i v i n g 
up of the rent c o n t r o l l e d f l a t . A f u r t h e r i n c o n s i s t e n c y 
of approach i s a p p a r e n t by comparing WILLIAMS v 
STAITE(60) with ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON. I n WILLIAMS v 
STAITE, a mother granted her daughter and son-in-law 
permission to l i v e i n a cottage owned by her f o r as long 
as they wished. The cottage adjoined a s i m i l a r one 
occupied by the mother and f a t h e r and one of the ideas 
behind the arrangement seemed to be t h a t t h i s would 
enable the daughter to look a f t e r her parents as they 
grew older. The son-in-law was somewhat r e l u c t a n t to 
take up the o f f e r as he had a cottage ( t h a t went with h i s 
job) i n another v i l l a g e , but he was persuaded to give 
t h i s up. Thus, the c o u p l e moved i n t o the mother's 
c o t t a g e and s u b s e q u e n t l y s p e n t a s m a l l sum of money 
improving i t . On t h e s e f a c t s , the Court of Appeal 
decided the young couple had an e q u i t a b l e r a t h e r than 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e . However, the case i s very s i m i l a r 
to ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON i n t h a t both cases concerned 
•F^TTHIV a r r s n r t o m o n t o ?.nd i n each C a S ? th"? p a r o n l - s a 1 1 nuefl 
the c h i l d r e n to r e s i d e i n property t i t l e to which was 
vested i n the parent. A d i f f e r e n c e , perhaps, i s t h a t the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n was not so c l e a r i n WILLIAMS v STAITE i n 
that no payments were made towards the purchase p r i c e of 
the property, and the permission to l i v e i n the cottage 
was d e s c r i b e d as a wedding present, but the f a c t t h at the 
son-in-law gave up the opportunity of a t i e d cottage i s 
s i m i l a r to TANNER v TANNER, where a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e 
was implied. 
Then a g a i n , t h e r e appear to be i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n 
approach between TANNER v TANNER and HORROCKS v FORRAY. 
The f a c t s of the former case have a l r e a d y been o u t l i n e d . 
I n the l a t t e r case a married man had, unknown to h i s 
wife, kept a m i s t r e s s up u n t i l h i s premature death i n a 
road a c c i d e n t . He had a c h i l d by h i s m i s t r e s s and had 
bought a house f o r her to l i v e i n with h i s c h i l d and her 
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other c h i l d r e n by another r e l a t i o n s h i p . The house was 
conveyed i n t o h i s name, but there was some evidence t h a t 
he had intended to t r a n s f e r i t i n t o her name or to c r e a t e 
a t r u s t , but d e c i d e d not to on acco u n t of t a x 
disadvantages. By the time of h i s death the married man 
had d i s s i p a t e d a l l h i s wealth and only i f the house could 
be s o l d w i t h v a c a n t p o s s e s s i o n would h i s e s t a t e be 
so l v e n t . Consequently the executors brought pos s e s s i o n 
proceedings against the m i s t r e s s . I t was argued on her 
behalf that she had an i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to 
remain i n the home e i t h e r f o r l i f e or f o r so long as her 
daughter was i n f u l l - t i m e education, or as long as the 
daughter reasonably r e q u i r e d the accommodation. Despite 
the apparent s i m i l a r i t i e s with TANNER v TANNER, the Court 
of Appeal d e c l i n e d to f i n d a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , and 
gave the m i s t r e s s j u s t 28 days to vacate the premises. 
Although Megaw L . J . was s a t i s f i e d the requirements of a 
l e g a l l y b i n d i n g agreement were p r e s e n t i n TANNER v 
TANNER, he considered they were not i n the case before 
him. He was unable to i n f e r a c o n t r a c t simply because 
the deceased had provided "handsomely" f o r the woman 
during h i s l i f e t i m e and the f a c t t h a t he had i t i n mind 
to provide some s e c u r i t y f o r her i n the event of h i s 
death was not s u f f i c i e n t . I n any event, even i f one 
c o u l d i n f e r a c o n t r a c t t h e r e was no c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
provided by the defendant. What f a c t o r s , t h e r e f o r e , 
underlay the d i f f e r e n c e s of approach i n s i m i l a r cases 
such as these? 
The explanation f o r the d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s i n TANNER v 
TANNER and HORROCKS v FORRAY can perhaps be explained by 
a tendency on the p a r t of the courts to give paramount 
co n s i d e r a t i o n to the me r i t s of the case, and with a 
c e r t a i n degree of moral censure. For example, i n TANNER 
v TANNER, the c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r the agreement to occupy 
However, i n HORROCKS v FORRAY, Megaw L . J . would not 
accept that the m i s t r e s s had provided c o n s i d e r a t i o n by 
"subordinating her mode of l i f e and choice of residence 
to another's". S u r e l y l e a v i n g of the rent c o n t r o l l e d 
f l a t i n TANNER v TANNER could j u s t as e a s i l y be de s c r i b e d 
as subordination of the m i s t r e s s ' s mode of l i f e , or a t 
l e a s t of her choice of residence f o r t h a t of another. 
Although i t was not e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d , i t i s i m p l i c i t i n 
HORROCKS v FORRAY t h a t the c o u r t r e g a r d e d t h e 
coha b i t a t i o n as immoral c o n s i d e r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e not 
valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The court i n r e f u s i n g to imply a 
co n t r a c t i n the circumstances of HORROCKS v FORRAY were 
i n e f f e c t passing a moral judgement to brin g about what 
they considered to be a j u s t r e s u l t . I t i s n o t i c e a b l e 
t h a t , d e s p i t e the f a c t Megaw L . J . says the evidence of 
the m i s t r e s s ' s " l i f e and a c t i v i t i e s " are i r r e l e v a n t to 
the i s s u e , he n e v e r t h e l e s s l a p s e s i n t o an account of her 
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marriage and divorce and the f a c t t h a t she "had not 
infrequent sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with another man"(61) The 
general tenor of the judgement suggests the court was 
concerned f o r the j u s t i c e i n the s i t u a t i o n . I t was 
pointed out th a t i f the m i s t r e s s was s u c c e s s f u l , the 
man's wife, who had been f a i t h f u l to him throughout and 
had b e l i e v e d her husband to be a "wonderful man"(62), 
would be l e f t with nothing. I n any case, the deceased 
had a l r e a d y been "generous beyond what one would 
reasonably expect the man to accept as a l e g a l l y binding 
o b l i g a t i o n to provide"(63) f o r the m i s t r e s s . 
I n c o n t r a s t i n TANNER v TANNER, the f i n d i n g , r a t h e r than 
the d e n i a l of the e x i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , 
seems to have been i n f l u e n c e d by m a t t e r s of moral 
judgement. T h i s i s apparent from Lord Denning's response 
to the suggestion t h a t the defendant m i s t r e s s had only a 
bare l i c e n c e revocable a t w i l l . He s a i d : 
" I cannot b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s i s the law. T h i s man 
had a moral duty to provide f o r the babies of whom 
he was f a t h e r . I would go f u r t h e r , I think he had 
a l e g a l duty towards them. Not only towards the 
babies, but a l s o twoards t h e i r m o t h e r ( 6 4 ) 
Moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a l s o appear to u n d e r l i e the d e c i s i o n 
i n CHANDLER v KERLEY. T h i s i s suggested by the statement 
of Scarman L . J . to the e f f e c t : 
" I t would be wrong.... to i n f e r , i n the absence of 
an e x p r e s s promise, t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was 
assuming the burden of housing another man's wife 
and c h i l d r e n i n d e f i n i t e l y and long a f t e r h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p was ended."(65) 
The r e a s o n i n g adnp-t-efl by .Tnnarhan P a r l r p r Q r i n POOMRFR 
v SMITH(66) i s reminiscent of th a t of Scarman L . J . i n 
CHANDLER V KERLEY. I n COOMBES V SMITH, the p l a i n t i f f 
l i c e n s e e was a l s o m a r r i e d to someone o t h e r than the 
l i c e n s o r . I n r e j e c t i n g the f i n d i n g t h a t an i r r e v o c a b l e 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to occupy f o r l i f e e x i s t e d , Jonathan 
Parker Q.C. says that i n the circumstance of the case i t 
would be very d i f f i c u l t but not impossible to i n f e r a 
l i c e n c e f o r l i f e and seems to imply, i f a l e s s e r duration 
had been pleaded, i t may have succeeded. 
One common thread i n a l l these d e c i s i o n s i s the s t a t e d 
d e s i r e of the courts to give e f f e c t to the i n t e n t i o n s of 
the p a r t i e s . However, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of m o r a l i t y and 
j u s t i c e lead the court to p l a c e the emphasis on one of 
the p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t i o n s over those of the other. For 
in s t a n c e s i n HORROCKS v FORAY, the emphasis was on the 
deceased's generosity, i n TANNER v TANNER, on the woman's 
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r e l i a n c e , and i n CHANDLER v KERLEY, on the i n t e n t i o n s of 
the man who had bought the house. 
Apart from enabling the judges to give e f f e c t to the 
j u s t i c e of the case, the use o£ the c o n t r a c t u a l approach 
seems to have been motivated by the f a c t t h a t i t provided 
f l e x i b i l i t y enabling p r o v i s i o n to be made f o r c h i l d r e n of 
a r e l a t i o n s h i p , t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t s i m i l a r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as apply on divo r c e , n u l l i t y or j u d i c i a l 
s e p a ration. For example, the Court of Appeal i n TANNER v 
TANNER considered the c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to occupy was 
intended to l a s t so long as the c h i l d r e n were of school 
age, reminiscent of a MESHER order(67) of the divorce 
court. Again, i n HARDWICK v JOHNSON(68), Lord Denning 
(although not himself adopting the c o n t r a c t u a l approach) 
considered the l i c e n c e would have been terminable had 
there been no c h i l d r e n and the wife had brought another 
man to l i v e t h e r e . I t i s a l s o n o t i c e a b l e t h a t i n t h i s 
case the Court of Appeal e x p r e s s l y refused to put a 
p r e c i s e l i m i t on the duration of the l i c e n c e , l e a v i n g the 
q u e s t i o n of i t s i r r e v o c a b i l i t y i n the a i r . The 
consequence of t h i s was t h a t i t gave the c o u r t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to look again and make a new determination 
when the circumstances changed, s i m i l a r to the powers 
under the matrimonial j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Another a t t r a c t i o n of the implied c o n t r a c t u a l approach 
may w e l l be the f l e x i b i l i t y i n the remedies a v a i l a b l e . 
As has alre a d y been noted, i n a d d i t i o n to an i n j u n c t i o n , 
damages f o r breach of c o n t r a c t may be awarded. I t may 
w e l l be that the Court of Appeal was p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious 
i n TANNER v TANNER to base i t s d e c i s i o n on the f i n d i n g of 
an implied c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e as the remedy of damages 
would be a v a i l a b l e to the woman, who had, by the time of 
the a p p e a l , l e f t t h e p r e m i s e s i n d i s p u t e and found 
— l t c r r . 2 t i V O 3. C C '"^r?rn ^  <^  4- •) «->»•> T 4- T_ e a r r r 11 a V\ 1 o { - h a t " a n 
a l t e r n a t i v e b a s i s f o r the d e c i s i o n c o u l d have been 
e s t o p p e l (69) ( t h e same a c t s which were r e g a r d e d as 
con s i d e r a t i o n being t r e a t e d as a c t s of r e l i a n c e f o r the 
purpose of e s t o p p e l ) , but s i n c e p o s s e s s i o n of the 
pr e m i s e s had a l r e a d y been g i v e n up, no monetary 
compensation would have been payable to the p l a i n t i f f who 
had been forced out. 
A f u r t h e r explanation f o r the i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s of approach 
i n family arrangement cases seems to be the involvement 
or otherwise of t h i r d p a r t i e s ( 7 0 ) . There are s u b s t a n t i a l 
problems a s s o c i a t e d with the notion t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e i s per se capable of binding a t h i r d p a r t y ( 7 1 ) . 
I t i s no t i c e a b l e t h a t the court or m a j o r i t y thereof, was 
prepared to take the c o n t r a c t u a l approach i n TANNER v 
TANNER, CHANDLEY V KERLEY and HARDWICK V JOHNSON, where 
no t h i r d p a rty was a f f e c t e d , but i n WILLIAMS v STAITE, 
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where a s u c c e s s o r of t h e l i c e n s o r was i n v o l v e d , an 
estoppel approach was taken. The whole i s s u e of the 
p o s i t i o n of c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e s as a g a i n s t t h i r d 
p a r t i e s w i l l s h o r t l y be d i s c u s s e d i n Se c t i o n I V ( d ) ( i i ) . 
I n conclusion, i t i s submitted that the f i n d i n g of an 
implied c o n t r a c t i n the cases surveyed was u n j u s t i f i e d . 
The whole approach a r i s e s out of looking a t what the 
l i c e n c e c r e a t e s r a t h e r than what i t does not c r e a t e and, 
as s u c h , i s a f a l s e t r a i l . The r e q u i r e m e n t s of a 
con t r a c t such as i n t e n t i o n to c o n t r a c t , c o n s i d e r a t i o n and 
c e r t a i n t y of terms do not i n many i n s t a n c e s appear to be 
s a t i s i f e d . Nevertheless the approach was d e s i r a b l e i n so 
f a r as i t attempted to p r o t e c t and provided f l e x i b i l i t y 
i n p r o t e c t i n g r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y where the mer i t s of 
the case appeared to j u s t i f y such p r o t e c t i o n , although i n 
some c a s e s the j u s t i c e of the s i t u a t i o n was perhaps 
overshadowed by t r a d i t i o n a l and outmoded moral 
judgements. On the other hand, the i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n 
approach to i n d i v i d u a l d i s p u t e s i s un d e s i r a b l e as t h i s 
l e a d s to unwarranted u n c e r t a i n t y and c o n f u s i o n of 
concepts and i t w i l l be argued t h a t other approaches 
could w e l l have been used i n the implied c o n t r a c t cases 
so as to produce a more u n i f i e d but e q u a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y 
r e s u l t . There appears i n any event to be an observable 
move away from r e l i a n c e on the concept of an implied 
c o n t r a c t i n f a v o u r of e s t o p p e l . T h i s t r e n d w i l l 
presumably be continued and enhanced on account of the 
House of Lords d e c i s i o n i n STREET v MOUNTFORD(72) I t 
would now seem, s u b j e c t to exceptions, whenever there i s 
an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and 
e x c l u s i v e possession i s granted f o r a f i x e d or p e r i o d i c 
term c e r t a i n and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a premium o r 
p e r i o d i c payments, a tenancy w i l l a r i s e . As an i n t e n t i o n 
to c r e a t e a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a n e c e s s a r y 
n r o r o r r n i c i _ f o -hr> f h o f i n d i n C Of ?.H ^ ni 1?! •> *?d Honf - T"a C.t . at 
l e a s t i n those s i t u a t i o n s where payments a r e made a 
p e r i o d i c a l t e n a n c y may w e l l be c o n s i d e r e d to a r i s e , 
u n l e ss the court f i n d s e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n has not been 
granted or that the occupation i s not f o r a f i x e d or 
p e r i o d i c term c e r t a i n . Presumably, with regard to the 
l a t t e r , i f the agreement to occupy i s construed as being 
fo r l i f e , t h i s would, by v i r t u e of S.149 (6) of the Law 
of Property Act 1925, take e f f e c t as a l e a s e f o r 90 years 
and, as such, would be f o r a f i x e d term. However arguably 
no informal family arrangement f o r the occupation of 
property w i l l f a l l w i t h i n STREET v MOUNTFORD s i n c e a 
subsequent court may be prepared to f i n d t h a t the very 
nature of the arrangement brings i t w i t h i n the excepted 
c a t e g o r i e s o u t l i n e d by Lord Templeman(73). 
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C o n t r a c t u a l L i c e n c e s (cont'd) 
( i i ) I r r e v o c a b i l i t y and t h i r d p a r t i e s . 
Given the f r e q u e n c y and c o m p a r a t i v e e a s e w i t h which 
property may be a l i e n a t e d , to develop p r i n c i p l e s which 
provide t h a t l i c e n c e s are merely i r r e v o c a b l e as a g a i n s t 
the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r i s of l i m i t e d use. S e c u r i t y i s 
enhanced i f the c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i s not only binding 
on the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r but a l s o on h i s su c c e s s o r i n 
t i t l e . C o n s e q u e n t l y i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t some 
attempts have been made to develop the law r e l a t i n g to 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s by pro v i d i n g the l i c e n c e may per se 
bind a t h i r d party. I t i s necessary b r i e f l y to consid e r 
t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s and t o a s s e s s the m e r i t s of t h i s 
approach to p r o t e c t i n g r e s i d e n t i a l occupation. What i s 
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n to begin with are a u t h o r i t i e s which 
p r o v i d e the c o n t r a c t u a l agreement f o r a l i c e n c e may 
i t s e l f bind a t h i r d p a r t y , as opposed to a u t h o r i t i e s 
where a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e b i n d s a t h i r d p a r t y on 
account of some other concept, such as a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t or the do c t r i n e of eq u i t a b l e estoppel. 
The p r i n c i p a l a u t h o r i t y which lends support to the view a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i s per se capable of binding a t h i r d 
party, i s the judgement of Denning L . J . i n ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON(1). I t i s , however, p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e 
s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t he enforcement of the l i c e n c e 
a g a i n s t a t h i r d p arty are o b i t e r d i c t a , as i t i s u n c l e a r 
from the judgements whether the widow was s u i n g f o r 
possession as personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , i n which case she 
would stand i n the shoes of the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r , or as 
devisee under h i s w i l l . I t has al r e a d y been noted t h a t 
Denning L . J . r e l y i n g c h i e f l y on the d e c i s i o n i n WINTER 
GARDEN THEATRE ( T E N D O N ) T.TT) . \r MTT.T.FNNTTTM PRnnnr.TTDNR 
LTD.(2) found, on a c c o u n t of the f u s i o n of the 
ad m i n i s t r a t i o n of common law and equity, a l i c e n s o r was 
no longer able to revoke a l i c e n c e i n breach of c o n t r a c t . 
However, without c i t i n g any f u r t h e r d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t 
a u t h o r i t i e s he concluded: 
"The f u s i o n of e q u i t y means t h a t c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e s now have a for c e and v a l i d i t y of t h e i r 
own and cannot be revoked i n breach of c o n t r a c t . 
Neither the l i c e n s o r nor anyone who claims through 
him can d i s r e g a r d the c o n t r a c t except a purchaser 
f o r value without n o t i c e . " ( 3 ) 
As has been p o i n t e d out by numerous w r i t e r s and 
commentators (4) i t i s one th i n g to say a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e c r e a t e s an agreement i r r e v o c a b l e by the l i c e n s o r , 
which i s p e r f e c t l y c o n s i s t e n t with a personal r i g h t to be 
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on land, but quite another to cla i m to make the l o g i c a l 
progression from t h i s to say the agreement c r e a t e s r i g h t s 
i r r e v o c a b l e a g a i n s t t h i r d p a r t i e s , c o n s i s t e n t only with a 
p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y so as the 
t r a d i t i o n a l use of the -Licence concept i n r e l a t i o n to 
lan d has been a n e g a t i v e one, t o d e s c r i b e t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between owner and o c c u p i e r where no 
pr o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t has been crea t e d . 
Denning L . J . d i d e x p l a i n more f u l l y the reasoning he had 
adopted i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, i n the deserted wife 
case of BENDALL v McWHIRTER(5), where he a l s o expressed 
the view t h a t a deserted w i f e ' s l i c e n c e was "so c l o s e l y 
a nalogous" to a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e t h a t "no v a l i d 
d i s t i n c t i o n can be made between them." He began h i s 
defence of ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON by p l a c i n g r e l i a n c e on a 
number of cases decided p r i o r to WOOD v LEADBITTER(6) 
which he c l a i m e d s u p p o r t e d the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a 
co n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to use and occupy land, once acted 
upon by entry i n t o occupation, was binding not only on 
the l i c e n s o r but a l s o h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n t i t l e and t h a t i t 
was not revocable except i n accordance with the terms of 
the c o n t r a c t . He c i t e d WEBB v PATERNOSTER(7), WOOD v 
LAKE(8), TAYLER v WATERS(9), as exp r e s s i n g t h i s view, and 
WALLIS v HARRISON(10) as being c o n s i s t e n t with i t . He 
then came to WOOD v LEADBITTER i t s e l f and argued the 
de c i s i o n does not c o n f l i c t w ith the aforementioned cases 
except i n so f a r as i t c r i t i c i s e s them on the ground t h a t 
the l i c e n c e should have been granted by deed. Of WOOD v 
LEADBITTER, Denning says the l i c e n c e would have been good 
i f i t had been granted by deed and now s i n c e the f u s i o n 
of law and e q u i t y t h i s i s no l o n g e r n e c e s s a r y . 
Consequently, every c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to use and occupy 
land, once acted upon, takes e f f e c t according to i t s 
tenor and i s only revocable i n accordance with the terms 
0"F th(=» r n n f r a n t r i o n r i ir> rr T. .T l 1 1 d l ? d th5.1T C5.5"? 5 5 s i i r h 
as HURST V PICTURE THEATRES LTD.(11) and WINTER GARDEN 
THEATRE (LONDON) LTD V MILLENNIUM PRODUCTIONS LTD.(12), 
had r e s t o r e d the law to i t s p o s i t i o n p r i o r to WOOD v 
LEADBITTER. 
Although i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK v AINSWORTH(13) Lord 
Upjohn seemed to agree the l i n e of cases s t a r t i n g w ith 
WEBB v PATERNOSTER (14) d i d give r i s e to r i g h t s binding 
on everyone except a purchaser f o r value without n o t i c e , 
i t i s doubtful whether such cases provide a u t h o r i t y f o r 
the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the c o n t r a c t u a l agreement i s e l f i s 
capable of binding a t h i r d p a r t y or t h a t Lord Upjohn 
understood them i n t h i s way. I n WEBB v PATERNOSTER the 
p l a i n t i f f was granted a l i c e n c e to l a y a haystack on the 
land of a c e r t a i n S i r W i l l i a m Plummer u n t i l he was able 
to s e l l the hay. S i r W i l l i a m Plummer subsequently l e a s e d 
the land to the defendant who l e t h i s c a t t l e i n t o the 
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f i e l d . The a c t i o n was f o r t r e s p a s s , as the defendant's 
c a t t l e ate the p l a i n t i f f ' s hay. On the f a c t s of the case 
i t was held t h a t no a c t i o n would l i e as the permission to 
l a y the haystack had not been f o r a s p e c i f i c p e r i od and 
more than a reasonable period of time i n which to s e l l 
the hay had elapsed. However, Dodderidge expressed the 
view that such a l i c e n c e would not be revocable i n a l l 
circumstances; although a l i c e n c e f o r mere p l e a s u r e and 
a l i c e n c e f o r an u n c e r t a i n p r o f i t were countermandable, a 
l i c e n c e f o r a c e r t a i n p r o f i t was an " i n t e r e s t " and not 
countermandable. I n the same d e c i s i o n Haughton expressed 
the o p i n i o n t h a t a l i c e n c e once e x e c u t e d was not 
countermandable. The reasoning adopted would seem to be 
open to a number of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s the most s a t i s f a c t o r y 
of which i s t h a t the l i c e n c e under d i s c u s s i o n was a 
l i c e n c e coupled with an i n t e r e s t . I t was i n t h i s way 
t h a t Goff J . i n RE S0L0M0N(15) thought L o r d Upjohn 
understood the c a s e i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK v 
AINSWORTH. An a l t e r n a t i v e view i s t h a t a c t i n g on the 
permission made the l i c e n c e i r r e v o c a b l e ( 1 6 ) . Even i f 
t h i s view i s taken, WEBB v PATERNOSTER i s not a u t h o r i t y 
f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l agreement to 
occupy land i s binding on a t h i r d party, f o r i t i s the 
conduct subsequent to the agreement which renders the 
l i c e n c e binding. 
R e t u r n i n g t o BENDALL v McWHIRTER, Denning L . J . next 
placed r e l i a n c e upon a number of r e s t r i c t i v e covenant 
cases i n support of h i s view a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e can 
bind a t h i r d party, namely TULK v MOXHAY(17), MORELAND v 
RICHARDSON(18) ANDREW V AITKEN(19) and SHARPE V 
DURRANT(20). Every c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , he s a i d , c a r r i e s 
with i t a negative covenant t h a t the l i c e n s o r w i l l not 
i n t e r f e r e with the use and occupation of the l i c e n s e e i n 
breach of c o n t r a c t . I t i s t h i s negative covenant which 
i s b i n d i n a r>n s u r p p R R n r s i n H t l p i n s t a s w i t h 
r e s t r i c t i v e covenants. Denning then quoted from the 
judgment of Lord Cottenham L.C. i n TULK v MOXHAY where he 
s a i d : 
" I f an equity i s attached to the property, no-one 
purchasing with n o t i c e of the eq u i t y can stand i n 
a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n from the person from whom he 
purchased."(21) 
However, as both Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce pointed 
out i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK V AINSWORTH(22), the law 
r e l a t i n g to r e s t r i c t i v e covenants does not provide a l l 
negative o b l i g a t i o n s are binding on s u c c e s s o r s i n t i t l e 
of the covenantor, but i n f a c t imposes s t r i c t parameters 
such as the requirement that the b e n e f i t of the covenant 
touches and concerns the land of the covenantee. I t i s 
thus questionable whether a v a l i d comparison can be drawn 
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between r e s t r i c t i v e covenants and c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s as 
a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e does not have to hold land capable 
of being b e n e f i t t e d and moreover whereas a r e s t r i c t i v e 
covenant r e q u i r e s the covenantor to r e f r a i n from doing 
some-thing on h i s own l a n d f o r the b e n e f i t of the 
covenantee, a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e r e q u i r e s the l i c e n s o r 
to a l l o w the l i c e n s e e to make c e r t a i n use of the 
l i c e n s o r ' s land. 
Denning L . J . a d d i t i o n a l l y drew s u p p o r t f o r h i s 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e can bind t h i r d 
p a r t i e s from two c h a r t e r p a r t y c a s e s , DE MATTOS v GIBSON 
(23) and LORD STRATHCONA STEAMSHIP CO v DOMINION COAL 
CO.(24) where i t was h e l d i f an owner of goods agrees to 
allow another to h i r e them, the agreement i s binding not 
only on the o r i g i n a l owner but a l s o on h i s s u c c e s s o r s i n 
t i t l e . However, i n CLORE v THEATRICAL PROPERTIES(25) 
Lord Wright M.R. had expressed the view t h a t such a 
p r o p o s i t i o n was confined to the "very s p e c i a l case" of 
c h a r t e r p a r t y agreements and was i r r e l e v a n t to the case of 
a l i c e n c e to use land. S i m i l a r l y , i n the r e s t r i c t i v e 
covenant c a s e of L.C.C. v ALLAN(26), B u c k l e y L . J . 
maintained the c h a r t e r p a r t y cases were not intended to 
s e t down general p r i n c i p l e s and would not be extended to 
land law. 
The other main a u t h o r i t y , claimed by Denning L . J . to be 
a u t h o r i t y f o r a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e b i n d i n g a t h i r d 
party, was IN RE WEBB'S LEASE, SANDOM v WEBB(27). Here, 
the Court of Appeal accepted a l e s s e e was bound, where 
before the l e a s e h i s l e s s o r had given a l i c e n c e to put up 
advertisements on the w a l l of the demised b u i l d i n g s . 
However, the s t r e n g t h of t h i s a u t h o r i t y i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
diminished by the f a c t t h a t counsel f o r the l e s s e e had 
conceded the point. 
I t would t h e r e f o r e appear the a u t h o r i t i e s which Denning 
L . J . attempts to r e l y on i n BENDALL v McWHIRTER (28) to 
j u s t i f y h i s p r o p o s i t i o n i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON t h a t a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e can bind a t h i r d p a r t y , can a t best 
be described as weak. However, what i s more s i g n i f i c a n t 
are the many a u t h o r i t i e s a g a i n s t such a p r o p o s i t i o n , none 
of which were c i t e d i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, and some of 
which, n e i t h e r i n BENDALL v McWHIRTER. For example, the 
important d e c i s i o n of HILL v TUPPER(29) was not c i t e d i n 
e i t h e r case. The f a c t s of t h i s case were t h a t a c a n a l 
company l e a s e d l a n d , b a c k i n g onto a c a n a l , t o the 
p l a i n t i f f , g i v i n g him " s o l e and e x c l u s i v e r i g h t " to h i r e 
out pleasure boats on the c a n a l . The defendant was the 
freeholder of the a d j o i n i n g p l o t . I n d i s r e g a r d of the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t he h i r e d out b o a t s f o r f i s h i n g 
purposes. The p l a i n t i f f thereupon brought an a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t the d e f endant a l l e g i n g d i s t u r b a n c e of h i s 
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easement to put boats on the c a n a l . However, i t was held 
t h a t as the r i g h t d i d not accommodate the dominant 
tenement, no easement c o u l d e x i s t . P o l l o c k C.B. 
concluded the p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t the defendant 
t h i r d party was thus: 
" T h i s g r a n t m e r e l y o p e r a t e s as a l i c e n c e or 
covenant on the p a r t of the g r a n t o r s and i s 
binding on them as between themselves and the 
grantee but gives him no r i g h t of a c t i o n i n h i s 
own name f o r any infringement of the supposed 
e x c l u s i v e r i g h t . " ( 3 0 ) 
As the r i g h t granted was not a p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t , i t was 
only a l i c e n c e , and, as such, could not bind a t h i r d 
party. S i m i l a r l y COLEMAN v FOSTER(31) d e t r a c t s from the 
view a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e can bind a t h i r d party. I n 
that case i t was held a l i c e n c e n e c e s s a r i l y determines on 
assignment of i t s s u b j e c t matter. P o l l o c k B. commented: 
"A l i c e n c e i s a t h i n g so evanescent t h a t i t cannot 
be t r a n s f e r r e d . " ( 3 2 ) 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t a u t h o r i t i e s p r o v i d i n g o b s t a c l e s 
against a f i n d i n g t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i s capable 
of binding a t h i r d p a r t y are the House of Lords' d e c i s i o n 
i n KING v DAVID ALLEN(33) and t h a t of the Court of Appeal 
i n CLORE v THEATRICAL PROPERTIES(34). Both t h e s e 
d e c i s i o n s were c i t e d i n BENDALL v McWHIRTER and 
accordingly d i s c u s s e d by the court. KING v DAVID ALLEN 
concerned an agreement under which the defendant and 
p l a i n t i f f were r e s p e c t i v e l y d e s c r i b e d as l i c e n s o r and 
l i c e n s e e . The defendant, f o r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n gave 
the p l a i n t i f f permission to f i x , f o r four y e a r s , p o s t e r s 
and advertisements to the f l a n k w a l l of what was to be a 
D I r . h i i r p h n n s p T n a d d i t i o n th? d^f9nd3.r!.t ^gir^^d w h i l s t 
the agreement was i n f o r c e he would not permit any other 
person to f i x advertisements to the w a l l . The premises 
were assigned by the defendant to a company of which the 
defendant was a d i r e c t o r . The assignees took with n o t i c e 
of the agreement but refused to accept i t was binding on 
them. The p l a i n t i f f l i c e n s e e s brought an a c t i o n f o r 
breach of c o n t r a c t a g a i n s t the l i c e n s o r , but the success 
of t h e i r c l a i m depended on proving the agreement was not 
binding on the s u c c e s s o r s of the l i c e n s o r , as the House 
of Lords maintained t h a t only then would the l i c e n s o r be 
i n breach of c o n t r a c t . Counsel f o r the l i c e n s o r argued 
the agreement was binding on the t h i r d p a r t y assignees as 
i t was the obvious i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s t o the 
c o n t r a c t that the l i c e n c e should bind an assignee with 
n o t i c e . Nevertheless, the House of Lords decided no 
i n t e r e s t i n land capable of binding a t h i r d p a r t y had 
been created, but merely a personal o b l i g a t i o n on the 
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p a r t of the l i c e n s o r , who, having put i t out of h i s power 
to f u l f i l l h i s o b l i g a t i o n s , was l i a b l e f o r damages. 
Various arguments have been put forward to d i s t i n g u i s h 
KING V DAVID ALLEN from ERRINGTON V ERRINGTON(35). 
F i r s t l y , i n BENDALL v McWHIRTER, Denning L . J . , no doubt 
i n s p i r e d by P r o f e s s o r Cheshire's a r t i c l e ( 3 6 ) on ERRINGTON 
v ERRINGTON, d i s t i n g u i s h e d KING v DAVID ALLEN on the 
ground t h a t the c o n t r a c t f o r the l i c e n c e was executory i n 
tha t case as the s u b j e c t matter of the l i c e n c e , the 
p i c t u r e t h e a t r e , was not yet i n e x i s t e n c e . I n c o n t r a s t 
i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, the young couple had taken up 
occupation. T h i s would seem to be an i n v a l i d d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n so f a r as the p r i n c i p l e i s s t a t e d as being t h a t the 
c o n t r a c t u a l agreement i t s e l f i s capable of binding a 
t h i r d party. I f i t i s the " a c t i n g upon" the agreement 
which provides the binding element, t h i s i s not the same 
as saying the agreement i t s e l f binds a t h i r d p a r t y . ( 3 7 ) 
A second d i s t i n c t i o n was drawn by Lord Denning i n the 
l a t e r case of BINIONS v EVANS(38). I n t h i s case he argued 
i n n e i t h e r KING v DAVID ALLEN nor CLORE v THEATRICAL 
PROPERTIES was t h e r e a s u g g e s t i o n of an e x p r e s s or 
i m p l i e d s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t the p u r c h a s e r was t o t a k e 
s u b j e c t to the r i g h t s of the l i c e n s e e . However, there 
appears to be no more reason to suppose there was any 
such e x p r e s s or i m p l i e d s t i p u l a t i o n on the f a c t s of 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON and moreover i t was argued, to no 
a v a i l i n KING v DAVID ALLEN, t h a t i t was the obvious 
i n t e n t i o n of the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s the agreement would 
bind assignees t a k i n g with n o t i c e . ( 3 9 ) 
A f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
and KING v DAVID ALLEN, i s t h a t put forward by P r o f e s s o r 
Maudsley(40) . He po i n t s out, i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
the l i c e n s e e s were i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , whereas i n 
KING V DAVID AT.T.RN the»y WOTA nnt- T h i s h o a r m . i P ? should 
be s i g n i f i c a n t as from the p o i n t of view of p o l i c y 
matters i t may w e l l be j u s t i f i e d to allow the c o n t r a c t u a l 
r i g h t s of a l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n to bind a 
t h i r d p a rty with a c t u a l or c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e as such 
r i g h t s are more e a s i l y d i s c o v e r a b l e . Not so, however, 
where the permission could take an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of 
forms s h o r t of e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n , making 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and d i s c o v e r y d i f f i c u l t . ( 4 1 ) 
To turn f i n a l l y to CLORE v THEATRICAL PROPERTIES(42) 
which was d e s c r i b e d by Denning L . J . i n BENDALL v 
McWHIRTER as the " o n l y c a s e which g i v e s r i s e t o 
d i f f i c u l t y " ( 4 3 ) . An agreement under s e a l was made 
between p a r t i e s who were d e s c r i b e d as l e s s o r and l e s s e e 
r e s p e c t i v e l y f o r " f r e e and e x c l u s i v e use of a l l the 
refreshment rooms" of a t h e a t r e . The " l e a s e " contained 
terms a g a i n s t assignment and s u b l e t t i n g except with the 
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consent of the l e s s o r . Assignees of the l e s s o r sought to 
p r e v e n t a s s i g n e e s of the l e s s e e from e x e r c i s i n g any 
r i g h t s conferred by the grant. The Court of Appeal found 
the grant was on i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n a l i c e n c e and not a 
l e a s e and c o n s e q u e n t l y as a l i c e n c e c o n f e r r e d o n l y 
personal r i g h t s ; i t could not be enforced a g a i n s t t h i r d 
p a r t i e s . The d e c i s i o n was explained by Denning L . J . on 
the b a s i s the c a s e proceeded on the assumption the 
l i c e n s e e had no r i g h t s i n equity enforceable a g a i n s t the 
l i c e n s o r , but s i n c e WINTER GARDEN THEATRE (LONDON) LTD. v 
MILLENIUM PRODUCTIONS LTD. (44) had subsequently a l t e r e d 
the assumption, CLORE v THEATRICAL PROPERTIES would have 
to be r e c o n s i d e r e d . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t o n l y the 
p o s i t i o n a t common law was taken i n t o account i n CLORE v 
THEATRICAL PROPERTIES as i n h i s leading judgement Lord 
Wright M.R. s a i d : 
"The defendants who seek to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r i g h t s 
under the document are not seeking to e s t a b l i s h 
them ag a i n s t [the o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r ] but a g a i n s t 
the p l a i n t i f f assignee .... which i s not p o s s i b l e 
at common law as there i s no p r i v i t y of c o n t r a c t 
between p l a i n t i f f and defendant."(45) 
However, i f t h i s was the case, i t i s somewhat strange as 
the court was c l e a r l y aware of the p r o t e c t i o n afforded by 
e q u i t y to l i c e n s e e s i n the e a r l i e r c a s e of HURST v 
PICTURE THEATRES LTD.(46) 
I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , not only was Denning L . J . ' s 
p r o p o s i t i o n i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, th a t a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e can per se bind a t h i r d party, based on very weak 
a u t h o r i t y , but there were a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t and recent 
a u t h o r i t i e s a g a i n s t such a p r o p o s i t i o n which were not 
c i t e d i n the case. I n any event, i t might have been 
t h n n r r h i - i-hat- a Hoa-hVt b*loT*? b ^ 5 n s t r u c k sit t h * notion 
when^ i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK v AINSWORTH(47) Lord 
Wilberforce i n the House of Lords r e f u t e d the view of the 
Court of Appeal i n BENDALL v McWHIRTER th a t KING v DAVID 
ALLEN and CLORE v THEATRICAL PROPERTIES were i r r e l e v a n t 
a u t h o r i t i e s . W h i l st accepting the a c t u a l d e c i s i o n i n 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, he went on to say he d i d not f i n d 
ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON of a s s i s t a n c e on the i s s u e of 
t r a n s m i s s i b i l i t y of c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s and questioned 
whether the d e c i s i o n i n f a c t involved a s u c c e s s o r i n 
t i t l e of the l i c e n s o r . However, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t 
Lord Wilberforce q u i t e c l e a r l y refused to c l o s e the door 
e n t i r e l y on the development of c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s along 
these l i n e s . He concluded, a f t e r commenting t h a t the 
p o s i t i o n of t h i r d p a r t i e s a g a i n s t c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e s 
was unclear: 
"No doubt the time w i l l come when t h i s whole 
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s u b j e c t w i l l have to be reviewed; t h i s i s not the 
occasion f o r i t and I think t h a t i t would be 
undesirable now to say anything which might impede 
the development of t h i s branch of the law." ( 4 8 ) 
Lord Denning took f u l l advantage of the sma l l opening 
t h a t remained to r e s u r r e c t t h e i d e a i n BINIONS v 
EVANS(49) although no doubt on account of the s u b s t a n t i a l 
opposition to h i s views, he d i d produce an a l t e r n a t i v e 
ground f o r the c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i n t h a t case binding a 
t h i r d p a r t y ( 5 0 ) . The f a c t s of the case were t h a t the 
defendant's husband had worked f o r h i s land l o r d s a l l h i s 
l i f e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , a f t e r h i s death, as an a c t of 
kindness, the landlords agreed to allow the defendant, 
aged 82 at the time of the a c t i o n , to remain i n the 
cottage which had been her home f o r l i f e , " as Tenant a t 
W i l l of them, f r e e of rent f o r the remainder of her 
l i f e . . . . " The agreement went on to provide t h a t the 
defendant could determine the agreement by g i v i n g four 
weeks' n o t i c e and th a t she had only a personal r i g h t to 
occupy with no r i g h t to a s s i g n or s u b l e t . Two years 
a f t e r making the agreement, the landlords s o l d the land 
which included the property e x p r e s s l y s u b j e c t to the 
agreement with the defendant, and f o r a p r i c e which was 
reduced on account of the arrangement. Nevertheless, 
a f t e r c o m p l e t i o n , t he p l a i n t i f f p u r c h a s e r s s e r v e d a 
n o t i c e to q u i t on the defendant and subsequently brought 
proceedings f o r poss e s s i o n on the ground t h a t she was a 
t e n a n t a t w i l l and h e r t e n a n c y had been e f f e c t i v e l y 
determined. The Court of Appeal refused a po s s e s s i o n 
order. The m a j o r i t y of the court (Megaw and Stephenson 
L . J J . ) were of the opinion the defendant was a tenant f o r 
l i f e under the S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 ( 5 1 ) , but L o r d 
Denning based h i s d e c i s i o n on the f i n d i n g t h a t t h e 
defendant was a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e with an i r r e v o c a b l e 
r i gh+- to r^m^in f o r th? r ? s t of. ^<^y lif**,- and thai -
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e had a fo r c e of i t s own capable of 
binding t h i r d p a r t i e s . He posed the question: "What i s 
the s t a t u s of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e ? " , and answered i t 
by saying: 
"...a r i g h t to occupy f o r l i f e a r i s i n g by c o n t r a c t 
g i v e s the o c c u p i e r an e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n 
land."(52) 
By v i r t u e of the agreement i t s e l f , the widow, he 
b e l i e v e d , had an e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t which c o u l d be 
protected by i n j u n c t i o n . Once again, the a u t h o r i t i e s 
c i t e d by Lord Denning i n support of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e 
per se binding a t h i r d p a r t y were e q u a l l y suspect and the 
su b j e c t of much academic c r i t i c i s m ( 5 3 ) . B r i e f l y , he 
f i r s t c i t e d RE B0YERS(54) and RE CARNE'S SETTLED 
ESTATES(55) both of which would appear to be cases of 
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l i f e i n t e r e s t s under a settlement and not l i c e n c e s a t 
a l l ( 5 6 ) . The next two cases c i t e d , namely FOSTER v 
ROBINSON(57) and ZIMBLER v ABRAHAMS (58) d id not involve 
s u c c e s s o r s i n t i t l e of the l i c e n s o r and BROWNE v 
WARNER(59) and RE KING'S LEASEHOLD ESTATES(60) involved 
r e s p e c t i v e l y a c o n t r a c t to c r e a t e a l e g a l e s t a t e and an 
e q u i t a b l e l e a s e . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e o n l y r e l e v a n t 
a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d b o i l down to ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON 
which i t has al r e a d y been noted was i t s e l f based on 
inadequate a u t h o r t i t y and WEBB v PATERNOSTER(61) which 
does not support the view a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e per se 
binds a t h i r d party. 
Since the d e c i s i o n i n BINIONS v EVANS, other reasoning 
has been developed to s u b s t a n t i a t e l i c e n c e s to occupy i n v some circumstances binding t h i r d p a r t i e s ( 6 2 ) . But the ^  
idea with a l l i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s appears s t i l l to be a l i v e . 
I n MIDLAND BANK LTD. V FARMPRIDE HATCHERIES AND 
ANOTHER(63),the bank l e n t money on mortgage to a company 
to enable business to expand. The s e c u r i t y f o r the loan 
was land owned by the company which included r e s i d e n t i a l 
p r e m i s e s c o n s i s t i n g of a manor house. There was a 
s e r v i c e agreement with the company whereby a c e r t a i n Mr. 
W i l l e y and h i s w i f e , who were s o l e s h a r e h o l d e r s and 
d i r e c t o r s of the company, were given a l i c e n c e to occupy 
the manor house f o r 20 ye a r s , r e n t f r e e . The e x i s t e n c e 
of the l i c e n c e was not d i s c l o s e d or known about by the 
bank a t the time of the mortgage but the bank's 
negotiator was aware the W i l l e y f a m i l y were l i v i n g i n the 
manor house. The company d e f a u l t e d i n the payment of the 
mortgage i n s t a l m e n t s and the bank thereupon sought 
p o s s e s s i o n w i t h a view t o s a l e . What i s somewhat 
s u r p r i s i n g about the case was t h a t the Court of Appeal 
(Buckley, Shaw and O l i v e r L . J J . ) was prepared to assume 
the c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e was per se capable of binding a 
t h i r d n a r t v a n H the> c ^ c s o V ? . 0 fov"^^*" *ao!!'?.''v OH the 
question of whether the bank had c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e of 
the l i c e n c e and, as such, was bound by i t . I n the event, 
i t was held t h a t , although the bank d i d have c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n o t i c e as the negotia t o r was aware of the occupancy of 
the house by the W i l l e y s , Mr. W i l l e y was estopped by h i s 
own conduct from r e l y i n g on the d o c t r i n e of c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n o t i c e , the p r e c i s e reasons f o r the estoppel v a r y i n g with 
the d i f f e r e n t judgments. 
Since there appears to be some, a l b e i t l i m i t e d , mileage 
i n the pr o p o s i t i o n t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may per se 
bind a t h i r d p a r t y who takes with n o t i c e , i t i s necessary 
to consider whether the law should be allowed to continue 
i t s development along these l i n e s or whether the route 
should, by some fu t u r e d e c i s i o n , be f i n a l l y c l o s e d . To 
say a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e to occupy of i t s e l f i s capable 
of binding a t h i r d p a r t y i s to r e c e i v e i n t o the law of 
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property a new a c c r e t i o n from the law of c o n t r a c t and 
thus c r e a t e a new i n t e r e s t i n land. Of course, when the 
need has a r i s e n , t h i s has happened many times before. 
For example, the d o c t r i n e of p r i v i t y of c o n t r a c t was 
p e n e t r a t e d by SPENCER'S CASE(64) which p r o v i d e d the 
b e n e f i t and burden of c e r t a i n covenants could run with 
l e a s e s and by TULK v MOXHAY(65) which makes s i m i l a r 
p r o v i s i o n f o r c e r t a i n covenants made between f r e e h o l d e r s . 
But, given one of the main reasons f o r the development of 
l i c e n c e concepts i n the twentieth century has been to 
g i v e e f f e c t to i n f o r m a l f a m i l y and q u a s i - f a m i l y 
arrangements f o r r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y , i s i t necessary to 
upgrade c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s to occupy to i n t e r e s t s i n 
land and, i f so, a t what expense? As has al r e a d y been 
s a i d , given the degree of geographical m o b i l i t y w i t h i n 
s o c i e t y , i f a l i c e n c e i s only enforceable a g a i n s t the 
o r i g i n a l l i c e n s o r , any p r o t e c t i o n i s i l l u s o r y as i t can 
be evaded by a s a l e of the p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n . 
P r o f e s s o r Wade put f o r w a r d ( 6 6 ) t h r e e main arguments 
aga i n s t such an extension. F i r s t l y , he maintained there 
must be a d e f i n i t e f r o n t i e r between property and per s o n a l 
r i g h t s , otherwise there w i l l be no l i m i t to the new 
i n c i d e n t s of property r i g h t s which could be invented. 
Secondly, he considered property r i g h t s need to be of a 
l i m i t e d and f a m i l i a r kind, otherwise purchasers w i l l have 
to i n v e s t i g a t e an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of circumstances. I t 
i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t the courts have been c a r e f u l to 
put s t r i c t l i m i t s on the running of covenants i n l e a s e s 
and between f r e e h o l d e r s . F i n a l l y , he claimed any attempt 
to develop a new i n t e r e s t u n s e t t l e s the law so badly and 
fo r so many year s , t h a t no new i n t e r e s t s i n property 
should be creat e d by the co u r t s . 
C e r t a i n l y , given the n e c e s s i t y t h a t property should be 
f r e e l y and e a s i l y a l i e n a b l e , P r o f e s s o r Wade would seem to 
be r i a h t in h i s bp"lie>f t h a t i t i s nnrlppsi r a h l P t n h n r d p n 
land with an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of incumbrances. But the 
p r i n c i p l e c o u l d be narrowed down and c o n f i n e d t o 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s which g i v e r i g h t s t o e x c l u s i v e 
p o s s e s s i o n ( 6 7 ) . I t i s a l r e a d y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
r e l a t i o n to u n r e g i s t e r e d l a n d by d e c i s i o n s s u c h as 
BARNHART v GREENSHIELDS(68) and HUNT v LUCK(69) t h a t i f 
a purchaser f a i l s to make proper e n q u i r i e s of those i n 
possession, whether tenants or o c c u p i e r s , he i s a f f e c t e d 
with n o t i c e of a l l e q u i t i e s enforceable by the occupier 
a g a i n s t the vendor. Moreover, s i n c e the d e c i s i o n of the 
House of Lords i n STREET v MOUNTFORD(70), the f i n d i n g of 
a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n w i l l be 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y r a r e , f o r , a p a r t from w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d 
exceptions such as s e r v i c e occupancies, wherever there i s 
an i n t e n t i o n to c r e a t e a l e g a l l y binding agreement and a 
person i s i n e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n p a y i n g a r e n t , a 
tenancy w i l l a r i s e . I f one accepted t h a t c o n t r a c t s could 
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genuinely be s p e l l e d out from the t y p i c a l informal f a m i l y 
arrangement f o r o c c u p a t i o n of p r o p e r t y , agreements 
f a l l i n g o u t s i d e the wide d e f i n i t i o n of a t e n a n c y i n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD may w e l l be almost confined to such 
arrangements, so long as nothing which could reasonably 
be d e s c r i b e d as a rent was paid. Thus by r e c o g n i s i n g 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s , where e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n was 
given, as i n t e r e s t s i n land, p r o t e c t i o n would be given 
v i r t u a l l y only where i t was needed. However, i t has been 
doubted(71) whether such agreements do s a t i s f y the s t r i c t 
requirements of a c o n t r a c t i n most cases and, although 
P r o f e s s o r Wade's opinion t h a t no new i n t e r e s t s i n land 
should be created by the courts i s unacceptably r i g i d , 
new i n t e r e s t s s h o u l d not be c r e a t e d where none a r e 
necessary. I t w i l l be argued(72) t h a t the same end, t h a t 
of g i v i n g e f f e c t t o i n f o r m a l arrangements, can be 
a c h i e v e d by more s a t i s f a c t o r y means, but f i r s t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n needs to be given to the notion t h a t an 
i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e can bind a t h i r d p a r t y by 
means of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . 
No doubt because of the conceptional d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
s a y i n g a l i c e n c e p e r se b i n d s t h i r d p a r t i e s and on 
account of the o p p o s i t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d , L o r d Denning, 
beginning with BINIONS v EVANS(73) s l i g h t l y a l t e r e d h i s 
approach so as to combine the notion of an i r r e v o c a b l e 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e w i t h a r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t , namely the c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . He s a i d : 
"Suppose, however, t h a t Mrs. Evans d i d not have an 
e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t a t the outset, n e v e r t h e l e s s i t 
i s q u i t e p l a i n t h a t she obtained one afterwards 
when the Tredegar e s t a t e s o l d the cottage. They 
s t i p u l a t e d with the purchaser t h a t he was to take 
the house " s u b j e c t t o " Mrs. Evans' r i g h t s under 
th?» 5.gr^^Hl9nt I n +" h 0 ^ * 3 n i r n i m s l - a n r p s -hhiR 
court w i l l impose on the purchaser a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t f o r her b e n e f i t . " ( 7 4 ) 
T h i s p r o v i d e s a neat l i t t l e way around the f o r c f u l 
a u t h o r i t i e s of KING v DAVID ALLEN(75) CLORE v THEATRICAL 
PROPERTIES(76) f o r the c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t a r i s e s on the 
conveyance to the p u r c h a s e r and, as such, does not 
p r e d a t e the conveyance. The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , as t o 
whether the i m p o s i t i o n of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t was 
j u s t i f i e d on precedent or p o l i c y grounds, and i s the l i n e 
of reasoning any more s a t i s f a c t o r y than the idea t h a t a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e can per se bind a t h i r d p a r t y ( 7 7 ) . To 
c o n s i d e r f i r s t , p r e c e d e n t . I n support of h i s 
p r o p o s i t i o n , Lord Denning M.R. placed r e l i a n c e on three 
main a u t h o r i t i e s , the f i r s t of which was BANNISTER v 
BANNISTER (78) I n t h i s case, on the p l a i n t i f f ' s o r a l 
undertaking t h a t the defendant would be allowed to l i v e 
170 
i n a cottage rent f r e e f o r as long as she d e s i r e d , the 
defendant agreed t o s e l l t h e p l a i n t i f f t h a t and an 
adjacent cottage. The p l a i n t i f f ' s undertaking was not 
included i n the formal conveyance and subsequently the 
p l a i n t i f f , going back on h i s word, sought p o s s e s s i o n of 
the cottage from the defendant on the grounds t h a t she 
was merely a tenant at w i l l and her tenancy had been 
terminated by s e r v i c e of a n o t i c e to q u i t . The defendant 
counterclaimed t h a t the p l a i n t i f f held the cottage on 
t r u s t f o r her l i f e . The House of Lords held t h a t , on 
account of the p l a i n t i f f ' s fraud, he held the cottage on 
c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t f o r the defendant who was a tenant f o r 
l i f e under the S e t t l e d Land Act 1925(79). However, i n 
BINIONS v EVANS, a l t h o u g h the m a j o r i t y of the c o u r t 
(Megaw and Stephenson L . J J . ) f o l l o w e d BANNISTER v 
BANNISTER i n f i n d i n g Mrs. Evans was a tenant f o r l i f e 
under the S e t t l e d Land Act, Lord Denning r e f u t e d t h i s , 
yet a t the same time imposed a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . I t 
would seem one t h i n g to impose a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t where 
a t r u s t i n the form of an e q u i t a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t a l r e a d y 
e x i s t e d , and quite another to impose a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t 
to e n f o r c e a p e r s o n a l r i g h t such as a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e . Moreover, the c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t i n BANNISTER v 
BANNISTER was imposed on a c c o u n t of f r a u d or 
u n c o n s c i o n a b l e conduct and, a l t h o u g h both Megaw and 
Stephenson L . J J followed a s i m i l a r l i n e of reasoning i n 
BINIONS v EVANS, a c c o r d i n g t o L o r d Denning, a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t was imposed: 
" . . . f o r the simple reason t h a t i t would be u t t e r l y 
i n e q u i t a b l e f o r the purchaser to t u r n the widow 
out cont r a r y to the s t i p u l a t i o n s u b j e c t to which 
he took the premises."(80) 
What i s more, i n BANNISTER v BANNISTER, the c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t w a s h p i nrr -i rrmn«; +-r> n u o r r o n i o 1 a r l r n f w r i t i n g 
r equired by S.40" of the Law of Property Act 1925, on the 
b a s i s that not to recognise the widow's r i g h t to occupy 
for l i f e would be to allow a s t a t u t e to be used as an 
instrument of fraud. I n c o n t r a s t i n BINIONS v EVANS, the 
agreement to occupy was i n w r i t i n g , so arguably, i f there 
was a t r u s t , i t s h o u l d have been an e x p r e s s t r u s t . 
However, i t i s probable t h a t there was no i n t e n t i o n , on 
the p a r t of the Tredegar e s t a t e , to c r e a t e a t r u s t i n 
f a v o u r of Mrs. E v a n s , the l i k e l y m o t i v a t i o n f o r the 
i n s e r t i o n of the c l a u s e concerning the cottage being to 
p r o t e c t the Tredegar e s t a t e from l i a b i l i t y r a t h e r than 
providing s e c u r i t y f o r Mrs. Evans.(81) 
A f u r t h e r h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between BANNISTER 
v BANNISTER and BINIONS v EVANS, i s the f a c t t h a t i n 
BANNISTER v BANNISTER the c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t was imposed 
i n a two party s i t u a t i o n , although there were admittedly 
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d i c t a wide enough to cover a three p a r t y s i t u a t i o n as 
Scott L . J . commented: 
" I t i s enough t h a t the b a r g a i n s h o u l d have 
i n c l u d e d a s t i p u l a t i o n under which some 
s u f f i c i e n t l y defined b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t i n the 
property was to be taken by another."(82) 
The second a u t h o r i t y Lord Denning purported to obtain 
support from was the judgement of Lord Diplock i n GISSING 
v GISSING where he s a i d : 
"A r e s u l t i n g , implied or c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t - and 
i t i s u n n e c e s s a r y f o r p r e s e n t purposes t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h between these three c l a s s e s of t r u s t -
i s c reated by a t r a n s a c t i o n between the t r u s t e e 
and the c e s t u i que t r u s t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h 
a c q u i s i t i o n by the t r u s t e e of an e s t a t e i n land 
whenever the t r u s t e e has so conducted himself t h a t 
i t would be i n e q u i t a b l e to deny the c e s t u i que 
t r u s t a b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t i n the l a n d 
acquired."(83) 
As a number of academic w r i t e r s have pointed o u t ( 8 4 ) , 
Lord Denning was i n f a c t quoting Lord Diplock out of 
c o n t e x t , as he f a i l s t o r e f e r t o the immediate 
l i m i t a t i o n s L o r d D i p l o c k went on t o impose on what 
otherwise appears to be a very broad p r i n c i p l e , namely: 
"And he w i l l be h e l d so to have conducted himself 
i f by h i s words or conduct he has induced the 
c e s t u i que t r u s t to a c t to h i s own detriment i n 
the reasonable b e l i e f t h at by so a c t i n g he was 
a c q u i r i n g a b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t i n the land."(85) 
I t s h o u l d a l s n hp nntpri t h a t T.nrH n i n l n r l f nrpfan.prl t h p 
above s t a t e m e n t by s a y i n g a t r u s t " i s c r e a t e d by a 
t r a n s a c t i o n between t r u s t e e and c e s t u i que t r u s t . . . . " 
T h i s suggests he was r e f e r r i n g to a two p a r t y s i t u a t i o n , 
whereas Lord Denning, i n BINIONS v EVANS, a p p l i e s the 
p r i n c i p l e to a three p a r t y s i t u a t i o n . 
The f i n a l a u t h o r i t y Lord Denning sought to p l a c e r e l i a n c e 
on was the w e l l known statement of Cardozo J . i n BEATTY v 
GUGGENHEIM EXPLORATION CO. where he s a i d t h a t : 
" . . . . [ a ] c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t i s the formula through 
which the c o n s c i e n c e of e q u i t y f i n d s 
expression." (86) 
But, as Oakley has pointed o u t ( 8 7 ) , the c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t has developed upon completely d i f f e r e n t l i n e s i n 
the E n g l i s h Courts as compared to that of the American 
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c o u r t s . I n America, i t i s regarded as a remedial device, 
whereas t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n England the c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t 
has been regarded as an i n s t i t u t i o n . Thus, as Browne-
Wilkinson J . commented i n RE SHARPE(88), the notion of 
imposing- a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t as a remedy was a "novel 
concept" i n E n g l i s h law. However, there i s evidence, a t 
l e a s t i n some spheres, t h a t the E n g l i s h courts have now 
a l t e r e d t h e i r approach to c o i n c i d e w i t h the American 
view. T h i s can be seen f o r example i n cases concerning 
i n t e r m e d d l i n g of t r u s t p r o p e r t y i n v o l v i n g knowing 
a s s i s t a n c e , such as SELANGOR UNITED RUBBER ESTATES LTD. v 
CRADDOCK (No. 3 ) ( 8 9 ) and KARAK RUBBER CO. V BURDEN 
(No.2)(90). Also i n the 1970s, i n dis p u t e s r e l a t i n g to 
the a c q u i s i t i o n of an i n t e r e s t i n property, Lord Denning 
developed the s o - c a l l e d "new model c o n s t r u t i v e t r u s t " 
which appeared to be more akin to the American view. 
Thus, i n HUSSEY v PALMER, he des c r i b e d the c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t as: 
"...a t r u s t imposed by law where j u s t i c e and good 
conscience r e q u i r e i t . I t i s a l i b e r a l process 
founded on la r g e p r i n c i p l e s of equity.... I t i s 
an e q u i t a b l e remedy by which the court can enable 
an aggrieved p a r t y to obtain r e s t i t u t i o n . " ( 9 1 ) 
I t has al r e a d y been i n d i c a t e d t h a t i n more recent times, 
the courts have moved away from t h i s l i b e r a l approach i n 
disputes where an e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n property i s being 
claimed. However, the only question which needs to be 
addressed here i s whether a broad remedial type approach 
to c o n s t r u t i v e t r u s t s i s warranted i n l i c e n c e cases where 
s e c u r i t y of o c c u p a t i o n i s o f f e r e d but no d i r e c t or 
i n d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n has been made to the purchase p r i c e 
to r e s u l t i n an eq u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n the property. 
Before o n i n a o n t o p r i n s i H e r '•"hie; i BBHO -it- should b<? 
noted that the notion t h a t an i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e can give r i s e to a c o n s t r u t i v e t r u s t binding a 
purchaser has been followed i n both DHN FOODS LTD. v 
TOWER HAMLETS BOROUGH COUNCIL(92) and a r g u a b l y RE 
SHARPE(93), a l t h o u g h i n the l a t t e r c a s e i t i s not 
e n t i r e l y c l e a r whether the l i c e n c e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
was of an "e q u i t a b l e " r a t h e r than c o n t r a c t u a l nature. 
The former c a s e d i d not co n c e r n an i n f o r m a l f a m i l y 
arrangement but r a i s e d the question of whether a company, 
DHN Foods L t d . , had, on compulsory p u r c h a s e , a 
compensatable i n t e r e s t i n premises which they occupied 
under an informal arrangement with l e g a l owners, Bronze, 
an a s s o c i a t e d company. The Court of Appeal (Goff, Shaw 
L . J J . and Lord Denning M.R.) decided DHN Foods L t d . had 
an i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e which gave r i s e to a 
c o n s t r u t i v e t r u s t binding the l e g a l owner of the premises 
and from t h i s t r u s t r e s u l t e d a s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t to 
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e n t i t l e the company to compensation f o r d i s t u r b a n c e . The 
au t h o r i t y of the d e c i s i o n i s , however, weakened by the 
f a c t t h a t there were three grounds f o r the d e c i s i o n and 
only one involved l i c e n c e reasoning. Furthermore, i n 
adopting the l i c e n c e reasoning- - r e l i a n c e was placed upon 
SIEW SOON WAH v YONG TONG HONG(94) and as t h i s concerns a 
tenancy by estoppel, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the 
d e c i s i o n can have any bearing on c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s . 
The f a c t t h a t the reasoning of Lord Denning i n BINIONS v 
EVANS has been followed i n the two aforementioned cases 
should not be taken as an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s 
are being g e n e r a l l y accepted. Even before the d e c i s i o n i n 
RE SHARPE(94), the whole approach was disapproved of i n 
CHANDLER v KERLEY(95) where Lord Denning was not a member 
of the court. The county court judge had held t h a t the 
co n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e found to e x i s t on the f a c t s of the 
case gave r i s e to a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . However, i n the 
Court of Appeal, Lord Scarman r e j e c t e d t h i s idea as being 
unsound. Moreover, i n WILLIAMS v STAITE(96), where the 
cottage i n question had been s o l d a f t e r the death of the 
l i c e n s o r to a purchaser who bought e x p r e s s l y s u b j e c t to 
the l i c e n s e e ' s occupation of the cottage and a t a reduced 
p r i c e , no c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t argument was put forward, 
even though, on ac c o u n t of the s i m i l a r i t y of the 
purchaser's p o s i t i o n to t h a t of the purchaser i n BINIONS 
v EVANS, t h i s would appear to have been an i d e a l case f o r 
such reasoning. 
What problems are t h e r e f o r e a s s o c i a t e d with combining the 
n o t i o n of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t w i t h an i r r e v o c a b l e 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , so as to bind t h i r d p a r t i e s with 
n o t i c e ? The p r o p o s i t i o n i n BINIONS v EVANS seems to be 
that i f a purchaser takes e x p r e s s l y or i m p l i e d l y s u b j e c t 
to t h i r d p a rty r i g h t s , whether those r i g h t s c o n s t i t u t e a 
r e c n a n i <=;<=»d n r n n r i p t - s r v i n f o r o d t- -t-hov w i l l h i the* 
purchaser i f i t i s unconscionable f o r him to ignore these 
r i g h t s . T h i s would appear to open the "floodgates". By 
the imposition of a " s u b j e c t t o" clause,—any^Jsurden, 
w h e t h ^ ^ c a p a b l e jander e x i s t i n g p r o p r i e t a r y concepts of 
running with the land, w i l l -bind t h i r d p a r t i e s . T h i s 
would f o r example make s u p e r f l u o u s the s t r i c t 
requirements concerning the nature of covenants between 
fr e e h o l d e r s which may be annexed to land. Moreover, even 
f o r a covenant to be e x p r e s s l y assigned, more i s needed 
than simply a chain of express assignments; i t must, f o r 
ins t a n c e , be e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t land i s capable of being 
b e n e f i t t e d and i s s u f f i c i e n t l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e , and s i m i l a r 
r e s t r i c t i o n s apply f o r covenants running with l e a s e s and 
reco g n i t i o n of easements and p r o f i t s . The reason f o r 
imposing such r e s t r i c t i o n s i s to ensure t h a t land cannot 
become burdened with an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of i n t e r e s t s 
p o t e n t i a l l y reducing the value of the land and i n h i b i t i n g 
174 
i t s a l i e n a t i o n . However, t h i s i s n o t t o say new 
i n t e r e s t s i n land should not be recognised where t h i s i s 
necessary and i t may w e l l be t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n could be 
drawn between d i f f e r e n t types of "subject t o " clauses, 
r e c o g n i t i o n o n l y b e i n g g i v e n t o cases where an 
i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e t o occupy has been 
granted by the vendor, and the purchaser had purchased 
subject t o such r i g h t s . But the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s 
need t o be considered. 
Lord Denning d i d n o t c o n f i n e t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a 
co n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t t o the s i t u a t i o n where a purchaser 
took expressly subject t o a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , f o r he 
suggested of a purchaser: 
"But even i f he does not take expressly "subject 
t o " the r i g h t s of the licensee, he may do so 
i m p l i e d l y a t any r a t e where the licensee i s i n 
a c t u a l o c c u p a t i o n of t h e l a n d so t h a t t h e 
purchaser must know he i s there and of the r i g h t s 
which he has: see HODGSON v MARKS(97). Whenever 
the purchaser takes the land i m p l i e d l y subject t o 
the r i g h t s of the c o n t r a c t u a l licensee a court of 
equ i t y w i l l impose a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t f o r the 
be n e f i c i a r y . " ( 9 8 ) 
This of course brings i n by the back door a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e t o occupy p r o p e r t y as a p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , as, 
under the d o c t r i n e of n o t i c e , once executed, i t w i l l 
always bind a purchaser. However, the reason, according 
t o Lord Denning, f o r imposing a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t i n the 
circumstances of BINIONS v EVANS, was because i t would be 
u t t e r l y i n e q u i t a b l e f o r the purchaser t o t u r n the widow 
out c o n t r a r y t o the s t i p u l a t i o n subject t o which he took 
the premises. Even i f one accepts t h i s broad basis f o r 
the i m p o s i t i o n of a r.nnst.rnr.ti V P t r u s t . , a s npnnsprl t n t h ^ 
t r a d i t i o n a l narrow f r a u d basis set down i n BANNISTER v 
BANNISTER(99), i t i s questionable whether i t would be 
" u t t e r l y i n e q u i t a b l e " f o r a l l purchasers t a k i n g , even 
expressly, l e t alone i m p l i e d l y , subject t o an i r r e v o c a b l e 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , t o t u r n t h e l i c e n s e e o u t . I n 
BINIONS v EVANS, the purchaser not only bought subject t o 
Mrs. Evans' r i g h t s of occupation but also a t a reduced 
p r i c e . What would be the p o s i t i o n i f the purchaser 
bought e i t h e r expressly or i m p l i e d l y "subject t o " , a t the 
f u l l market price? The de c i s i o n of D i l l o n J. i n LYUS v 
PROWSA (100) provides some i n d i c a t i o n s as t o the p o s i t i o n 
where a purchaser acquires p r o p e r t y expressly "subject 
t o " a c e r t a i n t h i r d p a r t y ' s r i g h t s although the case d i d 
not i n v o l v e a lice n c e t o occupy. A development company 
which was the r e g i s t e r e d p r o p r i e t o r of c e r t a i n 
development land, charged the land i n favour of a bank. 
Later the company contracted t o s e l l one p l o t t o the 
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p l a i n t i f f who r e g i s t e r e d a caution. This caution was 
c l e a r l y not bi n d i n g on the bank as mortagees, as i t was 
second i n time t o the l e g a l mortgage. The company became 
in s o l v e n t before the sale t o the p l a i n t i f f was completed 
and consequently the bank exercised i t s power of sale. 
Although the bank d i d not take subject t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
estate c o n t r a c t which was cautioned o f f the r e g i s t e r , i t 
chose t o s e l l the land t o the f i r s t defendants "subject 
t o and w i t h the b e n e f i t o f " the p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r a c t . 
Subsequently, the f i r s t defendant s o l d p a r t of the land 
i n c l u d i n g the p l a i n t i f f ' s p l o t t o the second defendant 
subject t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r a c t " i n so f a r , i f at 
a l l , as i t may be enforceable against the vendors." 
On these f a c t s , even though n o t h i n g r e l a t i n g t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f ' s e s t a t e c o n t r a c t ever reappeared on t h e 
r e g i s t e r and despite S.20 of the Land R e g i s t r a t i o n Act 
1925 which states t h a t transferees take subject t o minor 
i n t e r e s t s and o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t s but " f r e e from any 
other estates or i n t e r e s t s whatsoever", D i l l o n J. held 
the f i r s t and second defendants took the land subject t o 
a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . The reasoning adopted by D i l l o n 
J., p l a c i n g heavy r e l i a n c e on t h e judgement o f Lor d 
Denning M.R. i n BINIONS v EVANS(101), was t h a t as the 
defendants knew of the p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t s outside the 
r e g i s t e r and agreed t o take subject t o them, t o place 
r e l i a n c e subsequently on S.20 of the Land R e g i s t r a t i o n 
Act 1925 was t o use a s t a t u t e as an instrument of fr a u d . 
However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see what the unconscionable 
conduct j u s t i f y i n g the i m p o s i t i o n of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t 
was, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h regard t o the second defendants. 
They had paid the f u l l market p r i c e f o r the land, and, on 
the precise wording of the clause, had taken the land 
s u b j e c t t o a d i s p u t e d r i g h t ; t h e y were now s i m p l y 
r e l y i n g , i n the di s p u t e , on the conclusiveness of the 
r e g i s t e r . What i s more, d e s p i t p hhp f a r t t h a t t h e 
purchase had been at the f u l l market value, the e f f e c t of 
the de c i s i o n was t o r e q u i r e the second defendants t o put 
up a house on the p l a i n t i f f ' s p l o t i n 1982 a t 1978 
b u i l d i n g p r i c e s . T h i s seems t o t a l l y u n f a i r on t h e 
defendants who had i n no way been u n j u s t l y enriched a t 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s expense, and consequently the i m p o s i t i o n 
of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t i n these circumstances i s t o t a l l y 
unwarranted. 
A p p l y i n g these p r i n c i p l e s t o c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s i t 
would appear t h a t , i f the dec i s i o n of D i l l o n J. i n LYUS v 
PROWSA(102) were f o l l o w e d , even i f a purchaser bought a t 
the f u l l market value, a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t would be 
imposed i f he at l e a s t bought expressly "subject t o " an 
ir r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e and thus w i t h o u t u n j u s t 
enrichment and moreover even though the b e t t e r view i s 
t h a t an i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e t o occupy i s 
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merely a p e r s o n a l r i g h t and, as such, i n c a p a b l e of 
bindin g a t h i r d p a r t y . As t o the s i t u a t i o n where a 
purchaser merely takes i m p l i e d l y s u b j e c t t o an 
ir r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e under the d o c t r i n e of 
c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e on account of t h e l i c e n s e e ' s 
o c c u p a t i o n of premises, even i f one accepted Lord 
Denning"s broad approach t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a 
co n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t , one could h a r d l y describe the conduct 
of t h e purchaser i n these circumstances as " u t t e r l y 
i n e q u i t a b l e " i f he subsequently sought t o terminate the 
lic e n c e . This i s not t o say t h a t a licensee under an 
irr e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e should not be pr o t e c t e d 
against t h i r d p a r t i e s i n a wide v a r i e t y of circumstances 
but simply t h a t the machinery of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t i s 
an i n a p p r o p r i a t e means of p r o v i d i n g t h a t p r o t e c t i o n i f 
the concept of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t , even i f viewed as a 
remedial device, i s t o have any meaning at a l l . 
A decided case which i l l u s t r a t e s how the c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t approach t o the enforcement of c o n t r a c t u a l licences 
a g a i n s t t h i r d p a r t i e s can op e r a t e u n j u s t l y i s RE 
SHARPE(103). Sharpe purchased a p r o p r e r t y i n Hampstead 
f o r £17,000. He r a i s e d the purchase p r i c e w i t h the help 
of an unsecured loan of £12,000 from an e l d e r l y aunt who 
also spent £2,000 on decorations and f i t t i n g s f o r the 
house i n a d d i t i o n t o paying o f f some of Sharpe's debts. 
I n r e t u r n i t was agreed the aunt should l i v e i n the 
property purchased and be cared f o r by Sharpe and h i s 
w i f e . Subsequently, Sharpe became bankrupt and t h e 
t r u s t e e i n bankruptcy contracted w i t h a t h i r d p a r t y t o 
s e l l the property w i t h vacant possession. Only a f t e r the 
contract had been made d i d the aunt claim t o have e i t h e r 
a b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t under a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t o r an 
ir r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l or eq u i t a b l e r i g h t t o remain i n 
the property. The court found t h a t although the o f f i c i a l 
r p c p i v o r b ^ f o r ^ c o n t r a c t i n g t o s ^ l l th? property, 
sent l e t t e r s asking her f o r d e t a i l s as t o the nature and 
amounts of payments towards the purchase p r i c e , i n view 
of her age she took no steps t o deal w i t h them and had 
f o r g o t t e n about t h e i r r e c e i p t . On these f a c t s , Browne-
Wilkinson J. held t h a t , as there was evidence the money 
advanced towards the purchase p r i c e was a l o a n , no 
r e s u l t i n g t r u s t arose. However, the aunt d i d have an 
irr e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l or equ i t a b l e l i c e n c e t o remain i n 
occupation u n t i l the loan was repaid t o her, enforceable 
by means of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t on t h e t r u s t e e i n 
bankruptcy. Although the de c i s i o n only deals w i t h the 
aunt's p o s i t i o n as against the t r u s t e e i n bankruptcy and 
not w i t h her p o s i t i o n against the purchaser t o whom the 
t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y had c o n t r a c t e d t o s e l l t h e 
property, Browne-Wilkinson J. concluded h i s judgement by 
saying: 
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" I t may be t h a t as a purchaser w i t h o u t express 
n o t i c e i n an a c t i o n f o r s p e c i f i c performance of a 
c o n t r a c t [ t h e p u r c h a s e r ' s ] r i g h t s w i l l p r e v a i l 
over [ t h e aunt's]."(104) 
D e s p i t e t h i s d i c t a , on t h e r e a s o n i n g adopted i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o see how the purchaser would not have been 
bound by the l i c e n c e , however u n j u s t such a f i n d i n g may 
have been. The purchaser became aware of the i r r e v o c a b l e 
l i c e n c e before the conveyance of the l e g a l estate t o him. 
He could not t h e r e f o r e claim t o be a bona f i d e purchaser 
of a l e g a l estate w i t h o u t n o t i c e , and t h e r e f o r e once the 
co n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t was found t o e x i s t as against the 
t r u s t e e i n bankruptcy the purchaser must have been bound 
too. 
F i n a l l y , whatever the means by which a l i c e n c e i s made t o 
bind t h i r d p a r t i e s , problems w i l l a r i s e on account of the 
r i g i d i t y of the system of r e g i s t r a t i o n ( 1 0 5 ) . However, 
one s p e c i a l problem w i t h u s i n g t h e concept of a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t t o p r o t e c t c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e s 
against t h i r d p a r t i e s a r i s e s i n r e l a t i o n t o r e g i s t e r e d 
l a n d on account of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Land 
R e g i s t r a t i o n Act 1925. S.74 provides no ". . . . person 
d e a l i n g w i t h a r e g i s t e r e d e s t a t e o r charge s h a l l be 
a f f e c t e d w i t h n o t i c e of a t r u s t e xpress, i m p l i e d o r 
c o n s t r u c t i v e . . . . " and S.59 (6) provides t h a t a purchaser 
s h a l l not be concerned w i t h any pr o t e c t e d matter which i s 
not an o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t and "which i s not p r o t e c t e d by 
a caution or other e n t r y on the r e g i s t e r , whether he has 
or has not n o t i c e t h e r e o f express, i m p l i e d o r 
c o n s t r u c t i v e . " The issue was not discussed i n BINIONS v 
EVANS(106) as the t i t l e t o land was unr e g i s t e r e d , nor i n 
RE SHARPE(107) as t h e a c t i o n i n v o l v e d a t r u s t e e i n 
b ankru'?tc v s^d i " LYUS v BDQWQH I I_QP \ v.'h^r? the t i t l e v.T2.s 
r e g i s t e r e d i n imposing a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t D i l l o n J. 
f a i l e d t o g i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o e i t h e r of t h e 
aforementioned s e c t i o n s . He s i m p l y imposed t h e 
co n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t as the defendants had reneged on the 
agreement. However, i n the e a r l i e r case of PEFFER v 
RIGG(109) (which was not r e f e r r e d t o i n LYUS v PROWSA), 
Graham J. d i d , i n imposing a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t , consider 
S.59 (6) of t h e Land R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t . The case 
concerned a b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t under a t r u s t f o r sale 
which had not been pr o t e c t e d as a minor i n t e r e s t by e n t r y 
on the r e g i s t e r but of which the purchaser had express 
n o t i c e . I n h i s much c r i t i c i s e d d e c i s i o n , Graham J. 
concluded t h a t a "purchaser" w i t h i n the meaning of S.59 
(6) meant a purchaser i n good f a i t h , and a purchaser who 
bought w i t h express n o t i c e of an u n p r o t e c t e d minor 
i n t e r e s t and then claimed t o take f r e e from i t was not a 
purchaser i n good f a i t h . Nevertheless, i t i s u n c e r t a i n 
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whether PEFFER v RIGG w i l l be followed as i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o see how t h e d e c i s i o n can be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h t h e 
subsequent s t r i c t approach of the House of Lords which 
has confirmed the i r r e l e v a n c y of the d o c t r i n e of n o t i c e , 
both i n r e l a t i o n t o u n r e g i s t e r e d land (-MIDLAND -BANK TRUST 
CO. LTD. v GREEN (No. 2) )(1 1 0 ) , and r e g i s t e r e d land 
(WILLIAMS AND GLYN1S BANK LTD. V BOLAND) (111) . I n the 
l a t t e r case, Lord W i l b e r f o r c e commented of r e g i s t r a t i o n : 
"...the system i s designed t o f r e e the purchaser 
from t he hazards of n o t i c e - r e a l o r 
constructive."(112) 
I t i s arguable, however, e s p e c i a l l y i f the i m p o s i t i o n of 
a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t were t o be confined t o s i t u a t i o n s 
where a purchaser t o o k e x p r e s s l y s u b j e c t t o an 
i r r e v o c a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , t h a t r e g i s t r a t i o n 
p r i n c i p l e s are i r r e l e v a n t . I n BINIONS v EVANS, Lord 
Denning i n d i c a t e d a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t only arose when 
the Tredegar estate s o l d the cottage t o the purchaser 
subject t o Mrs. Evans* i n t e r e s t . I t would t h e r e f o r e seem 
the c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t does not pre-date the t r a n s f e r of 
the l e g a l estate t o the purchaser as such r e g i s t r a t i o n i s 
i r r e l e v a n t . Moreover, i f the c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t were 
seen only as a remedial device, i t would only then bind a 
subsequent purchaser who e x p r e s s l y agreed t o t a k e 
"subject t o " the li c e n c e and i n the same way as the f i r s t 
purchaser. I n other words, i t would operate l i k e a chain 
of express assignments i n r e l a t i o n t o covenants between 
freeh o l d e r s . The drawback w i t h t h i s i s t h a t i t may 
p r o v i d e inadequate p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e l i c e n s e e whose 
r i g h t s may not be expressly taken " subject t o " by a 
subsequent purchaser. 
I t seems t h e r e f o r e t h a t t o adopt t h e n o t i o n of a 
c o n s t n i r . r . i V P r n i s t - tn mairo ?> coT*.tr?.c* 1. l i f ^ n c e bind 5 
t h i r d p a r t y i s t a i n t e d w i t h as many d i f f i c u l t i e s as the 
idea t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e can, per se, bind a t h i r d 
p a r t y . I n c o n c l u s i o n i t would seem t h e c o n t r a c t u a l 
approach t o g i v i n g e f f e c t t o expectations of r e s i d e n t i a l 
s e c u r i t y a r i s i n g out of i n f o r m a l f a m i l y arrangements i s 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y from s t a r t t o f i n i s h . To begin w i t h , i t 
i s d o u b t f u l whether c o n t r a c t s can genuinely be s p e l l e d 
out of most such arrangements and, even i f the agreements 
c o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d as c o n t r a c t s , i t i s und u l y 
p r o b l e m a t i c t o develop t h e law t o make c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e s , e i t h e r per se or by means of a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t , bind a t h i r d p a r t y . I t i s t h e r e f o r e now proposed 
t o examine whether estoppel p r i n c i p l e s can be made t o 
operate more s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . 
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(e) P r o p r i e t a r y Estoppel 
( i ) The development of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel and i t s 
a p p l i c a t i o n t o l i c e n c e cases 
Owing t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s posed by t h e c o n t r a c t u a l 
approach t o g i v i n g e f f e c t t o i n f o r m a l f a m i l y arrangements 
t o occupy pr o p e r t y , the courts g r a d u a l l y began t o adopt 
and develop estoppel p r i n c i p l e s i n the sphere of l i c e n c e 
cases. For some time the concept of both a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e and t h a t of estoppel were used alongside one 
another p a r t i c u l a r l y by Lord Denning no doubt on account 
of misgivings w i t h regard t o the c o n t r a c t u a l approach as 
w e l l as a s u b t l e attempt t o cross the chasm from personal 
t o p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s , i t being more w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d 
t h a t an estoppel can b i n d a t h i r d p a r t y ( l ) . For example, 
i n ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON, he described the l i c e n c e as: 
" . . . c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t or, at any r a t e , an e q u i t a b l e 
r i g h t . " ( 2 ) 
S i m i l a r l y , i n TANNER v TANNER, w h i l s t basing h i s d e c i s i o n 
on the f i n d i n g of an i m p l i e d c o n t r a c t , he considered the 
two notions t o be a l t e r n a t i v e approaches, f o r towards the 
end of h i s judgement he s a i d : 
"Points about estoppel were r a i s e d too. There are 
a l l ways of s t a t i n g the l e g a l e f f e c t of the f a c t s . 
The f a c t s were s u f f i c i e n t l y p l e a d e d , i t seems t o 
me, f o r the cou r t t o deal w i t h i t on the basis of 
an i m p l i e d c o n t r a c t . " ( 3 ) 
However, by the t i m e of t h e d e c i s i o n i n HARDWICK v 
J0HNS0N(4), Denning appears t o have abandoned t h e 
c o n t r a c t u a l approach i n favour of estoppel but h i s f e l l o w 
jnHrf£»<=! ( P n s l r i 1 1 a.D-d B^OV?™? L JJ ^ 5*dh'?ril?d t o COlr*m T^^^y1.^. 1 
reasoning. This two-pronged approach l e d t o apparent 
c o n f u s i o n on the p a r t of Browne-Wilkinson J. i n RE 
SHARPE, who at one p o i n t i n h i s judgment s a i d of the 
s i t u a t i o n before him: 
" I t seems t o me t h a t t h i s i s a d e c i s i o n t h a t such 
c o n t r a c t u a l or e q u i t a b l e l i c e n c e does confer some 
i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y under a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t . " ( 5 ) 
I n a d d i t i o n i t l e d t o a f l o o d of a r t i c l e s by academic 
w r i t e r s ( 6 ) as t o whether a l i c e n c e can be both of a 
c o n t r a c t u a l and an e s t o p p e l n a t u r e , or whether t h e 
concepts are mutually e x c l u s i v e . This issue and i t s 
importance w i l l be returned t o l a t e r ( 7 ) but f i r s t i t i s 
necessary t o consider the o r i g i n s of estoppel p r i n c i p l e s 
and how they came t o be ap p l i e d t o l i c e n c e cases. 
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" E q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l " i s not a p r i n c i p l e c o n f i n e d t o 
licences t o occupy land but i s of general a p p l i c a t i o n . 
The term l i c e n c e by estoppel seems t o owe i t s o r i g i n s t o 
t h e judgment of Dankwerts J. i n INWARDS v BAKER(8). I t 
i s s u b m i t t e d , however, t h a t t h e terms " l i c e n c e by 
estoppel" or "estoppel l i c e n c e " should be avoided as i t 
suggests there i s a c e r t a i n type of l i c e n c e which may be 
created by estoppel and which i s d i s t i n c t from a bare or 
co n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e . Whereas the t r u t h of the matter i s 
t h a t only subsequent t o i t s c r e a t i o n may a li c e n c e become 
ir r e v o c a b l e on account of estoppel p r i n c i p l e s and these 
may operate whether the li c e n c e t o occupy was merely a 
bare l i c e n c e or arose by c o n t r a c t . 
There are t h r e e types of e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l namely: 
estoppel by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; promissory estoppel; and 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel. I t would appear i n the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of estoppel p r i n c i p l e s t o li c e n c e cases the d i f f e r e n t 
t ypes of e s t o p p e l have been confused and t h e s t r i c t 
requirements, t o be s a t i s f i e d before estoppel p r i n c i p l e s 
o p e r a t e , o v e r l o o k e d . For example, i n CRABB v ARUN 
D.C.(9), Scarman L.J. s a i d he d i d not f i n d t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between promissory and p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel 
u s e f u l , and i n AMALGAMATED INVESTMENTS AND PROPERTY CO. v 
TEXAS COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD. ( 1 0 ) , Goff J. 
doubted whether p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l was a sepa r a t e 
category of estoppel. I t i s intended t o consider b r i e f l y 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o p r i e t a r y and other estoppels 
and then t o tr a c e the development of estoppel p r i n c i p l e s 
as a p p l i e d t o l i c e n c e cases examining how t h e 
requirements have become more relaxed and considering the 
g e n e r a l m e r i t s of t h e approach i n g i v i n g e f f e c t t o 
inf o r m a l f a m i l y and q u a s i - f a m i l y arrangements. 
E s t O D D e l bv r e p r P R P n t a ) - i nn h a s a w o r v 1 onrr h i sf-rir-y and 
i s , moreover, recognised a t common law as w e l l as i n 
equi t y . A c l a s s i c statement of the p r i n c i p l e which was 
adopted by Evershed M.R. i n H0PG00D v BROWN(11) i s t h a t 
given by Spencer Bower and Turner: 
"Where one person ("the representor") has made a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o another person ("the 
representee") i n words or by acts or by conduct or 
(being under a duty t o the representee t o speak or 
act) by s i l e n c e or i n a c t i o n , w i t h the i n t e n t i o n 
( a c t u a l or presumptive) and w i t h the r e s u l t s of 
inducing the representee on the f a u l t of such 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o a l t e r h i s p o s i t i o n t o h i s 
detriment, the representor i n any l i t i g a t i o n which 
may afterwards take place between him and the 
re p r e s e n t e e , i s estopped as a g a i n s t t h e 
re p r e s e n t e e , from making o r a t t e m p t i n g t o 
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e s t a b l i s h by evidence any averment s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
at variance w i t h h i s former r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i f the 
representee a t the proper time and i n the proper 
manner objects t h e r e t o . " ( 1 2 ) 
Two p o i n t s need t o be noted about e s t o p p e l by 
repre s e n t a t i o n : f i r s t l y , , i t depends on a re p r e s e n t a t i o n 
as t o an e x i s t i n g f a c t and secondly, apart from a few 
long e s t a b l i s h e d exceptions, i t cannot found a cause of 
ac t i o n but merely acts n e g a t i v e l y . 
E q u i t y extended t h e d o c t r i n e o f e s t o p p e l by 
represen t a t i o n t o apply not only t o representations of 
e x i s t i n g f a c t s but also t o those of f u t u r e conduct or 
i n t e n t i o n s , i n what has become known as p r o m i s s o r y 
estoppel. This d o c t r i n e began i t s r i s e t o prominence i n 
an o b i t e r d i c t a statement of Denning J. i n CENTRAL LONDON 
PROPERTY TRUST LTD. V HIGH TREES HOUSE LTD.(13) although 
i t s o r i g i n s can be tr a c e d back much f u r t h e r ( 1 4 ) . I t i s 
d i f f e r e n t from e s t o p p e l by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n two 
respects: f i r s t l y , i t seems the e f f e c t of the estoppel 
need not be and u s u a l l y i s not permanent, and thus, a f t e r 
g i v i n g reasonable n o t i c e t o the promisee, the promisor 
may r e v e r t t o h i s o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ( 1 5 ) . Secondly, the 
requirement of detriment appears t o be less s t r i n g e n t , i t 
only being necessary f o r the promisee t o show he has 
committed himself t o a p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n as a 
r e s u l t of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( 1 6 ) . However, l i k e estoppel 
by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , promissory estoppel operates only as a 
defence and cannot create a cause of a c t i o n . I n COMBE v 
COMBE(17), i t was said t h a t promissory estoppel can only 
operate as a " s h i e l d not a sword". 
To t u r n now t o p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel, sometimes known as 
estoppel by encouragement or acquiescence. I n co n t r a s t 
t o b o t h e s t O D D e l hy r p p r p s p n i - a l - i n n «nrl p r o m i s s o r y 
e s t o p p e l , p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l can a c t p o s i t i v e l y , 
c r e a t i n g a claim t o p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s . The d o c t r i n e has 
been concerned almost e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the a c q u i s i t i o n of 
r i g h t s r e l a t i n g t o land but i t seems t h a t i t can be 
extended t o other forms of p r o p e r t y ( 1 8 ) . I t operates 
where one p a r t y knowingly encourages another t o act i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r way or acquiesces i n t h a t other's actions t o 
the infringement of h i s own r i g h t s , and t o the detriment 
of the p a r t y , p l a c i n g r e l i a n c e on the encouragement or 
acquiescence. The c l a s s i c statement of the d o c t r i n e i s 
contained i n the d i s s e n t i n g judgement of Lord Kingsdown 
i n RAMSDEN v DYSON, where he sa i d : 
" I f a man, under a v e r b a l agreement w i t h a 
la n d l o r d f o r a c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t i n land, or what 
amounts t o the same t h i n g , under an expectation 
created or encouraged by the l a n d l o r d t h a t he 
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s h a l l have a c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t , takes possession of 
such land, w i t h the consent of the l a n d l o r d and 
upon the f a i t h of such promise or expectations, 
w i t h the knowledge of the l a n d l o r d and wi t h o u t 
o b j e c t i o n by- him,--lays out money upon the land, a 
court of e q u i t y w i l l compel the l a n d l o r d t o give 
e f f e c t t o the promise or expectation."(19) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n passing t o note t h a t i t appears the 
common law had " a n t i c i p a t e d the r e s u l t reached by e q u i t y 
i n RAMSDEN v DYSON...."(20) i n a l i n e of cases which drew 
a d i s t i n c t i o n between executory and executed l i c e n c e , 
p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r group were i r r e v o c a b l e . 
Although the p r i n c i p l e s were not c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d as 
there are cases where a l i c e n c e had been acted upon but 
was nevertheless found t o be revocable(21), i n WINTER v 
BR0CKWELL(22), where X gave a li c e n c e by p a r o l t o Y t o 
put up a s k y l i g h t which Y subsequently f i t t e d a t some 
expense, i t was h e l d t h a t X, when he r e a l i s e d t h e 
s k y l i g h t stopped l i g h t and a i r coming t o h i s window and 
t h e r e f o r e brought an a c t i o n f o r nui s a n c e , c o u l d n o t 
succeed, at l e a s t not wi t h o u t reimbursing Y the money he 
had spent. The p r i n c i p l e was, moreover, extended i n 
LIGGINS v INGE(23), t o operate against a t h i r d p a r t y . I n 
t h i s case, the p l a i n t i f f ' s predecessor i n t i t l e by p a r o l 
l i c e n c e had authorised the defendant t o cut down and 
lower a bank and erec t a weir on h i s own land which had 
the e f f e c t of d i v e r t i n g water r e q u i r e d f o r t h e 
p l a i n t i f f ' s m i l l i n t o another channel. Consequently, the 
p l a i n t i f f r e q u i red the defendant t o remove the weir and 
resto r e the bank t o i t s former height. I t was held, 
however, t h e defendant was j u s t i f i e d i n r e f u s i n g t o 
comply on account of the p r i n c i p l e t h a t a l i c e n c e , once 
executed, i s not countermandable. 
R e t u r n i n a t o t h e e q n i r a h l o flnptrinB nf p r o p r i e t a r y 
estoppel i n WILLMOTT v BARBER, Fry J. expanded upon the 
do c t r i n e s e t t i n g out the f o l l o w i n g f i v e "probanda": 
" I n the f i r s t place, the p l a i n t i f f must 
have made a mistake as t o h i s l e g a l r i g h t s . 
Secondly, the p l a i n t i f f must have expended some 
money or must have done some act (not n e c e s s a r i l y 
upon the defendant's land) on the f a u l t of h i s 
mistaken b e l i e f . T h i r d l y , t h e defendant, t h e 
possessor of the l e g a l r i g h t , must know of the 
existence of h i s own r i g h t which i s i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h the r i g h t c l a i m e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f . 
F o u r t h l y , t h e def e n d a n t , t h e possessor of t h e 
l e g a l r i g h t , must know of the p l a i n t i f f ' s mistaken 
b e l i e f t o h i s r i g h t s . . . . L a s t l y , the defendant, 
the possessor of t h e l e g a l r i g h t , must have 
encouraged the p l a i n t i f f i n h i s expenditure of 
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money or i n the other acts which he has done, 
e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or by a b s t a i n i n g from a s s e r t i n g 
hi s l e g a l r i g h t . . . . " ( 2 4 ) 
These f i v e probanda have, i n recent times, continued t o 
be s t r i c t l y a p p lied i n some cases whereas i n others they 
have been ignored. For example, i n the recent d e c i s i o n 
of COOMBES v SMITH(25), they were a p p l i e d as they were i n 
E AND L BERG HOMES LTD. v GREY(26), where the p l a i n t i f f 
f a i l e d i n h i s a c t i o n , being unable t o s a t i s f y the f i r s t 
and the f i f t h requirements. I n CRABB v ARUN D.C.(27), 
the probanda were also a p p l i e d , although Scarman L.J. 
took a much broader approach. The p l a i n t i f f i n t h i s case 
claimed a r i g h t of way on account of representations made 
to him t h a t such a r i g h t would be granted t o him and h i s 
successors i n t i t l e and h i s consequential d e t r i m e n t a l 
r e l i a n c e . According t o Scarman L.J., once the court has 
analysed and assessed the conduct and r e l a t i o n s h i p of the 
p a r t i e s , i t has t o answer three questions: 
" F i r s t , i s there an e q u i t y established? Secondly, 
what i s t h e e x t e n t o f t h e e q u i t y i f one i s 
established? And t h i r d l y , what i s the r e l i e f 
appropriate f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g the equity?"(28) 
I n answering h i s f i r s t question, Scarman L.J. commented: 
"The c o u r t . . . . cannot f i n d an e q u i t y e s t a b l i s h e d 
unless i t i s prepared t o go as f a r as t o say t h a t 
i t would be unconscionable and u n j u s t t o allow the 
defendants t o s e t up t h e i r undoubted 
r i g h t s . . . . " ( 2 9 ) 
This would seem t o be tantamount t o saying the court must 
do what i t considers t o be j u s t . I n TAYLOR FASHIONS LTD 
. V LIVERPOOL VICTORIA TRUSTEE CO LTD.(30) a s i m i l a r l y 
f l e x i b l e approach was taken; O l i v e r J., deciding t h a t 
estoppel by acquiescence was not confined t o s i t u a t i o n s 
where the defendant knew h i s r i g h t s , went on t o say t h a t 
the p r i n c i p l e i n RAMSDEN v DYSON: 
"... requires a very much broader approach which i s 
d i r e c t e d t o a s c e r t a i n i n g whether i n p a r t i c u l a r 
i n d i v i d u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t would be 
unconscionable f o r a p a r t y t o be p e r m i t t e d t o deny 
t h a t which, k n o w i n g l y or unknowingly, he has 
allowed or encouraged another t o assume t o h i s 
d e t r i m e n t r a t h e r t h a n i n q u i r i n g whether t h e 
circumstances can be f i t t e d w i t h i n the confines of 
some preconceived formula s e r v i n g as a u n i v e r s a l 
y a r d s t i c k f o r every form o f unconscionable 
behaviour."(31) 
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This broader approach t o p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l was 
followed i n HABIB BANK LTD. v HABIB BANK A-G ZURICH(32) 
and i n AMALGAMATED INVESTMENT AND PROPERTY CO. LTD ( i n 
l i q u i d a t i o n ) v TEXAS COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD 
where Goff J. said: 
"Of a l l d o c t r i n e s , e q u i t a b l e estoppel i s s u r e l y 
one of the most f l e x i b l e . . . . i t cannot be r i g h t t o 
r e s t r i c t [ i t ] t o c e r t a i n d e f i n e d categories."(33) 
Having set out the general p r i n c i p l e s , i t i s now proposed 
t o consider how the d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel has 
been applied t o licences t o occupy land. Although the 
f i r s t reference t o a "l i c e n c e by estoppel" occurs i n 
INWARDS v BAKER, the o r i g i n s of the d o c t r i n e i n i n f o r m a l 
f a m i l y arrangement cases appears t o stem from DILLWYN v 
LLEWELYN(34) . I n t h i s case, a f a t h e r , w i t h o u t executing 
a conveyance, allowed h i s son possession of a farm and 
signed a memorandum saying he had done so i n order t h a t 
hi s son might b u i l d a residence f o r himself. The son 
went i n t o possession and spent £14,000 on b u i l d i n g a 
house. The f a t h e r died two years l a t e r and, by the terms 
of h i s w i l l , the land was l e f t on t r u s t f o r h i s widow. 
In the l i g h t of the above events, the son s u c c e s s f u l l y 
claimed the fee simple. Despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
saying so(35), the arrangement between f a t h e r and son was 
t r e a t e d as being a c o n t r a c t and t h e r e f o r e the basis on 
which e q u i t y was re q u i r e d t o intervene was t o overcome 
the lack of f o r m a l i t i e s on account of the f a c t the son 
had acted on the agreement. Lord Westbury said: 
"So, i f A puts B i n t o possession of a piece of 
land and t e l l s him, " I give i t t o you t h a t you 
may b u i l d a house on i t " , and B, on the s t r e n g t h 
of t h a t promise and w i t h t h e knowledge of A, 
e x n p n f i s a 1 3 ma sum r>-F mnnou i^n Hi l i l t i n g ?. hOU c^ 
a c c o r d i n g l y , I cannot doubt t h a t t h e donee 
acquires a r i g h t from the subsequent t r a n s a c t i o n 
t o c a l l on the donor t o perform the c o n t r a c t ( s i c ) 
and complete t h e i m p e r f e c t d o n a t i o n which was 
made. The case i s somewhat analogous t o t h a t of a 
verbal agreement not bi n d i n g o r i g i n a l l y f o r want 
of a memorandum i n w r i t i n g signed by the p a r t y t o 
be charged, but which becomes b i n d i n g by v i r t u e of 
subsequent p a r t performance."(36) 
This r e a s o n i n g suggests t h a t t h e b a s i s o f e q u i t a b l e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n was more aki n t o the e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e of 
pa r t performance which was l a t e r developed more c l e a r l y 
by the House of Lords i n MADDISON v ALDERSON(37). Had 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between f a t h e r and son not been t r e a t e d 
as c o n t r a c t u a l , t h e circumstances would seem t o be 
equall y f i t t i n g t o estoppel by acquiescence which i s 
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arguably e q u i t y ' s e q u i v a l e n t of the d o c t r i n e of p a r t 
performance i n a non-contractual s i t u a t i o n . INWARDS v 
BAKER(38), argued on the b a s i s of RAMSDEN v DYSON, was 
very s i m i l a r to the f a c t s of DILLWYN v LLEWELYN although 
the outcome was s l i g h t l y dif-ferent. Here a son had 
attempted to negotiate the purchase of a p i e c e of land on 
which to b u i l d a bungalow as h i s own, but the purchase 
p r i c e proved too h i g h . C o n s e q u e n t l y , h i s f a t h e r 
suggested he b u i l d a bungalow on h i s (the f a t h e r ' s land) 
and use the l i m i t e d funds he had to make the bungalow 
bigger. The son took up t h i s suggestion and, encouraged 
by h i s f a t h e r , b u i l t a bungalow on the f a t h e r ' s land, 
l a r g e l y by h i s own labour. The c o s t was approximately 
£300 of which the f a t h e r contributed about h a l f . The son 
went i n t o occupation of the bungalow i n the expectation 
he would be allowed to remain there f o r h i s l i f e time or 
fo r so long as he wished. The f a t h e r never conveyed a 
t i t l e to the land to h i s son and, under h i s w i l l , the 
land was vested i n t r u s t e e s f o r the b e n e f i t of persons 
other than the son. When the t r u s t e e s of the w i l l 
brought proceedings f o r p o s s e s s i o n , the son s u c c e s s f u l l y 
claimed to have a r i g h t to remain i n occupation f o r l i f e . 
Although the expenditure i n money terms was not so great 
compared with DILLWYN v LLEWELYN, the value of the son's 
l a b o u r made the f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n , once a g a i n , 
considerable. 
The next reported case i n which estoppel p r i n c i p l e s were 
adopted was DODSWORTH v D0DSW0RTH(39). although what was 
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the court here was not whether an 
"equity" could be r a i s e d but how the equity, once r a i s e d , 
was to be s a t i s f i e d . B r i e f l y , the p l a i n t i f f , an e l d e r l y 
woman, persuaded her younger brother and s i s t e r - i n - l a w to 
come and l i v e with her i n her bungalow on t h e i r r e t u r n 
from abroad. They agreed to do so and spent £711 on 
improvements to t h e b u n g a l o w i n t h e p x p e r t a - t - i on . 
encouraged by the p l a i n t i f f , t h a t they would be able to 
make the bungalow t h e i r home as long as they wished. 
Unfortunately, the s h a r i n g arrangement d i d not prove to 
be a happy one and so the p l a i n t i f f , having asked the 
couple to leave, began proceedings f o r p o s s e s s i o n . Once 
again, the e s s e n t i a l s of estoppel by acquiescence s e t out 
above, seem to have been c l e a r l y s a t i s f i e d . As i n the 
e a r l i e r cases d i s c u s s e d , the p l a i n t i f f had encouraged the 
defendants to a c t to t h e i r detriment by spending a not 
i n c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of money on the property i n the 
b e l i e f they could make i t t h e i r home f o r l i f e . 
GRIFFITHS v WILLIAMS(40) seems to mark the beginnings of 
a departure from the s t r i c t requirements f o r a c l a i m 
based on p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l t o s u c c e e d . As w i t h 
DODSWORTH v DODSWORTH, i t concerned an a c t i o n f o r 
possession of a house by executors. Under her w i l l , the 
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t e s t a t r i x had l e f t the house i n question to her grand-
daughter but her daughter had l i v e d t h ere with her f o r 
most of her l i f e and had, morevover, been assured by the 
t e s t a t r i x t h a t t h e house was h e r home f o r l i f e . 
Consequently, the daughter spent a l l her own c a p i t a l 
savings (£2,000) on the house, p a r t l y on improvements but 
some of the money went on outgoings. On these f a c t s , 
the Court of Appeal (Megaw, Orr, Goff L . J J . ) decided 
estoppel p r i n c i p l e s operated. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note 
t h a t Goff L . J . , g i v i n g the judgement of the c o u r t , 
d e s c r i b e d the c a s e as one of " p r o m i s s o r y e s t o p p e l " , 
despite the absence of any suggestions t h a t there had 
been a c o n t r a c t f o r occupation between the t e s t a t r i x and 
her daughter. Goff L . J . approached t h e i s s u e by 
following the guidance l a i d down by Scarman L . J . i n CRABB 
v ARUN(41). I t was argued by counsel f o r the executors 
that on account of the requirements l a i d down i n WILLMOTT 
v BARBER(42), the daughter's c l a i m must f a i l because, a t 
the time she c a r r i e d out the improvements, the t e s t a t r i x 
d i d not know of the da u g h t e r ' s m i s t a k e as t o her 
p o s i t i o n . However, Goff L . J . expressed the view t h a t 
t h i s was not necessary and, i n so f a r as i t was necessary 
to show a mistake, the daughter had made a s u f f i c i e n t 
mistake i n b e l i e v i n g she would be allowed to s t a y i n the 
house f o r her whole l i f e . The case i s a l s o n o t i c e a b l y 
d i f f e r e n t from those which had gone before i t i n the 
respect t h a t t h i s was the f i r s t case i n which there had 
been no encouragement f o r the daughter to expend money on 
taking up occupation of the house; she had l i v e d i n the 
house and then subsequently, b e l i e v i n g she could remain 
there f o r l i f e , spent money on i t . 
WILLIAMS v STAITE(43) continued the trend towards the 
r e l a x a t i o n of the s t r i c t requirements of estoppel by 
acquiescence i n l i c e n c e c a s e s , although, l i k e DODSWORTH v 
DODSWORTH. t h e n n n r t wan not" r a l l p r f nnnn t o <3s»t.prnn DP 
whether an equity could be r a i s e d , but whether i t was 
revocable on account of subsequent bad conduct. Here, i t 
w i l l be remembered(44), a mother granted her daughter and 
son-in-law permission to l i v e i n a cottage owned by her 
as long as t h e y w i s h e d . The young c o u p l e made no 
payments towards the purchase p r i c e of the property. 
Thus, u n l i k e the e a r l i e r c a s e s d i s c u s s e d , the 
arrangement d i d not i n v o l v e any encouragement o r 
acquiescence on the p a r t of the l i c e n s o r to spend money 
on the property. The mother simply promised they could 
l i v e i n the cottage as long as they wished. The couple 
did i n f a c t spend some money on the property, although 
t h i s only amounted to about £100 over a period of eleven 
years. T h i s i s hardly comparable with the sums spent i n 
e a r l i e r reported l i c e n c e c a s e s . Moreover, there i s no 
evidence i n the report as to how the money was spent; 
given the sums involved, i t may w e l l have been on r e p a i r s 
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to the property on account of wear and t e a r , r a t h e r than 
improvements, and, i n GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS(45), Goff L . J . 
s a i d t h a t the former type of expenditure was i n s u f f i c i e n t 
to r a i s e an equity. Nevertheless, even though, on the 
f a c t s of WILLIAMS v STAITE, there was no inducement to 
spend money on the property, there was encouragement on 
the p a r t of the mother to take up her o f f e r i n s t e a d of 
t a k i n g a house which went w i t h the son-in-law's job. 
I n f i n d i n g e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s o p e r a t e d , Goff L . J . 
appeared to be f o l l o w i n g once again the broader approach 
to estoppel cases o u t l i n e d by Scarman L . J . i n CRABB v 
ARUN D.C(46). However, under t h i s approach, an estoppel 
may only be r a i s e d i f there i s unconscionable behaviour. 
But on the b a s i s of the d e t a i l s given i n the r e p o r t , i t 
i s questionable whether the mother's behaviour could be 
d e s c r i b e d as unconscionable. On the evidence accepted by 
the court, the mother s a i d "You can l i v e i n .... and have 
[the cottage] as a wedding present. You can l i v e there 
as long as. you wish." I n the l i g h t of the surrounding 
circumstances, p a r t i c u l a r l y the understanding t h a t the 
daughter would care f o r her parents, i t may be p o s s i b l e 
to construe the mother's i n t e n t i o n as being merely one to 
grant r i g h t s to remain i n the cottage r e n t f r e e so long 
as the parents, or at l e a s t one of them, was a l i v e . 
Moreover, f a c t o r s which might a f f e c t a f i n d i n g of 
unconscionable behaviour on the p a r t of the mother, such 
as the value of her e s t a t e , the terms of the w i l l , how 
many c h i l d r e n the e s t a t e had to be shared between, are 
l e f t undiscussed i n the r e p o r t . For example, even i f the 
i n t e n t i o n had been to grant a l i f e i n t e r e s t , i f the 
e s t a t e was s m a l l and o t h e r c h i l d r e n may have been 
d e p r i v e d of b e n e f i t i n g from i t , g i v e n the minimal 
expenditure on the property, one could argue t h a t the 
mother's b e h a v i o u r c o u l d h a r d l y be d e s c r i b e d as 
u n c o n s c i o n a b l e by her m e r e f a i l u r e t-.p n e r f e r t a n 
imperfect g i f t . 
Not long a f t e r the d e c i s i o n i n WILLIAMS v STAITE, PASCOE 
v TURNER(47) provided an example of e q u i t y at i t s most 
f l e x i b l e , l a y i n g down minimal requirements necessary i n 
order to r e l y on p r i n c i p l e s of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel. The 
defendant i n t h i s c a s e had become f r i e n d l y w i t h the 
p l a i n t i f f who was a small businessman and had e v e n t u a l l y 
moved i n t o h i s home, f i r s t as a housekeeper and a s s i s t a n t 
to h i s business and l a t e r as h i s m i s t r e s s , although she 
continued to help with the b u s i n e s s . He gave her £3 a 
week housekeeping money, but she paid f o r her own c l o t h e s 
and personal e f f e c t s . E v e n t u a l l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p broke 
down and the p l a i n t i f f l e f t the defendant f o r another 
woman and l a t e r sued f o r p o s s e s s i o n of the house. The 
court accepted evidence to the e f f e c t t h a t the p l a i n t i f f 
had t o l d the defendant not to worry about her s e c u r i t y as 
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the house and i t s c o n t e n t s were h e r s , but he n e v e r 
conveyed the t i t l e to the house to her. Despite t h i s , 
the defendant continued to l i v e i n the house and, to the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s knowledge, spend a s m a l l sum of money, 
approximately £230 ( t h i s d i d , however, represent about 
one quarter of her investment c a p i t a l ) on improving and 
r e p a i r i n g the property. The defendant's defence to a 
c l a i m f o r p o s s e s s i o n was based on the d o c t r i n e of 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel. T h i s was accepted by the Court of 
Appeal who ordered the e q u i t y be s a t i s f i e d by conveyance 
of the fee simple to the defendant. 
Once again, i t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t , i n c o n t r a s t to e a r l y 
c a s e s , the element of e x p e n d i t u r e was l i m i t e d . 
Furthermore, i t i s c l e a r from the report not a l l the 
money was spent on improvements; some went on r e p a i r s , 
but, i n c o n t r a s t to GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS(48), no i s s u e was 
made of t h i s . The Court of Appeal was obviously aware of 
the l i m i t e d expenditure compared to e a r l i e r c a s e s , as 
Cummings-Bruce L . J . commented: 
"Then i t may r e a s o n a b l y be h e l d t h a t [ t h e 
p l a i n t i f f ' s ] expenditure and e f f o r t can h a r d l y be 
regarded as comparable to the change of p o s i t i o n 
of those who have constructed b u i l d i n g s on land 
over which they have no l e g a l r i g h t s . T h i s court 
a p p r e c i a t e s t h a t the moneys l a i d out were much 
l e s s than i n some cases i n the books. But the 
c o u r t has t o look a t a l l the 
circumstances...."(49) 
Looking at a l l the circumstances i n v o l v e s not looking a t 
the money expended i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e v a l u e of t h e 
property, as i n e a r l i e r c a s e s , but looking a t the money 
expended i n r e l a t i o n to the means of the l i c e n s e e . Much 
i s made of the f a c t t h a t the* de»f p n r i a n t w a s a wiHnw i n h p r 
middle f i f t i e s , with l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s . During 
the period she had l i v e d w ith the p l a i n t i f f she had 
reduced her c a p i t a l from £4,500 to £1,000, and she had 
now spent a quarter of the £1,000, l e a v i n g her with only 
a minimal amount of c a p i t a l and an i n v a l i d i t y pension. 
What i s more, t h e c o u r t took i n t o a c c o u n t the 
considerably more fort u n a t e p o s i t i o n of the l i c e n s o r , 
Cummings-Bruce p o i n t i n g out: 
"Compared to her. . . . the p l a i n t i f f was a r i c h 
man."(50) 
In d eciding whether estoppel p r i n c i p l e s operated, the 
court appeared to be t a k i n g i n t o account the kind of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e l e v a n t i n a divorce court on breakdown 
of marriage, namely the r e l a t i v e means of the p a r t i e s and 
t h e i r conduct. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t counsel i n 
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COOMBES v SMITH(51), i n c o n s i d e r i n g the way i n which the 
equity was s a t i s f i e d i n PASCOE v TURNER, r e f e r r e d to the 
conveyance of the f e e s i m p l e t o t h e defendant as 
a c h i e v i n g a " c l e a n break", c l e a r l y analogous t o the 
con s i d e r a t i o n s a divorce court i s re q u i r e d , so f a r as 
p o s s i b l e , to give e f f e c t to on breakdown of marriage 
s i n c e the p a s s i n g of the M a t r i m o n i a l and F a m i l y 
Proceedings Act 1984, amending S.25 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973. Although the r e c o g n i t i o n of a c t s of 
detriment other than p u r e l y expenditure on property i s a 
welcome r e l a x a t i o n of the r e q u i r e m e n t s t o r e l y 
s u c c e s s f u l l y on the d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel, i t 
i s q u e s t i o n a b l e as t o how f a r the s u r r o u n d i n g 
circumstances should be taken i n t o account, bearing i n 
mind the problems t h i s could pose where a t h i r d p a r t y was 
involved. T h i s i s s u e w i l l be taken up i n the Se c t i o n 
which d i s c u s s e s p o s s i b l e p o l i c y o b j e c t i o n s to r e l i a n c e on 
estoppel p r i n c i p l e s i n l i c e n c e c a s e s . ( 5 2 ) 
The other i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of PASCOE v TURNER i s the 
court's understanding of u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y . With regard 
to t h i s , Cummings-Bruce L . J . s a i d of the p l a i n t i f f : 
"....he i s determined to pursue h i s purpose of 
e v i c t i n g [the defendant] from the house by any 
l e g a l means a t h i s d i s p o s a l w i t h a r u t h l e s s 
d i s r e g a r d f o r o b l i g a t i o n s b i n d i n g on h i s 
conscience."(53) 
There does not appear to be any evidence of " r u t h l e s s " 
behaviour on the p a r t of the p l a i n t i f f . According to the 
f a c t s , as s t a t e d i n the report, he merely had a q u a r r e l 
with the defendant and made up h i s mind he was going to 
get her out of the house and r e l y on what were, a f t e r 
a l l , h i s s t r i c t l e g a l r i g h t s to do so. He may w e l l have 
p r o m i s e d ho tnakp h p r a rri-fh r»f hhe» h n n s p hnh hf» was r m i h i a 
at l i b e r t y to change h i s mind; t h i s i s s u r e l y what l i e s 
behind the maxim, "equity w i l l not p e r f e c t an imperfect 
g i f t " . Moreover, one of the fu n c t i o n s behind r e q u i r i n g 
l e g a l f o r m a l i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n to t r a n s a c t i o n s concerning 
land i s to p r o t e c t the donor from t a k i n g r a s h d e c i s i o n s . 
Why then should equity step i n and p e r f e c t the imperfect 
g i f t ? Admittedly, the p l a i n t i f f had l u l l e d the defendant 
i n t o a f a l s e sense of s e c u r i t y but one would have thought 
th a t , i n those circumstances, the e q u i t y could have been 
s a t i s f i e d by g i v i n g her a t most a l i f e i n t e r e s t i n the 
property. One of the reasons f o r not con f i n i n g her 
i n t e r e s t to the l a t t e r was apparently because of f e a r s 
concerning the p l a i n t i f f ' s f u t u r e behaviour towards the 
defendant. I t was suggested he may f i n d excuses f o r 
ent e r i n g the property, f o r example, to c a r r y out r e p a i r s . 
However, the report provides no i n d i c a t i o n s of v i o l e n c e 
or p e s t e r i n g of the defendant by the p l a i n t i f f , but 
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simply evidence he was determined to recover p o s s e s s i o n 
of the house and t h e r e f o r e refused to compromise the 
c l a i m b e f o r e the h e a r i n g . I t seems u n r e a s o n a b l e t o 
des c r i b e a p l a i n t i f f as " r u t h l e s s " simply because he 
appears i n f l e x i b l e i n r e l i a n c e on h i s s t r i c t l e g a l 
r i g h t s , and e s p e c i a l l y i n the circumstances of PASCOE v 
TURNER, where, i n the l i g h t of e a r l i e r reported c a s e s , 
one might w e l l have d e s c r i b e d the chances of the defence 
s u c c e e d i n g on the b a s i s of p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l as 
somewhat s l i m . 
RE SHARPE(54) continued the l i b e r a l approach to estoppel 
i n l i c e n c e c a s e s , a l t h o u g h t h e e x t e n t t o which the 
d e c i s i o n was based on estoppel p r i n c i p l e s i s not t o t a l l y 
c l e a r . However, Browne-Wilkinson J . d i d comment on how 
recent cases had extended the d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y 
e s t o p p e l . A f t e r r e f e r r i n g t o RAMSDEN v DYSON, he 
observed the d o c t r i n e now appeared to be: 
" I f the p a r t i e s have proceeded on the common 
assumption t h a t the p l a i n t i f f i s to enjoy a r i g h t 
to r e s i d e i n a p a r t i c u l a r property and i n r e l i a n c e 
on t h a t assumption, the p l a i n t i f f expends money or 
otherwise a c t s to h i s detriment, the defendant 
w i l l not be allowed to go back on t h a t common 
assumption and the court w i l l imply an i r r e v o c a b l e 
l i c e n c e or t r u s t which w i l l give e f f e c t to t h a t 
common assumption."(55) 
GREASLEY v COOK(56) was the next reported l i c e n c e case i n 
which p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel was argued. The defendant i n 
t h i s case had i n 1938 entered i n t o a household as a maid 
to the then owner but from 1946 onwards she cohabited 
with one of the owner's sons, Kenneth. Upon h i s f a t h e r ' s 
death, Kenneth and one of h i s brothers, Howard, i n h e r i t e d 
the house i n e q u a l s h a r e s . Tho rtefonrtant continued to 
look a f t e r the household g e n e r a l l y and i n p a r t i c u l a r a 
handicapped s i s t e r , but she r e c e i v e d no payment f o r her 
e f f o r t s and n e i t h e r d i d she ask f o r payment. She was, 
however, encouraged by Kenneth and Howard to b e l i e v e she 
could regard the house as her home f o r the r e s t of her 
l i f e . When Kenneth died, he l e f t h i s share i n the 
property to another brother, Hedley. As the defendant 
was, by t h i s time, alone i n occupation of the property, 
Hedley and the b e n e f i c i a r i e s who had i n h e r i t e d Howard's 
h a l f s h a r e on h i s i n t e s t a c y , s e r v e d n o t i c e on the 
defendant r e q u i r i n g p o s s e s s i o n . The defendant 
counterclaimed t h a t they were estopped from e v i c t i n g her 
and t h a t she was e n t i t l e d to occupy rent f r e e f o r the 
r e s t of her l i f e . The Court of Appeal upheld t h i s c laim. 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note the s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h i s 
case and MADDISON v ALDERSON(57) where the House of Lords 
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d i s m i s s e d the d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l as 
i n a p p l i c a b l e . I n t h a t c a s e , the d e f e n d a n t had been 
housekeeper to the p l a i n t i f f ' s predecessor i n t i t l e f o r 
27 y e a r s . She, l i k e the defendant i n GREASLEY v COOKE, 
had r e c e i v e d no remuneration and gave up -a- proposal of 
marriage on the f a i t h of an o r a l promise t h a t , i f she 
continued to l i v e w i t h the owner of the property, he 
would leave her a l i f e i n t e r e s t i n the property. He d i d 
i n f a c t draw up a w i l l to t h i s e f f e c t , but i t was 
unattested and, as such, i n v a l i d . Unfortunately, the 
a l t e r n a t i v e argument put forward, namely the doctine of 
p a r t performance, a l s o f a i l e d as the a c t s done by the 
defendant were not c o n s i d e r e d t o be u n e q u i v o c a l l y 
r e f e r a b l e to the c o n t r a c t . 
The appeal i n GREASLEY v COOKE was on a very narrow 
i s s u e . The t r i a l judge had found t h a t there was no 
estoppel as the defendant had not proved she had acted to 
her detriment by reason of the assurances of r e s i d e n t i a l 
s e c u r i t y made to her. I t appears t h a t , although the 
defendant had worked without payment, she could not show 
that t h i s was by reason of the assurances as, on the 
evidence, she had worked without payment even before any 
promises were made to her. However, the Court of Appeal 
(Lord Denning M.R., W a l l e r and Dunn L . J J . ) reversed the 
d e c i s i o n of the t r i a l judge on the ground t h a t , once i t 
had been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the defendant had been l e d to 
b e l i e v e she could s t a y i n the house, i t was up to the 
p l a i n t i f f s to prove she had not acted to her detriment i n 
r e l i a n c e on the assurances. Nevertheless, the judgment 
of Lord Denning c l e a r l y went much f u r t h e r than t h i s as he 
went on to say t h a t i t was unnecessary f o r the p a r t y 
e s t a b l i s h i n g p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel to show an element of 
detriment at a l l . He commented: 
"T R P P that- -in Rn«all'« P r i n r i n l o R o f F m i i t y . 27f-h 
e d i t i o n (1973), p. 565, i t i s s a i d : "A. must have 
in c u r r e d expenditure or otherwise have p r e j u d i c e d 
h i m s e l f . " But I do not t h i n k t h a t t h a t i s 
necessary. I t i s s u f f i c i e n t i f the party, to whom 
the assurance i s given, a c t s on the f a i t h of i t -
i n such circumstances t h a t i t would be u n j u s t and 
i n e q u i t a b l e f o r the p a r t y making the assurances to 
go back on i t . . . . " ( 5 8 ) 
As Jphnarhan P a r k e r Q.C. p o i n t e d out i n COOMBES v 
SMITHHj5jr£r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with e a r l i e r a u t h o r i t i e s and not supported by the judgments of Waller 
and Dunn L . J J . i n t h e same c a s e . Removal of the 
requirement of detriment would f u r t h e r the move towards a 
d o c t r i n e of changed p o s i t i o n which a l r e a d y seems to be 
evident i n both the judgments i n WILLIAMS v STAITE(60) 
and more p a r t i c u l a r l y PASCOE v TURNER(61), by not 
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a t t a c h i n g importance to expenditure or other detriment i n 
r e l a t i o n to the land i t s e l f . Under such a d o c t r i n e , a l l 
that i s required i s to show encouragement or acquiescence 
which r e s u l t s i n the l i c e n s e e a r r a n g i n g h i s or her 
a f f a i r s i n a_ p a r t i c u l a r way on—account of- a mistaken 
b e l i e f as to t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the property. Given the 
cost of g i v i n g e f f e c t to informal f a m i l y arrangements i n 
terms of i n t r o d u c i n g an element of u n c e r t a i n t y i n 
r e l a t i o n to t i t l e to land, i t i s submitted such a l i b e r a l 
approach swings the balance too f a r i n favour of the 
l i c e n s e e . 
The recent d e c i s i o n of COOMBES v SMITH may, however, mark 
the beginnings of a r e v e r s a l to a s t r i c t e r approach to 
the use of the d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l i n 
l i c e n c e c a s e s . The f a c t s were q u i t e simple. At the time 
when th e y formed a r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e p l a i n t i f f and 
defendant were both m a r r i e d t o o t h e r p a r t i e s . They 
decided to l i v e together and have a c h i l d . Consequently, 
when the p l a i n t i f f became pregnant by the defendant, she 
l e f t her husband, gave up her job, and moved i n t o a house 
purchased by the defendant. A f t e r the b i r t h of the 
c h i l d , the defendant s o l d the f i r s t house and bought 
another f o r the p l a i n t i f f to l i v e i n , so t h a t she was 
nearer h i s place of work. The p l a i n t i f f redecorated t h i s 
house on s e v e r a l o ccasions, i n s t a l l e d d e c o r a t i v e beams 
and improved the garden. She twice asked the defendant 
i f he would t r a n s f e r the t i t l e to the house i n t o t h e i r 
j o i n t names but he refused, although he always assured 
her he would provide a roof over her head. Ten years 
l a t e r , the r e l a t i o n s h i p broke down. The defendant 
o f f e r e d the p l a i n t i f f £10,000 to move out of the house, 
but she r e f u s e d t h i s and commenced a f f i l i a t i o n 
proceedings. T h i s l e d the defendant to agree to allow 
the p l a i n t i f f to occupy the house u n t i l the c h i l d of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p reached 17 years of age. Despite t h i s ; the* p l a i n t i f f commenced an a c t i o n seeking e i t h e r an order f o r 
the conveyance of the property to her a b s o l u t e l y or a 
d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t she was e n t i t l e d to occupy f o r l i f e 
e i t h e r on account of the e x i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e or p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel. The c l a i m on both bases 
f a i l e d . 
The p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel argument d i d not succeed, among 
other reasons, because Jonathan Parker Q.C. was of the 
opinion t h a t no mistaken b e l i e f could be e s t a b l i s h e d . On 
the f a c t s of the case, t h i s involved a mistaken b e l i e f on 
the p a r t of the p l a i n t i f f t h a t she could remain i n the 
property a f t e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p was over. Although the 
defendant had assured the p l a i n t i f f she would always be 
looked a f t e r and would have a roof over her head, 
according to the judge, such assurances could only be 
understood to r e f e r to the s i t u a t i o n so long as the 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p l a s t e d . I n any case, agreeing to provide a 
roof over the p l a i n t i f f ' s head was not the same as 
agreeing she could s t a y i n the house a g a i n s t h i s wishes. 
Whilst not di s a g r e e i n g w i t h the outcome of the case, i t 
seems i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t such a s s u r a n c e s s h o u l d be 
construed as r e l a t i n g only to the continuance of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . Surely, during t h i s time the p l a i n t i f f 
would have presumed her p o s i t i o n i n the house, or one 
s i m i l a r t o i t , was s e c u r e . Any a n x i e t y about h e r 
p o s i t i o n must have been r e l a t e d to the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p breaking down. Moreover, one ground on 
which Jonathan Parker Q.C. d i s t i n g u i s h e d PASCOE v TURNER 
was on the ground that the assurances of s e c u r i t y i n th a t 
case were made a f t e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p was ended, whereas, 
i n the i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e y were made d u r i n g t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t i s submitted t h a t t h i s should make no 
d i f f e r e n c e . The encouragement and acquiescence i n the 
ma j o r i t y of l i c e n c e cases r e f e r r e d to was made during the 
continuance of a f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s h i p ; was the judge 
suggesting that a f r i e n d l y assurance i s not to be taken 
s e r i o u s l y ? 
The c a s e c l e a r l y marks a much s t r i c t e r approach t o 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel than t h a t taken i n recent c a s e s . 
I n s t e a d of fol l o w i n g the broader approach of Scarman L . J . 
i n CRABB v ARUN D.C.(61), Jonathan Parker Q.C. i n s i s t s 
t h a t the f i v e probanda s e t out i n WILLMOTT v BARBER(62) 
should a l l be s a t i s f i e d . I n a d d i t i o n , i t has been seen 
t h a t , i n r e c e n t c a s e s , t h e c o u r t s have been moving 
towards a d o c t r i n e of changed p o s i t i o n , p a y i n g l e s s 
a t t e n t i o n t o the e x p e n d i t u r e or o t h e r d e t r i m e n t i n 
r e l a t i o n to the property i t s e l f . I n COOMBES v SMITH, the 
p l a i n t i f f had argued d e t r i m e n t on the b a s i s of ( i ) 
allowing h e r s e l f to become pregnant and to give b i r t h to 
the c h i l d ; ( i i ^ l e a v i n g h e r h u s h a n d a n d m o v i n g i n f o t-ho 
house provided by the defendant; ( i i i ) looking a f t e r the 
property and the c h i l d of the r e l a t i o n s h i p as w e l l as 
being prepared f o r the defendant's v i s i t s ; and ( i v ) not 
looking f o r a job or other form of s e c u r i t y . None of 
these f a c t o r s were s u f f i c i e n t i n the view of Jonathan 
Parker Q.C., although not looking f o r another job or 
s e c u r i t y would appear to be the only element of detriment 
which c o u l d have been c l a i m e d by the defendant i n 
GREASLEY v COOKE. L o r d Denning M.R. i n t h a t c a s e 
suggested t h a t , had i t not been f o r the assurances made 
to her, the defendant may w e l l have f e l t i t necessary to 
leave the employment of the p l a i n t i f f and f i n d s e c u r i t y 
elsewhere before she became too old. The only d i f f e r e n c e 
between t he two c a s e s would appear t o be t h a t , i n 
GREASLEY v COOKE, the defendant, D o r i s Cooke, was a 
s p i n s t e r aged 58 and had no c a p i t a l a s s e t s , whereas i n 
COOMBES v SMITH, although the age of the p l a i n t i f f i s not 
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given, she was obviously much younger and, moreover, 
p o s s i b l y had a cla i m f o r f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n a g a i n s t her 
husband. Therefore, the degree of i n s e c u r i t y to which 
Doris Cooke exposed h e r s e l f was f a r g r e a t e r than t h a t of 
Mrs . Coombes . - A g r e a t e r c o n s i s t e n c y of approach could 
perhaps have been a c h i e v e d by a c c e p t i n g t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f i n COOMBES v SMITH had acted to her detriment 
s u f f i c i e n t l y to r a i s e an e q u i t y on t h e b a s i s of 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l , but t h a t when i t came t o the 
q u e s t i o n as t o how the e q u i t y s h o u l d be s a t i s f i e d , 
r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t she had only been l u l l e d i n t o a f a l s e 
sense of s e c u r i t y to a l i m i t e d extent. The equ i t y could 
then have been s a t i s f i e d by al l o w i n g her to remain i n the 
property u n t i l the c h i l d of the r e l a t i o n s h i p reached age 
17, which was what the defendant had o f f e r e d her anyway. 
I t does not appear however, t h a t the s t r i c t approach of 
COOMBES v SMITH w i l l be c o n s i s t e n t l y maintained. T h i s i s 
apparant from the d e c i s i o n i n RE BASHAM(deceased)(64). 
The p l a i n t i f f i n t h i s case was not s p e c i f i c a l l y c l a i m i n g 
to have an i r r e v o c a b l e l i c e n c e to occupy on account of 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel, but was seeking a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t 
she was e n t i t l e d to her deceased s t e p - f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e 
because the s t e p - f a t h e r had encouraged and induced her i n 
the expectation or b e l i e f t h a t she would r e c e i v e the 
e s t a t e on h i s death. The deceased owned a cottage and had 
apparently, on a number of occasions i n d i c a t e d to the 
p l a i n t i f f she would get the cottage on h i s death i n 
re t u r n f o r a l l she had done f o r the deceased i n c a r i n g 
f o r him over the years and i n working f o r the deceased 
unpaid i n h i s b u s i n e s s . I n f a c t t h e d e c e a s e d d i e d 
i n t e s t a t e and consequently the p l a i n t i f f had no cl a i m 
over h i s e s t a t e . 
On these f a c t s Mr. Edward Nugee Q.C d e r i d e d t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d to the e n t i r e e s t a t e under the 
d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l , even though t h e 
expectation r e l a t e d to a fut u r e r i g h t and n o n - s p e c i f i c 
p r o p e r t y ( 6 5 ) . I n reaching h i s d e c i s i o n much r e l i a n c e was 
placed on the somewhat f l e x i b l e approach of Lord Denning 
i n GREASLEY v C00KE(66). However, what i s of g r e a t e r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e i s the f a c t t h a t Mr. Edward Nugee e x p r e s s l y 
denied t h a t i t was any longer necessary to s a t i s f y the 
' f i v e probanda' s e t out i n WILLMOTT v BARBER(67), 
r e l i g i o s l y adhered to i n COOMBES v SMITH. Quoting the 
words of Lord Tennyson to the e f f e c t t h a t the law "slowly 
broadens down from p r e c e d e n t t o p r e c e d e n t " ( 6 8 ) , he 
explained that the law had developed. I n the l i g h t of 
t h i s d e c i s i o n i t would be premature to suggest t h a t the 
courts are tending to r e v e r t to a s t r i c t approach to the 
use of the do c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel. 
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( i i ) Can a l i c e n c e be contracted and 
i r r e v o c a b l e on account of p r o p r i e t a r y 
estoppel? 
Having considered the way- i n which estoppel p r i n c i p l e s 
have been a p p l i e d to l i c e n c e c a s e s , we are now i n the 
p o s i t i o n to c o n s i d e r t h e c o n f u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g t h e 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of a l i c e n c e as c o n t r a c t u a l and the 
relevance or otherwise of estoppel p r i n c i p l e s . Some 
academic w r i t e r s have expressed the view t h a t c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e s and e s t o p p e l l i c e n c e s cannot o v e r l a p ( l ) ; 
consequently once the court c h a r a c t e r i s e s the l i c e n c e as 
being c o n t r a c t u a l i n nature, i t cannot go on to f i n d t h a t 
i t i s a l s o i r r e v o c a b l e on the b a s i s of estoppel. The main 
tenets of the argument are th a t c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s are 
p r e c i s e i n nature, whereas estoppel l i c e n c e s are more 
vague; i n a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s i t u a t i o n the l i c e n s e e 
a c t s to h i s detriment on account of a promise made, 
whereas i n an estoppel s i t u a t i o n the a c t of detriment 
f o l l o w s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; and f i n a l l y , a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e i n v o l v e s an element of request not necessary i n 
estoppel s i t u a t i o n s . 
The view t h a t c o n t r a c t u a l and estoppel p r i n c i p l e s are 
mutually e x c l u s i v e i n l i c e n c e cases would arguably seem 
to be supported by the judgement of Scarman L . J . i n the i 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e case o f CHANDLER v KERLEY(2), which 
has r e c e n t l y been quoted with approval by Jonathan Parker 
Q.C. i n COOMBES v SMITH(3). He s a i d of the defendant i n 
that case: 
" I f she cannot e s t a b l i s h . . . . a l i c e n c e . . . . she 
cannot e s t a b l i s h an equity, f o r no question of 
estoppel a r i s e s . . . . i f the defendant can e s t a b l i s h 
a l i c e n c e f o r l i f e , there i s n e i t h e r room nor need 
•For a n ortn if ahl^o i n t ? T ? ? t J.f. s h e r a n n n l -
e s t a b l i s h such a l i c e n c e (express or implied) she 
cannot e s t a b l i s h an equ i t y f o r no question of 
estoppel a r i s e s i n t h i s c a s e . " ( 4 ) 
I t has al r e a d y been noted(5) t h a t there are suggestions 
i n other cases t h a t a l i c e n c e may be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as 
both c o n t r a c t u a l and e q u i t a b l e . I t was suggested t h a t 
the p r o b a b l e m o t i v a t i o n f o r the f u s i o n of the two 
concepts was a s u b t l e attempt to c r o s s the chasm from 
personal to p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s . Moreover, the view was 
a l s o expressed t h a t , i n many of the informal arrangement 
cases where a c o n t r a c t has been implied, t h i s f i n d i n g was 
u n j u s t i f i e d ( 6 ) . I t w i l l be seen l a t e r t h a t most of the 
cases were i n s t a n c e s of e s t o p p e l ( 7 ) . However, i t i s not 
impossible t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may be create d i n a 
family s i t u a t i o n and, to t h i s extent, i t i s necessary to 
consider whether i t could a l s o be i r r e v o c a b l e on account 
205 
of estoppel. 
The importance of the i s s u e of whether c o n t r a c t u a l and 
estoppel l i c e n c e s may overlap, l i e s with the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n f i n d i n g t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e per se binds- a 
t h i r d party. I t seems l i c e n c e s i r r e v o c a b l e on account of 
estoppel may bind t h i r d p a r t i e s ( 8 ) . I f the f i n d i n g of a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e precludes e n f o r c e a b i l i t y on the b a s i s 
of e s t o p p e l , a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n s e e may, i n some 
circumstances, be i n a more p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n than a 
l i c e n s e e who i s found not to be occupying by v i r t u e of 
some express or implied c o n t r a c t . 
I n support of the view t h a t c o n t r a c t u a l and estoppel 
l i c e n c e s are mutually e x c l u s i v e , i t has been suggested 
t h a t ( 9 ) the d i f f e r e n c e between c o n t r a c t u a l and estoppel 
l i c e n c e s i s t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may be reasonably 
p r e c i s e l y defined, whereas estoppels are much more vague 
i n nature. Consequently, where there i s an agreement on 
c l e a r terms, su p p o r t e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the l i c e n c e 
should be enforceable on the b a s i s of c o n t r a c t ; and i t 
i s dishonest to r e l y on p r i n c i p l e s of estoppel simply to 
overcome the problem of e n f o r c e a b i l i t y a g a i n s t t h i r d 
p a r t i e s . However, although t h i s brings out one of the 
important reasons why many of the f a m i l y arrangement 
cases are i n c o r r e c t l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d as c o n t r a c t u a l but 
would be supportable on the b a s i s of estoppel, namely, 
l a c k of c e r t a i n t y , i t i s by no means an adequate 
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between l i c e n c e s 
i r r e v o c a b l e on account of e s t o p p e l and c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e s . I n IVES v H I GH(IO), where t h e r e was an 
informal agreement to allow the foundations of a b u i l d i n g 
to remain on the defendant's land i n r e t u r n f o r a r i g h t 
of way over the p l a i n t i f f ' s land, there was a reasonably 
p r e c i s e l y defined agreement but such agreement was only 
enforceable nn t h p hapsiR n-f »sf-pnp<=»l, Th<? '"OuT^ found 
the "agreement was complete"; the reason why no c l a i m 
could be made i n c o n t r a c t was because the c o n t r a c t was 
not i n p r o p e r form and t h e r e f o r e u n e n f o r c e a b l e ( 1 1 ) . 
Nevertheless, r i g h t s subsequently arose on the b a s i s of 
estoppel. 
A second d i s t i n c t i o n between c o n t r a c t u a l and s o - c a l l e d 
e s t o p p e l l i c e n c e s , drawn by t h o s e who b e l i e v e the 
concepts are mutually e x c l u s i v e , i s t h a t i n the case of 
both c o n t r a c t u a l and estoppel the p l a i n t i f f a c t s to h i s 
detriment, but i n the case of a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e t h i s 
i s because a promise has been made to him, whereas i n the 
case of estoppel, i t i s because of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
mistaken b e l i e f or perhaps a common assumption(12). I t 
i s on account of the common element of detriment t h a t the 
two c o n c e p t s have been c o n f u s e d . However, i t i s 
s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h i s a n a l y s i s i s not v e r y h e l p f u l . 
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Applying i t t o the f a m i l y arrangement case of WILLIAMS v 
STAITE(13), where the de c i s i o n was based on estoppel, i f 
asked why they had acted t o t h e i r detriment, i t i s l i k e l y 
the defendants would have responded "because a promise 
was made t o us t h a t we could stay i n the cottage as long 
as we wished". S i m i l a r l y , i n IVES v HIGH(14), where 
estoppel p r i n c i p l e s were again a p p l i e d . I n consequence 
upon the agreement f o r a r i g h t of way, the defendant 
surfaced the r i g h t of way and b u i l t a garage i n such a 
p o s i t i o n i t could only be entered by using the r i g h t of 
way. I f asked why he had behaved i n t h i s way, h i s answer 
ought t o have been "because a promise was made t o me", 
as the court found, there was a "concluded agreement". 
Thus, although i t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t the element of 
detriment i n a c o n t r a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n must be promise-
based, i t i s not t r u e t h a t f o r the p r i n c i p l e of estoppel 
t o operate the detriment must not be promise-based and 
can only a r i s e out of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , mistaken b e l i e f 
or common assumption. 
A t h i r d way i n which i t has been suggested c o n t r a c t u a l 
and estoppel licences may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d , i s t h a t , f o r 
the d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e t o amount t o co n s i d e r a t i o n and 
thus a c o n t r a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n , i t must be requested(15). 
This i s because one of the basic features of the d o c t r i n e 
of c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h e idea o f " r e c i p r o c i t y " ; a 
contract i s a bargain s t r u c k by exchange of promises. I n 
co n t r a s t , there i s no such " r e c i p r o c i t y " r e q u i r e d i n a 
s i t u a t i o n governed by estoppel p r i n c i p l e s . Consequently, 
where there i s a c o n t r a c t , the p a r t i e s are bound from the 
moment of t h e agreement, t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r each 
party's promise being the other's promise. Thus, i f one 
pa r t y subsequently refuses t o execute h i s p a r t of the 
bargain, the other may sue at once. Compare t h i s w i t h 
the e s t o p p e l s i t u a t i o n where t h e promise o r 
reoresentation only bpr-mrieR h i n i i i n g i f q n h s p q n p n t 1 y a r t p d 
upon t o the party's detriment. This d i s t i n c t i o n does 
exp l a i n why many of the f a m i l y arrangement cases were 
i n c o r r e c t l y c l a s s i f i e d as c o n t r a c t s . Take, f o r example, 
TANNER v TANNER(16); the mistress i n t h a t case had given 
up her re n t c o n t r o l l e d f l a t and paid f o r some of the 
f u r n i s h i n g s n ot because t h e r e had been r e c i p r o c a l 
promises made by the p a r t i e s , intended t o be immediately 
b i n d i n g , but simply because she wanted t o take advantage 
of the defendant's o f f e r , perhaps because she was l u l l e d 
i n t o a sense of s e c u r i t y by her r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h him. 
Lack of r e c i p r o c i t y was one m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a lack of 
i n t e n t i o n t o create a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , e s s e n t i a l f o r 
the e x i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t . However, i t i s not 
nece s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t i f Mr. Tanner had s a i d "Please give 
up your r e n t c o n t r o l l e d f l a t and come and l i v e w i t h me; 
i n r e t u r n you pay f o r the f u r n i s h i n g i n our j o i n t home", 
a c o n t r a c t would r e s u l t . I t may w e l l be t h a t t h e 
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agreement would s t i l l have lacked an i n t e n t i o n t o create 
a l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , had i t been made when the p a r t i e s 
were involved i n an amicable r e l a t i o n s h i p . Or, perhaps, 
i t would have f a i l e d f o r c e r t a i n t y of terms, there being 
no c l e a r d u r a t i o n f o r the li c e n c e t o occupy. So the 
element o f request i s not a complete answer t o t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between c o n t r a c t and estoppel; but i f one or 
more of the elements f o r a v a l i d c o n t r a c t are missing, 
even i f r e c i p r o c i t y could be es t a b l i s h e d , use could only 
be made of e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s , once t h e r e had been 
d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e . 
I n s h o r t , a l l t h r e e e x p l a n a t i o n s g i v e n f o r t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between c o n t r a c t and e s t o p p e l are i n 
themselves but p a r t of the p i c t u r e . The t r u t h of the 
ma t t e r i s t h a t a l i c e n c e t o occupy can o n l y be 
characterised as c o n t r a c t u a l i f a l l the elements of v a l i d 
c o n t r a c t are p r e s e n t , namely i n t e n t i o n , agreement, 
c e r t a i n t y of terms, r e c i p r o c i t y , and, w i t h respect t o 
land, evidence i n w r i t i n g ( 1 7 ) . I f one or more of these 
elements i s missing, there can be no v a l i d or enforceable 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e , b ut t h e agreement may s t i l l be 
enforceable on the basis of estoppel i f i t f a l l s w i t h i n 
the p r i n c i p l e s set down i n RAMSDEN v DYS0N(18). Equally, 
estoppel p r i n c i p l e s are appropriate where there i s l i t t l e 
or no suggestion of a c o n t r a c t u a l arrangement, but merely 
acquiescence or encouragement i n a mis t a k e n b e l i e f . 
Confusion has ari s e n because of a f a i l u r e t o appreciate 
t h a t p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l may be a v a i l a b l e i n some 
circumstances t o step i n t o give e f f e c t t o an agreement 
which lacks one or more of the e s s e n t i a l s of a v a l i d 
c o n t r a c t , as w e l l as be i n g a v a i l a b l e i n w i d e r 
circumstances where there i s no suggestion of a c o n t r a c t . 
To conclude, t h e r e f o r e , i t would seem t h a t c o n t r a c t and 
p R f n n p p l a r<=> miit-ns n v e y r l n s i w e r n n r p p l - R i-n th** fs-sr-t-jant 
t h a t , i f there i s a l e g a l l y b i n d i n g agreement i n proper 
form, r e l i a n c e f o r i r r e v o c a b i l i t y must be placed on the 
terms of the c o n t r a c t . Furthermore, i f , w i t h i n t h i s 
c o n t r a c t u a l framework, f u r t h e r promises are made which 
are not supported by co n s i d e r a t i o n , then the d o c t r i n e of 
promissory estoppel must be r e l i e d upon. This could be 
unfortunate as i t seems w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t promissory 
estoppel cannot found a cause of a c t i o n . Perhaps i t was 
t h i s f a c t o r which motivated Scarman L.J., i n CRABB v ARUN 
D.C.(19), t o say he d i d not f i n d the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
promissory and p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel h e l p f u l and s i m i l a r l y 
Goff J., i n AMALGAMATED INVESTMENTS AND PROPERTY CO. V 
TEXAS COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD.(20), t o doubt 
whether p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel was a separate category. 
I f , on the other hand, promises have been made but there 
i s no v a l i d and bi n d i n g c o n t r a c t on account of f a c t o r s 
such as lack of f o r m a l i t i e s , or vagueness of terms, then, 
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provided d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e can be proved, the li c e n c e 
may s t i l l be i r r e v o c a b l e on the basis of p r o p r i e t a r y 
estoppel. But, eq u a l l y , i f there has been no element of 
r e c i p r o c a l promises, t h a t i s t o say no suggestion of 
c o n t r a c t , but merely acquiescence and encouragement 
r e s u l t i n g i n d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e , the case may be one of 
estoppel. 
Assuming t h i s reasoning t o be a c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s of the 
law, what consequences does i t have f o r p r o t e c t i o n of 
r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y i n i n f o r m a l arrangements t o occupy 
l a n d , b e a r i n g i n mind t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n f i n d i n g a 
co n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may bind a t h i r d p a r t y ( 2 1 ) ? I t i s 
submitted t h a t t h i s creates l i t t l e t h r e a t a t a l l . I t has 
already been argued(22) t h a t the f i n d i n g of a c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i c e n c e i n many of the i n f o r m a l f a m i l y arrangement cases 
was unwarranted and, by t h e i r very nature, i t i s u n l i k e l y 
t h a t such i n f o r m a l arrangements w i l l i n f u t u r e manifest 
a l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a v a l i d and bi n d i n g c o n t r a c t . 
However, where t h e r e i s an element of d e t r i m e n t a l 
r e l i a n c e , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t estoppel p r i n c i p l e s can be 
r e l i e d upon t o provide i r r e v o c a b i l i t y . I n support of 
t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , i t i s proposed t o analyse whether the 
reported cases i n which a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e was held t o 
e x i s t and prevent revocation of the l i c e n c e ought t o have 
succeeded on estoppel p r i n c i p l e s , along the l i n e s on 
which such p r i n c i p l e s have been developed i n li c e n c e 
cases. 
To take f i r s t ERRINGTON v ERRINGTON(23). At t h e 
i n s t i g a t i o n of the l i c e n s o r , l e t alone mere encouragement 
or acquiescence, the young couple entered i n t o possession 
of the property and pai d the mortgage instalments on the 
understanding or common assumption t h a t they would not be 
d i s t u r b e d so l o n g as th e y c o n t i n u e d t o pay t h e 
instalments. This w n n 1 n n t tn h o «si r m f l e a n t l y 
d i s s i m i l a r t o DILLWYN v LLEWELYN(24) o r INWARDS v 
BAKER(25), which b o t h succeeded on t h e b a s i s o f 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel. The only d i f f e r e n c e i n ERRINGTON v 
ERRINGTON i s t h a t the expenditure took the form of a 
commitment t o make p e r i o d i c a l payments, whereas i n 
DILLWYN v LLEWELYN and INWARDS v BAKER, there was a 
c a p i t a l o u t l a y on the p a r t of the licensees. There seems 
t o be no v a l i d reason f o r s a y i n g a commitment t o 
p e r i o d i c a l payments i s any less d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e than 
making a c a p i t a l o u t l a y . Once i t i s accepted t h a t the 
tr u e basis of i r r e v o c a b i l i t y of the l i c e n c e i n ERRINGTON 
v ERRINGTON i s e s t o p p e l , HARDWICK v JOHNSON(26) i s 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . This was i n any case t r e a t e d by Lord 
Denning M.R. as an "eq u i t a b l e l i c e n c e " , although R o s k i l l 
and Browne L.JJ. c h a r a c t e r i s e d i t as c o n t r a c t u a l . Once 
again, i t w i l l be remembered, a mother had purchased a 
house f o r her son and d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w t o be t h e 
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m a t r i m o n i a l home, t h e t i t l e t o which was, however, 
conveyed i n t o the mother's name. The young couple p a i d 
her £28 per month i n the expectation t h a t they could 
remain i n the property. 
Thus, cases where the d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e took the form 
of p e r i o d i c a l payments, made a t t h e i n s t i g a t i o n o r 
encouragement of the l i c e n s o r and i n the b e l i e f t h a t 
occupation of the pr o p e r t y would be undisturbed, would 
seem t o f a l l c l e a r l y w i t h i n the d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y 
e s t o p p e l . But, what about t h e arrangements 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y c l a s s i f i e d by the courts as c o n t r a c t s , 
which d i d not in v o l v e any c a p i t a l o u t l a y or p e r i o d i c a l 
payments, namely CHANDLER v KERLEY(27), BINIONS v 
EVANS(28), and TANNER v TANNER(29). 
In CHANDLER v KERLEY(30), the p l a i n t i f f had bought the 
matrimonial home of Mr. and Mrs. Kerley f o r a reduced 
p r i c e of £10,000, instead of the asking p r i c e of £14,300. 
This was on the understanding t h a t the defendant, Mrs. 
Kerley, could continue t o l i v e i n the house u n t i l she 
o b t a i n e d a d i v o r c e from her husband and t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f would move i n w i t h her. As a r e s u l t of t h i s 
arrangement, the net proceeds of sal e , a f t e r paying o f f 
t h e mortgage debt t o t h e b u i l d i n g s o c i e t y , were n o t 
di v i d e d e q u a l l y between Mr. and Mrs. Kerley. I t was 
agreed t h a t Mrs. Kerley should have only £1,000, whereas 
Mr. Kerley would get £1,800. This would c l e a r l y seem t o 
f i t i n t o the f l e x i b l e approach t o estoppel p r i n c i p l e s 
w i t h i t s removal of the requirement of detriment and a 
movement towards the d o c t r i n e of changed p o s i t i o n ( 3 1 ) . 
The defendant had p u t h e r s e l f i n a disadvantageous 
p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s her husband and as such had s u f f e r e d a 
f i n a n c i a l d e t r i m e n t of £400 and a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e 
purchase p r i c e , on account of her mistaken b e l i e f t h a t 
she would be able t o remain i n t h e m a t r i m o n i a l hnmp. 
BINIONS v EVANS(32) i s arguably more d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y 
on an estoppel basis, as Mrs. Evans had s u f f e r e d no 
f i n a n c i a l detriment i n any way but had simply been l u l l e d 
i n t o a f a l s e sense of s e c u r i t y by being assured she could 
stay i n the cottage f o r the r e s t of her l i f e . This i s 
also t r u e of the woman i n TANNER v TANNER who had given 
up her r e n t c o n t r o l l e d f l a t . However, i f t h e more 
l i b e r a l approach t o p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel i s continued, 
the move towards a d o c t r i n e of changed p o s i t i o n would 
a l s o b r i n g l i c e n s e e s l i k e Mrs. Evans w i t h i n t h e 
p r o t e c t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel. I t 
co u l d be argued t h a t Mrs. Evans had a c t e d t o her 
detriment by not t a k i n g steps t o move t o a secure home a t 
a time when she was more p h y s i c a l l y and mentally able t o 
cope w i t h such an upheaval. F o l l o w i n g GREASLEY v 
COOKE(33), once i t i s es t a b l i s h e d t h a t assurances of 
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s e c u r i t y have been made t o the l i c e n s e e , the burden of 
p r o o f s h i f t s , and i t i s up t o t h e l i c e n s o r or h i s 
successor i n t i t l e t o prove t h a t the licensee has not 
acted t o his detriment. 
I t would seem t h e r e f o r e t h a t meritous cases w i l l f i t i n t o 
t h e p r i n c i p l e s of p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l i f t h e broad 
approach t o r a i s i n g an estoppel i s continued. Claims 
which have some, but l i t t l e , m e r i t could be d e a l t w i t h 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y by " s a t i s f y i n g " the e q u i t y i n some s u i t a b l y 
m i n i m a l way. I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t r e l i a n c e on 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel i s a much more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d and 
honest way o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h e problem of i n f o r m a l 
licences t o occupy p r o p e r t y than the a r t i f i c a l device of 
an i m p l i e d c o n t r a c t . Nevertheless there i s scope f o r 
improvement i n the approach taken. At t h i s p o i n t , one 
unacceptable aspect of the way i n which the courts have 
d e a l t w i t h some estoppel cases w i l l be mentioned. This 
i s a f a i l u r e t o s p e l l out p r e c i s e l y the extent of the 
r i g h t s acquired and the circumstances i n which a l i c e n c e 
may become r e v o c a b l e . For example, i n HARDWICK v 
JOHNSON(34), where Lord Denning M.R. alone found on the 
basis of an e q u i t a b l e l i c e n c e , he declared himself unable 
t o foresee the circumstances i n which the l i c e n c e may i n 
t h e f u t u r e be revoked and c o n s e q u e n t l y p r o v i d e d t h e 
p a r t i e s w i t h no guidance a t a l l . However, a d m i t t e d l y , i n 
more recent cases, the p r a c t i c e of the courts has been t o 
e x p l a i n the extent of the r i g h t s acquired more f u l l y and 
t h i s p r a c t i c e should be continued and enhanced.(35) 
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( i i i ) P r o p r i e t a r y estoppel and 
t h i r d p a r t i e s 
I t i s proposed t o c o n s i d e r how s a t i s f a c t o r y t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel t o li c e n c e cases i s 
from the p o i n t of view of precedent, l e g a l theory, and 
p o l i c y , w i t h regard t o the p o s i t i o n of t h i r d p a r t i e s ( 1 ) . 
(a) Precedent. 
I n c o n t r a s t t o c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e s , i t i s now ge n e r a l l y 
accepted t h a t a l i c e n c e i r r e v o c a b l e on account of 
estoppel i s capable of bindi n g a t h i r d p a r t y . I n DILLWYN 
v LLEWELYN(2) and INWARDS v BAKER(3), licences supported 
by p r i n c i p l e s of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel were held t o be 
enforceable against the personal repres e n t a t i v e s of the 
l i c e n s o r ' s e s t a t e and, no doubt, by reason o f these 
a u t h o r i t i e s , licences i n such circumstances were assumed 
t o be enforceable against personal repres e n t a t i v e s i n 
DODSWORTH v DODSWORTH(4), GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS(5) and 
GREASLEY v C00KE(6). I n RE SHARPE(7) , a lic e n c e t o 
occupy was held t o be bin d i n g on the l i c e n s o r ' s t r u s t e e 
i n bankruptcy although i t was unclear whether the l i c e n c e 
was regarded as be i n g c o n t r a c t u a l o r e q u i t a b l e o r a 
combination of both. HOPGOOD v BROWN(8) and IVES v 
HIGH(9) are a u t h o r i t i e s f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a 
licence i r r e v o c a b l e on account of estoppel i s bin d i n g on 
a purchaser of a l e g a l e s t a t e w i t h express n o t i c e . 
However, i n both cases, the dec i s i o n was based on the 
a l t e r n a t i v e ground of the d o c t r i n e of mutual b e n e f i t and 
burden set down i n HALZELL v BRIZELL(IO). I n IVES v HIGH, 
only Lord Denning M.R. s p e c i f i c a l l y s a i d e q u i t i e s a r i s i n g 
out of acquiescence of themselves bind t h i r d p a r t i e s . I n 
WILLIAMS v STAI T E ( l l ) , i t i s assumed t h a t a purchaser of 
a l e g a l estate who had bought w i t h express n o t i c e of a 
r i g h t - r n n r r n n y h a s o f l on n r n n r i o t - a r v p q t n n p p 1 was hnnnd 
But, as ye t , there i s no decisi o n which lays down t h a t a 
purchaser of a l e g a l estate w i t h merely c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n o t i c e of a lic e n c e i r r e v o c a b l e on account of estoppel i s 
bound, although there are o b i t e r d i c t a t o t h i s e f f e c t . 
For example, i n INWARDS v BAKER, Lord Denning M.R. 
expressed the view: 
" I t h i n k t h a t a purchaser who took w i t h n o t i c e 
would c l e a r l y be bound."(12) 
Assuming he i s r e f e r r i n g t o the d o c t r i n e of n o t i c e , t h i s 
would of course include a purchaser w i t h c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n o t i c e . Again, i n IVES v HIGH, Lord Denning M.R. sa i d 
t h a t e q u i t i e s a r i s i n g out of acquiescence: 
"...do not need t o be r e g i s t e r e d as land charges 
so as t o bind successors but take e f f e c t i n e q u i t y 
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without r e g i s t r a t i o n " ( 1 3 ) , 
more c l e a r l y implying t h a t the o l d d o c t r i n e of n o t i c e 
o p e r a t e s . Denning cannot have meant n o t i c e of t h e 
estoppel as opposed t o n o t i c e of the a l l e g e d r i g h t since 
the r e p o r t of the f a c t s of t h i s case as s t a t e d i n h i s 
judgment, i n d i c a t e the defendants were unaware how the 
estoppel arose. I n c o n t r a s t , i n RE SHARPE, although not 
c a l l e d upon t o determine the p o s i t i o n of the purchaser of 
the property i n question from the t r u s t e e i n bankruptcy, 
Browne-Wilkinson J. commented: 
" I t may be t h a t as a purchaser w i t h o u t express 
n o t i c e i n an a c t i o n f o r s p e c i f i c performance of 
the c o n t r a c t , h i s r i g h t s w i l l p r e v a i l over [ t h e 
l i c e n s e e ' s ] . . . . " ( 1 4 ) 
Support f o r t h i s view may also perhaps be found from the 
judgement of Lord W i l b e r f o r c e i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK 
LTD. v AINSW0RTH(15), where he pointed out t h a t j u s t 
because an o b l i g a t i o n binds one man's conscience does not 
nece s s a r i l y mean the conscience of another i s bound. 
Since the basis of a clai m f o r p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel i s 
t h a t of u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y , although express n o t i c e of a 
lice n c e enforceable on the basis of estoppel, e s p e c i a l l y 
where the property has been bought at a reduced p r i c e , 
may w e l l bind the purchaser's conscience, i t i s more 
d i f f i c u l t t o see how t h i s could apply t o c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n o t i c e . I t thus remains u n c l e a r whether a l i c e n c e 
i r r e v o c a b l e on account of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel binds a 
purchaser of a l e g a l estate w i t h only c o n s t r u c t i v e as 
opposed t o express n o t i c e . However, a con s i d e r a t i o n of 
what p r e c i s e l y i t i s t h a t makes a lic e n c e supported by 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l b i n d a t h i r d p a r t y may h e l p t o 
resolve t h i s issue. 
(b) Legal theory. 
The question t o be considered here i s whether the f i n d i n g 
t h a t a li c e n c e i r r e v o c a b l e on account of estoppel binds a 
t h i r d p a r t y poses t h e same o r s i m i l a r t h e o r e t i c a l 
problems as saying a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e binds a t h i r d 
p a r t y ( 1 6 ) . I n other words, does i t i n v o l v e crossing a 
chasm between p e r s o n a l and p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s and, 
moreover, saying t h a t something, which i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
simply a li c e n c e because i t i s not an i n t e r e s t i n land, 
has now become an i n t e r e s t i n land? 
For a lice n c e t o have become an i n t e r e s t i n land, i t must 
be possible t o say the l i c e n c e i t s e l f . by reason of the 
estoppel, i s capable of bi n d i n g a l l t h i r d p a r t i e s except 
a bona f i d e purchaser of l e g a l estate w i t h o u t n o t i c e ( 1 7 ) . 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e now proposed t o consider how p r o p r i e t a r y 
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estoppel makes a l i c e n c e bind a t h i r d p a r t y and what 
p r e c i s e l y i s the n a t u r e of the r e s u l t i n g b i n d i n g 
i n t e r e s t . As t o how estoppel binds a t h i r d p a r t y , there 
are i n d i c a t i o n s i n WILLIAMS v STAITE t h a t estoppel i n 
connection w i t h licences t o occupy operates r a t h e r l i k e 
express assignment of a r e s t r i c t i v e covenant r e l a t i n g t o 
f r e e h o l d land, which the courts i n more recent times have 
maintained requires a chain of express assignments(18) 
from vendor t o purchaser. Thus, i n the case of a l i c e n c e 
t o occupy, a serie s of personal estoppels a r i s e b i n d i n g 
purchasers w i t h n o t i c e . On the f a c t s of WILLIAMS v 
STAITE(19), i t was assumed t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n of 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel made the li c e n c e b i n d i n g on a t h i r d 
p a r t y , who had bought w i t h express n o t i c e o f t h e 
defendant's r i g h t s . However, the defendants were unhappy 
about the purchaser a c q u i r i n g t h e f r e e h o l d t o t h e 
premises i n question and consequently brought improper 
pressure t o bear on the purchaser i n the hopes o f , at 
f i r s t , dissuading him from buying and l a t e r , p reventing 
him from moving i n . The p l a i n t i f f purchaser thereupon 
applied t o the county co u r t f o r an order f o r possession 
on the grounds t h a t the defendants' conduct towards the 
purchaser had terminated t h e i r e q u i t a b l e l i c e n c e . The 
county court judge agreed w i t h t h i s view, but, on appeal, 
the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R., Cummings-Bruce, 
Goff L.JJ.) decided the l i c e n c e had not been terminated 
by the misconduct of the defendants. Nevertheless, Lord 
Denning M.R. expressed the view t h a t an e x i s t i n g claim 
based on p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel could perhaps be l o s t i f 
the behaviour of the licensee was extremely bad, but, on 
the f a c t s , i t was not so bad as t o j u s t i f y r evocation. 
S i m i l a r l y , Cummings^Bruce L.J. appears t o have viewed the 
licensees as having a s e r i e s of personal r i g h t s , since he 
said: 
"T do not t h i n k t h a t i n 9. pr"op°'r c a s e * t - h p r i r r h t R 
i n e q u i t y of t h e defendants n e c e s s a r i l y 
c r y s t a l l i s e f o r e v e r at the time when the e q u i t a b l e 
r i g h t comes i n t o existence.... When the p l a i n t f f 
comes t o the court t o enforce h i s l e g a l r i g h t s , 
the defendant i s then e n t i t l e d t o submit t h a t i n 
e q u i t y the p l a i n t i f f should not be allowed t o 
enforce those r i g h t s and.... must then b r i n g i n t o 
play a l l the r e l e v a n t maxims of e q u i t y . " ( 2 0 ) 
I t i s submitted t h a t the n o t i o n t h a t an e q u i t y based on 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel can be terminated by the behaviour 
of t h e l i c e n s o r i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r i t c r e a t e s an 
unacceptable degree of u n c e r t a i n t y as i t involves the 
purchaser not only i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g the circumstances i n 
which the r i g h t t o occupy came i n t o being, but also 
subsequent behaviour. There are other remedies a v a i l a b l e 
t o deal j u s t l y and adequately w i t h behaviour such as t h a t 
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of the S t a i t e s ; f o r example, actions may be brought i n 
nuisance or trespass and i n j u n c t i o n s obtained. 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Lord Denning M.R. and Cummings-Bruce L.J, 
Goff L.J., i n the same case, took a p r e f e r a b l e approach 
which i s co n s i s t e n t w i t h the view t h a t an e q u i t y based on 
acquiescence may give r i s e t o an e s t a b l i s h e d p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t . Goff L.J. p o i n t e d out t h a t , although grave 
misconduct may be r e l e v a n t when attempting t o e s t a b l i s h 
an e q u i t y because of the maxim, "he who comes t o e q u i t y 
must come w i t h clean hands", i t was not r e l e v a n t i n the 
case before the court as the e q u i t y had already been 
estab l i s h e d by an e a r l i e r court a c t i o n . A d i f f e r e n t 
question was now i n issue, namely, once an e q u i t y was 
e s t a b l i s h e d , could i t be f o r f e i t e d by misconduct? He 
answered t h a t question i n the negative: 
"Excessive user or bad behaviour towards the l e g a l 
owner cannot b r i n g the e q u i t y t o an end or f o r f e i t 
i t . I t may give r i s e t o an a c t i o n f o r trespass or 
nuisance or t o i n j u n c t i o n s t o r e s t r a i n such 
behaviour but I see no ground on which the e q u i t y , 
once e s t a b l i s h e d , can be f o r f e i t e d . " ( 2 1 ) 
The view t h a t p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel does not create a 
s e r i e s of personal r i g h t s i s endorsed by the d i c t a i n 
INWARDS v BAKER(22) and IVES v HIGH(23), which suggest 
t h a t such an i n t e r e s t i s b i n d i n g on purchasers of a 
l e g a l estate w i t h not only a c t u a l but also c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n o t i c e . The b a s i s on which t h e purchaser w i t h 
c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e i s bound would t h e r e f o r e seem t o be 
t h a t the p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel, once e s t a b l i s h e d by proof 
of unconscionable behaviour on the p a r t of the l i c e n s o r , 
c r y s t a l l i s e s f o r e v e r , making proof of u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y 
on the p a r t of successors i n t i t l e i r r e l e v a n t . 
The b e t t e r view would t h e r e f o r e seem t o be t h a t a 
purchaser w i t h n o t i c e i s bound because s u c c e s s f u l 
r e l i a n c e on p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l g i v e s r i s e t o an 
i n t e r e s t i n land which pre-dates the conveyance t o the ^ / 
purchaser. However, i t does not a u t o m a t i c a l l y f o l l o w 
from t h i s t h a t a l i c e n c e i t s e l f should now be regarded as 
capable of b i n d i n g a t h i r d p a r t y . There are s t i l l two 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s : e i t h e r the l i c e n c e w i t h the a i d of the 
d o c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel binds the t h i r d p a r t y ,, 
or some other recognised p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t a r i s e s . I t ^ 
has been argued t h a t the f u n c t i o n of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel 
i n l i c e n c e cases i s merely t o enable th e i n f o r m a l ^ 
c r e a t i o n of p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t s i n l a n d ( 2 4 ) . The 
d o c t r i n e i s not being used by the j u d i c i a r y t o create / 
some novel type of p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t which does not v 
f i t i n t o the orthodox scheme of t h i n g s , but merely t o 
overcome a d e f e c t i n procedure by which an o r t h o d o x 
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p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t i s created. I f t h i s view i s accepted, 
there i s no scope f o r saying t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
do c t r i n e of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel t o li c e n c e cases has 
elevated the l i c e n c e , a t l e a s t i n some s i t u a t i o n s , i n t o 
an i n t e r e s t i n land. I n order t o t e s t the v a l i d i t y of 
t h i s view, i t i s necessary t o examine whether there are 
any reported cases i n which estoppel was used t o enforce 
a r i g h t which would not, even i f i n the c o r r e c t form 
amount t o an i n t e r e s t i n land. To consider f i r s t DILLWYN 
v LLEWELYN(25). There the court decided t h a t the son was 
e n t i t l e d i n e q u i t y t o c a l l f o r the fee simple from h i s 
f a t h e r ' s d e v i s e e ; t h e son had an e q u i t a b l e e s t a t e 
contract and the court t r e a t e d the estoppel as supplying 
the c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Here, t h e r e f o r e estoppel p r i n c i p l e s 
were being used t o overcome the lack of f o r m a l i t i e s . So, 
to o , i n PASCOE v TURNER(26) , where t h e c o u r t a g a i n 
ordered a conveyance of the fee simple. I n t h a t case, 
the court accepted the evidence t h a t Sam Pascoe had t o l d 
Mrs. Turner, "The house i s yours and ever y t h i n g i n i t " . 
Cummings-Bruce L.J. c l e a r l y understood the f u n c t i o n of 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel t o be t h a t of overcoming the lack of 
f o r m a l i t y i n circumstances where a licensee has acted on 
a promise or assurance t o h i s or her detriment, f o r he 
said: 
" I f i t had not been f o r s e c t i o n 5 3 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925, the g i f t of the house would 
have been a p e r f e c t g i f t . I n t h e event, i t 
remained an imperfect g i f t . . . . and i f the f a c t s 
had stopped t h e r e , t h e defendant would have 
remained a licensee a t the w i l l of the p l a i n t i f f . 
But t h e f a c t s d i d not st o p t h e r e . . . . , t h e 
defendant having been t o l d t h a t the house was 
hers , s e t about i m p r o v i n g i t w i t h i n and 
without...."(27) 
Estoppel p r i n c i p l e s may arguably be performing the same 
f u n c t i o n i n cases where the e q u i t y i s s a t i s f i e d other 
than by a conveyance of the fee simple. I n INWARDS v 
BAKER, the son had entered i n t o occupation of the land i n 
the expectation t h a t the bungalow: 
"...was t o be h i s home f o r l i f e o r , a t a l l events, 
hi s home as long as he wished i t t o remain h i s 
home"(28) 
and i n WILLIAMS v STAITE. the young couple were t o l d by 
the l i c e n s o r , " You can l i v e t h e r e as l o n g as you 
wish" (29). I n each case t h i s might appear t o in v o l v e an 
i n t e n t i o n t o g r a n t a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t . 
GREASLEY v COOKE (30) would seem not t o be d i s s i m i l a r 
except t h a t there was nothing t o suggest t h a t Doris Cooke 
was t o have exclusive possession of the property f o r 
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l i f e , so at maximum a co-ownership i n t e r e s t , determinable 
on death, was intended. 
To t u r n t o the reported decisions where the licensee made 
a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the purchase p r i c e , such as DODSWORTH v 
DODSWORTH(31) and RE SHARPE(32), was t h e c o u r t here 
simply overcoming lack of f o r m a l i t i e s w i t h the a i d of 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l and th u s g i v i n g e f f e c t t o an 
i n t e n t i o n t o grant a co-ownership i n t e r e s t ? I f so, why 
were licensees held t o have no i n t e r e s t s i n the pr o p e r t y 
e i t h e r on the basis of a r e s u l t i n g or c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t , 
n e i t h e r of which r e q u i r e f o r m a l i t i e s t o be s a t i s f i e d ? 
Some commentators(33) have suggested t h a t r e s u l t i n g and 
co n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t s on the one hand, and li c e n c e concepts 
on the other, are d i f f e r e n t approaches t o the same t h i n g . 
T his has r e c e n t l y r e c e i v e d j u d i c i a l s u p p o r t i n t h e 
judgement of S i r Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.C. i n GRANT 
v EDWARDS(34), where he expressed t h e view t h a t t h e 
p r i n c i p l e s underlying p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel "are c l o s e l y 
akin t o those l a i d down i n GISSING v GISSING(35)" f o r 
r e s u l t i n g and c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . "The two p r i n c i p l e s " , 
he s a i d : 
"have been developed separately w i t h o u t cross-
f e r t i l i s a t i o n between them; but they r e s t on the 
same foundation and have on a l l matters reached 
the same conclusions"(36). 
S i r Nicholas went on t o draw out some undisputed common 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
" I n both, the claimant must t o the knowledge of 
the l e g a l owner have acted i n the b e l i e f t h a t the 
claimant has or w i l l o b t a i n an i n t e r e s t i n the 
property. I n both, the claimant must have acted 
t n h i s OT h e r rtofr^mon^ i^n r ? l i ? . r . C ? OP- S U C h 
b e l i e f . I n both, e q u i t y acts on the conscience of 
the l e g a l owner t o prevent him from a c t i n g i n an 
unconscionable manner by d e f e a t i n g t h e common 
i n t e n t i o n . " ( 3 7 ) 
Following t h i s l i n e of reasoning, i t has been suggested 
t h a t HUSSEY v PALMER(38), f o r example, could e a s i l y have 
been decided on the basis of estoppel. I n t h a t case, a 
widow was i n v i t e d t o l i v e w i t h her daughter and son-in-
law. She paid £607 f o r an extension t o the house t o 
provide a bedroom f o r h e r s e l f . Finding i t impossible t o 
l i v e h a p p i l y under the same roof w i t h the young couple, 
the widow l e f t the house a f t e r only 15 months and claimed 
t o have an i n t e r e s t on the basis of a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t . 
At one stage, she said she had l e n t the money t o the son-
in-law, but, i n cross-examination, she t o l d the court the 
young couple had said "they would give me a home f o r l i f e 
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i f I wanted i t " . On these f a c t s , Lord Denning M.R,. and 
Phillmore L.J. found a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t , w h i l s t Cairnes 
L.J., d i s s e n t i n g , was of the view t h a t there was only a 
debtor and c r e d i t o r r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t i s submitted t h a t 
the case would b e t t e r have been argued on e s t o p p e l 
p r i n c i p l e s ; encouraged by the young couple, the widow 
spent £607 i n b u i l d i n g an extension i n the b e l i e f i t 
could become her home f o r l i f e . As t h i s was a s i t u a t i o n 
where t h e p a r t i e s were a t loggerheads and c o u l d n ot 
th e r e f o r e continue t o l i v e under the same r o o f , and i n 
any case the widow had moved out before the a c t i o n , the 
appropriate way of s a t i s f y i n g the e q u i t y would have been 
t o impose an eq u i t a b l e l i e n f o r the money spent, as i n 
DODSWORTH v D0DSW0RTH(39). However, t h i s i s not t o agree 
w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t and 
p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel are two approaches t o the same t h i n g 
where money i s spent on r e a l p r o p e r t y i n r e t u r n f o r share 
accommodation. I f the p a r t i e s had been asked what they 
a c t u a l l y intended i n these cases, i t i s probable they 
would have r e p l i e d t h a t t h e y i n t e n d e d t o g i v e t h e 
licensee a r i g h t t o the "use b e n e f i t s " of the land; t h a t 
i s , t o occupy the p r o p e r t y f o r l i f e or as long as he/she 
wished, but they d i d not in t e n d the licensee t o have any 
share i n the investment v a l u e , t h a t i s t o say t h e 
in c r e a s e d c a p i t a l v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y , almost 
guaranteed on account of i n f l a t i o n i n recent years. The 
problem l i e s w i t h the d o c t r i n e of estates under which 
ownership of property can only be seen i n terms of a 
r i g h t t o occupy f o r a p e r i o d of time and which does not, 
w i t h regard t o f r e e h o l d p r o p e r t y , separate out the "use 
value" from the "investment value". I n c o n t r a s t , the 
ve r y d i s t i n c t i o n between f r e e h o l d and l e a s h o l d does 
separate out use from investment v a l u e , b ut f o r a 
l e a s h o l d e s t a t e t o e x i s t , t h e r e must be e x c l u s i v e 
possession f o r a f i x e d or p e r i o d i c term at a r e n t . 
Consequently, i t i s submitted t h a t , despite the common 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a c c u r a t e l y described by S i r Nicholas i n 
h i s judgement i n GRANT v EDWARDS(40), t h e r e i s a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between r e s u l t i n g t r u s t and e q u i t a b l e 
estoppel p r i n c i p l e s i n cases where a c o n t r i b u t i o n had 
been made towards t h e purchase p r i c e o r subsequent 
expenditure on r e a l p r o p erty. This d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s i n 
the courts having t o decide whether the b e n e f i t intended 
t o be conferred i s merely t h a t of use and occupation of 
the p r o p e r t y i n question, i n which case l i c e n c e concepts 
are appropriate, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y whether there i s an 
i n t e n t i o n t o share i n the investment value a l s o , where 
r e s u l t i n g t r u s t p r i n c i p l e s are a p p l i c a b l e . 
I t f o l l o w s from t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n 
between r e s u l t i n g t r u s t and e s t o p p e l concepts, t h a t 
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p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel has not always been used t o give 
e f f e c t only t o recognised p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t s . I f one 
return s t o consider cases such as WILLIAMS v STAITE(41) 
and GREASLEY v COOKE(42), where the court made negative 
o r d e r s , a r g u a b l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e 
i n t e r e s t , on a closer i n s p e c t i o n , i n so doing, the court 
was not g i v i n g e f f e c t t o a determinable l i f e i n t e r e s t . 
C e r t a i n l y , i n the case of GREASLEY. v COOKE, there can 
have been no i n t e n t i o n of Doris Cooke being able t o 
b e n e f i t i n the increased c a p i t a l value of the p r o p e r t y , 
the i n t e n t i o n was only t o provide her w i t h accommodation 
f o r l i f e . GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS i s not d i s s i m i l a r . Once 
again, a woman had been l e d t o b e l i e v e a p a r t i c u l a r house 
could be her home f o r l i f e and here the court appreciated 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between an i n t e n t i o n t o b e n e f i t from only 
the use value as opposed t o both the use and investment 
value of the property. The court held t h a t the p l a i n t i f f 
was not intended t o have a determinable l i f e i n t e r e s t , 
a d m i t t e d l y being i n f l u e n c e d by the consequences of the 
S e t t l e d Land Act 1925 i n so f i n d i n g ( 4 3 ) . The e q u i t y was 
more a p p r o p r i a t e l y s a t i s f i e d by the grant of a lease at a 
low r e n t , non-assignable and determinable on death. This 
was s u r e l y more akin t o what was intended as i t only 
conferred the b e n e f i t s of the use value of the property. 
Other cases, which arguably should have been decided on 
the basis of estoppel but where somewhat u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
i m p l i e d c o n t r a c t reasoning was adopted, would also cause 
d i f f i c u l t y i f the r o l e of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel i n l i c e n c e 
cases was confined t o overcoming lack of f o r m a l i t i e s i n 
g i v i n g e f f e c t t o recognised p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t s . Take, 
f o r example, TANNER v TANNER(44), where the i n t e n t i o n was 
found t o be t h a t the mistress should be allowed t o remain 
i n the pr o p e r t y rent f r e e so long as the twins she had 
had by the p l a i n t i f f were o f s c h o o l age or t h e 
accotnmndat.i n n w a s r<a»snn»v>i.y required f o r her and the 
c h i l d r e n . Such a r i g h t t o occupy does not s a t i s f y the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of any leasehold or f r e e h o l d i n t e r e s t , 
even though e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s would have been 
appropriate. 
A d m i t t e d l y , on t h e case law as i t s t a n d s , where 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s have a c t u a l l y been 
adopted i n licence cases, the view i s s u s t a i n a b l e , when 
l o o k i n g a t t h e way i n which t h e e q u i t y has been 
s a t i s f i e d , t h a t estoppel concepts are only used as a 
means of g i v i n g e f f e c t t o r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t s . This i s so, as the e q u i t y would appear always 
t o have been s a t i s f i e d by means of a r e c o g n i s e d 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , whether i t be the conveyance of a 
fee simple, a lease determinable on death, w i t h no power 
t o assign, or an e q u i t a b l e l i e n . This i s not t o agree, 
however, t h a t the r o l e of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel has simply 
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been t o overcome a lack of f o r m a l i t y i n order t o give 
e f f e c t t o the i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s . Other f a c t o r s 
have also i n f l u e n c e d the outcome of the d e c i s i o n . I n any 
case, w i t h respect t o the negative p r o t e c t i o n i n INWARDS 
v BAKER and GREASLEY v COOKE, i t i s arguable t h a t the 
c o u r t was not g i v i n g e f f e c t t o a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e 
i n t e r e s t and c e r t a i n l y , i n the case of GREASLEY v COOKE, 
i t would have been i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o order the grant of 
such an i n t e r e s t as opposed t o merely making an order not 
t o d i s t u r b occupation so long as the licensee wished t o 
remain. Moreover, t h e r e i s some a u t h o r i t y , a l b e i t 
l i m i t e d , t o support the view t h a t something other than a 
rec o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t t h r o u g h p r o p r i e t a r y 
estoppel may bind a t h i r d p a r t y . The f i r s t of these 
a u t h o r i t i e s i s PLIMMER v WELLINGTON CORPORATION(45). The 
W e l l i n g t o n C o r p o r a t i o n purchased c o m p u l s o r i l y l a n d 
i n c l u d i n g a j e t t y used by Plimmer. The question before 
the court was whether Plimmer had an i n t e r e s t i n i t f o r 
t h e purpose of compensation. The government of t h e 
province had encouraged and acquiesced i n the b u i l d i n g of 
the j e t t y but no formal conveyance had been made t o 
Plimmer's predecessor. I t was h e l d on account of 
estoppel t h a t Plimmer had a s u f f i c i e n t r i g h t t o e n t i t l e 
him t o compensation. What i s i n t e r e s t i n g i s the court's 
remarks concerning the nature of the r i g h t , f o r t h i s d i d 
not appear t o correspond w i t h a known p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t . The r i g h t was d e s c r i b e d as a p r a c t i c a l l y 
p erpetual r i g h t t o the j e t t y f o r the purposes of the 
o r i g i n a l l i c e n c e . The dec i s i o n i s not a strong a u t h o r i t y 
f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel i s capable 
of making r i g h t s other than recognised i n t e r e s t i n land 
bind t h i r d p a r t i e s , as, although the land became vested 
i n t h e c o r p o r a t i o n a f t e r t he a c t i o n s l e a d i n g t o t h e 
estoppel, i t was t r e a t e d by the P r i v y Council as being 
vested continuously i n the government and t h e r e f o r e d i d 
n n t i n v n l v p a t h i rr\ n a r f v P n r l - h o r m n r p t h p r n n r t -
appeared t o be of the view t h a t the l i c e n c e could only be 
regarded as an i n t e r e s t i n l a n d f o r t h e purpose o f 
construing the s t a t u t e e n t i t l i n g compensation and t h a t : 
" . . . i n such s t a t u t e s the expression "estate or 
i n t e r e s t i n , t o , or out of land" should receive 
wide meaning".(46) 
The other a u t h o r i t y f o r the view t h a t something other 
than a recognised i n t e r e s t i n land can bind a t h i r d p a r t y 
by means of p r o p r i e t a r y estoppel i s the judgement of Lord 
Denning M.R. i n IVES v HIGH(47). He deemed the r i g h t s i n 
t h a t case were n e i t h e r an e s t a t e c o n t r a c t nor an 
equ i t a b l e easement, yet through estoppel p r i n c i p l e s they 
were capable of bi n d i n g a t h i r d p a r t y . I n c o n t r a s t , 
however, Winn L.J., w i t h whom Dankwerts L.J. seemed t o 
agree, accepted t h a t the o r i g i n a l arrangement was an 
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e q u i t a b l e easement w h i c h was v o i d f o r n o n - r e g i s t r a t i o n , 
b u t d e c i d e d i t was n o t c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o f i n d t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s were n e v e r t h e l e s s bound on t h e b a s i s o f 
e s t o p p e l . 
I n c o n c l u s i o n , i t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t o c o n f i n e 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l i n l i c e n c e cases t o t h e r o l e o f \ 
o v e r c o m i n g a l a c k o f f o r m a l i t i e s c o u l d l e a d t o a 
dangerous n a r r o w i n g o f t h e concept d e p r i v i n g d e s e r v i n g 
l i c e n s e e s o f p r o t e c t i o n i n some cases where no r e c o g n i s e d 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t c o u l d be fo u n d t o be i n t e n d e d , such 
as TANNER v TANNER and GREASLEY v COOKE. However, t h e 
f i n d i n g t h a t r i g h t s o t h e r t h a n r e c o g n i s e d p r o p e r t y r i g h t s 
can, w i t h t h e a i d o f e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s , b i n d t h i r d 
p a r t i e s , g i v e s r i s e t o t h e same c o n c e p t u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
as s a y i n g t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e i s c a p a b l e o f 
b i n d i n g a t h i r d p a r t y ; t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e i s t h e n 
b e i n g u s ed t o b r i d g e t h e gap i n t h e chasm between 
p e r s o n a l and p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s . There would seem t o be 
two p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s t o t h i s p r o b l e m . F i r s t l y , 
a l t h o u g h i t may be r e c o g n i s e d t h a t r i g h t s b a sed on 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l a r e c a p a b l e o f b i n d i n g t h i r d 
p a r t i e s , i t need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t a l l r i g h t s 
a r i s i n g o u t o f e s t o p p e l b i n d t h i r d p a r t i e s . I f t h e 
e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e i s n o t b e i n g i n v o k e d t o overcome a l a c k 
of f o r m a l i t y i n b r o a d l y g i v i n g e f f e c t t o a r e c o g n i s e d 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , t h e n t h e r i g h t s s h o u l d be i. 
c l a s s i f i e d as p u r e l y p e r s o n a l . On a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e 
case law, i t i s f u r t h e r m o r e a r g u a b l e t h a t , i f t h e e q u i t y 
has been s a t i s f i e d by an e q u i t a b l e l i e n over t h e p r o p e r t y 
f o r i m p r o v e m e n t s c a r r i e d o u t as, f o r e x a m p l e , i n RE 
SHARPE, i t i s u n f a i r t h a t such l i e n s h o u l d b i n d a t h i r d 
p a r t y p u r c h a s e r because t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e o f t h e 
p r o p e r t y w i l l a l r e a d y be i n c r e a s e d on account o f t h e 
improvements. I t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t i n t h a t case, Brown-
Wi\kinson J. I s f t ops" t ^ s i s s u e o f " h s t h s r th*? J i o n 
would b i n d a t h i r d p a r t y p u r c h a s e r and indeed i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t i t would p r o b a b l y n o t be b i n d i n g on such a pu r c h a s e r 
u n l e s s he had express n o t i c e ( 4 8 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e 
would appear t o be drawbacks i n a c c e p t i n g t h e n o t i o n t h a t 
some e s t o p p e l s do n o t b i n d t h i r d p a r t i e s . I n t h e f i r s t 
p l a c e , i t may le a v e a l i c e n s e e u n p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t a 
t h i r d p a r t y and, i n t h e second, i t may w e l l r e s u l t i n an 
u n a c c e p t a b l e d e g r e e o f u n c e r t a i n t y as i t c o u l d be 
d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n o r p r e d i c t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t 
h e a r i n g w h e t h e r t h e e s t o p p e l was p u r e l y p e r s o n a l i n 
n a t u r e . The e x t e n t o f t h e l a t t e r p r o b l e m w i l l be 
e x p l o r e d more f u l l y i n more g e n e r a l terms i n t h e S e c t i o n 
f o l l o w i n g . 
The second p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n l i e s i n t h e c o u r t s b e i n g 
p r e p a r e d t o adopt a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t approach. The 
r o l e o f t h e c o u r t s i n e s t o p p e l cases s h o u l d be t o 
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a s c e r t a i n t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s and, i f t h i s does 
n o t correspond w i t h a r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , t o 
s a t i s f y t h e e q u i t y by g i v i n g e f f e c t t o t h e c l o s e s t 
r e c o g n i s e d i n t e r e s t s t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s f o u n d t o e x i s t . 
GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS(49) shows t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h i s 
f e a s i b l e . I t i s one t h i n g t o accept t h a t f l e x i b i l i t y and 
u n c e r t a i n t y s h o u l d be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o a system o f r i g i d 
and o r d e r e d p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t s t o accommodate t h e 
t r u s t i n g , t h e f o o l i s h , t h e aged and i n f a t u a t e d , b u t q u i t e 
a n o t h e r , and what i s more an unnecessary s t e p , t o wreak 
p o t e n t i a l havoc by a l l o w i n g h i t h e r t o u n r e c o g n i s e d 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t s t o become, w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l , i n t e r e s t s i n l a n d c a p a b l e o f 
b i n d i n g t h i r d p a r t i e s . 
( c ) P o l i c y . 
I t i s here proposed t o c o n s i d e r how s a t i s f a c t o r y t h e 
c u r r e n t approach t o e s t o p p e l i s fro m t h e p o i n t o f view o f 
t h e g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t s o f t h i r d p a r t i e s . The system o f 
r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing and t h e concept o f a l a n d charge 
i n r e l a t i o n t o u n r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing were i n t r o d u c e d , 
a l o n g w i t h o t h e r r e f o r m s i n 1925, t o p r o v i d e a balance i n 
t h e c o n f l i c t between t h e need f o r s a f e and q u i c k 
c o n v e y a n c i n g p r o c e d u r e s on t h e one hand, and t h e 
p r o t e c t i o n o f h o l d e r s o f e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s on t h e 
o t h e r . Since 1925, t h i s c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s would seem 
t o have become much more a c u t e . S a f e and q u i c k 
conveyancing procedures a r e a r g u a b l y more v i t a l now t h a n 
i n 1925, due t o t h e i n c r e a s e d number o f f r e e h o l d owners 
( t h e s m a l l p r o p e r t y o w n i n g d e m o c r a c y ) and i n c r e a s e d 
m o b i l i t y and t h e need t o f a c i l i t a t e such m o b i l i t y . A t 
t h e same t i m e , i t has become a d d i t i o n a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o 
p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y and t h e r e b y g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e "use" 
v a l l l f a o f n r o n o rf- y l i e hetS K o o r i c<aon ^ n r n n r i o h a r y 
e s t o p p e l has been made t o p l a y an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h i s 
sphere. The q u e s t i o n i s however, whether, g i v e n t h a t t h e 
c o n f l i c t o f aims i n t h e 1925 l e g i s l a t i o n has become even 
g r e a t e r , e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s a r e m a i n t a i n i n g a balance 
between t h e competing i n t e r e s t s o f t h i r d p a r t i e s and 
l i c e n s e e s o f l a n d , o r have t h e s c a l e s been t i p p e d t o o 
h e a v i l y i n f a v o u r o f t h e l i c e n s e e ? As L o r d W i l b e r f o r c e 
p u t i t i n NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD. V HASTNGS CAR 
MART, w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r problem o f t h e 
d e s e r t e d w i f e , ( a l t h o u g h t h e same would seem t o be t r u e 
o f any l i c e n s e e ) : 
"The u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n must be w h e t h e r s u c h 
persons can be g i v e n t h e p r o t e c t i o n w h i c h s o c i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f h u m a n i t y e v i d e n t l y i n d i c a t e 
w i t h o u t i n j u s t i c e t o t h i r d p a r t i e s and a r a d i c a l 
d e p a r t u r e f r o m sound p r i n c i p l e s o f r e a l p r o p e r t y 
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l a w . " ( 5 0 ) 
The f i r s t q u e s t i o n t o be c o n s i d e r e d i s whether t h e use 
made o f p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l i n l i c e n c e cases has a c t e d 
a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h i r d p a r t i e s by i n c r e a s i n g t h e 
number o f burdens on t h e l a n d i n a l l o w i n g a new c a t e g o r y 
o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t . On t h e b a s i s o f what has been argued 
i n t h e p r e v i o u s S e c t i o n , i n so f a r as e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s 
have been used t o overcome a l a c k o f f o r m a l i t y i n g i v i n g 
e f f e c t t o a r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , t h i s i s 
o b v i o u s l y n o t t h e case. Moreover, once t h e n o t i o n i s 
accepted t h a t t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y 
o p e r a t e so as t o g i v e r i s e t o r i g h t s capable o f b i n d i n g 
t h i r d p a r t i e s and t h u s , where t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e 
p a r t i e s was t o g r a n t r i g h t s l e s s t h a n an e s t a b l i s h e d 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t ( e . g . an e q u i t y t o r e m a i n ) , t h e 
r i g h t s a r e p u r e l y p e r s o n a l , i t t h e n f o l l o w s no new burden 
a r i s e s . 
However, a p o s s i b l e way i n w h i c h t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e 
has a r g u a b l y u n a c c e p t a b l y p r e j u d i c e d t h e i n t e r e s t s o f 
t h i r d p a r t i e s i s by t h e f a c t t h a t i t may be d i f f i c u l t t o 
d i s c o v e r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f r i g h t s based on e s t o p p e l w h i c h 
may n e v e r t h e l e s s be b i n d i n g . There a r e two as p e c t s t o 
t h i s . F i r s t l y , t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e r i g h t s based on 
e s t o p p e l may a r i s e o u t o f a p u r e l y o r a l agreement w h i c h 
may n o t be c l e a r l y d e f i n e d and may be capable o f v a r i o u s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ( 5 1 ) . Evidence o f t h e l a t t e r problem i s 
seen f o r example by t h e f a c t t h a t i n many o f t h e r e p o r t e d 
d e c i s i o n s t h e case has been b r o u g h t on q u i t e a number o f 
a l t e r n a t i v e f o o t i n g s ( 5 2 ) , n o t t o mention t h e wide v a r i e t y 
o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s g i v e n t o an arrangement p r o v i d e d by 
academic w r i t e r s . T h i s i s c l e a r l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y f r o m 
t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h i r d p a r t i e s and i t s h o u l d be 
remembered t h a t t h e s o c i a l and economic importance o f 
1 s n r l i <a OH? o f t h 1 ? r « ? * S O H S f o r r-f»rrn i T i n g s n r h a g r e e m e n t s 
t o be reduced t o w r i t i n g . W r i t i n g tends t o encourage 
p r e c i s i o n and c o n s e q u e n t l y c r e a t e s a degree o f c e r t a i n t y . 
The second aspect r e l a t e s t o t h e way i n w h i c h r i g h t s 
a r i s i n g o u t o f e s t o p p e l f i t i n t o , o r more t o t h e p o i n t , 
do n o t f i t i n t o , t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n system. Here i t i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n u n r e g i s t e r e d and 
r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing. 
W i t h r e g a r d t o u n r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing,Lord Denning i n 
t h e Court o f Appeal i n IVES v HIGH(53) d e c i d e d t h a t 
r i g h t s a r i s i n g o u t o f e s t o p p e l a r e n e i t h e r r e g i s t r a b l e 
under t h e Land Charges A c t 1972 nor o v e r r e a c h a b l e b u t 
depend on t h e o l d d o c t r i n e o f n o t i c e r e t a i n e d by S.199 o f 
t h e Law o f P r o p e r t y A c t 1925(54); t h a t i s t o say, a 
purc h a s e r o f a l e g a l e s t a t e i s bound i f he had a c t u a l , 
c o n s t r u c t i v e o r i m p u t i v e n o t i c e o f such r i g h t s . The case 
i t s e l f d i d n o t concern a l i c e n c e t o occupy l a n d b u t , i t 
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w i l l be remembered, an o r a l agreement f o r a r i g h t o f way 
over t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d , i n r e t u r n f o r a l l o w i n g t h e 
p l a i n t i f f ' s p r edecessor i n t i t l e t o r e t a i n f o u n d a t i o n s on 
t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s l a n d . On t h e f a c t s o f t h e case, t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s had express n o t i c e o f t h e r i g h t s i n q u e s t i o n 
and t h e d e c i s i o n was f u r t h e r m o r e based on t h e d o c t r i n e o f 
approbate and r e r o b a t e . I t i s , however, t o be assumed 
t h a t t h e same p r i n c i p l e s would a p p l y t o a l i c e n c e t o 
o c cupy and t h a t t h e y w o u l d o p e r a t e where e s t o p p e l 
p r i n c i p l e s a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e d o c t r i n e o f approbate 
and r e t r o b a t e . On t h i s b a s i s , t h i r d p a r t i e s who a r e n o t 
p u r c h a s e r s f o r v a l u e o f a l e g a l e s t a t e o r who a r e 
p u rchasers o f o n l y an e q u i t a b l e e s t a t e w i l l be bound by 
l i c e n c e s t o occupy i r r e v o c a b l e on account o f e s t o p p e l , 
a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s a case f o r s a y i n g t h a t as t h e r i g h t s i n 
IVES v HIGH were d e s c r i b e d as 'mere e q u i t i e s ' ( 5 5 ) , t h e y 
w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y b i n d p u r c h a s e r s o f e q u i t a b l e 
e s t a t e s w i t h o u t n o t i c e , t h e maxim "where t h e e q u i t i e s a r e 
e q u a l t h e f i r s t i n t i m e p r e v a i l s " a p p l y i n g . Those who 
are p u r c h a s e r s f o r v a l u e o f a l e g a l e s t a t e i n good f a i t h 
w i t h a c t u a l , c o n s t r u c t i v e o r i m p u t i v e n o t i c e w i l l a l s o be 
bound. But t h e q u e s t i o n w h i c h needs t o be asked i s when, 
i n t h i s c o n t e x t , w i l l a p u r c h a s e r be f i x e d w i t h 
c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e . The e x t e n t o f c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e 
has been e x p l o r e d i n cases concerned w i t h a s a l e o f l a n d 
by a s i n g l e t r u s t e e f o r s a l e where t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s a r e n o t o v e rreached on account o f S.2 ( i ) 
( i i ) Law o f P r o p e r t y A c t 1925, w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h e 
purchase money be p a i d t o two t r u s t e e s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
d e c i s i o n i n CAUNCE v CAUNCE(56), t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h i r d 
p a r t i e s i s s i m i l a r l y dependent on t h e o l d d o c t r i n e o f 
n o t i c e . The q u e s t i o n w h i c h a r o s e i n t h a t case was 
whether a mortgagee had c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f a w i f e ' s 
i n t e r e s t i n t h e m a t r i m o n i a l home a r i s i n g o u t o f a 
r e s u l t i n g t r u s t i n her f a v o u r . The husband had, w i t h o u t 
h e r I c n n w l e*c\rtf> n r m n q p n l - •(- a l r e n nut- t - h r e o s n r p s s s i w e 
mortgages t o r a i s e c a p i t a l t o enable him t o s e t up home 
w i t h a n o t h e r woman. He was e v e n t u a l l y d e c l a r e d b a n k r u p t . 
The m o r t g a g e e s had no a c t u a l n o t i c e o f t h e w i f e ' s 
i n t e r e s t and Stamp J. h e l d t h a t t h e y had no c o n s t r u c t i v e 
n o t i c e e i t h e r , as her o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e home was n o t 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t i t l e o f f e r e d by t h e mortgagor. He 
went on t o e x p r e s s t h e v i e w t h a t whenever t h e 
v e n d o r / m o r t g a g o r was i n p o s s e s s i o n o f p r o p e r t y , a 
p urchaser would n o t be f i x e d w i t h c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f 
t h e e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s o f any o t h e r person r e s i d e n t 
t h e r e whose presence was w h o l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t i t l e 
o f f e r e d , "e.g. t h e vendor's f a t h e r , h i s Uncle H a r r y o r 
h i s Aunt M a t i l d a . . . . " . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Stamp J. added: 
" I t would be o t h e r w i s e i f t h e vendor i s n o t i n 
o c c u p a t i o n and one f i n d s a n o t h e r p a r t y whose 
presence demands an e x p l a n a t i o n and whose presence 
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one i g n o r e s a t one's own p e r i l . " ( 5 7 ) 
Thus i t would seem t h a t , i f t h e l i c e n s e e c l a i m i n g r i g h t s 
on t h e b a s i s o f e s t o p p e l i s n o t i n o c c u p a t i o n w i t h t h e 
v e n d o r / l i c e n s o r , a p u r c h a s e r w i l l be t a k e n t o have 
c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f such r i g h t s . T h i s does n o t impose 
an i n t o l e r a b l e b u r d e n on t h i r d p a r t i e s as s u c h a 
s i t u a t i o n s h o u l d be c o m p a r a t i v e l y easy t o d e t e c t and 
im m e d i a t e l y p u t a p u r c h a s e r on guard. However, d e c i s i o n s 
s i n c e CAUNCE v CAUNCE have c a s t doubt on t h e view t h a t a 
p u r c h a s e r w i l l n o t have c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f t h e 
e q u i t a b l e r i g h t s o f p e r s o n s i n o c c u p a t i o n w i t h t h e 
vendor. The i d e a was c r i t i c i s e d by t h e Court o f Appeal 
i n t h e r e g i s t e r e d l a n d case o f HODGSON v MARKS(58) and 
d e s c r i b e d by L o r d W i l b e r f o r c e i n t h e House o f Lords i n 
WILLIAMS AND GLYN'S BANK LTD V BOLAND as " h e a v i l y 
o b s e l e t e " ( 5 9 ) . M o r e o v e r , i n t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n o f 
KINGSNORTH TRUST LTD . v T I Z A R D ( 6 0 ) , a m o r t g a g e e o f 
u n r e g i s t e r e d l a n d was h e l d t o have c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f 
the e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t o f a w i f e f o u n d t o be i n a c t u a l 
o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e m a t r i m o n i a l home o f wh i c h her husband 
was s o l e l e g a l owner. I n t h i s case, Judge John F i n l a y 
Q.C. e x p l a i n e d c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e i n t h e f o l l o w i n g 
terms: 
" I f t h e pu r c h a s e r o r mortgagee c a r r i e s o u t such 
i n s p e c t i o n s as ought r e a s o n a b l y t o be made and 
does n o t e i t h e r f i n d t h e c l a i m a n t i n o c c u p a t i o n o r 
f i n d e v i d e n c e o f t h a t o c c u p a t i o n r e a s o n a b l y 
s u f f i c i e n t t o g i v e n o t i c e o f t h e o c c u p a t i o n , t h e n 
I am n o t persuaded t h a t t h e p u r c h a s e r o r mortgagee 
i s i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s (and i n t h e absence .... 
o f o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) f i x e d w i t h n o t i c e o f t h e 
c l a i m a n t ' s r i g h t s . One o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
however, i s t h a t such i n s p e c t i o n i s c a r r i e d o u t as 
ought r e a a n n a h l y t.n b<=» m a r i e . " ( 6 1 ) 
T h i s p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e d t o e s t o p p e l cases, c o u p l e d w i t h 
t h e e v i d e n t i a l problems o f e s t a b l i s h i n g r i g h t s a r i s i n g 
out o f e s t o p p e l o b v i o u s l y imposes a v e r y heavy, b u t n o t 
i n t o l e r a b l e , burden on t h i r d p a r t i e s . I t r a i s e s e x a c t l y 
t h e same problems as t h a t o f a s i n g l e t r u s t e e f o r s a l e 
and an e q u i t a b l e owner i n o c c u p a t i o n w i t h an i n t e r e s t 
based on a r e s u l t i n g o r c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t , where t h e r e 
i s a l s o l a c k o f w r i t t e n e v i dence. Given t h e importance 
now a t t a c h e d t o t h e "use v a l u e " o f p r o p e r t y and t h e f a c t 
t h a t t h e r i g h t s o f a person i n a c t u a l o c c u p a t i o n a re 
r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y d i s c o v e r a b l e , t h e balance would n o t 
seem t o have been t i p p e d t o o h e a v i l y i n f a v o u r o f t h e 
l i c e n s e e a t t h e expense o f t h i r d p a r t i e s . T h i s i s 
e s p e c i a l l y a r g u a b l e i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e d e c i s i o n i n 
BRISTOL AND WEST BUILDING SOCIETY v HENNING(62) where i t 
was h e l d t h a t , i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e e q u i t a b l e 
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r i g h t s of a person i n a c t u a l o c c u p a t i o n may be postponed 
t o those of a p u r c h a s e r . On t h e f a c t s o f t h e case, i t 
was h e l d t h a t i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o impute t o an e q u i t a b l e 
owner, on t h e b a s i s o f a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t , a common 
i n t e n t i o n t o t a k e p r i o r i t y over t h e r i g h t s o f a mortgagee 
i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s where t o t h e knowledge o f t h e e q u i t a b l e 
owner t h e p r o p e r t y had been a c q u i r e d w i t h t h e a i d o f a 
mortgage. The d e c i s i o n i n e f f e c t amounts t o a r e v e r s a l 
o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f n o t i c e p l a c i n g t h e onus on t h e 
o c c u p i e r t o d e c l a r e h i s / h e r r i g h t s t o a p u r c h a s e r o f whom 
he/she has n o t i c e , l e s t he/she be deemed t o have conceded 
p r i o r i t y . Given t h a t p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l a l s o i n v o l v e s 
i n t e n t i o n , t h e same p r i n c i p l e s would seem t o a p p l y and 
w o u l d a t l e a s t p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n f o r m o r t g a g e e s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , BRISTOL AND WEST BUILDING SOCIETY V HENNING 
leaves i t u n c l e a r whether mere knowledge o f a mortgagee's 
r i g h t s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o postpone an e q u i t a b l e owner's 
i n t e r e s t o r w h e t h e r a p p r o v a l a n d / o r b e n e f i t t o t h e 
e q u i t a b l e owner must be e s t a b l i s h e d . I t would n o t seem 
t o be u n d u l y h a r s h on an e q u i t a b l e owner i f mere 
knowledge were t o be s u f f i c i e n t . 
To c o n s i d e r n e x t r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing and l i c e n c e s t o 
occupy s u p p o r t e d by t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e . I n c o n t r a s t 
t o t h e system o f u n r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing, such r i g h t s 
would appear t o f i t w i t h i n t h e system. A l t h o u g h S.20 (1) 
o f t h e Land R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t 1925 p r o v i d e s t h a t a 
t r a n s f e r e e t a k e s f r e e o f a l l r i g h t s o t h e r t h a n o v e r r i d i n g 
i n t e r e s t s and minor i n t e r e s t s p r o t e c t e d by one o f t h e 
a u t h o r i s e d methods p r o v i d e d , i t would seem t h a t e s t o p p e l 
r i g h t s may f a l l w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of minor i n t e r e s t s 
and where t h e l i c e n s e e i s i n a c t u a l o c c u p a t i o n , 
c o n s t i t u t e an o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t w i t h i n S.70 (1) (g) o f 
t h e Land R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t 1925. W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i s s u e 
o f a minor i n t e r e s t , s.3(15) o f t h e Land R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t 
1Q?5 rtofinoR minor int <?.TT' a?? +' S ! i n r l n r t i n n " a l l r i . c r h t s and 
i n t e r e s t s which are n o t r e g i s t e r e d o r p r o t e c t e d by e n t r y 
on t h e r e g i s t e r and w h i c h are n o t o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t s " . 
From t h i s v e r y wide d e f i n i t i o n , i t f o l l o w s t h a t any r i g h t 
r e l a t i n g t o l a n d must f a l l w i t h i n t h e system as a minor 
i n t e r e s t i f i t i s n o t r e g i s t r a b l e w i t h a s e p a r a t e t i t l e 
o r an o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t . The view has f u r t h e r m o r e been 
e x p r e s s e d ( 6 3 ) t h a t , s i n c e S.3 (15) r e f e r s t o " a l l 
r i g h t s " , t h e r i g h t i n q u e s t i o n need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be an 
i n t e r e s t i n l a n d t o be e l i g i b l e f o r p r o t e c t i o n as a m inor 
i n t e r e s t and would be capable o f p r o t e c t i o n by means o f a 
c a u t i o n under S.54 (1) o f t h e Land R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t 1925. 
I f one accepts t h e v iew t h a t n o t a l l l i c e n c e s t o remain, 
where t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e can be i n v o k e d , g i v e r i s e t o 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l s , such a f i n d i n g i s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
However, t h e f a c t t h a t e s t o p p e l r i g h t s may i n t h e o r y be 
capable of p r o t e c t i o n as minor i n t e r e s t s i s o f l i m i t e d 
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p r a c t i a l importance f o r two main reasons. F i r s t l y , i t 
may be d i f f i c u l t f o r a p a r t y c l a i m i n g r i g h t s a r i s i n g o u t 
o f e s t o p p e l t o s a t i s f y t h e r e g i s t r a r o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t 
b e f o r e t h e c o u r t d e c l a r e s such an i n t e r e s t and s e c o n d l y 
t h e t y p e o f p a r t y t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e has been 
developed t o p r o t e c t i s , i n most i n s t a n c e s , u n l i k e l y t o 
know about t h e i r need t o r e g i s t e r u n t i l i t i s t o o l a t e . 
I n any case, t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e as a p p l i e d t o l i c e n c e s 
r e l a t i n g t o l a n d i s l a r g e l y about p r o t e c t i n g e x i s t i n g 
o c c u p a t i o n of l a n d and i t would now seem c l e a r t h a t , 
where t h e l i c e n s e e i s i n a c t u a l o c c u p a t i o n , a t l e a s t w i t h 
a r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t a r i s i n g o u t o f e s t o p p e l , 
t h i s w i l l be an o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t under S.70 (1) (g) o f 
t h e Land R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t 1925 and, as such, b i n d i n g 
i r r e s p e c t i v e o f n o t i c e o r r e g i s t r a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
House o f L o r d s i n WILLIAMS AND GLYN' S BANK LTD. v 
BOLAND(64), a l l t h a t needs t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i s t h e mere 
f a c t o f o c c u p a t i o n c o u p l e d w i t h a p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t . 
T h i s imposes an even h e a v i e r burden on t h i r d p a r t i e s t h a n 
t h a t e x p e r i e n c e d u n d e r t h e s y s t e m o f u n r e g i s t e r e d 
coveyancing as t h e concept o f c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e i s more 
l i m i t e d i n ambit. N e v e r t h e l e s s i t s h o u l d be remembered 
t h a t t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e r e t e n t i o n o f o v e r r i d i n g 
i n t e r e s t s u n d e r S.70 ( 1 ) ( g ) was a l l p a r t o f t h e 
b a l a n c i n g a c t b etween t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h i r d p a r t y 
p u r c h a s e r s and t h e h o l d e r s o f e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s , and 
was based on t h e f a c t t h a t r i g h t s o f persons i n a c t u a l 
o c c u p a t i o n a r e r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y d i s c o v e r a b l e . T h i s 
does, however, l e a v e open t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a p r u d e n t 
p u r c h a s e r who does n o t d i s c o v e r a perhaps w e l l concealed 
o c c u p a t i o n o f a l i c e n s e e who can p l a c e r e l i a n c e on 
e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s , may s u f f e r , b u t t h i s i s l i k e l y t o be 
an e x t r e m e l y r a r e o c c u r r e n c e . A r e v i e w o f t h e e x i s t i n g 
case law on l i c e n c e s t o occupy r e v e a l s t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y 
o f t h e cases c o n c e r n d i s p u t e s b etween l i c e n s e e and 
l i c e n s o r c r t h e psrscr* 3'' rspr < =' c's T ,*"St'' , rss of v>e» l i c e n s o r 
and t h o s e i n v o l v i n g t h i r d p a r t i e s have been cases o f 
t h i r d p a r t i e s w i t h express n o t i c e o f t h e r i g h t s o f t h e 
l i c e n s e e . Moreover, s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r mortgagees 
may be a v a i l a b l e on account o f t h e d e c i s i o n i n PADDINGTON 
BUILDING SOCIETY v MENDELSOHN(65), which p a r a l l e l s t h e 
d e c i s i o n r e l a t i n g t o u n r e g i s t e r e d l a n d i n BRISTOL AND 
WEST BUILDING SOCIETY v HENNING(66) a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d . 
I n PADDINGTON BUILDING SOCEITY V MENDELSOHN, t h e c o u r t 
i m p u t e d an i n t e n t i o n t o a p a r t y w i t h an e q u i t a b l e 
i n t e r e s t by way o f r e s u l t i n g t r u s t , t h a t t h e mortgagee 
s h o u l d have p r i o r i t y o v e r her i n t e r e s t , i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
where t h e house i n q u e s t i o n had been a c q u i r e d w i t h t h e 
a i d o f a mortgage and c o u l d o n l y have been a c q u i r e d by 
t h i s means. 
A l t h o u g h i t c a n n o t be d e n i e d t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f 
e s t o p p e l r i g h t s capable o f b i n d i n g t h i r d p a r t i e s a r i s i n g 
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o u t o f l i c e n c e t o occupy makes conveyancing p o t e n t i a l l y 
more d i f f i c u l t and r i s k y i f , i n r e l a t i o n t o e i t h e r 
r e g i s t e r e d o r u n r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing, i t were t o be 
i n s i s t e d t h a t such r i g h t s s h o u l d o n l y be e n f o r c e a b l e 
a g a i n s t t h i r d p a r t i e s once p r o t e c t e d by r e g i s t r a t i o n . , one 
may as w e l l abandon t h e d o c t r i n e t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t 
a f f e c t s t h i r d p a r t i e s as i t has a l r e a d y been n o t e d t h a t 
t h e v e r y people l i k e l y t o need t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e 
d o c t r i n e a re u n l i k e l y t o know o f t h e need t o r e g i s t e r 
g i v e n t h e y have n o t even t a k e n s t e p s t o p r o t e c t t h e i r 
o c c u p a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e l i c e n s o r . A d m i t t e d l y , under t h e 
system as i t s t a n d s , f a i l u r e t o r e g i s t e r would s t i l l 
l e a v e t h e l i c e n c e b i n d i n g on c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s o f t h i r d 
p a r t y , namely, i n r e l a t i o n t o r e g i s t e r e d l a n d , t h o s e who 
are n o t purchasers f o r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and i n 
r e l a t i o n t o u n r e g i s t e r e d l a n d t hose p o t e n t i a l l y who are 
no t purchasers f o r money o r money's w o r t h . Moreover i f , 
i n r e l a t i o n t o r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing, d e c i s i o n s such as 
PEFFER v RIGG(67) and LYUS v PROWSA(68) were f o l l o w e d , 
t h i s w o u l d f u r t h e r e x t e n d t h e c l a s s o f p u r c h a s e r 
a f f e c t e d . I n PEFFER v RIGG, a p u r c h a s e r o f r e g i s t e r e d 
l a n d who a r g u a b l y ( 6 9 ) t o o k f o r nominal c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h 
express n o t i c e o f an u n p r o t e c t e d m inor i n t e r e s t was h e l d 
t o be bound by i t on t h e b a s i s o f a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t , 
n o t b e i n g a "purchaser f o r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n " w i t h i n 
S.20 o f t h e Land R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t 1925. A c c o r d i n g t o 
Graham J., t o be a p u r c h a s e r f o r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
t h e p u r c h a s e r must p u r c h a s e i n good f a i t h f o r f u l l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; i f one has knowledge o f u n p r o t e c t e d m inor 
i n t e r e s t and c l a i m s t o t a k e f r e e from i t , one cannot be 
s a i d t o have purchased i n good f a i t h . LYUS v PROWSA a l s o 
concerned r e g i s t e r e d l a n d . I n t h i s case, D i l l o n J. h e l d 
t h a t a t h i r d p a r t y p u r c h a s e r , who e x p r e s s l y agreed i n t h e 
c o n t r a c t o f s a l e t o t a k e s u b j e c t t o an u n p r o t e c t e d e s t a t e 
c o n t r a c t , was bound by t h e r i g h t on t h e b a s i s o f a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t b o t h o f th e s e 
d e c i s i o n s a r e f a r f r o m s a t i s f a c t o r y and i n v o l v e , t o 
g r e a t e r and l e s s e r e x t e n t s , a t t e m p t s t o b r i n g i n by t h e 
back door a m o d i f i e d d o c t r i n e o f n o t i c e w h i c h would, 
t a k e n t h e system o f r e g i s t r a t i o n o v e r a l l , be f a r more 
damaging t h a n i n t h e s p h e r e o f l i c e n c e s t o o c c u p y , 
a c c e p t i n g t h a t e q u i t a b l e r i g h t s c r e a t e d may b i n d 
p u r c h a s e r s i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i t h o u t t h e need f o r 
r e g i s t r a t i o n . Given t h e s m a l l number o f cases i n which 
t h i r d p a r t y p u r c h a s e r s a r e l i k e l y t o be a f f e c t e d , t h i s 
would seem t o be a c o m p a r a t i v e l y s m a l l p r i c e t o pay t o 
p r o t e c t d e s e r v i n g and v u l n e r a b l e members o f s o c i e t y - de 
m i n i m i s non c u r a t l e x ! 
Even i f one a c c e p t s t h a t , i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t more 
v u l n e r a b l e members o f s o c i e t y , a d m i t t e d l y t o t h e 
d e t r i m e n t o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h i r d p a r t i e s g e n e r a l l y , 
e s t o p p e l r i g h t s must c o n t i n u e t o e x i s t o u t s i d e t h e system 
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o f u n r e g i s t e r e d conveyancing and n o t be r e q u i r e d t o be 
p r o t e c t e d by an e n t r y on t h e r e g i s t e r under t h e system o f 
r e g i s t e r e d c o n v e y a n c i n g , i t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t s u c h 
p r o t e c t i o n goes t o o f a r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t e s t o p p e l 
r i g h t s may be u n a c c e p t a b l y d i f f i c u l t f o r a t h i r d p a r t y t o 
a s c e r t a i n and p r e d i c t t h e consequences o f . An 
ex a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e p o r t e d case law r e v e a l s t h a t , i n 
d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g l i c e n c e s t o o c c u p y , e q u i t y has 
a l r e a d y i n t e r v e n e d i n a v e r y d i v e r s e v a r i e t y o f ways. I n 
DILLWYN v LLEWELYN(70) and PASCOE v TURNER(71), t h e c o u r t 
o r d e r e d t h e conveyance o f t h e f e e s i m p l e , whereas i n 
INWARDS V BAKER(72), WILLIAMS V STAITE(73), and GREASLEY 
v COOKE(74) m e r e l y n e g a t i v e p r o t e c t i o n was o r d e r e d , an 
a c t i o n f o r p o s s e s s i o n b e i n g d i s m i s s e d , a l l o w i n g t h e 
l i c e n s e e t o remain f o r l i f e . Yet a g a i n i n RE SHARPE(75), 
t h e c o u r t d e c l a r e d an e q u i t a b l e l i e n o v er t h e p r o p e r t y 
f o r e x p e n d i t u r e i n c u r r e d , w h i l s t i n DODSWORTH v 
DODSWORTH(76), t h e c o u r t s u spended an o r d e r f o r 
posses s i o n u n t i l t h e c o s t o f improvements had been r e p a i d 
and f i n a l l y , i n GRIFFITH v W I L L I A M S ( 7 7 ) , t h e c o u r t 
g r a n t e d a no n - a s s i g n a b l e l e a s e a t a low r e n t . I t has 
been argued(78) t h a t i f one a p p r e c i a t e s what t h e c o u r t i s 
d o i n g i n e s t o p p e l c a s e s , t h e n t h e outcome i s n o t 
d i f f i c u l t t o p r e d i c t d e s p i t e t h e v a r i e t y o f remedies 
which have so f a r been g r a n t e d . The c o u r t , we a r e t o l d , 
i s , t h r o u g h e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s , s i m p l y overcoming a l a c k 
of f o r m a l i t y and g i v i n g e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e 
p a r t i e s by d e c l a r i n g and p e r f e c t i n g t h e r e l e v a n t 
e s t a b l i s h e d p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t t h e y i n t e n d e d . I t has 
a l r e a d y been argued t h a t , s i n c e t h e p a r t i e s may w e l l n o t 
envisage o r t h i n k i n terms o f a r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n t e r e s t , t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e has n o t s i m p l y been used 
f o r t h e purpose o f overcoming l a c k o f f o r m a l i t y and t h a t 
t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n some o f t h e remedies g r a n t e d w h i c h 
do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o r r e s p o n d t o e s t a b l i s h e d p r o p r i e t a r y 
i n h p r p s h R Hnuoiror i.a S U b l T . i t t?(3. t h ? . t even V?h?2T? t h S 
e q u i t y has been s a t i s f i e d by t h e g r a n t o f some r e c o g n i s e d 
p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t , t h e c o u r t i s n o t s i m p l y overcoming t h e 
l a c k o f f o r m a l i t y i n t h e arrangement by g i v i n g e f f e c t t o 
th e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s . The c o u r t i s a d d i t i o n a l l y 
l o o k i n g a t t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n o r d e r t o 
achieve " j u s t i c e " between t h e p a r t i e s , i n a s i m i l a r way 
t o t h a t o f L o r d Denning i n a p p l y i n g h i s s o - c a l l e d "new 
model" c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t t o co-ownership cases i n t h e 
1970s. Under t h i s a p p r o a c h , t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e 
p a r t i e s i s c l e a r l y n o t t h e o n l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r . 
P o t e n t i a l l y , we a r e s e e i n g t h e r e b i r t h o f new model 
c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r t h e new name 
" p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l " a f t e r m e e t i n g what would appear t o 
be a ne a r - d e a t h i n d e c i s i o n s o f t h e Court o f Appeal i n 
th e sphere o f co-ownership such as BURNS v BURNS(79) and 
GRANT V EDWARDS(80). 
231 
What evidence i s t h e r e , t h e n , t o s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t 
w i d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a n t h e a c t u a l o r presumed 
i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s a r e b e i n g t a k e n i n t o account i n 
d e c i d i n g how t h e e q u i t y s h o u l d be s a t i s f i e d ? An 
ex a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e a s o n i n g adopted i n PASCOE v TURNER 
(8 1 ) c l e a r l y r e v e a l s t h a t f a c t o r s o t h e r t h a n t h e 
i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s were t a k e n i n t o account• The 
f a c t s o f t h e case have a l r e a d y been e x p l a i n e d i n some 
d e t a i l . The c o u r t accepted evidence t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f 
had t o l d t h e defendant t h a t t h e house i n q u e s t i o n and i t s 
c o n t e n t s were h e r s , b u t had t h e n f a i l e d t o p e r f e c t t h e 
g i f t by a conveyance o f t i t l e t o t h e house t o her. 
A l t h o u g h t h e c o u r t o r d e r e d t h e f e e s i m p l e i n t h e house be 
t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h i s was n o t s i m p l y i n 
o r d e r t o p e r f e c t t h e i m p e r f e c t g i f t on account o f t h e 
e l e m e n t o f d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e ; t h e r e were o t h e r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Cummings-Bruce L . J . c o n s i d e r e d t h a t 
t h e r e were two a l t e r n a t i v e remedies a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
c o u r t : e i t h e r t h e de f e n d a n t s h o u l d have a r i g h t t o 
occupy t h e house f o r her l i f e t i m e , o r t h e r e s h o u l d be a 
t r a n s f e r o f t h e f e e s i m p l e t o her. I n o p t i n g f o r t h e 
l a t t e r remedy, t h e c o u r t t o o k i n t o a c c o u n t t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f was c o m p a r a t i v e l y w e a l t h y as compared t o t h e 
d e f e n d a n t , t h a t h i s c o n d u c t i n a t t e m p t i n g t o s e c u r e 
p o s s e s s i o n had been " r u t h l e s s " , t h a t i f he were t o r e t a i n 
an i n t e r e s t i n t h e house, he may make excuses t o e n t e r i t 
and t h e r e b y b o t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t . A d d i t i o n a l l y , g i v e n 
her l i m i t e d c a p i t a l , t h e defe n d a n t would n o t be a b l e t o 
c a r r y o u t any expensive r e p a i r s w h i c h became necessary i f 
she had o n l y a l i c e n c e t o remain, as she would be unable 
t o p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y t o f i n a n c e a l o a n . S i m i l a r " j u s t i c e " 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were t a k e n i n t o account by L o r d Denning i n 
HARDWICK v JOHNSON(82) i n f i n d i n g t h e d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w had 
an i r r e v o c a b l e " e q u i t a b l e l i c e n c e " t o occupy. I n t h i s 
r e s p e c t , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t he d e c l a r e s " t h e 
o c i r t h?.s t o s p s l l o u t t b ? t ? r T n s " ' 8 ? ^ o f th*" 11 f ^ n r e 
which does n o t seem c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i d e a o f t h e c o u r t 
s o l e l y g i v i n g e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s i n 
s a t i s f y i n g t h e e q u i t y . On t h e f a c t s o f t h e case, i n 
d e c i d i n g t h e l i c e n c e was i r r e v o c a b l e , L o r d Denning seemed 
much i n f l u e n c e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w had 
been d e s e r t e d by her husband, t h e son o f t h e l i c e n s o r , 
and had moreover been l e f t t o b r i n g up a baby. He goes 
on t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n may w e l l have been 
d i f f e r e n t , had t h e r e n o t been a g r a n d c h i l d and t h e 
d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w had formed an a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h a n o t h e r 
man i n t h e house. I t i s a r g u a b l e t h a t i n t h i s case, i n 
c o n t r a s t t o PASCOE v TURNER, t h e w i d e r j u s t i c e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e b e i n g t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t by L o r d 
Denning, t o e s t a b l i s h whether t h e r e has been an element 
o f d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e so as t o make t h e l i c e n c e 
i r r e v o c a b l e i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , r a t h e r t h a n f o r t h e 
p u r p o s e o f d e t e r m i n i n g how t h e e q u i t y , once r a i s e d , 
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s h o u l d be s a t i s f i e d . T h i s i s because L o r d Denning does 
n o t d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y b e t w e e n t h e two e l e m e n t s . 
However, i t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t he does envisage t h e 
d u r a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s a r i s i n g o u t o f e s t o p p e l as b e i n g 
governed by t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e conduct 
o f t h e p a r t i e s , as he r e f u s e s t o s e t o u t t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h t h e l i c e n c e may, i n t h e f u t u r e , be 
d e t e r m i n e d , c o n c l u d i n g : 
"One cannot f o r e s e e when i t may be p o s s i b l e t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e l i c e n c e b u t i t cannot be d e t e r m i n e d 
a t t h i s s t a g e . " ( 8 4 ) 
T h i s i s h i g h l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r t h e p a r t i e s themselves, 
l e t alone t h i r d p a r t i e s . A d d i t i o n a l evidence t h a t t h e 
c o u r t s are n o t s i m p l y g i v i n g e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f 
t h e l i c e n s o r and l i c e n s e e and p e r f e c t i n g i m p e r f e c t g i f t s 
i s a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e somewhat d u b i o u s n o t i o n i n t h e 
judgments o f L o r d Denning M.R. and Cummings-Bruce L.J. i n 
WILLIAMS v STAITE(85) a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d , t h a t a l i c e n c e 
i r r e v o c a b l e by reason o f e s t o p p e l may be t e r m i n a t e d by 
bad conduct on t h e p a r t o f t h e l i c e n s e e . 
I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i t n o t as easy as some 
would have us b e l i e v e , t o d e t e r m i n e how t h e e q u i t y may be 
s a t i s f i e d i n e s t o p p e l cases so t h a t even i f a t h i r d p a r t y 
has been f o r t u n a t e enough t o d i s c o v e r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f 
t h e r i g h t s founded on e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e y may have 
t o s u f f e r t h e f u r t h e r u n c e r t a i n t y o f n o t knowing t h e 
e x t e n t o f t h e r i g h t s a c q u i r e d u n t i l a c o u r t h e a r i n g . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s s u b m i t t e d , t h a t i f one accepts t h a t 
concepts such as e s t o p p e l s h o u l d have a p l a c e i n t h e 
scheme o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t more 
v u l n e r a b l e members o f s o c i e t y , t h e n one a l s o has t o 
accept most of t h e u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t goes w i t h them. One 
might argue t h a t , i n o r d e r t o i n t r o d u c e an element o f 
c e r t a i n t y , t h e c o u r t s s h o u l d , i n s a t i s f y i n g t h e e q u i t y 
once r a i s e d , o n l y g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e 
p a r t i e s and n o t t a k e i n t o account w i d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , 
b u t s i n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g whether t h e element o f d e t r i m e n t 
i s p r o ved, so as t o r a i s e t h e e q u i t y i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , 
i n v o l v e s l o o k i n g a t t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e 
f a c t t h a t such c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e a l s o t a k e n i n t o account 
i n f i n d i n g a s u i t a b l e remedy does n o t seem t o i n c r e a s e 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e problems t h i r d p a r t i e s w i l l i n e v i t a b l y 
e x p e r i e n c e . Having s a i d t h i s , however, t h e c o u r t s s h o u l d 
a s s i s t i n p r o v i d i n g a minimum degree o f c e r t a i n t y by 
b e i n g p r e p a r e d t o s e t o u t i n p r e c i s e terms t h e e x t e n t o f 
t h e r i g h t s a c q u i r e d w i t h t h e a i d o f e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s , 
and by g i v i n g e f f e c t t o them i n terms o f e s t a b l i s h e d 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t s , even i f these prove t o be somewhat 
a r t i f i c i a l as i n GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS(86). To a t t e m p t t o 
i n t r o d u c e a t o t a l element o f c e r t a i n t y would t a k e f r o m 
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t h e e s t o p p e l d o c t r i n e much o f i t s f o r c e ; i t s v e r y n a t u r e 
r e q u i r e s i t has "hazy edges" ( 8 7 ) and, t o deny t h e 
d o c t r i n e has a p l a c e i n t h e s y s t e m because o f t h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , would d e p r i v e t h e system o f t h e sense o f 
j u s t i c e w h i c h s o c i e t y demands. 
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The S e t t l e d Land A ct 
I t has been s u g g e s t e d by some ( 1 ) t h a t i n f o r m a l 
arrangements f o r r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y f o r l i f e o r f o r so 
l o n g as t h e l i c e n s e e wishes t o occupy t h e premises g i v e 
r i s e t o d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n s as t o whether t h e S e t t l e d 
Land A ct 1925 o p e r a t e s . T h i s , i t has been s a i d ( 2 ) , i s 
so, whether t h e l i c e n c e i s c l a s s i f i e d as c o n t r a c t u a l o r 
i s r e garded as i r r e v o c a b l e on account o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o f 
e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s . I n t h e l i g h t o f t h e view expressed 
i n e a r l y S e c t i o n s t h a t e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e s p r o v i d e t h e 
be s t way f o r w a r d f o r p r o t e c t i n g o c c u p a t i o n i n l i c e n c e 
cases, i t i s proposed t o c o n s i d e r how r e a l o r i n s u p e r a b l e 
these problems a r e . I f t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 does 
op e r a t e i n a l i c e n c e s i t u a t i o n , t h e l i c e n s e e would be a 
t e n a n t f o r l i f e and, as such, would be a b l e t o c a l l f o r 
the l e g a l e s t a t e t o be v e s t e d i n him o r h e r ( 3 ) and, 
amongst o t h e r t h i n g s , would be a b l e t o s e l l t h e f e e 
sim p l e o r l e a s e t h e p r o p e r t y ( 4 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , S.106 o f 
th e S e t t l e d Land A ct 1925 makes i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t such 
powers c o u l d n o t be o u s t e d o r c u r t a i l e d . The consequence 
of f i n d i n g t h e l i c e n s e e t o be a t e n a n t f o r l i f e i s t h a t a 
person who has m e r e l y been o f f e r e d r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y 
ends up w i t h much more t h a n was ever i n t e n d e d . T h i s 
p o i n t was made by L o r d Denning i n BINIONS v EVANS, where 
he commented: 
"No-one would expect Mrs. Evans here t o be a b l e t o 
s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y o r t o l e a s e i t . I t would be so 
e n t i r e l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e t r u e i n t e n t o f t h e 
p a r t i e s t h a t i t cannot be r i g h t . " ( 5 ) 
A s i m i l a r view i s a l s o expressed by b o t h R u s s e l l L.J. i n 
DODSWORTH v D0DSW0RTH(6) and Scarman L.J. i n CHANDLER v 
KERLEY(7). Consequently, even where a l i c e n c e t o occupy 
has been found t o g i v e r i s e t o a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t , t h e r e 
i s an obvious j u d i c i a l r e l u c t a n c e t o make such a f i n d i n g . 
T h i s i s apparent f r o m t h e judgments o f Stephenson and 
Megaw L . J J . i n BINIONS v EVANS, i n e x p r e s s i n g t h e 
m a j o r i t y view t h a t Mrs. Evans was a t e n a n t f o r l i f e under 
th e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925. Stephenson L.J. observed: 
"Apart f r o m a u t h o r i t y I would n o t have t h o u g h t 
t h a t s u c h an i n t e r e s t c o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d t o 
amount t o a tenancy f o r l i f e w i t h i n t h e meaning o f 
t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 , and I w o u l d have 
t h o u g h t t h a t t h e o t h e r terms o f her tenancy.... 
are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a power t o ask f o r t h e l e g a l 
e s t a t e t o be s e t t l e d on h e r o r t o s e l l t h e 
c o t t a g e . " ( 8 ) 
S i m i l a r l y , Megaw L.J. commented: 
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" I c onfess t h a t I have had d i f f i c u l t y i n s e e i n g 
p r e c i s e l y how t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 was 
a p p l i c a b l e , ( 9 ) " 
and l a t e r , 
" I r e a l i s e t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e S e t t l e d 
Land A ct may produce some odd consequences b u t no 
odder t h a n t h o s e w h i c h were i n h e r e n t i n t h e 
d e c i s i o n i n BANNISTER v BANNISTER."(10) 
Such j u d i c i a l r e l u c t a n c e may account f o r t h e f a c t t h a t 
o t h e r cases w i t h f a c t s , s i m i l a r t o th o s e i n which t h e 
i s s u e o f a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t was r a i s e d , make no 
r e f e r e n c e a t a l l t o t h e S e t t l e d Land A ct 1925; f o r 
example, t h e e s t o p p e l cases o f INWARDS v BAKER(11) and 
GREASLEY v COOKE(12), where i t would a r g u a b l y have been 
e a s i e r t o f i n d a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t t h a n i n t h e 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e cases i n wh i c h t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 
1925 was di s c u s s e d . I t i s t h e r e f o r e necessary t o d e c i d e 
w h e t h e r BANNISTER v BANNISTER(13) and BINIONS v 
EVANS(14), t h e two cases which s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t a 
s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t a r i s e s where t h e r e i s an i n f o r m a l 
arrangement t o p e r m i t a n o t h e r t o occupy premises f o r l i f e 
o r f o r so l o n g as t h e l i c e n s e e wishes, were r i g h t l y 
d e c i d e d . 
The f a c t s o f b o t h BANNISTER v BANNISTER and BINIONS v 
EVANS have a l r e a d y been r e l a t e d i n d e t a i l . I t w i l l be 
remembered, i n BANNISTER v BANNISTER, t h e de f e n d a n t had 
s o l d two c o t t a g e s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f a t a reduced p r i c e on 
th e o r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e defe n d a n t c o u l d s t a y i n 
one o f t h e c o t t a g e s r e n t f r e e so l o n g as she l i k e d . The 
p l a i n t i f f l a t e r sought p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e c o t t a g e on t h e 
ground t h a t t h e defe n d a n t was o n l y a t e n a n t a t w i l l and 
her tenancy had been d e t e r m i n e d by a n o t i c e t o q u i t . The 
Court o f Appeal, however, found t h e p l a i n t i f f h e l d t h e 
c o t t a g e on t r u s t f o r t h e def e n d a n t f o r her l i f e , w i t h t h e 
consequence t h a t t h e defe n d a n t was a t e n a n t f o r l i f e 
under t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925. I n BINIONS v EVANS, a 
w r i t t e n agreement had been e n t e r e d i n t o by t h e 
p r e d e c e s s o r i n t i t l e o f t h e p l a i n t i f f s , w h e r e b y t h e 
defendant had been p r o v i d e d w i t h a "temporary home", 
which she was p e r m i t t e d t o " p e r s o n a l l y occupy and l i v e 
i n " r e n t f r e e f o r t h e remainder o f her l i f e . On th e s e 
f a c t s , r e l y i n g on BANNISTER v BANNISTER, t h e m a j o r i t y o f 
th e Court o f Appeal ( L o r d Denning d i s s e n t i n g ) f o und t h a t 
t h e agreement had t h e e f f e c t o f c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e 
defendant a t e n a n t f o r l i f e under t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 
1925. One reason f o r o b j e c t i n g t o t h e f i n d i n g o f a 
s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t i n BANNISTER v BANNISTER b u t n o t 
BINIONS v EVANS i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e agreement t o a l l o w 
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t h e defendant t o occupy t h e c o t t a g e was m e r e l y an o r a l 
o n e ( 1 5 ) , whereas t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a s e t t l e m e n t i n S . l 
(1) o f t h e S e t t l e d Land A ct 1925 r e q u i r e s a "deed, 
w i l l , . . . . A c t o f P a r l i a m e n t o r o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t 
i n s t r u m e n t s " . Any argument t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e deed 
of conveyance o f t h e c o t t a g e s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , w h i c h was 
induced by t h e o r a l agreement t o a l l o w t h e defendant t o 
occupy, c o u l d be r e g a r d e d as t h e necessary i n s t r u m e n t f o r 
t h e purpose o f S. l ( 1 ) , would seem t o be u n j u s t i f i e d ; 
t h e whole p o i n t was t h a t t h e p r i o r o r a l agreement had n o t 
been embodied i n t h e deed. A s l i g h t l y s t r o n g e r argument 
i s t h a t t h e c o u r t o r d e r may be re g a r d e d as t h e necessary 
i n s t r u m e n t f o r t h e purpose o f S . l ( 1 ) . Reasoning a l o n g 
these l i n e s was adopted by Goff L.J. i n t h e p r o p r i e t a r y 
e s t o p p e l case o f GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS where he expressed 
t h e view: 
"... i t i s t h e c o u r t o r d e r d e c l a r i n g t h e e q u i t y 
w h i c h i s an " i n s t r u m e n t " and t h e r e f o r e a 
s e t t l e m e n t . " ( 1 6 ) 
However, a l t h o u g h t h i s may mean t h a t l i c e n c e s i r r e v o c a b l e 
on account o f p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l a r e n o t p r e c l u d e d f r o m 
b e i n g regarded as s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t s t h r o u g h l a c k o f a 
w r i t t e n agreement, i n BANNISTER v BANNISTER, t h e r i g h t t o 
occu p y was h e l d t o be e n f o r c e a b l e by means o f a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . T h i s i s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i f 
t h e v i e w i s t a k e n t h a t r i g h t s b a sed on p r o p r i e t a r y 
e s t o p p e l o n l y come i n t o e x i s t e n c e when d e c l a r e d by t h e 
c o u r t whereas an o r a l agreement e n f o r c e a b l e by means o f 
th e i m p o s i t i o n o f a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t e x i s t s f r o m t h e 
d a t e o f t h e a g r e e m e n t , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e c o u r t 
m e r e l y making i t e n f o r c e a b l e . Thus, f r o m S . l ( 1 ) , i t 
would appear t h a t l a c k o f w r i t i n g may o f i t s e l f p r e v e n t a 
l i c e n c e t o occupy f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t , 
but t h i s would not he s o i f . as i s now i n c r e a s i n g l y t h e 
f i n d i n g , t h e o r a l agreement i s i r r e v o c a b l e on account o f 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l . 
I n h i s d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n i n BINIONS v EVANS, L o r d 
Denning p r e s e n t s t h r e e o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e f i n d i n g o f a 
s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t on t h e f a c t s o f t h a t c a s e ( 1 7 ) . 
F i r s t l y , t h a t such a f i n d i n g would be e n t i r e l y c o n t r a r y 
t o t h e t r u e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s . Secondly, t h a t 
S.l (1) of t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 r e q u i r e s t h e l a n d t o 
be " l i m i t e d i n t r u s t " b e f o r e a s e t t l e m e n t can a r i s e , by 
which i t means " e x p r e s s l y l i m i t e d i n t r u s t " and t h i r d l y , 
S . l ( 1 ) a l s o r e q u i r e s t h e l a n d t o be l i m i t e d i n t r u s t "by 
way o f s u c c e s s i o n " , whereas on t h e f a c t s o f BINIONS v 
EVANS, t h e r e was "no t r a c e o f a s u c c e s s i o n o f one 
b e n e f i c i a r y a f t e r a n o t h e r " . The v a l i d i t y o f each o f 
these o b j e c t i o n s must now be c o n s i d e r e d i n t u r n . 
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On t h e i s s u e o f i n t e n t i o n , a s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n i s p u t 
f o r w a r d a g a i n s t t h e f i n d i n g t h a t a l i c e n s e e i s a t e n a n t 
f o r l i f e under t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 by L o r d J u s t i c e 
R u s s e l l i n DODSWORTH v DODSWORTH(18). I n t h a t case, t h e 
C o u r t o f A p p e a l r e f u s e d t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t s were 
t e n a n t s f o r l i f e on t h e grounds t h a t t h i s would l e a d " t o 
a g r e a t e r and more e x t e n s i v e i n t e r e s t t h a n was e v e r 
contemplated by t h e p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t s . " B e a r i n g 
i n mind t h a t one o f t h e main aims b e h i n d t h e S e t t l e d Land 
Act 1925 i s t o p r e v e n t l a n d f r o m becoming i n a l i e n a b l e , i t 
i s q u e s t i o n a b l e whether t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s i n 
t h i s r e s p e c t s h o u l d be r e l e v a n t . An i r r e v o c a b l e l i c e n c e 
t o occupy f o r l i f e w h i c h i s found t o t a k e e f f e c t o u t s i d e 
t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t w i l l r e n d e r t h e l a n d l e s s m a r k e t a b l e 
s i n c e a p u r c h a s e r w i t h a c t u a l o r c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e w i l l 
be bound by such l i c e n c e which w i l l n o t be o v e r r e a c h a b l e 
and t h e l i c e n s e e him o r h e r s e l f w i l l n o t be a b l e t o 
a l i e n a t e t h e l a n d by s a l e , l e a s e o r o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n . 
Furthermore S.l ( 1) o f t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 s e t s o u t 
f u l l y t h e ci r c u m s t a n c e s i n which a s e t t l e m e n t a r i s e s and, 
i n d o i n g so, makes no r e f e r e n c e t o i n t e n t i o n . I t would 
t h e r e f o r e seem t o f o l l o w t h a t , i f an arrangement f a l l s 
w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n , a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t must 
a r i s e i r r e s p e c t i v e o f i n t e n t i o n . What i s more, t h e r e a r e 
many r e p o r t e d c a s e s ( 1 9 ) where t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e 
S e t t l e d Land A c t have o p e r a t e d a g a i n s t t h e a c t u a l 
i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s . 
T u r n i n g t o t h e second o b j e c t i o n p u t by L o r d Denning i n 
BINIONS v EVANS, namely t h a t t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 
r e q u i r e s t h e s e t t l e m e n t t o be e x p r e s s l y l i m i t e d i n t r u s t . 
I t has been r i g h t l y a r g u e d ( 2 0 ) t h a t t h e r e i s no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r imposing such a r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e 
ambit o f t h e A c t . Since 1926, S . l ( 1) o f t h e Law o f 
P r o p e r t y A c t 1925 p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y t w o 
• i n t p r P R t K which are capable o f e x i s t i n q as l e g a l e s t a t e s 
i n l a n d , namely a f e e s i m p l e a b s o l u t e i n p o s s e s s i o n and a 
term o f years a b s o l u t e . A l l o t h e r b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t s 
must s u b s i s t b e h i n d a t r u s t . I t t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w s , f o r 
example, t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n i n S . l ( l ) ( 2 ) o f t h e S e t t l e d 
Land A c t 1925 t h a t a s e t t l e m e n t a r i s e s where l a n d i s 
" l i m i t e d i n t r u s t .... f o r an e n t a i l e d i n t e r e s t " , w i l l be 
s a t i s f i e d w h e t h e r o r n o t i t i s e x p r e s s l y l i m i t e d i n 
t r u s t . Once i t i s accepted t h a t l i m i t e d i n t r u s t i n n o t 
c o n f i n e d t o e x p r e s s l y l i m i t e d i n t r u s t , i t would f o l l o w 
t h a t s i n c e , i n BANNISTER v BANNISTER, and, on L o r d 
Denning's own r e a s o n i n g , i n BINIONS v EVANS, c o n s t r u c t i v e 
t r u s t s were found t o e x i s t , t h i s f a c t o r c o u l d n o t o f 
i t s e l f p r e v e n t t h e a g r e e m e n t s f o r o c c u p a t i o n c o m i n g 
w i t h i n t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t . However, i t i s a r g u a b l e 
t h a t l i c e n c e s i r r e v o c a b l e on a c c o u n t o f p r o p r i e t a r y 
e s t o p p e l may, i n some c i r c u m s t a n c e s , f a l l o u t s i d e t h e 
Ac t . Whether t h e r i g h t t o occupy c o u l d be s a i d t o be 
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" l i m i t e d i n t r u s t " w o u l d seem t o depend on how t h e 
" e q u i t y i s s a t i s f i e d " . I t t h i s were done i n terms o f a 
r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , t h i s w ould, s i n c e 1925, 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y b r i n g t h e l i c e n c e w i t h i n t h e A c t , p r o v i d e d 
one o f t h e two l e g a l e s t a t e s i s n o t c r e a t e d . I f , on t h e 
o t h e r hand, t h e e s t o p p e l i s n o t expressed i n terms o f a 
r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t , t h e n , s i n c e t h e t e r m 
" l i m i t e d " i s o n l y a p p o s i t e t o an e s t a t e ( 2 1 ) , no s t r i c t 
s e t t l e m e n t would a r i s e . T h i s would be t h e case, f o r 
example, w i t h r e s p e c t t o INWARDS v BAKER(22) and GREASLEY 
v COOKE(23), where t h e r e was an " e q u i t y t o remain", a 
r i g h t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e same as a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e 
i n t e r e s t . 
The t h i r d and f i n a l o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d by L o r d Denning 
a g a i n s t t h e f i n d i n g o f a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t , i s t h a t , on 
t h e f a c t s o f BINIONS v EVANS, t h e r e s i m p l y was no 
suc c e s s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s t o b r i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n t h e 
S e t t l e d Land A c t . Given t h a t S . l (4) o f t h e S e t t l e d Land 
Ac t 1925 p r o v i d e s t h a t any e s t a t e n o t d i s p o s e d o f by t h e 
s e t t l o r and r e m a i n i n g o r r e v e r t i n g t o t h e s e t t l o r i s , f o r 
t h e purposes o f t h e A c t , comprised i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t , 
L o r d D e n n i n g c a n n o t have been s a y i n g t h e r e was no 
s e t t l e m e n t , as t h e r e was m e r e l y an i r r e v o c a b l e l i c e n c e 
f o l l o w e d by n o t h i n g more. He must t h e r e f o r e have been 
e x p r e s s i n g t h e o p i n i o n t h a t , where a f e e s i m p l e a b s o l u t e 
i s s u b j e c t t o an i r r e v o c a b l e l i c e n c e , t h e l i c e n c e i t s e l f 
c a n n o t c r e a t e t h e s u c c e s s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s . I t i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o examine w h e t h e r t h i s v i e w i s i n f a c t 
c o r r e c t . 
The main a u t h o r i t y r e l i e d upon by t h e m a j o r i t y i n BINIONS 
v EVANS, i n f i n d i n g a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t e x i s t e d , was 
BANNISTER V BANNISTER. I n t u r n , i n BANNISTER V 
BANNISTER, t h e Court o f Appeal c h i e f l y p l a c e d r e l i a n c e 
n p n n ) -hp r l o r - i s i o r i s i n R E C . A R N E ' R SETTLED ESTATES(24) and 
RE BOYER'S SETTLED ESTATES(25). I n r e f e r r i n g t o these 
two cases, S c o t t L.J. i n BANNISTER v BANNISTER commented 
t h a t : 
" S i m i l a r words i n deeds and w i l l s have f r e q u e n t l y 
been h e l d t o c r e a t e a l i f e i n t e r e s t d e t e r m i n a b l e 
( a p a r t from t h e s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t r o d u c e d 
by t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925) on t h e b e n e f i c i a r y 
c e a s i n g t o occupy t h e p r e m i s e s . " ( 2 6 ) 
I t i s , however, d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r e i t h e r o f t h e s e 
a u t h o r i t i e s j u s t i f y t h e f i n d i n g o f a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t on 
t h e f a c t s o f e i t h e r BANNISTER v BANNISTER o r BINIONS v 
EVANS. I n BANNISTER v BANNISTER, t h e Court o f Appeal 
a p p a r e n t l y f e l t o b l i g e d t o conclude t h e def e n d a n t had a 
d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t c r e a t i n g t h e s u c c e s s i o n o f 
i n t e r e s t s t o b r i n g t h e agreement w i t h i n t h e S e t t l e d Land 
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A c t , on account o f t h e s i m i l a r f i n d i n g s i n RE CARNE'S 
SETTLED ESTATES and RE BOYER'S SETTLED ESTATES. The 
f i r s t i s s u e t h e r e f o r e i s w h e t h e r t h e s e o r any o t h e r 
p r e c e d e n t s s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t an agreement t o a l l o w 
a n o t h e r t o occupy premises f o r l i f e n e c e s s a r i l y amounts 
t o t h e g r a n t o f a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t . I n RE 
CARNE'S SETTLED ESTATES, a mansion house was h e l d by 
t r u s t e e s on t r u s t f o r a t e r m o f 1,000 ye a r s t o a l l o w t h e 
p l a i n t i f f t o occupy t h e mansion house r e n t f r e e f o r as 
l o n g as she mi g h t w i s h and, s u b j e c t t o t h i s , t h e p r o p e r t y 
was h e l d f o r one o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s . N o r t h J . , r e l y i n g on 
RE EASTMAN'S SETTLED ESTATES(27), f o u n d t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f had a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t on t h e b a s i s 
t h a t t h e f a c t s b e f o r e him were i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e 
e a r l i e r case. However, i t has been p o i n t e d o u t ( 2 8 ) t h a t 
N o r t h J. appears t o have r e l i e d upon an i n c o m p l e t e r e p o r t 
o f RE EASTMAN'S SETTLED ESTATES i n "Weekly Notes" and, 
had he r e f e r r e d t o t h e r e p o r t o f t h e same case i n (1898) 
68 L.J. Ch. 122n, he would have f o u n d f u r t h e r d e t a i l s o f 
t h e t e r m s o f t h e t r u s t w h i c h r e v e a l e d s i g n i f i c a n t 
d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e f a c t s o f RE CARNE'S SETTLED ESTATES 
and which showed, moreover, a c l e a r i n t e n t i o n t o c r e a t e a 
d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t . RE CARNE'S SETTLED ESTATES 
was t h e r e f o r e d e c i d e d p e r i n c u r i a m and cannot be t a k e n as 
a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t an agreement t o a l l o w 
a n o t h e r t o occupy p r o p e r t y r e n t f r e e f o r l i f e n e c e s s a r i l y 
amounts t o a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t . There a r e , 
however, o t h e r cases where words, s i m i l a r t o tho s e used 
i n RE CARNE'S SETTLED ESTATES, were a l s o h e l d t o c r e a t e 
d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t s . For example, i n RE PAGET'S 
SETTLED ESTATES(29), a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e e s t a t e was h e l d 
t o have been c r e a t e d where p r o p e r t y was d e v i s e d t o t h e 
use o f t h e t e s t a t o r ' s son so l o n g as he s h o u l d r e s i d e i n 
t h e d w e l l i n g house and co u p l e d w i t h a c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n 
c o n c e r n i n g o c c u p a t i o n . However, once a g a i n , t h e r e were 
e t h e r c l e a r v.'ord? showing a c l e a r i n t e n t i o n t o c r e a t e 
such an e s t a t e , f o r t h e w i l l went on t o s p e c i f y t h a t , i f 
he f a i l e d t o comply w i t h t h e r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n , t h e 
p r o p e r t y was t o pass "on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s e s t a t e 
t h e r e i n " t o t h e use o f t h e t r u s t e e s f o r s a l e . S i m i l a r l y , 
i n RE TRENCHARD ( 3 0 ) , where a t e s t a t o r gave h i s w i f e a 
c e r t a i n house, so l o n g as she s h o u l d d e s i r e t o make i t 
her permanent p l a c e o f r e s i d e n c e and s h o u l d remain a 
widow, she s u c c e s s f u l l y c l a i m e d t o be t e n a n t f o r l i f e 
w i t h i n t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1882(31). N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
a l t h o u g h Byrne J. d e c i d e d t h a t she d i d n o t m e r e l y have a 
l i c e n c e t o r e s i d e on t h e pre m i s e s , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o 
note t h a t he d i d so as a m a t t e r o f c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e 
terms o f t h e w i l l and, as such, c l e a r l y c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a t 
i t was p o s s i b l e f o r a r i g h t t o occupy o r r e s i d e i n 
p r o p e r t y f o r l i f e t o amount t o me r e l y a l i c e n c e . I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e s u b m i t t e d t h a t n e i t h e r RE PAGET'S SETTLED 
ESTATES n o r RE TRENCHARD s u p p o r t s t h e v i e w t h a t a 
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d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t i s a necessary f i n d i n g . There 
a r e , f u r t h e r m o r e , a u t h o r i t i e s p r i o r t o 1882, w h i c h , on 
t h e b a s i s o f t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d d e c i s i o n s , would n o t 
appear t o have been a l t e r e d by t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1882, 
whereby l i c e n c e s t o occupy were found t o e x i s t and t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e between a l i c e n c e t o occupy and t h e g r a n t o f 
an e s t a t e was seen as b e i n g a q u e s t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n . For 
example, i n STONE v PARKER(32), a t e s t a t o r d e v i s e d h i s 
house t o t r u s t e e s t o p e r m i t h i s w i f e t o occupy and e n j o y 
t h e same d u r i n g her l i f e , b u t , i f she s h o u l d ( i n t e r a l i a ) 
r e f u s e t o occupy t h e house, t h e t r u s t e e s were t o s e l l i t . 
The c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e c o n t e x t showed t h a t a p e r s o n a l 
r i g h t o f o c c u p a t i o n o n l y was i n t e n d e d . L i k e w i s e , i n MAY 
v MAY(33), where a t e s t a t o r p r o v i d e d t h a t h i s w i f e m i g h t 
r e s i d e r e n t f r e e i n a c e r t a i n r e s i d e n c e d u r i n g her l i f e , 
i t was h e l d t h a t she was n o t g r a n t e d a l i f e e s t a t e b u t 
merely a l i c e n c e t o l i v e i n t h e house. F i n a l l y , i t i s 
co n c e i v a b l e t h a t , i n t h e post-1882 case o f RE BOYER'S 
SETTLED ESTATES(34), c i t e d i n BANNISTER V BANNISTER, 
a l t h o u g h a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t was fo u n d t o e x i s t , t h e 
r i g h t s g r a n t e d may w e l l have been r e g a r d e d as m e r e l y 
l i c e n c e s t o occupy. Here t h e t e s t a t o r d e v i s e d a house t o 
t r u s t e e s t o p e r m i t h i s w i f e d u r i n g her l i f e t o "occupy" 
i t and, a f t e r her d e a t h , on t r u s t t o p e r m i t "such one o r 
more o f my c h i l d r e n who s h a l l f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g be 
unm a r r i e d and s h a l l d e s i r e t o r e s i d e [ i n i t ] t o occupy 
i t . . . . " The q u e s t i o n a r o s e , a f t e r t h e de a t h o f t h e 
widow, as t o whether t h e two o n l y u n m a r r i e d c h i l d r e n were 
t e n a n t s f o r l i f e under t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1882. I t was 
argued t h a t t h e two c h i l d r e n had no e s t a t e i n t h e l a n d 
and t h e r e f o r e c o u l d n o t c o n s t i t u t e t e n a n t s f o r l i f e . 
Sargant J. d i s m i s s e d t h i s argument, m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e 
S e t t l e d Land A ct 1882 had t o be b r o a d l y i n t e r p r e t e d and 
one had mere l y t o c o n s i d e r whether t h e r e was a b e n e f i c i a l 
i n t e r e s t i n po s s e s s i o n t o d e c i d e whether a person was a 
t e n a n t f o r l i f e v t ^ - i n i-hp> A c t . Along w i t h o t h e r s , t h i s 
d e c i s i o n l e d Harvey C. J. i n t h e A u s t r a l i a n case o f 
STEVENSON V MYERS t o comment: 
" I t may be now t a k e n as s e t t l e d by a c u r r e n t o f 
E n g l i s h a u t h o r i t y t h a t a person who me r e l y has a 
r i g h t o f r e s i d e n c e i n a p r o p e r t y f o r h i s l i f e has 
t h e powers o f a t e n a n t f o r l i f e under t h e S e t t l e d 
Land A c t . . . . The c o u r t s have i n e f f e c t h e l d t h a t 
t h e words.... " A person b e n e f i c i a l l y e n t i t l e d t o 
posses s i o n o f s e t t l e d l a n d f o r l i f e " a r e s a t i s f i e d 
by a mere b e n e f i c i a l r i g h t o f p h y s i c a l o c c u p a t i o n 
o f t h e l a n d and t h a t i t i s unnecessary t h a t an 
e s t a t e , i n t h e s t r i c t use o f language, s h o u l d be 
v e s t e d i n him. ... I n my o p i n i o n , a mere r i g h t o f 
p e r s o n a l r e s i d e n c e i n a house cannot be c a l l e d an 
e s t a t e o f any k i n d , and i t i s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e 
f r o m a mere i r r e v o c a b l e l i c e n c e . " ( 3 5 ) 
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Whether o r n o t one agrees t h a t RE BOYER'S SETTLED ESTATES 
proceeded on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n had a mere 
l i c e n c e t o o c c u p y , t h e case l aw s u r v e y e d shows t h e 
e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s do n o t deny t h e p o s s i b i l i t y ^ of t h e r e 
b e i n g a mere l i c e n c e t o occupy o r r e s i d e i n p r o p e r t y f o r 
l i f e , as opposed t o a ( d e t e r m i n a b l e ) l i f e i n t e r e s t . The 
q u e s t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , now a r i s e s as t o whether a l i c e n c e 
t o o c c u p y can i n any c i r c u m s t a n c e s e x i s t w i t h i n t h e 
framework o f a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t . I f one accepts Harvey 
C.J.'s u n d e r s t a n d e i n g o f RE BOYER'S SETTLED ESTATES i n 
STEVENSON v MYERS, t h e n t h e answer would seem t o be i n 
th e a f f i r m a t i v e . T h i s v iew would seem t o be s u p p o r t e d by 
th e d e c i s i o n s i n b o t h RE BARONESS LLANOVER'S WILL(36) and 
RE VARLEY(37). I n t h e f i r s t mentioned case, a t e s t a t r i x 
had d e v i s e d c e r t a i n houses t o t r u s t e e s on t r u s t t o keep 
up t h e same and t o p e r m i t h er da u g h t e r a t any t i m e and 
from t i m e t o t i m e d u r i n g h er l i f e t o " r e s i d e " i n any o f 
t h e houses. S i m i l a r r i g h t s o f r e s i d e n c e were g i v e n t o 
c e r t a i n remoter i s s u e and s u b j e c t t o such r i g h t s , t h e 
e s t a t e was d e v i s e d i n t a i l . The case would seem t o be 
comparable t o t h e l a t e r d e c i s i o n i n RE BOYER'S SETTLED 
ESTATES i n t h a t , once a g a i n , t h e q u e s t i o n was, n o t so 
much t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e o f t h e da u g h t e r ' s i n t e r e s t , b u t 
whether she was a t e n a n t f o r l i f e under t h e S e t t l e d Land 
Act 1882, and i t was d e c i d e d t h a t she was, p u r e l y on t h e 
b a s i s o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n i n S.2 (5) o f a t e n a n t f o r l i f e 
as b e i n g " t h e p e r s o n b e n e f i c i a l l y e n t i t l e d i n 
pos s e s s i o n " . As i t was never suggested t h a t t h e da u g h t e r 
had an e s t a t e i n l a n d , l i k e RE BOYER'S SETTLED ESTATES, 
t h i s would seem t o s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t a l i c e n c e can 
e x i s t w i t h i n t h e framework o f a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t . The 
second d e c i s i o n , RE VARLEY(38), i s a c l e a r e r a u t h o r i t y 
f o r a l i c e n c e e x i s t i n g w i t h i n t h e framework o f a s t r i c t 
s e t t l e m e n t . Here t h e t e s t a t o r d i r e c t e d h i s t r u s t e e s t o 
a l i o ; ; h i e v : i f c t c r e s i d e r e n t -Frpe i n a c e r t a i n house 
d u r i n g widowhood and t o have t h e use, o c c u p a t i o n and 
enjoyment o f t h e house and i t s c o n t e n t s and, s u b j e c t 
t h e r e t o , t h e e s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g t h e house, was h e l d on 
t r u s t f o r a nephew f o r l i f e w i t h remainders i n t a i l . The 
c o u r t was b e i n g asked t o d e c i d e who was e n t i t l e d t o t h e 
e s t a t e on t h e nephew's d e a t h , b u t i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e w i l l , 
N o r t h J. commented t h a t t h e widow had o n l y been g i v e n a 
p e r s o n a l r i g h t o f r e s i d e n c e and was n o t a t e n a n t f o r 
l i f e , a l t h o u g h t h e l a n d was c l e a r l y r e g a r d e d as s e t t l e d 
l a n d . 
However, i t i s one t h i n g t o say t h a t a l i c e n c e t o occupy 
can e x i s t w i t h i n t h e framework o f an e x i s t i n g s e t t l e m e n t , 
b u t q u i t e a n o t h e r t o say t h a t t h e l i c e n c e i t s e l f can g i v e 
r i s e t o a s e t t l e m e n t by c r e a t i n g a s u c c e s s i o n o f 
i n t e r e s t s . As has been p o i n t e d o u t ( 3 9 ) , i n each o f t h e 
cases o f RE VARLEY(40), RE BARONESS LLANOVER'S WILL(41) 
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and RE BOYER'S SETTLED ESTATES(42), a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t 
would have e x i s t e d because, a p a r t f r o m t h e l i c e n c e , t h e r e 
was a s u c c e s s i o n o f e s t a t e s . I n c o n t r a s t , i n b o t h 
BANNISTER v BANNISTER and BINIONS v EVANS, t h e r e was no 
succ e s s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s u n l e s s t h e l i c e n c e i t s e l f gave 
r i s e t o such a s u c c e s s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s . The f a c t t h a t i n 
bo t h RE BARONESS LLANOVER'S WILL and RE BOYER'S l i c e n s e e s 
were a r g u a b l y found t o c o n s t i t u t e t e n a n t s f o r l i f e i s n o t 
t h e same t h i n g as f i n d i n g t h a t a l i c e n c e o f i t s e l f 
c r e a t e s a su c c e s s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s because, as Harvey C.J. 
p o i n t e d o u t i n STEVENSON v MYERS: 
" I t i s t o be n o t e d t h a t t h e E n g l i s h S e t t l e d 
E s t a t e s A c t does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e person t o 
have t h e powers o f a t e n a n t f o r l i f e s h o u l d be a 
person w i t h any e s t a t e . A l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d i s 
t h a t he s h o u l d have a b e n e f i c i a l r i g h t o f 
posses s i o n f o r h i s l i f e . " (43) 
I t would t h e r e f o r e appear t h a t BANNISTER v BANNISTER was 
wrong i n p l a c i n g r e l i a n c e on RE BOYER'S SETTLED ESTATES, 
f o r t h e f i n d i n g o f a s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t as, on t h e f a c t s 
o f t h a t case, t h e r e was a l r e a d y a s e t t l e m e n t a p a r t f r o m 
any r i g h t s g r a n t e d t o occupy o r r e s i d e i n t h e premises i n 
q u e s t i o n . Moreover, a l t h o u g h t h e g r a n t o f such r i g h t s 
was h e l d t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e "occupants" t e n a n t s f o r l i f e , 
t h i s was n o t on account o f an e s s e n t i a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e 
r i g h t s g r a n t e d gave an " e s t a t e " i n t h e l a n d . R e l i a n c e 
p l a c e d on RE CARNE'S SETTLED ESTATES(44) was e q u a l l y 
m i s guided i n so f a r as i t was t h e n assumed t h a t a r i g h t 
t o occupy was o n l y on t h e f a c t s capable o f g i v i n g r i s e t o 
a d e t e r m i n a b l e l i f e i n t e r e s t . Given t h a t BANNISTER v 
BANNISTER was w r o n g l y d e c i d e d , as t h e m a j o r i t y i n 
BINIONS v EVANS p l a c e d r e l i a n c e upon t h e d e c i s i o n , i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t t h e l a t t e r case was a l s o w r o n g l y d e c i d e d . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , even i f one a c c e p t s t h a t BANNISTER v 
BANNISTER and BINIONS v EVANS were b o t h b ased on a 
mi s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e law, i t does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y 
f o l l o w t h a t a f e e s i m p l e , s u b j e c t t o an i r r e v o c a b l e 
l i c e n c e t o o c c u p y can n e v e r g i v e r i s e t o a s t r i c t 
s e t t l e m e n t . I t would seem t h a t t h i s remains a p o s s i b i l i t y 
where t h e d o c t r i n e o f p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l i s r e l i e d 
upon. The view has a l r e a d y been expressed t h a t i t i s n o t 
necessary f o r t h e l a n d t o be " e x p r e s s l y " l i m i t e d i n t r u s t 
t o f a l l w i t h i n t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 and t h a t , 
a l t h o u g h S . l (1) o f t h e A c t may r e q u i r e some f o r m o f 
w r i t i n g b e f o r e a s e t t l e m e n t may a r i s e , i n t h e case o f 
p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l , t h i s may be s a t i f i e d by t h e c o u r t 
o r d e r . I t t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w s , i f t h e " e q u i t y i s 
s a t i s f i e d " by means o f a r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t 
o t h e r t h a n one o f t h e two l e g a l e s t a t e s , t h i s w i l l g i v e 
r i s e t o t h e necessary s u c c e s s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s t o b r i n g 
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t h e A c t i n t o p l a y . T h i s f a c t need n o t , however, g i v e 
r i s e t o problems; t h e c o u r t , aware o f t h e consequences 
of b r i n g i n g t h e agreement w i t h i n t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t , 
can always make an o r d e r o u t s i d e t h e terms o f t h e A c t . 
Indeed, t h i s i s e x a c t l y what t h e Court o f Appeal d i d i n 
GRIFFITH v WILLIAMS. I n t h a t case, t h e " e q u i t y was 
s a t i s f i e d " by g i v i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t a l o n g l e a s e 
d e t e r m i n a b l e upon her d e a t h a t a no m i n a l r e n t , s i n c e , i n 
th e words of Goff L.J.: 
" t h a t would g i v e her t h e r i g h t o f o c c u p a t i o n 
f o r her whole l i f e and c o u l d n o t i n any event g i v e 
her t h e s t a t u t o r y powers, under t h e S e t t l e d Land 
A c t . " ( 4 5 ) 
A l t h o u g h such an approach i s b o t h clumsy and a r t i f i c i a l , 
i t would seem t o be t h e o n l y o p t i o n , so l o n g as t h e 
S e t t l e d Land Act 1925 remains on t h e s t a t u t e book. A 
b e t t e r s o l u t i o n would be t o r e p e a l t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t , 
which a r g u a b l y no l o n g e r serves a u s e f u l p u r p o s e ( 4 6 ) , b u t 
s i m p l y causes problems t o t h e unwary and t h e u n s u s p e c t i n g 
t h r o u g h t h e a c c i d e n t a l c r e a t i o n o f s t r i c t s e t t l e m e n t s . 
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C o n c l u s i o n 
T h i s t h e s i s s e t o u t t o s t u d y and t o e x p l a i n t h e reasons 
f o r t h e development o f l i c e n c e s t o occupy l a n d , and a t 
th e same t i m e t o d i s p e l some o f t h e c o n f u s i o n t h a t has 
accompanied t h e development. I t was f u r t h e r i n t e n d e d t o 
c o n s i d e r whether t h e development o f l i c e n c e concepts and, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e n o t i o n t h a t a l i c e n c e c o u l d be an 
i n t e r e s t i n l a n d , was necessary and d e s i r a b l e . 
I t has been shown t h a t t h e i d e a o f a possessory l i c e n c e 
l a r g e l y owed i t s o r i g i n s t o a few cases i n t h e e a r l y 
1950s (1) and was developed f o r a number o f d i f f e r e n n t 
reasons: namely t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e i m p a c t o f 
s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s on t h e l a n d l o r d and t e n a n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , t o a v o i d t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e L i m i t a t i o n 
A c t s and t o p r o v i d e r e s i d e n t i a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e g r o w i n g 
number o f i n f o r m a l f a m i l y and q u a s i - f a m i l y arrangements. 
The r o l e f o r t h e l i c e n c e i n l a n d l o r d and t e n a n t cases has 
now been s e v e r e l y curbed by t h e House o f Lords' d e c i s i o n 
i n STREET v MOUNTFORD ( 2 ) . S i m i l a r l y , amendments t o t h e 
L i m i t a t i o n A c t 1939 i n t r o d u c e d i n 1980 (3) have reduced 
b o t h t h e need f o r and scope o f l i c e n c e conopejts i n t h i s 
sphere. N e v e r t h e l e s s , a m b i g u i t i e s i n t h e 'reasoning i n 
STREET v MOUNTFORD and subsequent case law have shown a 
narrow r o u t e l i e s open f o r l i c e n c e concepts t o grow and 
p o t e n t i a l l y f l o u r i s h . S i m i l a r l y paragraph 8 (4) o f t h e 
L i m i t a t i o n A c t 1980, w h i c h a l l o w s f o r t h e f i n d i n g o f an 
i m p l i e d l i c e n c e as a m a t t e r o f f a c t so as t o p r e v e n t t i m e 
r u n n i n g , as w e l l as t h e r e c e n t acceptance ( 4 ) o f t h e 
n o t i o n o f an express u n i l a t e r a l l i c e n c e , suggest t h a t t h e 
r o l e o f l i c e n c e s i s n o t over i n adverse p o s s e s s i o n cases 
e i t h e r . 
The need f o r and o p p o r t u n i t y o f u s i n g l i c e n c e concepts t o 
p r o t e c t r e s i d e n t i a l o c c u p a t i o n i n i n f o r m a l f a m i l y and 
q u a s i - f a m i l y arrangements remains. I t i s i n t h i s sphere 
t h a t much o f t h e c o n f u s i o n has a r i s e n . F i r s t l y , because 
o f t h e e a r l i e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a 
c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e may i n some c i r c u m s t a n c e s be 
i r r e v o c a b l e ( 5 ) , t h e i d e a developed o f c l a s s i f y i n g f a m i l y 
arrangements f o r t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y as c o n t r a c t s . 
T h i s was d i s h o n e s t , f o r as i t has been shown, t h e 
e s s e n t i a l s o f a c o n t r a c t were r a r e l y , i f e v e r , s a t i s f i e d . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , g i v e n t h e f r e q u e n c y w i t h w h i c h l a n d i s 
a l i e n a t e d , t h i s l e d t o a n o t h e r problem, namely p r o t e c t i n g 
t h e " c o n t r a c t u a l " l i c e n s e e a g a i n s t a t h i r d p a r t y . 
U n s a t i s f a c t o r y ideas t h a t a c o n t r a c t u a l l i c e n c e c o u l d p e r 
se, o r by means of a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t , b i n d a t h i r d 
p a r t y c o n s e q u e n t l y developed. The n e x t stage i n t h e 
c o n f u s i o n r e s u l t e d because t h e d o c t r i n e o f p r o p r i e t a r y 
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e s t o p p e l was b e g i n n i n g t o be a p p l i e d t o l i c e n c e cases on 
account o f t h e c r i t i c i s m a t t r a c t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e 
c o n t r a c t u a l approach was t h e o r e t i c a l l y unsound. T h i s i n 
t u r n l e d t o c o n f u s i o n as t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
c o n t r a c t u a l and s o - c a l l e d " e q u i t a b l e l i c e n c e s " . Much o f 
the c o n f u s i o n c o u l d have been a v o i d e d i f , i n s t e a d o f 
i n v e n t i n g l a b e l s and c r e a t i n g c a t e g o r i e s , t h e j u d i c i a r y 
had been p r e p a r e d t o c o n s i d e r more o p e n l y t h e p o l i c i e s 
b e h i n d t h e i r d e c i s i o n s ( 6 ) . No doubt t h e reason f o r 
r e s o r t i n g t o f i x e d c a t e g o r i e s was i n an e f f o r t t o reduce 
t h e element of u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h i t was f e a r e d would 
r e s u l t f r o m a broad-based approach, g i v e n t h a t c e r t a i n t y 
i s so i m p o r t a n t i n t h e sphere o f p r o p e r t y law. However, 
i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t a s t u d y o f t h e development o f t h e 
law shows t h a t t h e r i g i d c o n c e p t u a l approach adopted has 
r e s u l t e d i t s e l f i n a h i g h degree o f u n c e r t a i n t y . 
A l t h o u g h some c o n f u s i o n s t i l l remains, apparent f r o m t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e bases on w h i c h p l e a d i n g s c o n t i n u e t o be 
based ( 7 ) , t h r o u g h t h e i n c r e a s e d f l e x i b i l i t y o f t h e 
d o c t r i n e o f p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l , a s a t i s f a c t o r y approach 
t o i n f o r m a l arrangements f o r t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y 
i s emerging, a l t h o u g h some problems s t i l l need i r o n i n g 
o u t . A p p l i c a t i o n o f p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l t o l i c e n c e 
cases does n o t i n v o l v e t h e t h e o r e t i c a l problems o f t h e 
c o n t r a c t u a l approach and enables a balance t o be drawn 
between t h e i n t e r e s t s o f v u l n e r a b l e s e c t i o n s o f s o c i e t y 
and t h i r d p a r t i e s . I t has been shown t h a t enforcement o f 
l i c e n c e s t o occupy by means o f p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l does 
n o t r e q u i r e t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t a l i c e n c e , e s s e n t i a l l y a 
n e g a t i v e t h i n g , b i n d s a t h i r d p a r t y . I t would seem a l s o 
t h a t c o n f u s i n g n o t i o n s o f q u a s i - p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ( 8 ) o r 
t h e i d e a t h a t a l i c e n c e i s n o t an i n t e r e s t i n l a n d b u t 
"somewhere between a r i g h t i n rem and a r i g h t i n 
personam" (9) can be abandoned. Once i t i s accep t e d t h a t 
t h e m l e n f p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l i n l i c e n c e cases i s t o 
g i v e e f f e c t "to t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s e i t h e r i n 
t h e f o r m o f t h e r e c o g n i s e d p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t i n t e n d e d o r , 
i f none, i n t h e fo r m o f t h e c l o s e s t p r o p r i e t a r y r i g h t 
t o t h a t i n t e n d e d ( 1 0 ) , t h e n i t can be s a i d t h a t i j t _ i . s t h e 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t g i v e n e f f e c t t o by means o f t h e 
o p e r a t i o n " of p r o p r i e t a r y • " e s t o p p e l " t h a t " "binds" a t h i r d 
p a r t y . I n a d d i t i o n i t has " been n o t e d t h a t "by c a r e f u l 
c o u r t o r d e r s t h e S e t t l e d Land A c t 1925 can be a v o i d e d 
(11) • 
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e b a l a n c i n g o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f 
l i c e n s e e s w i t h those o f t h i r d p a r t i e s , a l t h o u g h i t must 
be a d m i t t e d t h a t p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l does i n c r e a s e t h e 
r i s k s i n v o l v e d i n conveyancing, i t i s i n h e r e n t i n t h e 
v e r y a c c e p t a n c e o f a d o c t r i n e s u c h as p r o p r i e t a r y 
e s t o p p e l t h a t t h e l a w s h o u l d p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n f o r 
v u l n e r a b l e members o f s o c i e t y who f a i l t o t a k e t h e p r o p e r 
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s t e p s t o secure t h e i r p o s i t i o n , and t h u s an element o f 
d i s a d v a n t a g e t o t h i r d p a r t i e s i s i n e v i t a b l e . Moreover, 
i t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t cases c o n c e r n i n g p r o p r i e t a r y 
e s t o p p e l , l e t a l o n e p r o p r i e t a r y e s t o p p e l and t h i r d 
p a r t i e s a r e c o m p a r a t i v e l y r a r e . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s 
p o s s i b l e t o keep t h e element o f r i s k t o a minimum by 
w i l l i n g n e s s on t h e p a r t o f t h e c o u r t s t o i n t r o d u c e a 
g r e a t e r element of c e r t a i n t y i n t o e s t o p p e l cases by o n l y 
t a k i n g i n t o account t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s i n 
making an o r d e r and n o t c o n c e r n i n g themselves w i t h t h e 
s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r b r o a d e r " j u s t i c e " 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
For a t i m e , i t l o o k e d i n t h e 1970s as though l i c e n c e s t o 
occupy l a n d may have developed beyond t h e n e g a t i v e terms 
i n which t h e y were d e s c r i b e d by Vaughan C.J. i n THOMAS v 
SORRELL (12) b u t i n t h e mid-1980s, a l t h o u g h i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t t h e concept o f a possessory l i c e n c e i s w i t h us t o 
s t a y , i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t t h e l i c e n c e w i l l i n any 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s become r e g a r d e d as an i n t e r e s t i n l a n d and 
i t l o o k s as though i t s r o l e i n t h e f u t u r e w i l l be k e p t 
w i t h i n f a i r l y s t r i c t b o u n d a r i e s . 
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